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This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to 
a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijiia traditions. Questions will be 
asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two 
traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a 
model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and 
concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, 
examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will 
also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a 
model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical 
in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to 
person, it also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and 
Pratyabhijiia traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the 
development of the term, Atman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human 
personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A 
comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the 
theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and 
deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijiiii traditions been 
undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type 
of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Atman-
hypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of 
terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the 
academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the 
field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to 
overcome the barriers that separate and divide. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims and Considerations 
This thesis will have two broad aims, to compare concepts of person within the 
Byzantine and Pratyabhijiili traditions in Chapters 2 and 3, and then to converge and 
synthesise ideas developed from those traditions within a single model, the Atman-
hypostasis, in Chapter 4. Through this model, the place for considering new 
approaches to person will be affirmed, as will the use of one tradition to inform the 
other. The thesis will therefore develop a fusion of ideas through the study of 
personhood within a comparative analysis of these seemingly different traditions. 
While this research will also be placed within the context of contemporary research, 
most specifically relating to the ideas of John Zizioulas, the intent is to provide a 
deeper understanding of the concept of person through two areas of study: firstly, in 
relation to terms in which personhood has become centred, hypostasis/prosopon and 
ousia within the Byzantine tradition; and puru$a and Atman within the Pratyabhijiili 
tradition. The second area of the study will relate person to the notion of deification or 
re-cognition. Through this examination terms will be adopted and synthesised within 
the new model to converge ideas and aid interreligious dialogue. 
This thesis was conceived of as a response to the contemporary theological debate on 
person in the Byzantine tradition and the wish to bring that debate into the inter-
religious discourse. l It will develop a model that is open to interreligious dialogue,2 
which allows the study of person within the two traditions to be considered from a 
new perspective within a space for dialogue and convergence. Openness to 
interreligious dialogue indicates a rejection of clinging to a rigid adherence to 
I The debate on personhood within an inter-religious context is exemplified by Descry, 'Unknowing 
and Personalism' in Bllumer (ed.), Mysticism in Shaivism and Christianity (Delhi: 1997); and K. P. 
Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought (Delhi: 2000). 
2 Exemplified by Jacques Dupuis who calls for an honest approach to inter-religious dialogue, see 
'Christianity and Religions: Complementarity and Convergence', in Catherine Cornille, Many 
Mansions: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity (Maryknoll: 2002), pp.61-75. 
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traditional answers and allows personhood also to be considered within the context of 
multiple divine revelations. The very notion of multiple divine revelations can be 
considered as the driving force behind inter-religious dialogue. This answers the 
problem of perceived differing revelations and how these revelations relate to the 
human religious experience or the transfonnation of the individual. Thus, at the heart 
of understanding how religions can exist in-situ with each other, is the understanding 
of how the divine reveals itself and how this relates to the dispensation and reception 
of grace. While this thesis will not answer these problems directly, it will consider the 
place for different fonns of manifested grace within different traditions, where the 
notion oftransfonnation and restoration of all human persons become the focus for 
understanding the nature of revelation. 
The relationship of mUltiple revelations in relation to grace and human becoming will 
be considered as implicitly related to how the divine nature and activity impacts upon 
each human person. Maximus the Confessor stated that "by grace, God, is the self-
be comer, Author, of the deification of creatures". 3 Through grace and deification, 
human persons gain a better understanding of themselves through the divine intention 
for human persons. The concept of divine intention allows deified person to be 
correlated to the te/os of personhood within different religious traditions. The term 
grace also implies an inter-religious perspective through an end result, deification/re-
cognition, which when placed in an inter-religious context expands the role of the 
divine act to indicate a cosmic work ofthe divine to deifo the whole of mankind. 
Maximus argued that grace indicates the divine purpose for the whole of humankind: 
By grace he himself is God and is called God. By his gracious condescension 
God became man and is called man for the sake of man and by exchanging his 
condition for ours revealed the power that elevates man to God ... by this 
blessed inversion, man is made God by divinization and God is made man by 
hominization.4 
3 Kat rf\~ Kara XaPIV auroupyov YEVE0'9at r6)v YEYOV6VTWV 9£<i>0'£w~, Maximus Thai 60 (CCSG 22), 79, 
117-120; translation by P. M. Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery o/Christ (Crestwood: 2002), pp.127-
128. 
4 Maximus, Ambig. 7 (PG 91), 1084C; translation by P. M. Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery o/Christ. 
p.60. 
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To some extent this thesis is forcing a change in the way a person has traditionally 
been considered, especially in contemporary models, through comparison and 
convergence and by allowing for reciprocity and the synthesising of ideas. 
Due to the syncretistic and synthetic nature of this work it is appropriate here to 
provide some defence of this approach. This is necessary to answer criticisms that 
object to a syncretistic and synthetic model, and hence we can look to the Early 
Church Fathers for a defence of this methodology. Justin Martyr had referred to the 
"seed of reason (the Logos) implanted in every race ofmen",5 and Clement of 
Alexandria viewed other faiths and philosophies, apart from the Christian, as Logos-
spermatikoi or the seeds of the Logos6 sowed through time by the Logos. Clement 
stated that the "truth, much more powerful than limitless duration, can collect its 
proper germs (spermata), though they have fallen on foreign soil". 7 These seeds of 
truthS represent a context by which multiple revelations can be understood and allow 
the place for syncretistic and synthetic approaches, which seem to be not only 
appropriate within this context, but also inevitable. 
This thesis appeals to this early inter-religious model, which utilises the powerful 
imagery of the cosmic Christ who sows the seeds of truth in every faith and time to 
determine that certain philosophies and theologies represent descents of truth. Hence 
philosophies and religions can be said to stem from the perennial flow of truth that 
flows at all times in history.9 Inter-religious discourse within this narrative allows for 
non-hegemonic interpretations and cross-philosophical interpretations within a 
5 Justin Martyr, Apol.2.8, (PG 6), 441-471; translation by Coxe (ANF, I), p.191. 
6 Clement, Str.l.13 (PG 8), 756A; translation by Coxe (ANF, 2), p.313. 
7 XOAU Ot xAtov ouvaTwTtpa TOU aiG>vo<; ~ ciAiJ9Ela ouvayaYEiv Ta obeEia mctpllaT!l, KaV Ei<; niv 
illooa1tllV EKxtan, Clement, Str.I.13 (PG 8), 756A; translation by Coxe (ANF 2), 313. See also G. L. 
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: 1959), p.117, who highlights that "logos spermaticos" 
examples a Christian use of "Stoic conception", or "immanent germinative principle", (ibid). 
R An interesting contemporary use Logos-Spermatikos is exemplified by David Lawrence who sees this 
type of model as helpful when developing convergence within the philosophical narrative, especially in 
relation to Pratyabhijnii and Western epistemological models; see David Peter Lawrence, 
Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999), p.2 I; and Aspects of 
Abhinavagupta's Theory of Scripture', Satya Nilayam; Chennai Journal of Intercultural Philosophy 5 
(2004), p.22. 
9 Clement, Str.1.5 (PG 8), 685-708; translation by Coxe (ANF 2), p.305. 
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philosophia perennis, 10 as Clement of Alexandria believed, that the "way of truth is 
one, but into it, as into a perennial river, streams flow from all sides". 1 1 
In Eastern Orthodox terms, it is the Logos that inspires all philosophical endeavours 
before the Logos-Sarx Incarnation, the Christ, who perfectly embodies the 
culmination of philosophy, and who encourages ascents of truth. 
To help argue the case for this open dialogical approach in the context of 
contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, the Greek Orthodox theologian Philip Sherrard can 
be cited. Sherrard criticised concepts of "linear 'salvation history,,12 that produce 
negative and exclusive claims, but rather looked to positive or optimistic models that 
stressed the economy of the divine Logos and eschatological fulfilment. He stated: "it 
is the Logos who is received in the spiritual illumination of a Brahmin, a Buddhist, or 
a Moslem". 13 
In addition this thesis will focus only on certain areas relating to personhood and will 
not seek to engage in an examination of all the areas relating to personhood. Hence, 
many theological problems will be left unaddressed, and will have to be addressed in 
future studies, such as the ontological issues relating to the Trinity in respect of the 
monism of Kashmir Saivism. There have been no previous attempts to compare the 
notion of person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijiiii traditions, but some broad 
comparisons are now being made between Byzantine and Kashmir Saivite schools 
especially in relation to the concepts of deification (theosis)14 and fullness (pleromal 
purIJa).15 Therefore this work sits within an ever growing corpus of theologians who 
wish to examine how ideas in the Byzantine, Kashmir Saivite and Vediintic traditions 
10 See Michael Barnes, Religious Pluralism, in, John R. Hinnells ed., The Routledge Companion to the 
Study of Religion, (Oxon: 200S), p.409; Michael Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions. 
Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine. (Cambridge: 2002), p.45; Macquarrie, Stubborn Theological 
ff,estions, pp.50-SI. 
I Clement, Str.I.S, 713; translation by Coxe (ANF, 2), p.30S. 
12 Philip Sherrard, Christianity: Lineaments of a Sacred Tradition (Brookline: 1998), p.61. 
13 Ibid., p.62. 
14 See Bettina Baumer (ed.), Mysticism in Shaivism and Christianity (Delhi: 1997). 
IS See Bettina Baumer and John R. Dupuche (eds.), Void and Fullness in the Buddhist. Hindu and 
Christian Traditions: Siinya - Piir~a - Pler6ma (New Delhi, 2005). A similar type of comparison that 
deals with comparative theology, Christianity and Kashmir Saivism was given by Gavin Flood, 'Self 
and Text: Towards a Comparative Theology of SeIr, Cross Currents (2006). 
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can be better understood in relation to each other within a dialogical forum. 16 It will 
be argued that there is indeed a place for theological dialogue between the Byzantine 
and Kashmir Saivite (Pratyabhijfiii) traditions, and that through dialogue, each 
tradition can learn from the other17 which can be mutually beneficial theologically. 
1.1.1 Eschatological Hope 
Comparison 18 and convergence19 will be considered in relation to an "eschatological 
hope",2o as Wolfhart Pannenberg puts it, and fulfilment,21 that is to say a fulfilment in 
the end (the eschata), the telos, of all things. This idea of hope will be placed within 
the discourse of inter-religious dialogue and seeking dialogue with the other22 within 
the hope of fulfilment, which underlines the reasons for bringing the two traditions 
together in a comparison. But hope will not only be understood in terms of an outward 
fulfilment, but also of the inner life, where in the inner experience, the te/os of person 
is attained in an inner event. This inner event represents the end or completion of the 
person23 within an inner mystical experience, and which represents the hope for all 
persons in the fulfilment experience of deijication/re-cognition. 
16 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought. 
17 See Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (London: 2006). 
1M Types of theological comparison have been highlighted by William E. Paden, 'Comparative 
Religion', in John R. Hinnells, The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion (London: 2005), 
pp.208-225. See also: John Hick and Paul Knitter (eds.), The Myth o/Christian Uniqueness 
(Maryknoll: 1992); Gavin D'Costa, The Meeting 0/ Religions and the Trinity (Maryknoll: 2000); P. L. 
Quinn and K. Meeker (eds.), The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity (NY: 2000); 
Catherine Cornille (ed.), Many Mansions: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity 
(Maryknoll: 2002); Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue 
(Maryknoll: 2003); Vel i-Matti Karkkainen, Trinity and Religious Pluralism (UK: 2004); Paul F. 
Knitter (ed.), The Myth of ReligiOUS Superiority (Maryknoll: 2005). 
19 I will develop convergence similar to the type of K. P. Aleaz, who argues for the place of 
theological convergence of Vedanta and Eastern Christianity, see A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta 
and Eastern Christian Thought (Delhi: 2000). 
20 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'The Task of Christian Eschatology', in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. 
Jenson (eds.), The Last Things: Biblical and Theological Perspectives on Eschatology (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: 2002). 
21 See 'Revelation', in the New Testament, 22: 12. 
22 See John D. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (London: 2006), pp.43-55. The notion of the other 
will also be understood from the context of Zizioulas' Trinitarian theology, where the other becomes 
related to the divine hypostasis and thus in this thesis will also relate to the nature of hypostasis through 
Atman. 
23 See Mathew 24:13-14, where Jesus refers to a single end (ttA.O~) event, but which can also be 
understood in terms of an inward completion. 
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Consequently, through this approach to person, this chapter will contain an evaluation 
of the problems and approaches relating to comparison and dialogical theology while 
admitting that all things cannot be known and will seek an apophatic approach24 to an 
eschatological hope. The reasoning for interreligious dialogue should be shrouded 
within an admittance of a divine plan that cannot be known and remains hidden to 
most. Such a plan for mankind indicates not only eschatological hope, affirming that 
approaches to interreligious dialogue should be attempted, but that the reasoning for 
dialogue should be placed within a context of what cannot be known. It cannot be 
known how or why the divine reveals itself, but that such varied revelations take place 
and from those revelations many types of theologies are born to explain those 
revelations, which allows for the space for inter-religious dialogue to be considered. 
This dialogue represents the recognition of the possibilities contained within the 
choice to engage rather than reject. In addition the emphasis will be not upon the 
methods of inter-religious dialogue, even though some examination of problems 
relating to approaches will be given later in the introduction, and it will be affirmed 
that dialogue is necessary, given that all humans are persons, sharing a common 
experience and nature. 
What will be accepted is that an eschatological vision allows for fulfilment and yet 
recognises the place for difference, where the divine wish to bring humankind to God 
reflects the recognition for the place for revelatory participations. Theological and 
religious paradigms must go beyond previous, exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralistic 
claims ofreligion,25 to a cosmic26 vision, while at the same time considering models 
that encourage a mindset that look to new theologies. 
1.1.2 Encounters of the Personal 
In affirmation of this approach, a comparison should be sought between Indian 
philosophy (Pratyabhiji1ii) and Christianity (Byzantine tradition) in an encounter of 
24 For an example of this approach being employed in theological method, see Sarah Coakley, 'What 
Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some Reflections on the Meaning of Chalcedonian 
"Definition"', in Stephen T. Davis et al. (eds.), The Incarnation (Oxford: 2002), pp.114-163. 
25 See Perry Schmidt-Leukel, 'Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology-Clarified 
and Reaffirmed', in Knitter (ed.), The Myth of Religious Superiority, p. 13; and see also Hick, 
Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, pp.186-187. 
26 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, p.187. 
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the personal, of the personal Christ to the world, and between persons (hypostases). It 
is due to the focus on the nature of person and the shared reality of being persons that 
an encounter with other traditions will be considered from an inter-religious 
perspective allowing for meaningful reciprocity. 
The reasoning behind engaging in comparison and dialogue will be sought by 
affinning a depth of meaning within the encounters of the personal, not only in the 
meetings between human persons but in the encounters between the human person 
and the divine person. But there should be incorporated into attempts at understanding 
such encounters, elements of what cannot be known or grasped especially when 
considering how these encounters relate to revelation. It can only be affirmed that 
from a soteriological perspective, encounters on a personal level are to be considered 
in a way that rises above the mundane vision. Thus dialogue should be sought not 
only within the context of a shared common experience but through an eschatological 
vision27 or a hope of the unity of persons. The place for the eschatological unity of 
religions, and thus the need for seeking what is common, shared and hoped for in 
human beings was also called for in Nostra Aetate of Vatican 11. 28 In this 
eschatological context, the ground for dialogue is sought in the truth of the eschata, 
which becomes the basis for both unity and diversity, which helps negotiate, as 
Karkkainen states, "the dynamic and tension between one and many". 29 
The examination of the human person in the context of the Byzantine and 
Pratyabhijiiii traditions will thus be placed within a soteriological and eschatological 
context in the "universal design of God for the salvation of the human race",30 who 
reveals Himself, as Dupuis states, in "many and various ways". 31 The role of divine 
revelation for the whole of humankind will be viewed as central not only to the 
discourse of personhood but also to inter-religious dialogue, but will also stress the 
Christian role of Christ as the central salvific figure. I again cite Dupuis to support 
27 For an example of this approach in relation to dialogue. see Kiirkkiiinen. Trinity and Religious 
Pluralism, p.87. 
2M See 'Declaration on the Relation of Church to Non-Christian Religions'. or Nostra Aetate, in A. 
Flannery, The Basic Sixteen Documents of Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, A 
Completely Revised Translation (Dublin: 1995). pp.569-570. See also Gavin D' Costa. The Meeting of 
Religions and the Trinity, pp.1 0 I-I 03. 
29 Ibid., p.177. 
30 Pope Paul VI, Decree on the Mission and Activity of the Church: Ad Gentes (Boston: 1965). 
31 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions. p.114. 
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this view in his model of "'one mediator" within "participated mediations,,,32 in 
which the uniqueness of Christ is upheld while also affirming the place of divine 
multiple mediations, and multiple revelatory events through the divine revelatory 
activity. The two positions will be viewed not in conflict, but as complementary. 
Thus, this work represents an optimistic view of inter-religious dialogue, as 
exemplified by Keith Ward in his notion of disclosures,33 and Ninian Smart's notion 
of shared experience34 which also represents an optimistic approach to dialogue. 35 
Thus a growing body of theologians have developed and are developing theological 
models which are not content with underlining the same old barriers of separation, but 
look to optimism and solutions for discourse. This work will become part of an ever 
growing corpus which encourages new ideas, and even new Christologies. 36 It is 
hoped that ideas relating to the Atman-hypostasis paradigm constructed in this thesis 
will add to and aid discourse that invites, what Samartha calls, "possibilities for 
Christological developments".3? 
32 Ibid., p.163. 
33 Keith Ward believes that from such disclosures comparative theology can allow "enquiry into ideas 
of God and revelation", Religion and Revelation (Oxford; Clarendon Press) p.50. 
34 See Ninian Smart, 'Our Shared Experience of the Ultimate', Religious Studies 20/1 (1984), pp.19-26. 
Studies relating to 'shared' experience is also exemplified by, David Brown, God and the Enchantment 
of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience (Oxford: 2006); and Paul M. Collins, Context, Culture and 
Worship: The Quest for 'Indian-ness' (lSPCK: 2006). 
35 Within this context of optimism, and disclosures and truth, the concept of the Absolute will be 
understood in terms of God who discloses "Himself' and a disclosed truth. I refer to the term 
"Himself' giving a masculine attribute to God not in a sexist context but because this is utilised in the 
Greek Patristic tradition, see Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 7.3 (Luibheid), "He is known through knowledge" 
(PG 3), 872A; and in Pratyabhijna see IPK 4.3, which states "He is taken to be numerous types of 
finite persons" (Pandit). A notion of truth, through an Atmanic reality, can be correlated to John Hick's 
concept of the "Real" (see John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, UK: 2001, p.14), which 
infers a notion of the Absolute divine transcendent, "Ultimate Reality", which, for Ward, is versatile 
enough to be related to equivalent ideas in Hinduism and Islam (ibid).This line of thought is also taken 
up by Harold Coward in The Perfectibility of Human Nature in Eastern and Western Thought (NY: 
2008). 
36 Some examples of see: S. J. Samartha, One Christ many Religions (NY: 1991); Jacob Parappally, 
Emerging Trends in Indian Christo logy (Bangalore: 1995); K. P. Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita 
Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought; Raimon Panikkar, Christophany, the Fullness of Man (NY: 
2004); Mathew Vekathanam, Indian Christo logy (Bangalore: 2004). 
37 Samartha, One Christ many Religions, p.93. 
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1.2 Methodology: Comparative and Convergent Approaches to 
Theology 
While a comparison and convergence of terms will be considered discretely 
throughout the thesis, with a sharp focus in Chapter 4, the main emphasis will be upon 
comparing models of person that relate to the constructs of individuality, modes of 
existence, relationality and unity in Chapters 2 and 3. The comparison of such models 
will represent a wish to develop a convergence of ideas, as exemplified by Briick,38 
and bring such convergence to a point of synthesis in Chapter 4. While the thesis will 
develop convergence and a synthetic approach, it will do so within a Christian 
framework. 
1.2.1 Comparative Theology 
The wish to evolve ideas through comparison is not new, and there is a voluminous 
corpus of material from scholars such as Max Miiller39 to Swami Abhishiktananda,4o 
and in the contemporary field is exemplified by Francis X. Clooney41 and Gavin 
Flood,42 that seeks to engage in comparative theology to aid dialogue and reciprocity. 
What this thesis proposes is to utilise Aleaz's notion of convergence43 to construct a 
model of person within a comparison that is workable. To some extent this process 
could be related to a "re-imagining,,44 of God, as Richard Kearney put it, where we 
redefine and re-consider the way in which we view God and thus ourselves. 
3M Michael Yon Bruck, The Unity Of Reality: God. God-Experience. and Meditation in the Hindu 
Christian Dialogue. trans. James Y. Zeitz (Mahwah: 1991). This excellent work by Bruck outlines 
introductory categories in which Advaita and Christian Trinitarian theology can come together. 
39 See Max Muller, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion (London: 1878). 
40 See Abhishiktananda, Hindu-Christian Meeting Point (Delhi: 1969,2005). 
41 See Francis X. Clooney, Theology After Vedanta: An Experiment in Comparative Theology (Delhi: 
1993). See some other examples of contemporary comparative theology: Ishanand Yempeny, Kr$f/a 
and Christ (Pune: 1988); Catherine Cornille, The Guru in Indian Catholicism (Louvain: 1991); Arvind 
Sharma, The Philosophy of Religion and Acivaita Vedanta (Delhi: 1995); Hans Torwesten, 
Ramakrishna and Christ (UK: 1997). 
42 See Gavin Flood, The Ascetic Self(Cambridge: 2004}. 
43 Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought. 
44 Richard Kearney, 'Re-imagining God', in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), 
Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 2007), pp.51-65. 
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But there are difficulties that confront the inter-religious dialogical theologian such as 
over confessionalism, which makes the rationale for theological comparison reductio 
ad absurdum. Problems relating to the confusion of theological concepts are 
highlighted by John Thatamanil, who shows that comparative theologians in their 
efforts to be comparative may even have become hyphenatect5as a Hindu-Christian or 
Christian-Hindu. In an inclusivist position the outcome may even become more 
radical in seeking common ground, as exemplified in Bede Griffiths' promotion of 
hybridization.46 But while the over-confessional approach represents a stumbling 
block to comparison and convergence, a model that is too accepting can denude faith 
claims, and so what should be the approach to inter-religious dialogue? Clooney 
recognises that one way may be to accept "multiple religious identities",47 in which 
one enters into partnership and experience with the other faiths, even though he 
prefers to work through his own tradition. This view is taken up Jacques Dupuis in his 
inter-religious dialogical approach. Dupuis argues that to engage with the "faith of the 
other,,48 one must be open to the faith of the other to become a true partner in 
dialogue,49 where one enters "into the experience of the other in an effort to grasp the 
experience from within".50 But here lies the problem; the term other51 can imply 
separateness and distance,52 and so one solution is either to identify oneself with the 
other or even become the other, taking on the other's tradition in which one can 
experience the other's religion and thereby gain respect for other traditions. This has 
led to the notion of "multiple religious belonging", 53 but there has not been enough 
work on this side of inter-religious dialogue to see where this line of dialogical 
theology is going. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Catherine Comille, The Guru in Indian Catholicism. p.I77. 
47 Francis X. Clooney, 'God For Us; Multiple Religious Identities as a Human and Divine Prospect', in 
Catherine Comille, Many Mansions (Maryknoll: 2002), p.44. 
4R See Dupuis, 'Christianity and Religions: Complementarity and Convergence', in Catherine Comille, 
Many Mansions: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity. p.63. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See also Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions, p.45. 
52 Zizioulas argues though. the opposite. where the notion of the other has a relational quality. see 
Communion and Otherness, p.43. 
53 See Claude Geffre, 'Double Belonging and the Originality of Christianity as a Religion', in 
Catherine Comille, Many Mansions: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity. pp.93-105. 
and also Phan, 'Multiple Religious Belonging', in Being Religious Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives 
on Interfaith Dialogue (Maryknoll: 2004), pp.60-81. 
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Perhaps the notion of otherness in a relational context, of a collective religious 
belonging could help to support inter-religious dialogue when viewed in the context 
of friend. 54 This highlights a reciprocal model, where the recognition of what is 
shared by all persons having the nature of hypostatic existence, and the participating 
in a faith in God, itself brings persons together through the sharing of a common 
nature and faith. 
The theological development of comparativism or comparative theology, has also laid 
itself open to criticism for its broad generalisations, exampled in Radhakrishnan' s 
comparison of Eastern and Western ideologies. 55 While Radhakrishnan looked to 
qualify his approach through notions of "self-discovery and self-knowledge",56 he 
made broad comparisons of the mysticism and ethics of the West and India and of 
what is to be understood by the term soul.57 But he was mindful of the danger in his 
approach and underlined that his attempts were but cursory. 58 In addition so often a 
comparison may wish to accomplish something beneficial but the outcome may be 
detrimental to dialogue. In this case I am thinking of Hans Torwesten's work 
Ramakrishna and Christ. which compares Ramakrishna with Christ,59 and deny the 
uniqueness of Christ, which serves only to repel from a Christian point of view. 
Another good example of comparison seeking a unity of ideas but actually 
underlining difference is Bede Griffiths' correlation of the Trinity with Sat-Cit-
Ananda or Satcidiinanda. 60 Bede Griffiths' Hindu-Christian syncretism,61 though well 
intentioned, actually muddles theological ideas.62 Hence criticism of the comparativist 
method thus seems somewhat founded upon real fears. William E. Paden reflects that, 
54 See Thomas Aquinas, ST, Q 114.1-2 (1670). 
55 S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (Oxford: 1969). 
56 Ibid., p.35. 
57 Ibid., p.145. 
5H Ibid., p.117. 
59 Hans Torwesten's Ramakrishna and Christ (UK: 1997), p.21; also see Geoffrey Parrinda, Avatar and 
Incarnation (Oxford: 1997); and R. S. Sugirtharaja, Asian Faces of Jesus (Maryknoll: 1993). 
60 Bede Griffiths, The Marriage of East and West (Illinois: 1982), also see G. Feuerstein, Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of Yoga (London: 1990). 
61 See also Abhishiktananda, 'The Depth-Dimension of Religious Dialogue', Vidyajyoti 4515 (1981), 
pp.202-22I ; Abhishiktananda, 'Notes on Christo logy and Trinitarian Theology', Vidyajyoti 64/8 
(2000), pp.598-612; see also Anthony Kalliath, The Word in the Cave (New Delhi: 1996); Edward T. 
Ulrich, 'Swami Abhishiktananda and Comparative Theology', Horizons 31/1 (2004), pp.40-63, and R. 
Yesurathanam, A Christian Dialogical Theology: The Contribution of Swami Abhishiktananda 
~Kolkata: 2006). 
2 These confused models make "superficial identifications" which should not be employed and this 
problem of "superficial identifications" is beginning to be understood as detrimental to encounter, see 
David Brown, God and Enchantment of Place (Oxford: 2004), p.352. 
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"comparativism is not without its problems and critics for it can make superficial 
parallels, false analogies and misleading associations".63 It can also be shown that 
some modem Indian thinkers, such as, Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo 
confused or even blurred theological ideas in their attempts at seeking harmony,64 and 
made erroneous correlations between an impersonal divinity and theism,65 and so it is 
important to be careful when constructing synthetic models that seek a convergence of 
ideas. 
The theological comparativist has also been accused of developing a non-existent 
meta-narrative, and agenda, and thus, as Paden puts it, comparativism has developed 
a "kind of conceptual imperialism".66 However, comparative theology should be used 
as a tool to push theological boundaries and to promote dialogue through 
convergence. Perhaps Hindu theological methods could provide a way into 
convergence, in as much as Hinduism has been doing comparison and convergence 
for a long time. This is exemplified in the Bhiigavad Gita, which incorporated many 
of the philosophical and theological systems of India.67 In the Gitiirtha Samgraha, 
Abhinavagupta informs us that it is the purpose of the Lord to manifest many paths of 
knowledge (Siinkhya) and action (Yoga), and that such a fusion enhances humanity'S 
existence: 
The Lord combines and presents both these paths in one because knowledge 
(jniina) and action (kriyii) are the very nature of consciousness.68 
Taking these concerns into consideration in relation to comparison and convergence 
this thesis is placed within the context of inter-religious dialogue, where seeking 
common ground with other religions has become imperative for fostering mutual 
understanding and respect. The facing of other religions in inter-religious encounters, 
forces us not only to ask the question why engage in a comparison at all, but to also 
63 William E. Paden, 'Comparative Religion', in John R. Hinnells, The Routledge Companion to the 
Study of Religion (London: 2005), p.216. 
64 See Vivekananda's Neo-Vedanta, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (1-8; Calcutta, 2000) 
and Sri Aurobindo's Synthesis of Yoga (BCL, 20-21). 
65 See Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. vol.2, pp.175-188; and Sri 
Aurobindo, The Life Divine (BCL, 18-19), pp.338-354; 
66 Ibid., p.217. 
67 See Vedwati Vaidik (ed.), Sr'imad Bhagavad-G1tii (New Delhi: 2003); and A. C. Bhaktivedanta 
Swami Prabhupiida, The Bhagavad-G1tii As It Is (UK: 1986), p.3. 
68 B. Matjanovic (trans.), Abhinavagupta's Commentary on the Bhagavad Gila. Giliirtha Samgraha 
(New Delhi: 2004), p.82. 
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ask why have we not engaged more in meaningful theological dialogue? Thus we 
should then ask to what extent comparison and convergence can develop or aid inter-
religious dialogue. But the why of theological comparison should not only be based 
upon an academic need to develop meaning in theological dialogue and convergence, 
or a political will to harmonise cultures and religions, but that engagement with other 
faith communities should have a deeper significance. The why of comparison must 
have as its centre an ontological and existential quest that seeks a deeper rationale for 
dialogue. While often the most suitable path to achieve an encounter in the study of 
religions is found through comparison, so too ontological inquiry is important in 
informing us of the nature of personhood when asking the questions not only 'who am 
I' as a person, but also 'who are we' as persons? What is a human person?' 69 Hence 
comparison and convergence, while serving as a dialogical tool, can also be used to 
increase our knowledge of who we are as human persons. 70 
1.2.2 Converging Theologies 
The wish to attempt not only at comparison between theologies from different 
traditions but also a convergence has recently been adopted by the Indian Oriental 
Orthodox theologian K. P. Aleaz. He argues that such dialogical approaches can 
promote a "unitive vision",71 that is to say a holistic ideal, exemplified in an 
eschatological vision.72 He envisions new meanings, and insights gained through 
convergence73 of Advaita Neo-Vedanla74 with Christianity, within a category called 
"Pluralistic Inclusivism".75 Aleaz structures his approach to theology stressing 
theological comparison and convergence, and drawing upon Neo- Vedanta to develop 
69 See RudolfOtto. Mysticism East and West (NY: 1932), who was attempted an ontological 
comparison between Meister Eckhart and Sailkara's use of Esse (ibid. pp.19-21) and Atman 
respectively in seeking such answers to these questions. 
70 For this reason Gavin Flood states that "comparisons are not odious but necessary for human 
understanding", see Gavin Flood, The Ascetic Self, Subjectivity. Memory and Tradition (Cambridge: 
2004); also see also on this Paul E. Murphy, Triadic Mysticism. The Mystical Theology ofSaivism of 
Kashmir (Delhi: 1999). 
71 Aleaz, Christian Responses to Indian Philosophy (Kolkata: 2005). p.120. 
72 See K. P. Aleaz, Jesus in Neo- Vedanta. p. I. 
73 K. P. Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought, p.xix. 
74 Neo-Vedanta is generally considered as the resurgence of Vedanta or Upani$adic theology which 
brought together ideas not only of Saivite, Yogic, and Vai$t/ovite theologies but incorporated the 
context of other religions and exemplified by Ramakrishna. Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo. 
75 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought, p.xv. 
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new Christologies through the incorporation of Hindu philosophies. As with Aleaz, 
this work will also affirm that isolationist theologies cannot provide new insights into 
old problems, and that what are needed are new approaches that enrich 76 and bring 
new dimensions to theology. Aleaz demonstrates that new approaches sought in 
Indian Christianity,77 through the incorporation of the term Atman. can be used as an 
epistemological and metaphysical tool in Christian reformulation78 theology. 
While many approaches to inter-religious dialogue have, especially over the last forty 
years, been attempted, what will be considered here is that, a space for theological 
comparison and convergence enhances inter-religious dialogue, and pushes 
theological boundaries forward towards a goal that contemplates fruitful and 
harmonious encounters. 79 To that end, this work will not present an overtly 
confessional or exclusivist approach,80 nor will it develop a religiously pluralistic 
model taken up by Keith Ward and John Hick, which accepts all types of spirituality. 
The necessity to look to new approaches can be justified in the Early Christian 
synchronistic use of philosophical terms.81 So too, present day Christianity, if it is to 
respond to pluralism, has to accept the place for the inclusion and convergence82 of 
ideas and terms not traditionally utilised in Christianity. Indeed the task of theology 
itself when considering an eschatological and a cosmic vision of God must be able to 
include and not exclude. In this context Keith Ward has stated that, "theology is a 
pluralistic discipline. In it people of differing beliefs can co-operate, discuss, argue 
and converse". 83 
76 Ib'd . I ., p.XIX. 
77 It is now can be recognised that there is a distinct Christian approach in India which is called 'Indian 
Christianity' and which, regardless of the denomination, has a flavour that is distinctly Indian. See R. 
Boyd, An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology (Delhi: 1969, 2005); and M. Vekathanam, Indian 
Christology. 
78 Vekathanam, Indian Christology (Bangalore: 2004), p.508. 
79 There have in this context, even been some discussion on 'multiple religious belonging' see, 
Catherine Comille (ed.), Many Mansions: and Peter C. Phan, Being religious Interreligiously 
(Maryknoll: 2004). 
80 Problems relating to confessionalism is highlighted in V. M. Karkkiiinen, Trinity and Pluralism and 
Keith Ward who believes that one cannot hold a "religious view without holding a confessional view", 
see Religion and Revelation (Oxford: 2003), p. \08, which is in contradistinction to Hick's 
interpretation of the "Real", see Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (UK: 2001), p.14. 
D'Costa upholds the view that dialogue is possible but only through exclusivism and "nothing called 
~Iuralism really exists" (ibid. p.169). 
I See C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: 1953). 
82 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vediinta and Eastern Christian Thought, p.279. 
83 Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.45. 
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While previous theological models have fallen short of convergence, and are 
exemplified in S. 1. Samartha 84 who did not intend to "articulate a systematic fully-
fledged Christo logy" 85 to "indicate possibilities for Christo logical developments in a 
religiously plural world",86 Aleaz goes further, as he places convergence in relation to 
Christian Theology through his 'Neo-Vedantic Christology,.87 This thesis will also 
develop a methodology in common with Aleaz's approach and will endeavour to 
develop a fluidity and syncretism of theological language through a convergence of 
the terms and theologies of the Byzantine tradition and Pratyabhijiiii. 
1.3 Towards Dialogue: Dialogical Paradigms 
This part of the introduction will examine some approaches and problems relating to 
inter-religious dialogue which have impacted on the way in which a comparative 
theology and theology of convergence are considered. Even though inter-religious 
dialogue has been affected by the hardening of confessional positions, or is due to the 
present political problems relating to fundamentalism, this environment itself 
highlights the importance and necessity of inter-religious dialogue. 
Approaches to inter-religious dialogue seem to have been set within certain narratives 
that reflect a theological stance of faith constructs, developing methodologies that 
reflect those beliefs, and have been broadly determined within 'exclusivist', 
'inclusivist' and 'pluralistic' models.88 Alan Race in 1983 and Gavin D'Costa in 1986 
highlighted these paradigms as being helpful when categorising responses to 
pluralism,89 but these have now been superseded. Hence, the ever growing 
populations and interactions and encounters between religions are forcing theologians 
to re-think models and narratives through which inter-religious dialogue has been set. 
R4 SJ. Samartha. One Christ Many Religions (Maryknoll: 1991), p.4. 
RS Ibid., p.93. 
R6 Ibid. 
R7 Aleaz, Jesus in Neo- Vedanta, p.l. 
RR See Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism (London: 1983); see also P. Schmidt-Leukel 
'Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism', in Paul F. Knitter, The Myth o/Religious Superiority, p.13. 
R9 Ibid., p.2. 
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The increasing encounters between peoples of different faiths, although forcing the 
Western mind to re-address its standards and belief systems, should not be considered 
as a stumbling block to the Christian mind for many Eastern and Oriental Christians 
have lived and developed their faith within other faith communities. Also, initially 
Christianity emerged out of a pluralistic environment and was confident enough to 
engage within a pluralistic culture.9o This type of Christianity was confessional and 
yet incorporated non-Christian tenns and ideas.91 The Letter to Diognetus92 
highlighted the ability of early Christians to integrate and dialogue with other cultures 
using Hellenistic words such as Logos93 within a Jewish theological setting yet. 94 But 
Christianity should not to be set merely within a narrative of pluralism, but should 
confess itself within pluralism and considering that God may manifest through many 
types of revelations. In the context of multi -revelatory events, religions can be 
considered as inherently related to each other, but which find fulfilment in Christ. 
l.3.1 Exclusivism 
Consequently the category of dialogical response that is exclusivist will be rejected, 
mainly because of the cosmic vision given by the Byzantine tradition, which affinns 
that religions and philosophies in some way express parts of the whole truth, but 
which is revealed totally in ChriSt.95 Exclusivism,96 defined through its rigorous 
90 See 'npo~ .,lIOrNHTON', in J. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers (London: 1893). 
91 For example the Prologue to John's Gospel is distinctly Platonic, see C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation 
or the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: 1953). 
9 'npo~ .,lIOrNHTON', in J. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers, pp.490-511. 
93 See the Gospel of John and C. H. Dodd. The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel. and also see 
Augustine'S admittance that the Prologue of John's Gospel has Platonic influences, in Confessions, 
trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: 1961). bk.7.9, p.144. 
94 'npo~ .,lIOrNHTON'stated: "For Christians are not distinguished from the rest of mankind either in 
locality or in speech or in customs. For they dwell not somewhere in cities of their own, neither do they 
use some different language, nor practice an extraordinary kind oflife ... But while they dwell in cities 
of Greeks and barbarians as the lot of each is cast, and follow the native customs in dress and food and 
the other arrangement of life, yet the constitution of their own citizenship, which they set forth, is 
marvellous, and confessedly contradicts expectations" (Xpl<Jtlavol yap OUtt Y1'l OUtt <pwvf\ OUtt f9ta\ 
olaKtKplJ.1tvO\ t&v AoI1t&V dalv av9p6mov. OUtE yap 1tOU 1t6Atl~ io{a~ KataKOUOlV OUtE OlWKtql ttv! 
1tapaAAayJ.1tvll xp<ovta\ OUtt ~iov 1tapaa'lJ.1ov aaKoualV ... KatO\Koijvtt~ of.: 1t6At\~ 'EUl1vioa~ tE Kai 
~ap~apou~ w~ fKaatO~ tU'lpw9'l, Kai tO~ tnwpio~ E8tOlV aKoA.ou90ijvt~ tv tt ta9f1n Kal O\altn Kal 
t41 AOI1t41 ~l41 9auJ.1uatiJv Kul 6J.10AOyOUJ.1tvw~ 1tapaoo~ov tvOtllCVUvtal t1'\v KUtaataOlv tfI~ taut&v 
1tOAl£iu~), see 'npo~ .,lIOrNHTON', 5.1-3, 5.4-6, in J. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers, pp.493-
507. 
9S See Clement, Str.1.l3, 756A (Coxe); and Justin Martyr, Apol.2.7, 441-471 (Coxe). 
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claims, excludes any real attempt at dialogue, and conditions its theology through the 
term 'extra ecclesiam nulla salus' (outside of the Church there is no salvation).97 This 
axiom is the driving force behind the exclusivist view,98 and it negates any salvation 
for those perceived not to be called Christians. Theologians ofthis type affirm the 
erroneous character of other faiths.99 However, this axiom should not be a hindrance, 
for if the word, Church, indicates the hope of an eschatological fulfilment for 
humanity, it could be argued that all who are called to God and experience God within 
another religion apart from Christianity are brought into God's Church through the 
grace of the Logos. Perhaps the very meaning of the word church or assembly 
(EKKA£aia)IOO has to be examined further, especially in the context of Christian 
affirmation in the light of other religions. 
1.3.2 Inclusivism 
The next category comes broadly under the term inclusivist which can be said to have 
evolved out ofa response to exclusivist claims. Schleiermacher101 and Rudolf Otto 102 
were forerunners of inclusivism and of the later development of pluralism. The notion 
of inclusivism, which can be said to define those who work within the acceptance 
model,103 belies a reticence to affirm an equal place at the dialogical table. Examples 
of this type are found in Karl Rahner who argued for an inclusive view through his 
notion of the "anonymous Christian", 104 and Paul Knitter, whose inclusivism is 
96 See: Glyn Richards, Towards a Theology of Religions (London: 1989), p.14; Allan Race, Christians 
and Religious Pluralism (London: 1981), p.l 0; K. P. Aleaz Harmony of Religions: The Relevance of 
Swami Vivekananda (Calcutta: 1993), pp.154-173; and Aleaz, Christian Responses to Indian 
Philosophy (Kolkata: 2005). 
97 See Cyprian of Carthage, Epistulae 73.21 (PL 3), 1169; and De Unitate (PL 4),509-536; on this in 
relation to inter-religious dialogue see Gavin D' Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, 
ff-101-103. 
See Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, p.ll. 
99 See Aleaz Harmony of Religions, p.154. 
100 Mentioned 114 times in NT, but only 3 in Gospels, all in Mathew, e.g. Mt.\6: 18; 18: 17. There are 
46 occurrences in Pauline the corpus. 
101 See F. Schleiermacher's 'Doctrine of "Original Perfection of Man" in The Christian Faith, eds. H. 
R. Mackintosh, and J. S. Stewart (London: 2005), p.244. 
102 See Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (NY: 1970). 
103 Aleaz, Dialogical Theologies: Hartford Papers and Other Essays (Kolkata: 2004), p.85. 
104 Karl Rahner, Theo!ogicallnvestigations, Vol. V, Later Writings, trans. Karl-H. Kruger (London: 
1969), p.132. 
32 
developed within his fulfilment model. 105 Knitter goes beyond what is to be 
considered inclusivistic, and seems to develop an all-inclusive inclusivism.106 Aleaz 
includes also Raimundo Panikkar in the inclusivist category, 107 but Panikkar could 
perhaps be placed within the pluralist model. 
The inclusivism narrative is restricted in what it can accomplish, for it does not rely 
on reciprocity but on metered out generosities. For example Rahner's view, from a 
Hindu point of view, is innately patronising. Certainly, the increased encounter of 
Christianity with other religions provoked Panikkar to go further than Rahner, by 
declaring that the God of Hinduism is the "unknown Christ",108 and that if Hindus are 
thereby anonymous Christians then "Christians are anonymous Hindus". 109 Panikkar 
believes that Christians have "no monopoly of truth" 110 and neither do they have a 
"monopoly of salvation", III but that to be a Christian is to work in co-operation with 
Christ and creation, engaging in a cosmic dialogue. Those subscribing to this view 
would naturally be inclined to a theology of agreement and inclusion. As Panikkar 
states, "it is offensive and unacceptable for the so-called non-Christian religions to be 
described only by a negative feature". I 12 He goes on to state, "it leaves a bad taste in 
the mouth to divide people up in this way". I 13 For this reason Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
asserted that religious separation within self-sufficient I 14 positions of any religion 
cannot legitimately develop a "world theology of religions". 115 Rather, what Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith purported is a working toward religious dialogue through generic 
concepts such as/aith, God and the like. 116 
105 See Aleaz, 'Christian Theologies of Religious Need to Go Global: A Response to Paul F. Knitter', 
in, Dialogical Theologies: Hartford Papers and Other Essays. pp.88-91. 
106 Knitter, The Myth of Religious Superiority. 
107 Aleaz Harmony of Religions: The Relevance of Swami Vivekananda. p.173. 
lOR Raimundo Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (New Edition; London: 1981), p.13. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Panikkar, 'Christians and So-Called Non-Christians', Cross Currents 22/3 (1972), pp.281-308. 
III Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Towards A World Theology. Faith and the Comparative History of 
Religion (UK: 1981). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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1.3.3 Pluralism 
The last major dialogical category developed has been called pluralism, which called 
for even greater scope in dialogue between religions, but paradoxically, allowing 
religions and religious type movements their own space, discourages dialogue. 
Examples of pluralists are Keith Ward, John Hick and Jacques Dupuis. However, this 
category is at present ambiguous and is muddling models which could be interpreted 
in any variety of ways. Hence, new categories must be conceived of in which are 
fruitful, open, and allow optimistic theologies to develop, yet which retain identity 
and thereby significance. This open approach reflects an optimism to Christian inter-
religious dialogue, evidenced in Nicholas Cusa (1401-64), who in De pace fidei 117 
developed a dialogical approach by recognising the divine in another religion. Cusa 
considered that each person was a reflection of the divine Person, and thus dialogue 
gains significance in that encounter with persons of other religions. 
The notion of optimism within interreligious dialogue allows for reciprocity and 
acceptance of other faiths and ideas not possible in comparison, 118 without detracting 
from personal beliefs. Jacques Dupuis remarks that "affirming the Christian identity is 
best done in an open dialogue with the other religions". I 19 He argues that Christians 
should engage in open dialogue and thereby be "enriched or even renewed". 120 He 
addresses the question of mutual enrichment, and highlights the importance of 
convergence in relation to dialogue. So models of convergence and synthesis offer a 
way to approach dialogue. This approach can be exemplified in early Christianity, and 
117 See Willem Dupre, 'Religious Plurality sand Dialogue in the Sermons of Nicholas Cusa', Studies in 
Interreligious Dialogue 15.1 (2005), pp.76-85, see also Nicholas ofCusa, 'De docta ignorantia' and 
'Dialogus de Deo abscondito', in Nicholas ofCusa, trans. H. L. Bond (The Classics of Western 
Spirituality; Mahwah: 1997), p.125 and pp.209-213. Troeltsch (1865-1923) too indicated the 
importance of dialogue with other religions, see Joseph Molleur, 'Troeltsch, Comparative Theology 
and the Conversation with Hinduism', Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 1112 (200 I), pp.133-4 7. 
Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) was one of the first Hindus who argued for inter-religious dialogue 
at the Parliament of Religions (Chicago 11th _27th September 1893); also see Swami Vivekananda, 
, Address at the Parliament of Religions, Read at the Parliament on the 19th September 1893', in The 
Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (l; Calcutta: 2000), p.14. 
11M See Richard Schebera, 'Comparative Theology: A New Method of interreligious Dialogue', 
Dialogue and Alliance 17/1 (2003), pp.7-18. 
119 Jacques Dupuis 'Renewal of Christianity Through Interreligious Dialogue', Bijdragen 65 (2004), 
pPo·131-145. 
o Ibid. 
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Kippenburg even argues that "early Christianity was a syncretistic religion". 121 In this 
understanding, new integrations could help to invigorate Christian theology and Aleaz 
offers such a model with his incorporation of Vedanta into Orthodox Christianity. 122 
Aleaz calls his model, pluralistic inclusivism,123 in which, "Inclusivism and Pluralism 
undergo change in their previous meanings". 124 In this category, he offers the 
possibility of developing "practical dialogical theology" 125 through convergence 
exemplified in his Neo-Vedantic Christology.126 It is my intention to continue along 
the lines of Aleaz's approach, but I do have reservations about the category of 
"pluralistic inclusivism" for it is not clear exactly what this means. 
Aleaz believes that Indian Christianity, through the incorporation of Indian 
philosophical terms, could offer new ways of doing interreligious dialogue. He points 
to new types l27 of theology, which are based largely upon Neo-Vedanta, in which a 
"harmony of religions" 128 is substantiated through Neo-Vedantic Christ%gy.129 
Concerning the methodological use of convergence, the thesis will build upon K. P. 
Aleaz's work, which looks to a convergence of theologies, specifically of Advaita 
Vedanta and the Byzantine tradition. 130 But this thesis will go further, as Aleaz does 
not consider many of the nuanced debates on the concept of person, such as how a 
concept of person is related to the term hypostasis and the ontological implications 
when considering the inclusion of Vedanta into the Orthodox Christian model. 
Neither does Aleaz consider hypostasis in relation to the contemporary Orthodox 
existentialist debate. Although Aleaz's general premise of convergence is accepted 
here, his comparison seems to me to be somewhat flawed in his use of Advaita 
Vedanta. This is because the rigid idealism and monism of Advaita Vedanta 131 does 
121 Hans. G. Kippenberg, 'In Praise of Syncretism: The Beginnings of Christianity Conceived in the 
Light of a Diagnosis of Modem Culture', in Anita Maria Leopold, Jeppe Sinding Jensen, eds .. 
S~ncretism in Religion. A Reader. Critical Categories in the Study 0/ Religion (London: 2004), p.29. 
I 2 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought. 
123 Aleaz Harmony o/Religions: The Relevance o/Swami Vivekananda. pp.162-176, and Aleaz. 
Dimensions 0/ Indian Religion (Calcutta: 1995), p.262. 
124 Aleaz. Dimensions of Indian Religion. p.262. 
125 K.P. Aleaz, Jesus in Neo-Vedanta (Delhi: 1995), p.xv. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., p.I, and p.32. 
12M Ibid., p.3 
129 Ibid. 
130 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaila Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought. 
131 This is exemplified by Sailkaracarya who stated that "everything of the nature of the non-Self is 
negated from the eternally existing Self', in Upadda Sahasri, trans. Swami Jagadlinanda (Madras), 
p.2l8. 
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not allow for any meaningful reciprocity when related to the notion of revelation and 
divine appearance in Byzantine theology, and especially in relation to personhood. It 
could be argued that a comparison of the Byzantine tradition and Dvaita (dua/ism)132 
which stresses difference, or Visi$!iidvaita (qualified non-dualism or qualified non-
difference)133 might be more fruitful. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that 
in both Dvaita and Visi$!iidvaita. the ontological outcome is too dualistic. Hence, the 
most useful Indian philosophy from my point of view that provides a fruitful 
comparison with the Byzantine tradition, in this context, is Pratyabhijnii. 
Pratyabhijnii, as with the Byzantine tradition, allows for a mystically completed 
(perfected) or maximalist notion of deified person without negating the place for what 
is real through the philosophical incorporation of unity-in-diversity or bhediibheda. 
When considering an appropriate model to focus the comparison, the traditional 
Hindu openness for dialogue in accepting other faiths can be utilised, which 
exemplifies a workable dialogical model for the convergence of theologies. This is 
not to say that the pluralistic landscape in India has always been harmonious and 
collaborative; on the contrary, in India there have existed historical tensions between 
its main faiths such as Saivism, Vai$/Javism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Sikhism, and 
Christianity. In the climate of post-Vivekananda Neo-Vedantism, a consensus of an 
agreed unity-in-diversity134 came to be evidenced, but this has somewhat experienced 
a setback in the contemporary environment in India of political extremism. What is 
needed is a return to the theological inter-religious vision offered by Ramakrishna 
(1836-1886). This vision of religious and spiritual harmony which uses synthesis to 
underpin its dialogical efforts l3S is also shared by contemporary scholars such as 
Samartha and Aleaz to develop Indian dialogical theologies. 136 Aleaz states: 
132 The Dvaita of Mlldhavllcharya in Indian philosophy indicates a dualism is not a Gnostic dualism but 
relates to the concrete realness of the world, which is not negated as unreal. For a synopsis of how 
these ideas relate to different philosophical systems see Miidhavllcharya, The Sarva-Darsana-
Saf71graha (London: 1908, 2004). 
133 In Rllmllnuja affirmed the "reality of the world", SwiimT Tapasyiinanda, Sri Ramanuja, His Life. 
Religion and Philosophy (Madras), p.32; N. Bhashyacharya, A Catechism o/the Vishistadwaita 
Philosophy o/Sri Ramanuja Acharya (Madras: 1887); see also S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy 
(2; New Delhi: 1923, 2002). This type of theism comes very close what is accepted by Byzantine 
theology. 
134 Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works o/Swami Vivekananda. vol.2, pp.175-188. 
135 This vision was also shared by Sri Aurobindo, see Synthesis 0/ Yoga (BeL 20-21). 
136 Aleaz, Jesus in Neo- Vedanta p.121, and footnote 43; also see S. J. Samartha, One Christ: Many 
Religions. Towards a Revised Christology (Bangalore: 1992), pp. 94-104. 
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The present author's Christian thought in relation to Sankara's Advaitic 
Vedanta is a practical demonstration of an Indian dialogical theology, more 
specifically an Indian dialogical Jesuology in terms of the perspective of 
Pluralistic Inclusivism for the relational convergence of religions, in this case 
of Hinduism and Christianity. It is also points to the fact that our 
hermeneutical context, a major factor of which is Advaita Vedanta decides the 
content of our theology. 137 
This model of dialogue will be developed through the notion of eschatological 
fulfilment, where all faith persons dialogue through a shared encounter with the 
divine. This model safeguards the uniqueness of each religion, yet upholds unity-of-
faith, that is to say it allows for faith principles to be safeguarded through the concept 
of the personal revelatory event or experience of each person while upholding the 
need to consider what is shared. In this context, categorising is replaced with ideas 
relating to the experience of what it is to be a human being, the shared reality of the 
human person. This type of approach has recently been argued by H. Coward in his 
analysis of human nature and 'perfectibility' 138 in Western Philosophy, Jewish 
thought, Christianity, Islam, Yoga, Hinduism and Buddhism. 
The problem seems to be that inter-religious dialogue has been forced into categories 
of exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and now the pluralistic-inclusivism of Aleaz. 
What is needed is a shift in ideas where these categories are replaced with personal 
dialogue, where persons enter into dialogue with other faith persons, because each 
person, as an icon of the divine, should be engaged with. Inter-religious dialogue has 
learned ignorance, to cite the words of Nicholas of Cusa, 139 in which it has learned to 
dialogue through forced categories, which are foreign to a notion of sharing and the 
fulfilment of each person. Inter-religious dialogical theologians have learned 
ignorance: they have learned how not to dialogue by setting up barriers through these 
categories. But learned ignorance should be applied to dialogue so that religions learn 
to see what they cannot know, the truth, for as Nicholas of Cusa stated, "by means of 
learned ignorance we will ascertain what is the truer". 140 In this context of "learned 
ignorance", the ignorance of this thesis will encourage theological synthesis and 
convergence of theologies relating to person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijiiii 
IJ7 Ibid., p.121. 
IJX See Harold Coward, The Perfectibility of Human Nature in Eastern and Western Thought (NY, 
2008). 
139 Ibid., p.IS3. 
140 Ibid., p.IS3. 
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traditions (in Chapters 2 and 3). By acknowledging the need for a space for 
convergence, a theology of convergence, a model of person will be constructed by 
bringing together terms from each tradition within that space. 
1.4 Traditions, Terms and Definitions 
In this part of the introduction I want to examine some terms and ideas relating to the 
traditions utilised in this study. 
1.4.1 Tradition 
Firstly, concerning the notion of tradition, I will accept that there have arisen certain 
narratives which affirm the place for historical traditions. However, does that imply 
that there is an authentic academic approach to a certain tradition? The word tradition 
itself, while it seems to imply that conforming to an authentic or traditionalist 141 
position is paramount, can be helpful in defining certain parameters which marks out 
specific geographical, historical and theological perspectives. Taking these issues into 
consideration, this thesis presents a study through what can be called Byzantine and 
Pratyabhijfzii traditions. Within the Byzantine tradition, the focus will mainly centre 
upon Eastern Orthodox approaches and interpretations to that tradition, especially in 
relation to contemporary scholarship. When considering the Pratyabhijfzii tradition 
such a qualification is not necessary as there is no proven living continuous tradition 
of Kashmir Saivism, and so the study of ideas relating to a concept of person within 
Pratyabhijfzii, of the ninth to eleventh-twelfth centuries in Kashmir, will be 
considered. 
141 Traditionalist view is examined by G. L. Prestige who argues that the term traditionalist should not 
be necessarily viewed pejoratively, see, Prestige, Fathers and Heretics. Six Studies in Dogmatic Faith 
with Pro/ague and Epilogue: being the Bampton Lectures For 1940 (London: 1968), pp.I-22. 
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The term tradition can also be considered a hindrance, for example David Gwynn 
argues that an appeal "to the authoritative past,,142 in relation to Chalcedon has led to 
the denuding of the true Patristic spirit. He considers that although Christian tradition 
has never been "truly static,,143 the notion of tradition can be utilised to preserve the 
"essential continuity" 144 of Christianity while adapting and presenting new ideas to 
suit the demands of the times. 
The wish to adhere to a traditional perspective in relation to contemporary Christian 
debates, as exemplified by Zizioulas,145 has paradoxically led to the emergence of 
new ideas and new models, which are manifesting new traditions within an older 
tradition. Consequently it may even be evident that those who view themselves as part 
of authentic tradition may have departed from ideas that, that very tradition is 
supposed to uphold. D'Costa also raises important questions regarding problems 
centred on tradition by asking, "who's 'God,' which tradition?,,146 
1.4.2 The Byzantine Tradition 
Is there a theological tradition which can be called Byzantine that adheres to specific 
theological parameters? Does Byzantine theology belong to the Roman Christian 
tradition or the Christian Greek East? These questions cannot be answered here but 
they show how difficult the term Byzantine is to define especially in relation to 
theology. This is especially true when considering the misunderstandings between 
Latin West and Greek East147 and when considering the historical and theological 
divergences between those traditions. Nevertheless, the term Byzantine will be used 
in a theological context to affirm a general adherence to a Greek Christian tradition 
142 David M. Gwynn, 'The Council ofChalcedon and the Definition of Christian Tradition', in Richard 
Price and Mary Whitby, Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700 (Translated Texts for 
Historians, Contexts I; Liverpool University Press, Liverpool: 2009), p.22. 
143 Ibid., p.23. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Zizioulas, BC, pp.16-50. 
146 D'Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp.18-51. 
147 Some of these misunderstandings and differences have been highlighted by Judith Herrin, 
Byzantium: the Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire (London: 2007). pp.192-211. The distinction 
between Latin West and Greek East has also be defined as such by Andrew Louth where he underlines 
a "split" between these "two Christian civilizations", see Andrew Louth, Greek East and Latin West; 
the Church AD 68/-/07/ (The Church in History, Volume III; Crestwood: 2007), p.3. 
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which historically had its roots in the Greek Patristic period (first - to eighth 
centuries)148 and which flourished in the Byzantine era (fourth to fifteenth 
centuries). 149 This Eastern Greek tradition can said to have continued in what is now 
referred to as Greek Orthodoxy I 50 or the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church. 
Although this is not a precise correlation, it can suffice as a rudimentary model. 
Consequently, I will focus most of my analysis on the concept of person within this 
tradition, specifically focusing on the Cappadocians, Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus 
the Confessor, while also considering contemporary interpretations of the Greek 
Fathers. I will also consider Western theologians when appropriate. This constitutes a 
flexible approach to Byzantine studies, which is also exemplified by Sarah Coakley. 
She cites the opinions of various denominational theologians who all claim a link to 
the Greek Fathers, and the inclusion of such differing views allows for fresh 
perspectives and an exchange of ideas. IS I 
1.4.3 Byzantine Terms 
Within the Byzantine tradition, or rather through that tradition, I will focus on certain 
terms to develop a model of person in relation: hypostasis/ prosopon and ousia l52 and 
in relation to the notion of deification. These words will correlate, in the Pratyabhijnli 
tradition, to purU$a. Atman and deification which will be equated to re-cognition. 
Also the word "man" (iiv9pro1tOC;)153 will be utilised, which was not used pejoratively 
by the Greek Fathers, but was a generic determination utilised to denote human 
beings. 
14M See John A. McGuckin. Patristic Theology (London: 2005). 
149 See Steven Runciman, The Byzantine Theocracy (Cambridge: 1977,2003), p.1. 
150 This correlation of the Byzantine with the Greek Christian tradition is made by J. Herrin in 
Bsrzantium, p.43. 
I I See Sarah Coakley. Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa (Malden: 2003). p.4. 
152 All these words are contained within Basil's Letter 38. The meaning of the words hypostasis and 
ousia in this letter seem to be clearly indicating what is particular and general. Basil ascribed to the 
term hypostasis, particular existence. "note of His person (imoGTclCJEroc;) ... and by this note He is also 
recognised individually Himself' (PG 32), 329C-332A (Deferrari); ousia indicated what was 
ontologically shared or generic. that which implied a sharing (in the Trinity) the essence in a 
"community of substance (ouCJi~ KOlV6t11tl)" but in which there was "no accord or community as 
regards the distinguishing notes", (PG 32), 329C-332A (Deferrari). However the use of the word 
7tgoCJOmov in Ep. 38 (PG 32), 332A. is ambiguous and could refer to person or face. 
I 3 Also see Basil of Cae sa rea, Ep. 38 (PG 32), 325B, where Basil states "Those nouns which are 
predicted of subjects plural and numerically diverse have a more general meaning. as for example 
'man' (av9pro7toC;)", (Deferrari). 
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The tenn Cappadocian is also manifests certain problems, for while taking into 
consideration the influences upon the three Cappadocians 1s4 such as the sister of 
Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea, Macrina, 155 it infers that there is a general 
corpus of material that is unified to such an extent it can be tenned Cappadocian. 
Clearly this is not the case. Although there was no systemisation of ideas that 
exemplified a consistent type of theology that can be called Cappadocian, the tenn 
Cappadocian can be said to indicate a general type oftheologising. 156 Christopher 
Beeley affinns that the tenn Cappadocian does obscure the fact that there are "painful 
differences" I 57 between the theological positions of the Cappadocians. Nevertheless, 
there is a consensus given by Eastern Orthodox theologians that Cappadocian is a 
valid tenn to indicate a genre in Greek Patristic thought and theology. 158 
Another point that has to be raised here, relates to the authorship of Letter 38 of Basil 
of Caesar ea. which is also attributed to Gregory of Nyssa in the work To His Brother 
Peter: On the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis (Ad Petrum). 159 Turcescu in 
his examination of hypostasis and ousia. in Ad Petrum. argues that authorship belongs 
to Gregory of Nyssa, rather than Basil. However, Turcescu does state that some 
scholars do indeed attribute authorship to Basil. 160 It can be affinned that Letter 38 
154 Basil of Cae sa rea (c. 330-379); Gregory of Nazianzen (c. 329-389); and Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-
395);see also John A. McGuckin, Patristic Theology (London: 2005), and Chapter 1.5. 
155 See Catherine P. Roth ed., St Gregory of Nyssa. The Soul and the Resurrection (Crestwood: 1993), 
pg.8-25; and also NPNF 5, footnote I, pA30. 
6 See 1. Tixeront, History of Dogmas (11; London: 1923). 
157 Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God (Oxford: 
2008), p.viii. 
15R This consensus is expressed exemplified in: Lossky, The Vision of God (Crestwood, 1983), pp.76-
77; John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Crestwood: 1987), p.15; Zizioulas, BC, 
p.17; Yannaras, Elements of Faith (Edinburgh: 1998), p.33, and also see usage of 'Cappadocians' 
within Western scholastic examinations such as: A. Harnack, History of Dogma (London: 1898), p.124; 
J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas (1\; London: 1923); G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: 
SPCK), p.233; 1. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: 2000), p.296; Aloys Grillmeier, 
Christ in Christian Tradition (I; Atlanta: 1975); Basil Studer, Trinity and Incarnation (London:2002), 
p.139; Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy (Oxford: 2006), pp.250-25I in which Ayres gives sound 
reasoning for drawing together Cappadocian theology within a group while at the same time 
highlighting the differences between them; Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil 
of Cae sa rea (Washington: 2007), p.202. 
159 See Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Persons, p.22; also footnote 64 of Chapter I , 
p.47; footnote I of Chapter 3, p.135. This view is also affirmed by John Behr, see The Nicene Faith 
Part 2, On the Holy Trinity (2; Formation of Christian Theology, Crestwood: 2004), pAI5 and P. 1. 
Fedwick • A Commentary of Gregory of Nyssa or Letter 38 of Basil of Caesarea' OCP 44 (1978). 
160 ' See Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Persons. p.47. 
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does bear strong resemblance to Gregory of Nyssa's work Tres DU, R. J. Deferrari l61 
and B. Jackson l62 argued that the Synod ofChalcedon ascribed the work to Basil 
hence Basil will be cited as the author while at the same time admitting the possibility 
that authorship can be ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa. 
The notion of person as hypostasis will also be correlated to otherness, or the other l63, 
which expresses an idea of difference and yet unity, where the notion ofthe other 
shall include a sense ofrelationality or relationship with the divine to indicate an 
ontological centre by which the other can be understood through unity. This sense of 
unity should not be confused with "sameness,,164 but it is not "sameness" that will be 
argued, but sharing for the sharing of a common ontological reality does not 
necessarily indicate "sameness". The relationship of difference or otherness in 
relation to unity will be examined throughout the thesis and synthetically brought 
together within the Alman-hypostasis model. This thesis establishes a conceptual 
bridge between non-difference, and that which is below, 165 or difference, in a unified 
model of being or a model which accepts unity-in-diversity in the Atman-hypostasis. 
The qualifying of Atman within hypostasis will also be argued to establish in a model 
of person, the possibilities of an Almanic mode of hypostatic existence. 166 
The notion of deification will be equated to the restoration of human person through 
the highest reality. It will be correlated in Pratyabhijna to the experience of re-
161 See (LCL 190). p.197. 
162 See (NPNF 8). p.155. 
16JThis term in the context of divine the other which expresses a type of existence or otherness 
(hypostatic life). see Communion and Otherness. pp.43-55. The notion ofthe other can indicate a 
variety of things. either inferring separation. difference. or unity in relational communion, but I will 
understand other to implicitly indicate both existential difference, yet the possibilities of unity through 
the sharing of a common nature of hypostatic experience. On otherness also see Emmanuel Levinas, 
On Thinking-of the-Other: entre nous (London: 1998); Humanism of the Other (Urbana and Chicago: 
2006). and Outside the Subject (London: 1990); Michael Barnes. Theology and the Dialogue of 
Religions (Cambridge: 2002), p.65; Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (London: 2006), pp. \3-98; 
and see also Christos Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God (London: 2005), pp.78-79. 
164 Ibid., p.43, where Zizioulas highlights Levinas notion of "sameness" in a detrimental context. 
165 See Gregory Johnson's paper 'Theology from Above and Theology from Below: The Systematic 
Methodology of Charles Hodge and Stanley Grenz'. 
http://grescouch.homstead.comlfiles/hodgeGrenz.html. , accessed September 2002, on the 
examination on theology "from above" and "from below" and the arguments of the two positions ofS. 
J. Grenz in Revisioning Evangelical Theology, and C. Hodge. 
166 This borrowed from Zizioulas (BC p. 50) and modified to include in the existential reality of the 
human persons. a relational context within the experience of the essential reality of being (Atman). 
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cognition and to the activity of Consciousness (Citi-Sakti}.167 Deification will indicate 
the possibilities of human becoming through the mediation of the Christ hypostasis 
(person) as the "great will of God". 168 This will and activity of the divine to unite 
human persons with Himsel f represents a mystery (1ll)(J-nlPtov) 169 and the reasoning 
for the divine becoming in Christ, which established a union (EvOOcru;) of God with the 
world. As Maximus the Confessor stated this union was established: 
between a limit of the ages and limitlessness, between measure and 
immeasurability, between finitude and infinity, between Creator and creation, 
between rest and motion. 170 
While basic theological similarities can be drawn between the Byzantine and 
Pratyabhijiiii traditions in the use of deification and re-cognition, distinctions and 
differences also remain. The most important being the ontological implications to the 
human existence and the ways in which the apparent gulfbetween the divine reality 
and the world could be overcome. While both traditions stressed the difference 
between the divine and human natures, the Byzantine tradition, while overcoming this 
gulfin the Christ through the hypostatic union (U1to(J'tuov Evrocru;) , 171 still maintained 
167 As its stat~s in the Pratyabhijniihrdayam (PBH), in Sutra 9, that "in consequence of its limitation or 
contraction, Sakli, which is all consciousness, becomes the mala-covered samslirin or individual soul", 
~ C1~o;fffi:t1Cflhll('t ~: ~, cidvai tacchakti-sa",kociit ma/avritab sa",siirf; translation by 
Singh, PBHs, p. 71. This is also expressed in the Paramiirthasiira (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states 
in verse 16 that, "pure consciousness, having adopted Miiya, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes 
impure and appears as the finite subject known as puru~a", J11~lqfifl){iafl~cnm~: ~ 
q'fl~I, Miiyii-parigraha-vasiid bodho ma/inabpumiinpasur bhavati, (Pandit). 
16K See Maximus the Confessor, Tha/.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic 
Mrtery of Jesus Christ. p.124. 
16 Ibid., 75.43. 
170 yap ItPO&It£vot'J9'l t(i)v aicilVlrov OPO\) Kat cifl&tpia~ Kat ciOPloti~ Kat flttPO\) Kat 7ttpato~ Kat 
ci1t&ipla~, Kat Kdoo\) Kat Ktio&w~, Kat otao&w~ Kat KlVt'JO&W~, ibid., 75.50-55; p.125. 
171 Ambig. 60. 73.11. The union of body and soul in the hypostatic union, of Christ's divinity and 
humanity, confers upon the human existence the union and body and soul. Through this union of unity 
and distinction, humanity becomes deified as Maximus stated, "we attain, in the future state, the 
supernatural deification (theosis)", ibid., 77.72; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus 
Christ, p 126. Maximus the Confessor stated that the hypostatic union was a union of natures, which in 
tum allowed reciprocity between humanity and God through the principle of this union: "the principle 
of person (hypostasis); it is a union that realizes one person composite (oUv9&to~) of both natures", 
Ambig. 42. 73.11; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. p.123. This model of 
the uniting of the two natures in Christ, of the divine (Logos) and the human nature does not infer that 
Christ had a gnomic (inclination/intention) will that is a deliberate will that is fallen, but the wills and 
thus natures are united, where the natural material will was deified. As Andrew Louth observed that a 
distinction between a natural will and a "deliberative (or 'gnomic') will becomes clear", in Maximus 
the Confessor (London: 1999), p.192. Maximus stated "that the Incarnate Word possesses as a human 
being the natural disposition to will, and it this is moved and shaped by his divine will...it is not 
opposed to God but is completely deified", Opsc.3, 48A-B (Louth). 
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a level of distinction. In Pratyabhijiia tradition, the gulf between the lower and the 
higher nature was resolved by focusing on the unity that binds the differing natures. 
But both traditions did focus on the notion of the transfonnation of the lower nature 
(in humans) through deification/re-cognition to indicate how the ontological gulf was 
to be resolved. In addition the terms Neo-Vedanta and Indian Christianity l72 will also 
be utilised in this work. The former will indicate ideas that came from the resurgence 
of Vedanta in the late nineteenth century to the middle ofthe twentieth century, which 
synthesised ideas from many traditions including Christianity within a theistic non-
dual setting, and were exemplified in the teachings of Ramakrishna (c. 1836-1886), 
Vivekananda (c. 1863-1902) and Sri Aurobindo (c. 1872-1950). The notion of Indian 
Christianity indicates fonns of Christianity in India that incorporate many 
denominations and yet have a flavour that is Indian. m 
1.4.4 The Pratyabhijnii Tradition 
I shall now consider the Pratyabhijiia tradition (the word literally meaning re-
cognition. the re-cognition of one's true condition), 174 which indicates a philosophy-
theology of the ninth to eleventh centuries A.D. in Kashmir and belonged to the wider 
Kashmir ,~aivite or Trilm school. The main text of this philosophy that will be used in 
relation to this study is the lsvarapratyahhijiiakiirika which is divided into four 
chapters. The first, the Jiianadhikara. deals with the relationship between the 
metaphysical Absolute reality (Paramatman), from a position of unity or non 
difference, while the second chapter, Kriyadhikara, understands the relationship of 
the Absolute divine activity (kriya) in relation to the world or unity-in-difference. The 
third chapter, Agamadhikara, describes the principles of divine activity and difference 
while the last chapter, Tattva-salflgrahadhikara, acts as a conclusion. 
172 It is now recognised, that there is a distinct Christian approach in India called 'Indian Christianity', 
see Boyd, An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology (Delhi: 1969,2005); and Vekathanam. Indian 
Christ%gy. 
173 For an example, see Paul M. Collins, The Quest/or 'Indian-ness' (Delhi: 2006). 
174 Descriptive Analysis o/the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies. (Srinagar: 1911-1947), p.5. 
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Historically, Pratyabhijiiii is thought to have emerged 175 within the wider non-
dual/dual Kashmiri tradition, it may have been older and Lakshmanjoo refers to 
Pratyabhijiiii as being reintroduced at the end of the eighth centuryl76 by Somananda, 
indicating an older system of Pratyabhijiiii. However, Pratyabhijiiii will be related to 
the system founded by Somananda and developed by Utpaladeva, and the later 
Abhinavagupta, the author of the Tantriiloka. 177 and by his disciple K~emaraja. It has 
been argued by most of the contemporary scholars from J. C. Chatterji to Jaideva 
Singh and Moti Lal Pandit that this form of Kashmir Saivism known as Trika was 
synonymous with non-dualism and monism, 178 and as such Pratyabhijiiii represented 
a continuation of this school. 179 Even though in the Descriptive Analysis of the 
Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies it is argued that the whole series was related to 
'"just one subject,,180 that is the 'Trika Shastra' ('Threefold-science'), which was 
thought to be monist l81 and integral to this system was the philosophy of 
Pratyabhijiiii. This simplistic type of categorising has recently been questioned by 
Alexis Sanderson. 182 
Consequently, the way in which Pratyabhijiiii is categorised has to be re-considered. 
But generally the paramparii of the non-dual Trika lineage is said to pre-date history 
and come from Siva himself who revealed the Agamic literature, such as the 
Miilinlvijayollaratantra. 183 Nevertheless, in the ninth to eleventh centuries in Kashmir 
there was a resurgence l84 of the non-dual Saivism through the literature of the Siva 
Siltras which were revealed to Vasugupta by Siva who came to him in a dream telling 
him that the Siva Siltras were carved on stone (Samkaropala) on the Mahadeva 
Mountain. 18s It was the disciple ofVasugupta, Somananda (c. 850- 900 A.D.), 186 
175 For the historic development of PratyabhijfUl see: J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism (Srinagar, Delhi: 
1918,2004), pp.36-44; J. Rudrappa, Kashmir Saivism (Mysore: 1969), pp.I-24; B. N. Pandit, Aspects 
of Kashmir Saivism (Srinagar, 1977), pp.32-39; B. N. Pandit, History of Kashmir Saivism (Delhi: 
1990). pp.26-46; Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism (Cambridge: 1996. 2006), pp.166-167; G. 
V. Tagare. The Pratyabhijilo Philosophy (Delhi: 2002), pp.2-13. 
176 See Lakshmanjoo. Kashmir Shaivism. (USA: 2003), p.131. 
177 (KSTS 23. 28, 29,30,35,36,41,47,52,57,58,59). 
17M M. L. Pandit, The Trika Saivism of Kashmir (New Delhi, 2003), p.ix. 
179 See Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra', in T. Goudriaan (ed.), Ritual and 
Sfoeculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honour of Andre Padoux (Albany: 1992). 
I 0 Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies. p.l. 
IMI Ibid., p.2. 
1M2 See Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra'. 
IMl See M. L. Pandit, The Trika Saivism of Kashmir. p.ix. 
IM4 (KSTS 23, 28, 29. 30, 35. 36.41.47.52. 57, 58, 59). 
IM5 See SSVs. p.xvi and also Flood. An Introduction to Hinduism, p.167. 
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author of Sivadr$!i, who was responsible for propagating the resurgent Pratyabhijnii 
and Somananda's disciple Utpaladeva (c. 900- 950 A.D.), 187 who wrote the major 
work on Pratyabhijnii, the ]svarapratyabhijniikiirikii. This philosophy was also later 
developed by Abhinavagupta (993-1015), author of the Tantriiloka, and Guru to 
K~emaraja who was the author of the Vimarsinf on the Siva Sutras. The corpus of 
literature from this period has come to be known as non-dual Kashmir Saivism, or 
Trika. In the light of Alexis Sanderson's work, such assumption can be questioned in 
light of the dualistic influences on Trika of the earlier Miilinlvijayottaratantra. 188 This 
resurgent non-dualistic Trika will be referred to as the new Trika. 189 In the new Trika 
schema, Pratyabhijnii, along with the Siva Sutras, emerged as a polemic to 
dualism,190 Vijniinaviida Buddhism,191 Advaita Vediinta, and formed parts of the 
system of the resurgent Kashmir Saivism. Chatterji identified the main thought in this 
resurgent Kashmir .~aivism or Trika as being non-dual which was for Chatterji, the 
main philosophical characteristic. 192 In support of this view, Jaideva Singh also 
believed that Trika was non-dualistic in its philosophy and consequently within the 
resurgence of the new Trika the Siva Sutra has to be considered the most important 
193·· . text given Its momst perspective. 
However, in the pre Siva Sutras era the Miilinfvijayottaratantra, 194 Svacchiindatantra, 
Vijniina Bhairava and Mrgendra, were some of the main works of Trika and had 
elements of dualism. Alexis Sanderson believes that the Miilinivijayottaratantra 
retained its place of precedence in the light of the new Trika l95schema and in relation 
to dualistic influences. The view of Sanderson is supported in that Abhinavagupta 
IK6 On this see J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism, p.39. Most ofSomlinanda's work ,~iva Dmi (KSTS 
54) is lost. 
IK7 For the historic development of PratyabhijfUi see, J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism, pp.36-44; J. 
Rudrappa, Kashmir Saivism, pp.I-24; B. N. Pandit, Aspects of Kashmir Saivism (Srinagar, 1977), 
pp.32-39; B. N. Pandit, History of Kashmir Saivism, pp.26-46; Gavin Flood, An Introduction to 
Hinduism, pp.166-167; G. V. Tagare, The PratyabhijiJii Philosophy, pp.2-I3. 
IKK Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the Mlilinivijayottaratantra', p.282. 
IK9 Sanderson himself historically categorises Trika into 3 types, that of the 3 goddesses, of Kiili, and of 
the later Pratyabhijna of Abhinavagupta, see 'Saivism and the Tantric Traditions', in Sutherland et at. 
(eds.), The World Religions (London: 1988), p.696. 
190 See SSs, p.xvi, but this is disputed by Alexis Sanderson who argues that the nature of the MT and 
thus Trika is dualistic, see Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra', p.300, but I will 
examine this more in Chapter 3. 
191 See IPKp, p.13 
I'l2 Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism. 
193 SS . s, p.xvt. 
194 See MT. 
195 See Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the Miilinivijayottaratantra', p.282. 
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thought the Miilinfvijayottaratantra to be the "core-text of the Trika Tantras".196 
Although Alexis Sanderson has questioned the non-dualism of Trika in the light of 
dualistic influences,197 in this thesis it will be affirmed that Sanderson's points have to 
be qualified because ofthe non-dualism evident in the Trika and new Trika. 
Paradoxically, Sanderson's ideas will be used to support the ideas presented in this 
thesis to include notions of the dualistic, which allow for the notion of concrete 
person in Chapter 3. 
1.4.5 Consciousness as Cit 
This thesis will also incorporate the notion of Cit (consciousness) 19& within an 
Atmanic paradigm. The use of the notions Cit and Logos will be utilised to denote 
hypostatic difference in which unity is established, through the hypostatic union and 
through the activity of CW. The Logos-cit model will also underline the importance of 
theistic revelation, rather than affirming a static monism. It is important here to 
qualify the use of the term consciousness, or Cit. 199 in Pratyabhijnii. Cit will indicate 
awareness can be related to the mundane experience and to an awareness that goes 
beyond material experience, encompassing a divine experience. Consciousness is not 
to be considered purely within material limitations or as merely indicating the 
psychological self, but that which is illumined by "the light of consciousness" 
196 Ibid. 
197 See Sanderson: 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra', p.307; 'Religion and the State: Saiva 
Officiants in the Territory of the King's Brahmanical Chaplain', Indo-Iranian Journal 47 (2004), 
pp.229-300; Alexis Sanderson's review of Lillian Silburn's work Sivasutra et Vimarsinl de K$emaraja 
in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 46/1 (1983), pp.160-
161, htnl:11alexissanderson.com!aboutus.aspx; and 'Saivism and Brahmanism in the early Medieval 
Period', Gonda Lecture (2006), htnl:llalexissanderson.cQm!aboutus.aspx. 
19K The notion of consciousness will be explained later but in the model offered in Pratyabhijiia it 
becomes a theological tool to understand the nature of divine awareness and will in the theism of 
Pratyabhijna which differs to the modem interpretation see Ned Block, et al (eds.), The Nature of 
Consciousness (Massachusetts: 1997), also see also J. B. Chethimattam, Consciousness and Reality 
(London: 1971). Cit has also been used synergetically with Logos. Cit-Logos to argue for a theistic 
model in the self-knowledge of the incarnate Christ in relation to the world, see Vekathanam, Indian 
Christo logy, p.395. 
199 Or Citi, which represents the dynamic form of Atman, and the consciousness inferred within the 
Atmanic model, as the PBH stated in Sutra 4, "Citi, the aspect of the contracted Atman or ultimate 
reality, is the individual experient in contracted form", citisamkociitma celano pi sa",kucila-
visvamayahl. Citi in K~emarllja's model also takes on a role ofa dynamic feminine aspect of the 
masculine (Siva) and unmoving Atman, having an almost particular hypostatic existence (see PBHs, 
p.55.). This understanding also represents a sort of dualistic approach to Pratyabhijna. 
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(prakiisa)200 and becoming that light. I will accept the idea of many levels of 
consciousness within the individual concrete existence, that also allows for the 
mystical condition, and which allows for changes of consciousness. Thus 
consciousness reflects the experience of all areas of being and culminates in divine 
consciousness: the union of self into the divine Self. This will represent a synthesis by 
which concrete person can be expressed through unity with the divine, and it 
represents a model similar to the synthesis of ideas developed by Sri Aurobindo. 20 I He 
recognised the problem in reconciling transcendence and immanence in relation to 
revelation, thus developed the notion of the "evolution of consciousness,,202 by 
incorporating into the individual mind-body schema, the development of 
consciousness through the "Lower Mind", "Higher Mind" and "Super Mind" 
schemas.203 In Sri Aurobindo's works, consciousness devolves from the Divine and 
evolves back towards the Divine in stages or evolutions of consciousness from 
separated, isolated, individual existence, to gaining spiritual awareness and 
culminating in Supreme consciousness. 204 
The understanding of consciousness in this work will follow a similar pattern, in that 
it affirms the place of ordinary awareness, but which is renewed and divinized 
through a higher spiritual consciousness. Both levels of cognition will be included in a 
model of person in this thesis, which affirms the place for a sense of difference while 
having at the centre of difference, non-difference through the inclusion of a notion of 
the ultimate reality of being (or Alman). This mirrors ideas from Pratyabhijiiii. which 
recognises that citta (mind) and Cit (Supreme consciousness) are actually non-
different, as Utpala stated: 
CUi (universal consciousness) itself descending from (the stage of) Cetana 
(the uncontracted conscious stage) becomes Cilia (individual consciousness) 
inasmuch as it becomes contracted (sarnkocinf) in conformity with the objects 
of consciousness (cetya).205 
200 IPK. 1.34. p.15; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.3. 
201 See Aurobindo. Life Divine (Bel 19-20). 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) also developed the relationship between self-consciousness 
and God-consciousness. to being and becoming. see Friedrich Schleiermacher Der christliche Glaube. 
or The Christian Faith (london: 2005). 
205 filRlhl iI(1"N~I~CI't\GI ilC"'lI<tf4l)fiI;fj ~I. Citir evacetanapadOd avarii~ha cetya-sa",kocini 
cittaml, PBH. SUtra 5. translation by Singh. PBHs. 
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The Byzantine tradition also developed an important relationship between human 
cognition and divine awareness, for persons are rational creatures sharing a nature of 
like with the divine awareness. Human persons are rational because they are created 
in the image of God; they share a divine mode (tropos)206 of being which is noetic or 
rationa1.207 It shall be argued that this noetic nature can be correlated to the Atmanic, 
which will allow for a substantialist and rational model of person. Through an 
experience of this noetic or higher consciousness (or Cit), personhood will relate to a 
mode of existence that experiences a conscious awareness of the Atman, within a Cid-
iitmanic208 mode of hypostatic existence. The possibilities of existence through modes 
is accepted, because humans made in the image of the divine, can experience a mode 
of existence that is noetic and also essential (or Atmanic), while having the ability to 
experience a mundane conscious. This existence or Atmanic mode, it is argued, allows 
human persons to become what they should be through the union of natures in Christ. 
Gregory Nazianzen stated: 
Through the medium ofthe mind (VOUC;) he had dealings with the flesh 
(aapKi), becoming man (yevOJ.levoc; iiv8po)1toC;), God descended (6 Ko.tO> 
0eoc;): Man and God blended (cruvaveKp0.8TJ 0elP); and they become one (Kai 
yr.yovev e~) .. .in order that I might become God (iva yEvOJ.lat toaoihov 8eoc;), 
to the same extent that he was made man (o(Jov eKeivoc; iiv8po1to<;).209 
The union of natures "from above" with what is "below,,2IO indicates the possibilities 
of convergence of the two traditions in the affirmation of many types of revelations. 
In this convergence, the notion of consciousness becomes significant on a personal 
and revelatory level, and in this thesis the revelation of divine consciousness in the 
world will be considered in terms Logos and Cit. Both terms will be brought together 
206 See Maximus. Thai. 60 (CCSG 22). 75.30. who refers to the tropos or mode of the divine existence 
which through the economy of the divine hypostatic union. reveals the nature of humanity through the 
divine nature (ibid .. 75.25-35). 
207 See Hierotheos Vlachos. Orthodox Psychotherapy (Greece: 2002). pp.123-132. 
20R This term is modified from Utpala's IPK (2.51. p.57). which states that the Atman (Self) "consists of 
pure consciousness with the capability of appearing diversely". iibhiisa-bhediid ekatra cid-iitmani tu 
yujyate// (translation from Pandit. IPKp. 2.4.19, p.149) and is thus cid-iitmanic. A hypostasis consisting 
of a mode of deified existence shares this cid-iitmanic existence 
209 Gregory Nazianzen. Or. 29. 19 (PG 36). IOOA-B. 
210 See Julius Lipner in already cited passages. The Face a/truth. p.44. 
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in a model of Logos-ciP 11 to provide a way to understand the nature of the human 
person through the Christ-hypostasis. It is the contention of this thesis, that the 
Byzantine notion of the hypostatic union resolves the ontological gulf between creator 
(Logos) and the created (world), and provides a model which can be applied in both 
traditions. In this paradigm the activity of the conscious divine (Cit), in the Logos-cit 
reality, unites the world to the divine. 
In both the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnli traditions, the Logos and Cit respectively, 
represent models which in both cases overcome the gulf between the metaphysical 
(ousia or Atman) and the concrete existence (hypostasis), between creator and created. 
It is in the context of participation and change of consciousness, in the experience of 
deification in Byzantine tradition and re-cognition in Pratyabhijifli, that being and 
existence can be understood in the experience of union between the one who reveals 
and the one to whom revelation is given. In this sense revelation can be considered in 
terms of the subsequent changes of consciousness. The Logos and Cit, here presented 
in a single Logos-cit model, provide a mode of intercession between the transcendent 
God and world, in respect of consciousness, and facilitate a change in consciousness. 
It is the revelation of the Logos-Sarx (the Christ) and Cit or divine conscious 
awareness that provides the basis for that change. Thus the principle of Cit was 
developed in Pratyabhijnli in the same way as the Middle Platonists212 who used the 
term Logos. Both Cit and Logos were used to bridge the gulf between divine 
transcendence and manifestation. Just as the Logos, as Hagg puts it, becomes the 
"mediating principle between the transcendent God and the world",213 so Cit becomes 
the dynamic revelatory principle in Pratyabhijifli. 214 The synthesis of the Logos and 
Cit as a mediating principle of Logos-cit between the world, or persons (hypostases), 
and supreme divine being (or the Paramlitman) will be examined in greater depth 
throughout the thesis. 
211 This syncretistic use of Logos-cit or "Cit-Logos" is also exemplified by M. Vekathanam, Indian 
Christology, p. 395, where the tenn refers to the self-knowing of the Logos, "and it is from this self-
cognition of God that the 'Cit-Logos' is eternally generated" (ibid.). 
212 See Henny F. Hllgg, 'The Concept of God in Middle Platonism', in Clement of Alexandria and the 
Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (Oxford: 2006), pp.71-133. 
213 Ibid., p.230. 
214 See SS, Sutra I. 
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1.5 Contents of the Thesis 
Throughout the thesis a notion of person will be philosophically sought through a 
qualified fonn ofnon-dualism. 215 Within this non-dual theme, a model of person will 
be developed that will relate to a notion of concrete human existence 
(hypostasis/puru$a) within a category that also considers the place for the 
metaphysical reality of that existence (ousia/ Atman). 
The first chapter will consider comparative structures and the method by which a 
comparison of the two traditions will be considered. Chapters 2 and 3 will provide an 
examination of the concept of person within the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii 
traditions with a stress on difference in relation to unity. The comparative in Chapters 
2 and 3 will lead to a convergence and synthesis of theologies, set within the 
discourse of inter-religious dialogue. A convergence of ideas leading to the 
construction of Atman-hypostasis will be presented in Chapter 4. It is through this 
model of person that tenns, taken from each tradition relating to a notion of person, 
will be brought together within a synthesis and a space for convergence, or a theology 
of convergence developed in Chapter 4. 
In part 2.2 of Chapter 2A, the relationship of contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy to 
Byzantine theology will be examined and the subsequent influences which shaped 
contemporary Eastern Orthodox notions of person. Some of the issues raised in the 
personhood debate by John Zizioulas will be considered as will ideas extant within 
the contemporary Eastern Orthodox theological landscape. The theologians Sergei 
Bulgakov (1871-1944), Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958), Georges Florovsky (1893-
215 Though this thesis wi1\ be oriented to a Christian non-dual "world view" similar to that argued by 
Sara Grant, see Sara Grant. Towards an Alternative Theology: Confessions of a Non-Dual Christian 
(Bangalore: 1991). p.ix. it will incorporate ideas relating to revelation that qualify such a model. This 
world view will be placed in relation to Kashmir Saivism which understands Advaita in a qualified 
sense as highlighted by Upasani Maharaj see. see H. D. Sankalia, Satchidananda-Sopana: The 
Teachings of Upasani Maharaj (Rahata: 1988). See also Swami Muktananda, Secret of the Siddhas 
(South Fallsburg: 1994). 
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1979), John Meyendorff (1926-1992), Archimandrite Sophrony (1896-1993) and 
Christos Yannaras (b. 1935) will also be considered. 
In parts 2.3-2.6 of Chapter 2A the terms \mo(J'tamc;, ouaia and 1tpoa(01tov will be 
studied in relation to a concept of person. In addition ideas relating to what is 
particular (hypostatic difference) and what is common (the ousia) will also be studied, 
while examining contemporary interpretations of the Cappadocians. The notion of 
person will placed in relation to a concept of unity through an examination of the term 
ousia and this notion of unity will in Chapter 3 be argued through the tenn Atman. 
In Chapter 2B, notions relating to person (hypostasis) will be correlated to the concept 
of deified person, which will in Chapter 3 also be also correlated to the notion of re-
cognition. The notion of person will be re-considered through the concept of 
deification or theosis which has in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy become 
fundamental to understanding the nature ofperson.216 Part 2.9 of Chapter 2B will 
examine how deification relates to the physis of human personhood, and to the divine 
through the hypostatic union. The notion of person will be correlated to the notion of 
the restored or deified person, focusing on the contribution of Gregory N azianzen, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Macarius, Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor 
to deification. The place for the Macarian vision of unity will also be considered. The 
relationship between awareness experienced in deification will be examined in 
relation to recapitulated consciousness, which will also be correlated to a Cid-iitmanic 
consciousness as a mode of hypostatic existence. 
In Chapter 3, the notion of person in Pratyabhijfzii will be examined, and the question 
will be asked whether Pratyabhijfzii had a concept of person and how to construct a 
notion of person in Pratyabhijfzii while utilising its understanding of re-cognition. 
Parts 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3 will provide the historical, theological and 
philosophical background against which a model of person that accepts both 
difference and unity can be constructed in Pratyabhijfzii. In part 3.4, the tattvas 
(principles) will be examined, especially the purU$a laltva in relation to difference or 
diversity within the concept of person (hypostasis), and in part 3.5 the relationship 
216 S D'S '\ ee umltru tam oae, Orthodox Spirituality (South Canaan: 2003), p.21. 
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between Atman and a concept of person will be studied. Part 3.6 this thesis will 
examine the correlation between mundane consciousness of the experient (pramiitr) 
and re-cognition, while in part 3.7 the paradox of divine being and manifest 
phenomena in relation to revelation will be examined through the philosophical use of 
bhediibheda (unity-in-diversity). This model will intrinsically be related to how a 
concept of difference is related to a notion of person when juxtaposed to unity in the 
divine. 
In Chapter 4, a convergence and synthesis of ideas will be attempted in relation to the 
construction ofa new model of person, Atman-hypostasis. This model represents an 
inquiry into the nature of human personhood, raising questions that go to the heart of 
existential and ontological issues raised in the contemporary debate on person and to 
the discovery of who we are, as human persons. The place for a space for 
convergence, a theology of convergence. will be argued in which terms from each 
tradition will be brought together, which will focus more precisely on a single term, 
Atman-hypostasis. In part 4.3, the new term Atman-hypostasis will be constructed, 
especially in relation to deified person. I will attempt to consider hypostasis in relation 
to the term Atman and qualified through Cit, and by exploring the possible role of the 
notion of the other, or hypostatic difference, in such a model. The model of Atman-
hypostasis will be examined not only in relation to Cit and a Cid-iitmanic mode of 
hypostatic existence, but also in relation to relationality and the model of unity-in 
difference (or diversity). 
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CHAPTER2A 
PERSON IN BYZANTINE THEOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction: Setting the Scene 
In this chapter I will consider models of person in relation to: individuum; the terms 
i>1toatacn~, 1tpoa(01tov and ouaia; a substantialist context; modes of existing; 
relationality; and unity, to provide a response to contemporary personhood, I 
especially that of John Zizioulas' model of person. 2 I will do this by re-addressing 
Cappadocian ideas in relation to developing models of person. Ideas issuing from this 
examination will be considered with a mind to juxtaposing those ideas in relation to 
Pratyabhijfza philosophy. The main emphasis will be upon hypostasis in relation to 
ousia, which focuses the debate within an existential context, of how3 persons exist in 
relation to the what of being. 
The addressing of contemporary models through an examination of the Cappadocian 
use of hypostasis will represent a qualifying of overt existentialist interpretations of 
person as exemplified by Zizioulas.4 It will be observed that the term hypostasis 
evolved from the Nicaean stress on underlying nature, to the Cappadocian and 
Chalcedonian models, putting the focus on what was specific or individualistic. and 
then again in the contemporary settingS hypostasis has come to be placed within 
IFor examples of scholars that deal with the contemporary debate see: Turcescu, 'Person Versus 
Individual and Other Modem Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa'; Sarah Coakley, Re-Thinking Gregory 
of Nyssa (Malden: 2004); Coakley, Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa; Michael Rene Barnes, 'Divine 
Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context', in 
Sarah Coakley (ed.) Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa; Joseph Lienhard, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The 
Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of One Hypostasis' in Stephen Davis et al. (eds.), The 
Trinity (Oxford: 200 I); Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy; and most recently Morwenna Ludlow, 
Gregory and of Nyssa: Ancient and Post/Modern (Oxford: 2007). 
2 The extensive influence in contemporary personhood is highlighted by Douglas Knight. The Theology 
of John Zizioulas (London 2007). 
3 The relating of personhood to how persons exist is one of the main arguments presented by John 
Zizioulas, BC, p.6. 
4 See BC, p.26. 
5 As argued by Colin Gunton. The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (London: 2003), pp.10-94, who 
changes the way hypostasis was originally used within a relational context. 
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relational6 and existential models. I will also evolve the term to include an Atmanic 
dimension throughout the thesis but specifically focused on in Chapters 3 and 4, so as 
to contend with a purely existential focus. While I will also agree that the term 
qualifies individuality7 and allow hypostasis to include a relational context,S this 
context will be related to a substantialist model. As such, this chapter will address 
these ideas and consider that the term hypostasis should be considered in such a way 
to include a notion of unity by affirming the role of essential nature (relating to ousia) 
within the hypostatic model ofCappadocian theology. The notion of unity within 
SUbjectivity will be later considered in the proceeding chapters in terms of the 
relationship of Atman9 to hypostasis within the Atman-hypostasis model in Chapter 4. 
The discussion will begin by posing the question did the Byzantine tradition have a 
concept of person? This question is very difficult to answer for the issue of 
personhood has become clouded with bias, and conditioned within specific 
hermeneutical approaches to Dogma, Creeds, and Councils. Nevertheless, in this 
chapter an examination of the term person will be given, in relation to re-addressing 
Cappadocian terms to understand how concrete individuality relates to being a person. 
Being a person will fundamentally be related to a unified concept of person in which 
the spiritual or the essential reality fundamentally provides meaning to what it is to be 
a person. This essential reality, equated to the term ousia, does not exclude somatic 
materiality but informs it. This model will harmonise Greek Patristic ideas pertaining 
to the rational (voii~) and essential (ouain or property of being) reality, balancing the 
concept of hypostatic difference through unity or non-difference. This notion of non-
difference expressed through the term ousia shall, in Chapter 3, be correlated to the 
notion of Atman. The model of "distinctiveness in unity"\O is not new as Gunton 
6 As exemplified by John Zizioulas see BC, pp.16-50. 
7 As Gunton stated that the Fathers' concern was to "avoid what we can fairly call individualism", 
ibid., p.93. 
R Colin Gunton even concludes that the Cappadocian model of hypostasis, and particularly that of 
Basil, was originally considered in terms of developing "a relational conception of person", Gunton, 
The Promise o/Trinitarian Theology, p.94. 
9 The equating of ousia with Atman within a model of human personhood will qualify hypostatic 
difference through Atmanic unity will also be related to the conscious awareness (Cit) of the Atmanic 
reality. This type of consciousness will also be equated with a type of consciousness experienced in a 
noetic or deified mode of existence which shall be equated to a mode of existence that has a conscious 
awareness of the Atmanic reality or a Cid-iitmanic mode of hypostatic existence, as already discussed 
on page 47 of this thesis. 
lOG 
unton, The Promise o/Trinitarian Theology, p.94. 
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argues that it was the "marked feature of the biblical characterisation", 11 but Gunton's 
model is based on correlating distinctiveness in unity to an outer existentiality rather 
than focusing also on an inner reality. 
Consequently, a concept of person will be constructed where person indicates 
something more than the outer ecclesial person and is more than isolated individual 
as highlighted in the individualism of modem and postmodem notions of self, or mere 
bodily existence. Indeed, the Cartesian bifurcation of the individual will be rejected 
and a holistic model will be sought. The Greek Fathers' model of deified person will 
be utilised to indicate a profound mystical experience within hypostatic difference. 
Even though the term person has been used in contemporary models in a variety of 
ways to determine the character of individual existing, a concept of person should 
infer something more than an outward material existence. It will be argued that being 
a person or individual has to include a spiritual (noetic) nature, and that this implies 
something more than that which is argued by John Zizioulas' existentialist approach 
to person. 12 In response to the contemporary interpretation of Greek Patristic theology 
this chapter will also provide a background to the contemporary Eastern Orthodox 
debate on person. The study of person will also be extended to include a basic 
examination of the term prosopon (1tpocrC1)1tov) beyond the Cappadocians. 
The relationship between specificity, indicated through the term hypostasis and 
human individuality,13 and unity will also be explored in terms of relationality. The 
notion of the essential reality of particular existence will be examined in relation to 
the nature of a shared and common experience within the Trinity (oucriav 
KOtvOTl1'tO~). 14 This Trinitarian model of relationality will be correlated to the human 
condition to consider how human personhood and human relationality can be 
II Ibid. 
12 Zizioulas states, that his work is addressed to those who seek "in Orthodox theology the dimension 
of faith of the Greek Fathers, a dimension necessary to the catholicity of the faith ofthe Church and to 
the existential implications of Christian doctrine and of the ecclesial institution", see BC, p.26. 
13 This link between the use of hypostasis in the Trinity and in the human model was made by Basil of 
Caesarea, see Ep.38, 325A-328B, where specificity was indicated "by the, expression hypostasis" (ibid. 
328A) in the category of "man" and to affirm personhood in the Trinity (ibid. 329C) where the 
hypostasis of the Father is recognised by what is "individually Himself' (ibid. Deferrari). 
14 See Basil of Cae sa rea, Ep.38, 333A. 
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understood in relation to a unity of being, especially when both {)1t6(rracn~ and oU0'1a 
together indicated a sense of complete being. 15 
The re-addressing of the Cappadocian model of hypostasis will constitute an 
exploration of terms demonstrating that there was evident an evolution of Greek 
Patristic terms from the Council ofNicaea (c. 325) to Council ofCha1cedon (c. 451).It 
is also evident that these terms are not static but are continually changing and indeed 
are still evolving, 16 which permits a precedent for the terms to be evolved further in 
this thesis. 
To understand the way the terms and ideas of the Greek Fathers are being developed 
it is important to consider the contemporary theological scene in which the 
hermeneutical models are presented. Within this scene, approaches to the Greek 
Fathers have become centred in certain approaches to person such as the equating of 
outward looking person with hypostasis and influenced through the ideas of John 
Zizioulas. 17 
2.1.1 Individuum 
The use ofthe term hypostasis in contemporary Eastern Orthodox models has come to 
be used within a context of an apologetic to Western models of individuum, or 
individual,ls hence before I examine the notion of hypostasis in relation to the 
15 For examples see: Basil, Ep.38. 325A; Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28.11, 88C; and Gregory of Nyssa, 
Tres DU. 115A. 
16 It will be argued that the Cappadocian use of hypostasis was placed within a corpus of Greek 
Patristic notions that was evolving ideas within a narrative that included notions of "personal identity", 
"autonomy", and "freedom" (argued by Gerson in, Knowing Persons. p.5) and where such ideas 
represent not the end of the journey in discovering the nature of person, but the beginning. In such a 
narrative a variety of terms were employed as tools to understand a sense of individuality, such as: 
hypostasis; aut~ or self (indicating individual or in connection with prefix, i.e. true-self or autaA.T\etl~, 
true-God! God-self, or aut6eEo~, perfect-self or aUtOtEA.~~, see G. W. H. Lampe, A Greek Patristic 
Lexicon. Oxford: 2005); 6.tOIlO~ or indivisible part (see Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon); iOlO~ or 
one's oWn/personal (ibid.); and 7[p6o(J)7[oV (face/mask). 
17 The debate on the development of person in relation to Zizioulas and an authentic Greek Patristic 
models is highlighted by Douglas H. Knight (ed.), The Theology of John Zizioulas. Personhood and 
Church (UK: 2007). 
IKTh . 
e equatmg of the term hypostasis with person as different to individual is exemplified by 
Ar~himandrite Sophrony see, His Life is Mine (Crestwood: 1977), p.23, and Archimandrite Zacharias's 
notIOn of 'The Hypostatic Principle' in Christ. Our Way and Our Life (South Canaan: 2003). See also: 
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Cappadocians it is important to contextualise an examination to this apologetic. 
Eastern Orthodox paradigms have used the notion of person with the term hypostasis 
to indicate something different from individual,19 as Zizioulas states that being "a 
person is fundamentally different from being an individual".20 However, it will be 
demonstrated that the Cappadocians did not view a concept of individual as different 
to the term hypostasis. Indeed, it cannot be affirmed that the Cappadocians even had a 
fully developed sense of individual as understood in the contemporary sense of the 
word. What can be asserted is that a concept of individual was beginning to be 
developed to mean person in Cappadocian theology, through the term hypostasis. 
However hypostasis initially meant something altogether completely different. 
What can be asserted is that if the word individual does mean materialistic, bodily 
creature, then the Greek Fathers did indeed make a distinction between the fallen, 
lower condition of humanity, and the noetic (spiritual) or higher aspect of human 
beings or 'man' (iivepol1to~il. In general terms, the Greek Fathers22 did not develop a 
distinct concept of person but utilised the general category of 'man' , and hypostasis 
mostly in the context of divine existence, to develop a model that focused on specific 
particularity or distinctiveness.23 Distinctiveness was classified through a focus on 
what was general, which was denoted through the term "man", in contrast to what was 
particular. Basil stated that "when you say 'man' (iivep(01to~), you thereby signify the 
general class, and do not specify any man who is particularly known by that name". 24 
Specificity was also correlated to a notion of hypostasis or to a specific existence (TOV 
Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: 1991); Zizioulas, BC; 
Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition (Greece: 1998); Christos Yannaras, 
Elements of Faith (Edinburgh: 1998); Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God. The World: 
Creation and Deification (2; Brookline: 2000); Nicholas Sakharov, I Love Therefore I am (Crestwood: 
2002). 
19 This is generally expressed in the works of; Sophrony, His Life is Mine; Zizioulas, BC; Yannaras 
Elements of Faith; Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition; and also Colin Gunton, The 
Promise of Trinitarian Theology. pp.1 0-11. 
20 Zizioulas, BC, p.1 05. This view is also exemplified in the works of Archimandrite Sophrony where 
the term hypostasis takes on a theocentric dimension in expressing a relational character of the divine 
persons not evident in the term individual which infers isolation, see His Life is Mine. pp.23, 35, 37,43-
45,116; Zizioulas. This view is also generally expressed by Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the 
Orthodox Tradition; Vladimir Lossky, In The Image and Likeness of God; 'The Doctrine of the Holy 
Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution', in Christoph SchwObel (ed.), Trinitarian 
Eheology Today (Edinburgh: 1995), p.55; and by Christos Yannaras, see Elements of Faith. 
For examples of the use of "man" as a generic term see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif..126A, 144D. 
22 They followed the Platonic line of thought, see Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons (Oxford: 2003), 
r·2. 
3 Basil of Cae sa rea, Ep.38 (PG 32), 325B (Deferrari). 
24 Ibid. 
58 
i31ro~)25 in the Trinity, while the tenn iivepro1to~ was a generic detennination to 
examine the human, nature composite of body (oroflll) and soul ('l'Uxil).26 Through the 
generic tenn 'man', the individual was considered through somatic existence, 
compound (crUYKtflll)27 of material elements, and the soul. But it was the tenn 
hypostasis that was generally used, especially in a Trinitarian context, to denote 
specificity. 
The tenn 'man' also indicated what can be accomplished in human beings where the 
lower parts can be restored through the higher. In this sense the Greek Fathers 
hannonised that which is above (spirit) and that which is below (body), as Maximus 
stated, "the principle of human nature is to exist in soul and body as one nature 
constituted of rational soul and a body".28 
Within this approach to person Zizioulas and Yannaras' ecclesiology comes to be 
opposed to the concept ofindividual,29 which is viewed in relativistic tenns. The 
mistake was to relate this idea within an outward existential context. From an 
ontological perspective the notion of person cannot be distinct from individual, for 
what can be applied to one can be applied to the other, and so the question of being a 
person has to relate to how a person exists, which seems to lead back to an affinnation 
of Zizioulas' approach. Indeed Zizioulas' view can be considered useful if it indicates 
a focus on the inner nature of the person and not just the outer condition. This relation 
of the inner with the outer however, seems to be lacking in Zizioulas' model, but it 
does seem to be well defined in the Greek Fathers. 
25 Ibid. (328A), however, this was to establish in the Trinity an understanding of what was specific (to 
tOlOV) or different to other hypostases as compared to what was shared (to KOlV6v); this notion of 
commonness and particularity was also expressed in Aristotle. On the Soul. 3.1425a.15. 
26 This general way of describing the human, see Gregory of Nyssa Hom.Opif.. influenced by the 
Platonic model, see Phaedrus which states that "every body which derives motion from without is 
soul1ess , but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the very nature of the soul", 
Phaedrus 24.245E-246A (Fowler); and from Aristotle where the soul "is the first cause and principle of 
the living body" (Aristotle, On the Soul, 2.4415a.9; Hett) and has a rational context, see Metaphysics. 
which refers to "the rational part of the soul" (~<; 'lfUxi'\<; tv t& 'A.Oyov £xovn), Met.IX.I046a.35b 
(Tredennick), where the focus is upon rationality; not as with Plato which was upon essence, the 
essence of the soul ('lfUxi'\<; ouo{av), Phaedrus 24.245E-246A. 
27 (PG 46), 168-248; Plato considered the soul to be immortal and the cause oflife, indicating the 
nature of the human individual. Plato, Phaedo, \07C, and Phaedrus 246A (Fowler). 
2M SM. 
ee aXlmus, Ambig.42, 134 ID. 
29 Th· 
IS argued by: Colin E. Gunton, The Promise o/Trinitarian Theology. Zizioulas. BC, and Kal1istos 
Ware, "'In the Image and Likeness"': The Uniqueness of the Human Person', in John T. Chirban, 
Personhood: Orthodox Christianity and the connection Between Body, Mind and Soul (Westport: 
1996). 
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2.1.2 An Authentic Tradition? 
Even though the idea of hypostatic person in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy seems 
to be presented as fixed, indicating an authentic interpretation of the Greek Fathers 
and in contradistinction to notions of individual, this view seems difficult to support 
as it implies a fixed superior position by which all other considerations are negated. 
This is clearly not the case as contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, though representing 
some sort of continuation ofthe Byzantine tradition, has become influenced by 
Western ideas. Contemporary Eastern Orthodox models of person have not only 
utilised Western existentialist constructs, but in doing seem to have radically departed 
from early Patristic notions of hypostasis. 
However, Eastern Orthodox contemporary scholars have not developed their ideas in 
isolation, but within a milieu that has forged those ideas, which is reflected in their 
interpretations of the Cappadocians. Nevertheless in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy 
many Orthodox scholars view themselves as bringing a corrective to Western 
philosophical models. The importance attached to this corrective by many, but not all 
Eastern Orthodox theologians, cannot be underestimated, nor can the penitential 
attitude for believing that Eastern Orthodoxy has succumbed to Western processes 
which have distorted, "authentic Eastern patterns of theology". 30 This attitude could 
be the reasoning behind the need to polemicise Western theological constructs. 
Contemporary exponents of this type include George Florovsky, John Zizioulas and 
Christos Yannaras. 3 ( Consequently Zizioulas, who cites Florovsky, states that a return 
30 Christos Yannaras. On the Absence and Unknowability of God (London:2005). p.5 
31 At the forefront of Orthodox developments. in the first half of the 20lh century. were the Russian 
Orthodox scholars who developed what is called neopatristic theology. This style of new approach to 
the Greek Fathers which emerged from the meeting of Eastern Orthodox Russian emigres in Paris with 
the West. and were exemplified in Sergi us Bulgakov. George Florovsky. Vladimir Lossky. and 
Archimandrite Sophrony. They crafted a Russian style of "neopatristicism" (see Alan Brown. 'On the 
Criticism of Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology'. in D. Knight ed .• The Theology 
of John Zizioulas, Personhood and Church. p.36) that utilised Western philosophy and yet. at the same 
time. polemicised Western concepts. Nevertheless the Slavophiles were content to admit utilising 
modem concepts of person. and did so to radicalise the notion of persona to argue against the notion of 
individuum through the language of deification. Nikolai Sakharov affirms that in particular. Berdyaev. 
Florovsky and Lossky considered hypostasis to indicate the opposite of "individuum".31 and Sakharov 
states. "For Sophrony. person is the opposite of individuum: the entire content of life of person is the 
not 'I'. my 'Ego' but other persons". See Nikolai Sakharov. 'Monastic Life According to Fr Sophrony·. 
Sourozh 99 (2005), pp.29-41 31 
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to the Greek Fathers represents "the rediscovery of this consciousness, lost in the 
tortuous paths of medieval scholasticism and the 'Babylonian captivityd2 of modern 
Orthodoxy".33 Zizioulas along with Lossky, Florovsky, Ware, and Yannaras,34 
represent a body of Eastern Orthodox scholars who argue that their work provides a 
corrective, by considering person as meaning something different from the Western 
notion of individual. 35 
Paradoxically this corrective is accomplished by Zizioulas through the utilising of 
Western existentialism.36 Zizioulas directly relates his understanding of person to an 
"authentic" interpretation of the Greek Fathers. 37 This authentic interpretation is 
presented through an existential model where the outward act, through communion 
(koinonia),38 is stressed rather than the inner reality of being. Also Zizioulas believes 
his views bring a corrective to substance based models,39 to an Augustinian stress on 
substance,40 and hence to Western models. 
The notion of Eastern Orthodoxy correcting Western ideas through existentialist 
approaches, focusing on outward existence and difference rather than on essential 
being itself or unity, is also taken up by Yannaras.41 Yannaras negates the 
"ontological argument,,42 to affirm the existentialist position and also to highlight that 
absolute being is beyond our understanding. He correlates the negation of the divine 
in the West, where "God is absent",43 with the Western focus on substance and being. 
32 This also echoes Luther, see Luther's Works (Philadelphia: 1967), p.xxxvi. 
JJ Zizioulas, BC p.20.The phrase 'Babylonian captivity', of Georges Florovsky was utilised also by 
Yannaras, see On the Absence and Unknowability of God, p.4. 
34 In the most recent study on the theology of Zizioulas, Douglas H. Knight (ed.), The Theology of John 
Zizioulas. Personhood and Church, for me misrepresentations and misreadings of the Fathers and the 
distinction between person and individual becomes the main core of the debate. 
3S See footnote 2 of this Chapter, but this argument is presented by numerous Eastern Orthodox 
scholars throughout their works, see: Archimandrite Sophrony, His Life is Mine (Crestwood; 1977); 
Vladimir Lossky, In The Image and Likeness of God: Zizioulas, BC and Communion and Otherness 
(London: 2006); Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith and 'Person and Individual' in Morality and 
Freedom (Crestwood: 1984); Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition (Greece: 
1998). 
36 This has already been shown, see, Zizioulas, BC: and Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability 
~f ~~~ulas, BC, p.26, though authentic is not stated as such here, this is the general implication. 
3M Z" I IZIOU as, BC, pp.16-18. 
39 S Z" I ee IZIOU as, Communion and Otherness, pp.118-119. 
40 Ibid. 
41 
See Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God. :~ Ibid. p.25; which was developed by Anselm, see Proslogion (Charlesworth). 
Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God, p.21. 
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But for him the Christian East focuses on what can be known of God, the mode of 
hypostatic existence, which for him, through Eastern Orthodox Christianity, resolves 
issues the West cannot. Yannaras however, does not say that God is without essential 
being, but that God is beyond our understanding.44 Yannaras thus concludes that 
because he believes that the Absolute God is beyond the human condition, we can 
know only of the divine existence45 (hyparxis) or hypostasis, which radically affects 
the way humans consider their own hypostatic existence. 
The focus, especially by Zizioulas and Yannaras, on developing a correction to 
Western models has paradoxically led to a synthesis46 between Greek Patristic 
concepts and Western existentialist ideas.47 This type of synthesis has led to a new 
type of theological existentialism, which utilises the discourse ofrelationality48 
incorporated into a contemporary Greek Patristic narrative. This relationality has 
consequently impacted on the way in which Greek Patristic theology is done49 and led 
to a focus upon hypostasis through act, which has also allowed a focus on energies 
rather than on the essentiality of being, or ousia. 5o The exact relationship of the 
historical development of contemporary relational constructs in Eastern Orthodoxy 
44 Ibid. p.83; see also R. D. Williams 'The Theology of Personhood: A study in the Thought of 
Yannaras', Sobornost, 6 (1972), pp.415-430. 
45 Z" I IZIOU as, Communion and Otherness, p.14. 
46 Z" I IZIOU as, BC. p.26. 
47 Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability o/God, p.2. 
4& This discourse is highlighted by Paul M. Collins, 'The Nature and Mission of the Church 
Communion: God, Creation and Church', American Academy o/Religion; Ecclesiological 
Investigations Group (Washington: 2006). 
49 However, in the Eastern Orthodox scholastic community, a division seems to have arisen and Alan 
Brown divides the contemporary field into those belonging to "Anglophone Orthodoxy" (see Brown, 
'On the Criticism of Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology', p.36) and a 
"Zizioulian' school" (ibid.) representing two distinct bodies of scholars within the contemporary field. 
The first, "Anglophone Orthodoxy", emerged from the "English tradition of Orthodox patristic 
theology ... within the Anglican-Orthodox milieu centred in Oxford" (ibid) which became open to 
Western philosophy and academia. The second body of scholarship for Alan Brown, pertaining to 
"Zizioulian" thought, has remained faithful to neopatristicism. For Alan Brown a split has developed 
between the two groups, the later remaining faithful, and the former (exampled in John Behr and 
Lucian Turcescu) moving away from what is perceived as traditional Orthodoxy, concerning 
themselves with "Anglican post liberalism" (ibid.) and attacks on Zizioulas. See, Sarah Coakley, 
Michael Rene Barnes and Lewis Ayres, as highlighted by M. Ludlow, see M. Ludlow, Gregory 0/ 
Nyssa. Ancient and Post/Modern. p.58. 
50 Yannaras, 'The distinction Between Essence and energies and its Importance for Theology', SVTQ 
19/4 (1975), pp.232-264. There is not enough space in this thesis to go into the energy-essence debate 
as developed by Gregory Palamas (c. 1296-1359) in the Late Byzantine period, and which has become 
so important in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, especially in the teachings of Vladimir Lossky, but 
the use of divine uncreated energies has become the driving force behind contemporary Eastern 
Orthodox Christology and understanding the human participation with God. 
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and personhood in relation to energetic models has not been examined, and will not 
be examined in this thesis, but still needs to be studied. 
The development of person within the outward looking person has forced a focus on 
the nature of existence in persons, and based upon the Trinity as a community model, 
and has developed a stress on how God is, not what he is. 51 When this was then 
translated into human personhood it has resulted in a focus, not on what human 
persons can know of their essential being, but only of their outward existence. In 
Zizioulas' works the notion of essential reality of being is completely negated,52 
which is not so much the case in Yannaras. In both theologians' works the outward 
person is understood within a relational model that utilises communion to qualify, not 
only a Western model of individual, but to allow the notion of individual to gain an 
existential character or mode of existence without denuding a Greek Patristic 
emphasis on a higher condition of being. The concept of being is then transferred 
from a focus on the properties of being to activities, which becomes the nature of 
being. The focus is shifted to an emphasis on outer existence, where it becomes 
important not only to understand causality of being, but the way in which being 
operates through relationally. 
2.1.3 Zizioulas and Relationality 
Thus the contemporary focus on the way human persons exist has become related to 
relationality in the context of the term hypostasis.53 This relationality puts the stress in 
communion as an act of relationally. Consequently Zizioulas states that, not even God 
has "ontological content, no true being, apart from communion". 54 
The word communion or koinonia becomes important for around it Zizioulas centres 
his whole ontological model stating that "without the concept of communion it would 
II See Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood' in Christoph Schwi}bel and 
Collin Gunton (eds.), Persons Divine and Human (Edinburgh: 1991), pp.44-45; see also Yannaras, On 
the Absence and Unknowability of God. p.29. 
12 The essential nature of the human being shall be correlated to the term Alman in chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis. 
IJ As highlighted by Zizioulas, see BC, pp.16-36. 
14 See Zizioulas, BC, p.17. 
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not be possible to speak of the being ofGod".55 This use of koinonia (communion) to 
express the outward unity of hypostases has had a huge impact upon present-day 
theologians56 and subsequent interpretations of Cappadocian thought. The notion of 
communion is very important for it is shaping the way in which theologians revisit the 
Cappadocians. However, as it shall be shown later in this chapter, the notion of 
communion in the Cappadocians, although expressed through the hypostases, centred 
on unity57 through the tenn ousia, where a communion was developed through a 
"community of substance", and Basil stated: 
Therefore we assert that in the community of substance (ouoia~ KOlv6'tT\n) 
there is no accord or community as regards the distinguishing notes assigned 
by faith to the Trinity, whereby the individuality of persons of the Godhead .. .is 
made known to us, for each is afprehended separately by means of its own 
particular distinguishing notes.5 
While contemporary notions of relationality have come to be equated with a 
heterogeneous model of person,59 negating the place for an autonomous notion of 
individual, in this thesis a compromise is sought where the notion of individual 
evolves a sense of relational person but through individual personal development and 
restoration. However, the Greek Fathers show no evidence of developing a distinction 
between individual and person, but related what was particular (to \BlOV),60 or 
hypostasis. to autonomy and the specific characteristics of each hypostasis (of the 
Trinity). But this was an outward existential denotation for in the united being of God, 
unity was related to the shared nature of God the ()usia. the shared essence of the 
divine and to non-difference. Because of the ontological disposition of the divine, in 
which three hypostases represented the existential characteristics of the united divine 
SS See BC,p.17. 
56 I am thinking of the scholastic debate on personhood exampled in the work of Douglas Knight (ed.) 
The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church (UK: 2007). 
57 As Gregory Nazianzen stated that though there is "numerical distinction, there is no division in the 
substance", Or.29. 76B (Wickham). 
SR Toutou EvElCEV tv tfi ti'\~ ouo{~ lCOlV6tT\tl ucrUllPUtll «PUIlEV dVa\ lCui UlCOlVWVTttU tn E1tlOEWPOUIlEVU 
tfi tPlllOl YVWP{oIlUtU, 01' 6)V ti iot6TT\~ nup{crtUtUl twv tv tf\ n{OtElnupuoEoOIlEvWV npoownov, 
ElClloTou TO~ ioiOl~ yvwpiOIlUOI OtalCElCPlIlEvW~ lCUTaAUIlPuvolltvoU', Basil Ep. 38 (PG 32). 329C-332A 
(Deferrari). 
S9 See Georges Florovsky, 'Creation and Creaturehood', in Collected Works of Georges Florovsky: 
Creation and Redemption (3; Belmont: 1976), pp.47-48, who equated heterogeneity with the created; 
~e al~o Zizioulas, BC; and Christos Yannaras. Elements of Faith. 
BaSIl of Caesar ea. Ep.38. 325A-C; Maximus Ep.15. 545A. 
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being, heterogeneity or otherness has come to be applied to the term hypostasis. This 
implies difference which is qualified through a type of existence or mode of 
hypostatic existence,61 which is thought to promote a relational model of person as 
argued by Zizioulas.62 It will be argued however that relationality should also be 
applied through a stress on what was shared {'to Kotv6v),63 not just to hypostasis. This 
sharing allows a sense of difference, or hypostatic heterogeneity, to indicate that 
ontological unity underlines any expression of otherness. The notion of otherness does 
not undermine the nature of unity, especially when considering the Trinity, but relates 
the notion of communion to unity. Communion is established as the centre of unity in 
existential difference with an emphasis on the underlying nature of difference or the 
essential reality of being. In Zizioulas' model of otherness however, communion, 
through hypostatic relationality is stressed where the emphasis is on the outward 
looking subject, which becomes the medium of unity not the divine ousia. This type 
of relationality shall be examined later in relation to the Cappadocians but it can be 
stated here that it provides an unsatisfactory resolution to individual and communion 
as it is never revealed what the two actually mean. Because of the forcing of a notion 
of relationality as being through communion and the term hypostasis. it is necessary 
to ask whether some contemporary Byzantine scholars, including Zizioulas, have read 
back into the Greek Fathers ideas that were not originally conceived by the Greek 
Fathers. Lucian Turcescu also thinks this to be the case, and argues that Zizioulas: 
uses nineteenth- and twentieth-century insights which he then foists on the 
Cappadocians. This methodology leads him to misleading conclusions. 64 
Turcescu considers that contemporary ideas of person were alien to the ancients65 and 
criticises Zizioulas for making a distinction between person and individual.66 
61 z· . IZloulas, BC, p.50. 
62 This is what is argued throughout the works of Zizioulas, see BC and Communion and Otherness. 
63 This is explicitly made by Basil who refers to a "community of substance" (KOlV6tl1tl ouoiru;) and 
states that, "that which is separated in person is at the same time united in substance" (Kcli to 
KEX(oPlO~tvOV tv lJ1[OOtlloEl Kui to auVl1~~tvov tv tfl ou<rlu olM<JKouou), see Letter 38, 336 
(Deferrari). This point is also made in relation to Maximus the Confessor by modem scholars, see also 
M. Toronen, Union and Distinction in the Thoughts ofSt Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: 2007), p.25. 
64 L . 
uClan Turcescu, 'Person Versus Individual, and Other Modem Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa'. 
in Sarah Coakley, Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa, p.1 06. 
65 This is the point made by Lucian Turcescu who argues that "the ancients did not have a notion of 
person before the Cappadocians ... They (the ancients) did not connect soul with individual, because 
before the Cappadocians they only had rudiments of a theory of individual", see Gregory of Nyssa and 
the Concept of Divine Persons, pp. 7 -8. Here it can also be seen that Turcescu links the notion of 
individual with person. 
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Turcescu believes that such distinguishing is a modem concern. Consequently I do 
not think Zizioulas' fault is reading ideas back into the Cappadocians or a manifesting 
a certain personhood narrative, for that is what I shall do, but that his interpretations 
tend to over-stress outward existentiality, or difference. 
Yannaras and Zizioulas utilise the relational models of Buber, Heidegger and Levinas 
to accomplish their existential tasks.67 This seems to be inconsistent with an authentic 
position being so dependent on Western models, in developing a kind of relational 
existentialism. This modified form of existentialism negates the concept of essential 
or pure being and replaces it with the notion of relational acts of existence with other 
persons who also act in a way that conforms to an authentic form of relationality. 
The notion of an existential communion is qualified in this thesis through a 
relationality in which a communion established through an experience of the nature of 
pure being expresses unity, and is equated with a notion of Atman. In this communion 
a concept of hypostasis is qualified to contextualise difference through a unity-based-
relationality. This unity can then be expressed outwardly through a mode of existence, 
but a mode of hypostatic difference is not the essence of being. but expresses the 
outward nature of unity. In this existence, the notion of mode will be developed to 
include the idea of an Cid-iitmanic modeMI of hypostatic existence or an awareness of 
the Atmanic condition within the hypostasis. This condition indicates a particular type 
of existence that incorporates a change of consciousness in the experience of 
deification of the holy one, the enlightened master or yogi. The completed person or 
yogi through God's grace comes to understand the nature ofhislher existence 
(hypostasis) through an experience or awareness (of consciousness or Cit) of pure 
being or Atman. This view modifies the existentialist position of Yannaras and 
Zizioulas who highlight a methodology that puts the focus on outward relationality 
66 Lucian Turcescu, 'Person Versus Individual. and Other Modem Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa', 
in Sarah Coakley. Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa. p.l 06. 
67 The connection between Heidegger. Buber and Levinas has already been given. and indeed 
Yannaras' work On the Absence and Unknowability of God is a testimony to the desire by some 
Eastern Orthodox theologians to orientate their ideas through modem philosophers. This is also evident 
in Zizioulas' work Communion and Otherness. pp.43-56. See also: Martin Suber. I and Thou (London: 
1937.2004); Martin Heidegger. Being and Time (Oxford: 1962.2004); John Macmurray. The Self as 
Agent (NY: 1957); Levinas, Outside the Subject (Stanford: 1993). On Thinking-of the-Other: Entre 
Nous. and Humanism and the Other ~ . 
As already stated in Chapter 1.4.6 of this thesis. 
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and existence. It also moves the stress away from the autonomous self. to a 
heterogeneous communion based on an "1-Thou,,69 type of existentialism and a 
Heideggerian type of relational-cum-existentialist approach to person. 70 Within this 
existential relationality the personal experience of the unique individual71 is reduced 
to an outer pre-determined act, making personal communion a sort of relational 
"determinism".72 The character and nature of this type of model of person is valued 
only within an activity of an automaton collective. This model promotes the concept 
of a relational communion at the cost of personal identity and personal participation. 
I however, qualify the notion of separate individual or the natural physis, through a 
relational value of an experience of 'I am Thou' rendered through unity with the 
divine. In this type of relational model a person is not only valued as an outward 
looking entity but experiences a relational and thus inward dynamic where the 
purifying of a lower nature is accomplished through the higher. This purifying activity 
is not to be considered in isolation or due to the gaining of a property of some 
impersonal nature. The spiritual activity of purifying the lower nature is directly 
related to the acting and willing of the divine who creates a low nature with the 
capability to escape that nature through the potentiality of existing hypostatically. 
Hence Maximus stated that existence is: 
shaped by the intention (gmime) of the one who speaks. So being able to speak 
always belongs to the nature, but how you speak belongs to the hypostasis. 73 
Through this model hypostasis comes to reflect firstly, the reality of a bound 
condition and then the capabilities ofa coming out of the lower nature (ek-stasis) 
through a mystical communion with the divine reality (en-stasis), which is able to 
look beyond that lower condition. The term hypostasis infers a double dynamic of 
69 As developed by Buber who states "the primary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation", in I 
and Thou, p.13. 
70 Ch· 
71 nstos Yannaras, Elements of Faith (Edinburgh: 1991), pp.29-30, 58-59. 
See also Lossky,ln the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood: 2001), p.105, who basically makes 
the same point. 
72 Th· . IS vIew modifies Lossky's opinion of "sacramental determinism" in which the "collective totality 
of the Church tends to suppress personal encounter with God". See Lossky, In the Image and Likeness 
o/God. p.\05. 
7 Maximus, Opse.3, 48A (Louth). 
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existing and being.74 Within this model, communion does not only indicate an outer 
activity ofthe person but an inner awareness of the divine, which allows the person to 
understand both the limited and limiting condition which is then transformed within a 
unifying condition. If the act of communion was the centre of being it would not be 
able to conceive of another act outside of its initial relational activity and not be able 
to create a limiting condition and then a unifying condition in which limited 
hypostases exist. However, when being is grasped as coming from an essential divine 
reality not as an external act, all activities can be understood as issuing from this 
centre ofthe highest being as principles of the divine being. This will be examined 
later in the chapter on deification. Just as the Logos hypostasis transformed the natural 
physis to its true hypostatic existence, so too in the human person the hypostasis 
indicates the potentiality for restoration through a deification of natures. Within this 
deification experience a communion is wrought after being, which is the evidence of 
an activity emanating from the source of deification. The activity is not the source but 
the effect by which that source can be understood and by which human persons can 
then be understood. 
In this type ofrelationality, through an experience of unity with the hypostasis. the '1-
Thou' of traditional relational models is changed to an 'I Am Thou' model. In this 
model the human physis is radically transformed within an experience of hypostatic 
deification or union with the divine, where the cognition of an inner reality, the 
Atman. affirms a true cognition in the hypostasis. transforming the natural physis and 
allowing for a true relationality. This model modifies Zizioulas' notion of person, 
where the use of communion expresses a heterogenic existential relationalality, so as 
to affirm that the ontological condition of hypostasis indicates the true condition of 
the human physis. This condition reflects a mode of life that experiences an Atmanic 
condition. While in Zizioulas' anti-substantialist model being is reduced to the outer 
existential of the undetermined, that is to say Zizioulas never tells us what this 
communion is, in this thesis, being also includes the essential reality (Atman) that 
underpins all existential conditions. 
74 As Cyril of Alexandria stated that "(the body of the Word) in its own nature has been enriched with 
the Word who is united to it. It has become holy, life-giving, full of the divine energy. And in Christ 
we are too transfigured", That Christ is One 1269 (PG 75); translation by Oliver Clement, The Roots of 
Christian Mysticism (London: 1995). 
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However, in Zizioulas' model, a collectivisation becomes evident where a hegemonic 
type of ecclesial communion develops in which communion becomes qualified 
through some space outside of essential being, negating the space of the personal. In 
Zizioulas' model we see a move towards a modified fonn of existentialism evident in 
his relational ecclesiology where persons attain an authentic personhood,7s not in the 
individual experience, but in an outward act. Paradoxically, whilst claiming to support 
the Greek Patristic hypostatic model of person (hypostasis), which qualifies 
hypostatic difference in notions of unity, Zizioulas' fonn of relationality represents a 
de-hypostasising76 of the homogenous individual in its determining ontology through 
unknown dynamics. It cannot be stated with any certainty what Zizioulas' type of 
ecclesial communion indicates, where hypostasis ceases to be known or fixed. It 
indicates a non-specific relationality and shifts the focus away from the homogenous 
person to the heterogeneous, de-personalising and thus de-hypostasising personhood 
through a general existential category. Zizioulas' model, in putting the focus on 
ecclesial communion, stresses relatedness, the connection between beings, and not the 
beings themselves. The paradox of this type ofrelationality is that it is qualified in a 
common experience in the experience of the many as exemplified in the Trinitarian 
model. This places the focus back onto the generic, on the common experience rather 
than the particular or person, and thus to the general (ousia), a resolution that 
Zizioulas would not endorse. 
A working relationality should include a dynamic of unity in diversity, which allows 
the notion of individual to exist simultaneously as hypostatic unity. In this model the 
nature of the rational existence reflects some ontological likeness with the divine, 
being "akin" to the divine, yet having difference, which also indicated the limits of 
human understanding. Within the Trinity, difference indicates specific and yet 
pennanent characteristics, but within a united nature and it is this sense of unity and 
difference which becomes important when transposing such ideas into human models. 
Gregory Nazianzen stated: 
75 Z· . IZloulas, BC, p.58 
76 T~ese conclusions a drawn in relation to my studies on metaphysics such as R. Schacht, 
'ExIstentialism', in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics (Malden: 1995), pp.150-
156. 
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the aim is to safeguard the distinctiveness of the three hypostases within a 
single nature and quality of the Godhead .... The three are a single whole in 
their Godhead and the single whole is three in personalities (idiotes or 
properties). 77 
Thus there was developed a model of unity-in-difference in which hypostatic 
difference was not taken out of the notion of a centre of unity but qualified through it. 
While term hypostasis (u1t6crra<n<;)78 inferred a meaning which implied an underlying 
reality to a specific existence, the Cappadocians allowed it to indicate concrete 
individual existence. This provided answers to theological dilemmas, such as 
Sabellianism 79 in relation to the Trinity. But the Cappadocian emphasis on hypostasis 
relating to particular, concrete existence80 seems to have led to a negation of the 
Nicaean stress on ousia and thus unity, and consequently in the contemporary debate 
has led to an emphasis on outer existentiality. 
2.1.4 Existential Constructs: Tropos Hyparxeos 
The focus on outward existentiality, through Cappadocian theology has highlighted a 
stress on how persons should exist in answer to modem existentialism.81 In most 
contemporary models the focus is upon on difference,82 which has become the driving 
force behind present-day models of personhood. Consequently, there is evident a 
77 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.31.9, 113C; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, p.123. 
7M Etymologically i)7t6(Jtu(J~ derived from un:6 (under) and (Jta(J~ (standing),7K referring to that which 
supports. In a scriptural context u1t6(Jtu(Ju; referred to the underlying substance of a thing, person or 
deed and occurs five times in the New Testament and twenty times in the LXX. See also Lampe, A 
Greek Patristic Lexicon. In the Latin tradition, person was equated through the term persona. 
79 The use of the term hypostasis was also employed by Basil to refute those that denied the reality of 
the concrete existences of the Trinity in equating hypostasis with ousia. He stated that Sabellius 
understands "hypostasis and substance to be identical...But they did not there state (in the council of 
Nicaea) hypostasis and substance to be identicaL.!t is on the contrary clear that while by some it was 
denied that the Son was of the same substance with the Father, and some asserted that He was not of 
the substance and was of some other hypostasis, they thus condemned both opinions as outside that 
held by the Church", Ep.125, (Jackson). 
NO 
Example of see, Hom.Opif,ll, I 54C-0; and Hom.Opif,14, 1750. 
HI Zizioulas recognizes the importance of Heidegger and Buber in the personhood, especially within the 
context ofrelationality, stating that "the comprehension of the being of Dasein includes the 
comprehension of "the Other", see Communion and Otherness (London: 2006), pA5. Yet Zizioulas 
also recognizes the limitations of the models of Heidegger and Buber and considers also the relevance 
of Levinas in his interpretations of the Greek Fathers, especially in relation to otherness see 
Communion and Otherness pp 45-53 H2 ,. • 
For Yannaras, difference is the main ontological distinction between the world and God. see On the 
Absence and Unknowability a/God (London: 2005), p.53. 
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consensus in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy that the term person is a hypostatic 
denotation that relates to an existential interpretation, where the focus is upon person 
in respect of act rather than an inner reality. 
The existential perspective has consequently manifested too much stress on the 
material, on the outward existence and a sense of difference. This is exemplified in 
the writings of George Florovsky who in defence of this existentialist approach stated 
that, "the main distinctive mark of Patristic theology was its existential character". 83 
Through this existential approach the notion of person comes to be qualified through a 
way of existing. This emphasises not only difference and isolation, in the focus on 
difference, but that has come to infer that persons have no ontological centre by which 
unity is expressed. The focus on a way of existing does highlight that many types of 
existing can be affirmed, which allows unity to be developed through a way of 
existing with a substantialist stress. Nevertheless, focusing on a way of existence 
allows a focus on the way God exists, which provides a pattern for human persons. 
The way the divine exists should be considered as consequence to the divine being 
and not the other way round, but for Zizioulas being is a type of existence having no 
innate centre.84 Another way of putting it is that by observing hypostatic difference in 
the divine, humans come to understand their own sense of importance through the 
ontological condition of being a person. Zizioulas also affirmed this stance and states: 
"the fact that a human being is a member of the Church, he becomes an 'image of 
God,' he exists as God Himself exists; he takes on God's' way of being ",.85 Here 
again as with Yannaras the focus is on a way of existing or difference rather than on 
the what of being. 
Thus the way (mode) of existence, tropos hyparxeos (tp61to~ U1tap~E(J)~, or mode of 
eXistence),86 vouchsafes the notion of existential difference (or otherness) through the 
distinguishing particularity of each hypostasis. yet unity through communion, which 
is established through a type of mode of these hypostatic existences. 
RJ George Florovsky, 'St Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers', Sobornost 4 (1961). 
r;.165-176. 
See Ziziou1as, BC, p.17. 
R5 Z' . IZlou1as, BC, p.15. 
R6 ~ee Basil. Ep. 38 (PG 32). 337 A, which refers to il1tap~E(!)9'\J7t11p~l(;, pertaining to a type of 
eXIstence. 
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However, did the Cappadocians' place an emphasis on the existential through a focus 
on mode of existence as Zizioulas and Yannaras suggest? Turcescu confirms that 
tropos hyparxeos was not used at all by Plato or Aristotle or Gregory Nazianzen, but 
was mentioned three times in Gregory of Nyssa and five times in Basil ofCaesarea.87 
Hence the term was not widely employed by the Cappadocians, but it was used, for 
example in Letter 38 of Basil, to indicate the different characteristics or existences of 
the hypostases of the Trinity. 88 Basil stated that: 
Then there no longer remains to the Father exclusively to be called 
'unbegotten' in a sense peculiar to Himself alone if indeed the existence 
(U1t(lP~t~) if the Only-begotten is characterised by the individual not peculiar 
to the Father. 89 
Maximus also utilises the idea of mode (tp61to~) many times to indicate the 
relationship of a particular type of existing with the mode of existing90 even in the 
human condition, stating that the human principle exists as a soul and body as one 
nature and has a "mode ... which naturally acts and is acted upon, which can frequently 
change".91 The reason for change indicates that human beings each have two natures 
within a single hypostasis, one relating to the lower nature and another relating to a 
higher nature, where the lower is restored revealing the higher in deification. The type 
of existence a person has, indicates the mode of a particular nature which that a 
particular person is operating within. This model is based upon Cappadocian 
Christology, where Christ has, within a particular hypostasis, characteristics specific 
to Him and natures human and divine, which becomes a model to understand the 
divine and human conditions. 
X7 Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons. p.1 04. This has to be contextualised 
to the notion that Turcescu believes some of Basil's corpus to be written by Gregory of Nyssa. Ayres 
also states that the term was used 3 times by Basil see Nicaea and its Legacy p.21 O. It is fair to say the 
term was not employed much at all by the Cappadocians, which may, or may not be of importance. 
xx For an example of see Basil of Caesarea, Ep.38. 325A; and Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. 142B-D; see 
also G. L. Prestige, God in Christian Thought (London: 1959), pp.246-247; J. N. D. Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrines (London: 2000), p.265-267; and Brian E. Daley, 'Nature and the "Mode of 
Union": Late Patristic Models for the Personal Unity of Christ' , in S. Davis et at. (eds.), The 
'~car~ation (Oxford: 2002), pp.164-194. 
BaSil, Ep.38. 337 A (Deferrari). 
: For ~ome examples see Maximus, Ambig.42, 1341 D; and ThaI. 60 (CCSG, 22), 75. 
Maxlmus, Ambig.42, 13410; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.89. On the 
notion of tropos in Maximus also see Lars Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos (Crestwood: 1985), pp.43, 
88. 
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One of the main reasons for considering God through a mode of existence is that it 
allows a focus on what can be known of God and highlights what cannot be known. 
The apophatic model underlines the limits of human knowing, where human beings 
can only understand Trinitarian hypostatic specificity or the divine operations, for the 
divine ousia was beyond the comprehension of the human mind. 92 Gregory Nazianzen 
stated that: "to tell of God is not possible ... to know him is even less possible".93 This 
inability of the intellect to grasp a deeper nature, for Gregory Nazianzen, also implied 
a depth of being within the human soul. Gregory tells us that the soul, is "God like,,94 
when mingled with "its kin,,95 (God) but he does not elaborate how this is 
accomplished or on the implications for the human person. Gregory stated that the 
when the individual is deified "the copy returns to the pattern it now longs for".96 This 
pattern as the highest part of the soul could be grasped as a rational operation O .. o'Y\l(ti~ 
EvEP'Yei(l~).97 Gregory of Nyssa also affirmed that a capability for understanding was 
also part of the human condition, stating that "the soul, having perfection, is both in 
the spiritual and also in the mental (rational)",98 which indicates the capabilities of 
human higher awareness to comprehend the depth of the spiritual realms. In the same 
passage Gregory of Nyssa goes on to explain that the rationality of the soul is not 
enclosed "within any thing ... but the union of the mental with the bodily,,99 where 
union indicates a capability of the human person to understand the spiritual within 
some framework of conscious awareness. 
Nevertheless, the apophatic approach has come to be qualified through an emphasis 
on revealed types or modes of existence based upon Trinitarian theology and 
exemplified in the works of Christos Yannaras. Yannaras argues that the divine being, 
through his operations, extends his activities to the human realm, while God's true 
92 As Gregory of Nyssa stated that, "His glory, His holiness 'there is no end': and if His surroundings 
have no limit, much more is He Himself in His essence what ever it may be, comprehended by no 
limitation in any way", see Eun.3.5 (Moore). 
93 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28.4, (PG 36), 29C-31 B; translation by L. Wickham, On God and Christ: St 
Gregory of Nazianzus; The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius (Crestwood: 
2002), p.39. 
9
94 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28.17, 48C-49D; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, pp.s0-51. 
5 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 
9 
Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opij. 14 (PG 44), 176A. 
K~ 
vutUl toivuv Kat tt'\~ \jIUxi)~ tv ttp VEPtp tE Kat AOY1Ktp to ttUlOV txouaT\~, xOv 0 ~1l'l rout6 tattv, 
6~wvu~ov ~tv elval OUVatUl tfl \jIUXfl, oil Il~V Kat OvtUl~ \jIUX~, ili6. t~ tvtpYEla ~UlttK~, tfl ti)~ 'I'\)xi)~ 
KA.tlaEl <ruyKEKPllltvT\, See Hom.Opif. 15.2 (PG 44), 176D-I77; translation by W, Moore, On the 
~aking of Man (NPNF, 5), p.403. 
Ibid. 
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being is beyond the limits of human knowing. \00 Revelation through the divine 
activities provides humans with the knowledge of ways of existing open to human 
persons. Humans are restricted to knowing about the divine "Being"lOl but can know 
of the divine operations. Yannaras states that: 
apophatic knowledge, as the event of participation .. .is equivalent to 
participation in the body of the Church that is the historical realisation of the 
mode of existence of Christ, of the mode of the new human nature. l02 
The term "apophatic knowledge", however, seems to be problematic for it implies a 
revealed hidden knowledge which is not completely hidden for it has been revealed 
but not understood. It is not that divine awareness cannot be experienced but that it 
cannot be grasped within the normative consciousness. But for Yannaras any 
knowledge becomes immediately reduced to a knowing within a mundane mode of 
existence that reflects that incapacity, where the "mode of existence"lOJ informs the 
human person only of who he or she immediately is. He tells us nothing ofthe 
implications for this existence other than it is hypostatic and thus reflecting some 
personal traits which are shared. Yannaras does argue that the nature of that existence 
is hypostatical/y relational. He states that "the mode of existence that we know only 
'by participation'- only to the extent that we participate - we call personal".lo4 Thus 
being-ness for Yannaras is only to be understood through an outer participatory 
personhood, which reflects a personal mode of existence that is ecclesial in nature. 
The true and intimate nature of this participation is never fully explained. 
2.2 How Does Hypostasis Indicate Person? 
Within the theological topography of the Byzantine tradition, ideas relating to a 
concept of person have developed in relation to the Cappadocian use of hypostasisl05 
100 
Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability o/God, p.73. 
1011b·d I ., p.53. 
10' Ib·d 
• I., p.95. 
10} Ib·d 
104 I. p.95, which also becomes the mode of being (ibid., p.83). 
Ibid., p.84. 
105 
Of course there have been many other important factors and influences relating to the contemporary 
debate of person including the ideas of Karl Barth, Colin E. Gunton, Alistair McFayden and Alan 
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and it is within this context that the notion of person is re-addressed. But the initial 
question, can hypostasis come to signify that which is understood by a concept of 
person in the contemporary context, is not the same as did the Cappadocians 
purposefully equate hypostasis with a sense of person? The latter is impossible to 
answer as it cannot be proved that the Cappadocians had a distinct notion of person, 
although they may have indeed had some sense of personhood constructed around the 
word hypostasis. The term hypostasis did infer in the pre-Cappadocian era that ideas 
relating to concrete material existence were included within a metaphysical 106 context 
as hypostasis107 was an underlying reality of an existence. Hypostasis indicated the 
essential reality at the depths of being and existence, but was evolved through the 
Cappadocians. 108 
2.2.1 Divine Operations 
Through the development of term hypostasis. the Cappadocians re-cast ideas relating 
to subjectivity to focus on what they believed humans could know of God. the divine 
operations (£vEp'Yda~).I09 This focused the arguments on the extrusive or knowable 
operations of the divine, the characteristics of the persons of the Trinity, and denied 
access to understanding the divine ousia. Gregory of Nyssa attested that: 
Torrance which should also be considered, but I shall restrict the study within the context of Eastern 
Orthodoxy. Considering the term person, there is a consensus that the Cappadocians did have a general 
approach to the use of hypostasis. which is exemplified in the works of V. Lossky, see, In the Image 
and Likeness of God, pp.III-123; and 'The Cappadocians' in Lossky The Vision of God (Crestwood: 
1983), pp.73-89. 
106 The dynamism of the term hypostasis to include both dimensions is also argued by G. L. Prestige, 
God in Patristic Thought (London: 1959), who states that "Hypostasis thus comes to mean positive 
and concrete and distinct existence, first of all in the abstract, and later, as will be seen, in the particular 
individual", p.174; see also, pp.179, 189,233,240. 
107 The word im6crtacr~ comes from tl1t6 meaning under and crttlcrlC; meaning standing. 
lOR It is thought that initially, hypostasis was not viewed as indicating anything different than ousia. as 
J. Pelikan informed us; hypostasis was synonymous with ousia in the pre-Nicaean era. Later, even 
Athanasius (c. 296-373) "insisted that hypostasis is ousia and means nothing else but simply being''', 
see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition. p.219. On how the notion of substance or the property of 
being relates to Christian models see Prestige, God in Christian Thought. p.168; Christopher Stead, 
'Greek Influence on Christian Thought', in Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity (UK: 2000), 
p.183; and Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: The Emergence of the Catholic Faith. 100-600 
(I; Chicago: 1975), p.219; see also Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God. 
109 This is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa's work Tres Dii, which stated "every operation apart from 
which extends from God to the Creation .. .is named according to our variable conceptions of it, has its 
origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. For this 
reason the name derived from the operation is not divided", (PG 45), 125C-0; translation by Moore 
(NPNF 5), p.334. 
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Now if anyone should ask for some interpretation and description, and 
explanation of the Divine essence, we are not going to deny that in this kind of 
wisdom we are unlearned, acknowledging only so much as this, that it is not 
possible that that which is by nature infinite should be comprehended in any 
conception expressed by words. 110 
While this approach seemed to allow an inevitable focus on the operations of the 
Trinity, it was at the expense of understanding the divine ousia or the nature of divine 
unity. Through this operational focus, especially relating to the Son, a notion of 
person was successfully born that affirms the place for concrete and unique person 
who shares a personal existence in relation to others (to other persons of the 
Trinity). III This model has then been applied within contemporary models of person 
in relation to the Cappadocians to fix person within an operational context. However, 
the nature of the relationship of Christ to the other persons of the Trinity, or the exact 
nature of communion, and the consequent implications to human personhood has far 
from been resolved. 
The equating of hypostasis with concrete personal existence was first evidenced in the 
writings of Basil of Caesarea, who identified the specific characteristics (iSl<.tlJ.ult<.tlV, 
pertaining to one's own qualities) I 12 of each hypostasis of the Trinity, allowing not 
only a lens through which specificity in the divine could be examined, but the 
consequent evolution of ideas relating to a sense of personal being. This clarity of 
examination was also very much evident in the works of Gregory Nazianzen who 
stated that: 
The result is that though there is numerical distinction, there is no division in 
the substance. For this reason, a one eternally changes to a two and stops at 
three - meaning the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In a serene, non-
temporal, incorporeal way the Father is parent of the 'offspring' and originator 
of the 'emanation' - or what - every name one can apply when one has 
entirely extrapolated from things visible ... This is why we limit ourselves to 
110 See Eun. 3.5; translation by Moore (NPNF 5), p.146; see also Basil, Ep.38. 325A; Gregory 
NI azianzen, Or. 28. 48C-49D, Or.29. 76A-77B; Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. 142B-D. 
II S Z·· I ee IZIOU as, Communion and Otherness, pp.43-55. 
112 B '1 
. aSI stated that "Consequently, by all these means - the name, the place. the peculiar qualities of 
hIS character, and his external attributes as disclosed by observation - the description of the subject of 
the story becomes explicit", Basil, Ep.38. 328; translation by Deferrari, Basil I: Letters I-58 (LCL 
190), p.203. 
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Christian terms and speak of 'the Ingenerate' (aYEvvrJtov) 'the Begotten' 
(Y€VVT)tov), and 'what Proceeds (£K7tOpWO~EVOV) from the Father'. I \3 
Thus hypostasis (imoo-tume;) came to be related to what is individually characteristic, 
unique, existentially particular, 114 which also forced a distinction between hypostasis 
and ousia. In contemporary interpretations, this has led to a theological view that in 
the Cappadocians the divine hypostases or particular existences become almost 
separate from essential being, 115 the ousia, which becomes predicated as an aspect of 
the divine subjects or hypostases. The Cappadocians however, show no indications to 
divorce the divine ousia from the divine operations. On the contrary, the divine 
hypostases I 16 were implicitly related to the notion of unity expressed through the term 
"Godhead" (8EOtlle;). 117Neither did unity imply an existential collection of non-related 
characteristics or subjects, for Gregory of Nyssa declared. "to extend the number of 
the Godhead to a multitude belongs to those only who suffer from the plague of 
polytheistic error". I 18 Unity indicated the way in which specificity should be 
ontologically considered through the divine essence or ousia, where Trinitarian 
specificity indicated not disunity or a division between ousia and hypostatic 
existences, but a unity in both types of existence and being. Specificity provides the 
ontological manner by which unity was outwardly existentially expressed. Gregory of 
Nyssa stated: 
for our statement does not hereby violate the simplicity of the Godhead, since 
community and specific difference are not essence, so that the conjunction of 
these should render the subject composite. I 19 
111 WatE I(iiv apl9q, Ola<ptpu, tn yE oua{~ ,.lI) ttl1vEa9al. Ala tOUTO I10Va~ Wt'apXll~ E~ ouaoa 
I(lV'l9Eiaa, I1tx.pl Tpuioo~ £at'l. Kat tout6 tatlV ~l1tv 6 natllP. Kat 6 Yio~. Kat to iiYlOV 1tVEUl1a' 611£\1 
YEVV'lt(op Kat 7tpOeoA.EiJ~, A.tyw Ot a7tae(i)~, Kat ax.p6vw~, Kat aawl1(lTo~' t(i)v 0&, to 11£\1 yf:vvt1l1a. t6 0& 
np69A'll1a• ti OUK oto'07tW~ iiv t~ tauta KaA£aElEV. acpdwv 7telvt'l t&v 0PWI1£vwv ... Aui tOUtO tnt t(i)v 
~I1EtEpwV opwv iatell1EVol, to aytvv'ltov EiaelYOl1EV. Kat to YEVV'ltOv. Kat to tIC tOU natpo~ 
tK7topEU6I1EVOV, &~ no" CP'lalV aUt~ 6 eEO~ Kal A6yo~., Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 29.2 (PG 36), 76B-C; 
translation by Wickham, On God and Christ. p.70. 
114 This comes close to defining a notion of person as purU$a which will be examined in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
115 As exemplified by Zizioulas, in BC. p.17, who sees almost no role for ousia at all. 
116 S 
ee Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium de Trinitate or Ep.J89 of Basil of Cae sa rea (PG 32), 684. 
117 I I' . 
n re atton to the umty of the Godhead and the hypostatic operations see Gregory of Nyssa. Tres Dii. 
who makes clear his model of unity-in-difference (PG 45), 115A-136A. 11M 
See Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium de Trinitate or Letter J 89 of Basil of Caesarea (PG 32).684 
(Deferrari). 
119 
Gregory of Nyssa. Eun.12.5; translation by Moore (NPNF 5), p.247. 
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When applied at the human level, hypostasis indicates not isolated individuals 
collectively forming random communities, but where hypostases become intrinsically 
related to each other. Gregory of Nyssa's sense of community can be applied so as to 
make clear that "specific difference" 120 does not negate the place for unity within 
specific existences. This Cappadocian model of unity and difference was also 
highlighted in the "Cappadocian Settlement,,121 of the Trinity, of "one ousia and three 
hypostases". 122 This formula seemed to change the use of hypostasis in the light of the 
Council ofNicaea (c. 325), which was originally equated ousia with hypostasis. for 
the Council had stated, "from another hypostasis or substance" (E~ Etpepu<; 
u1toO'tamxo<; i1 oUO'iU<;).123 This statement has come be interpreted in a way that moved 
the notion of hypostasis away from ousia, 124 where the notion of personal hypostasis 
has been dislocated from ousia. But if hypostasis is to be reviewed through the notion 
of unity, then this dislocation is to be revised within the qualifying of particularity 
(hypostasis), through unity (ousia), while recognising the place for concrete identity. 
In this model, the hypostasis or particular self-aware concrete existence is informed 
through its essential reality as much as through its hypostasis. because of the 
inseparable unity within the divine being. 
To underline the role of unity whilst accepting the place for concrete specificity, the 
notion hypostasis has to be re-considered through the context of the Nicaean use of 
homoousios (6~00uO'lov), 125 to underline the need for unity within distinction. The 
term homoousios provides the context of hypostasis in the person of Christ who, "was 
the only begotten of God" (YEVV1l8Evtu EK tOU 1tUtpo<; ~OVOYEV1j).126 and has existence 
that is distinct from the Father, and yet is God by virtue of sharing the divine nature or 
ousia. The term hypostasis in the context of Nicaea provides a model of simultaneity, 
of unity and difference, which significantly changes the way to approach the term 
hypostasis when considering the context of substance. 
120 Ibid. 
I~I S P . G d' h ee restlge, 0 In C ristian Thought. p.232. 
122 Ibid. 
123 See Albergio et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.I-15; and Nonnan Tanner, Decrees of 
the Ecumenical Councils p.5. 124 • 
In contemporary times this shift in the notion of hypostasis is exemplified by Zizioulas, BC. p.48, 
where he divorces the divine essence from hypostatic existences stating "not on account of His 
~~bstance but ~n account of His trinitarian existence". 
See AlberglO et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.I-15; and Nonnan Tanner, Decrees of 
the Ecumenical Councils. p.5. 
126 Ibid. 
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2.2.2 Subjectivity: the Particular and the General 
While the Cappadocians had linked hypostasis to subjectivity, divine subjectivity was 
not disassociated from a sense of unity in the Council ofNicaea where hypostasis 
indicated the same as ousia. 127 This allowed for the essential reality of the Trinity (or 
the ousia) to be juxtaposed to Trinitarian difference within an ontological framework 
that did not divorce essential being from outer existence. Nevertheless, through the 
Cappadocians, the conceptual use of hypostasis changed. 128 The term hypostases 
came to be equated with specificity, moving the-term from a denotation that implied 
concrete SUbjectivity or individuality and not an underlying substance. This 
movement away from essential being seemed to be exasperated further by equating 
the operations with a mode of existence (tropos hyparxeos).129 In addition, the term 
hypostasis was equated with concrete uniqueness or specificity, relating to one's own 
existence (tOV iOic.oC;),130 which also allowed the term to focus on an outer life. 
To allow this conceptual change of hypostasis. Basil separated that which is 
individually specific, from that which is shared in both the human and divine cases, 
forcing a distinction between difference and unity. He gave the examples of "Peter, 
Andrew, John, or James" 131 to provide examples of uniqueness, and in each case to 
underline unity in the sharing of what is common, a generic nature (KOtVOTT)C; tf\c; 
q>ucn:c.oC;),132 or the "common element". 133 Hence this classification difference was 
expressed through uniqueness, or "a certain characteristic of a particular thing" 
(1tpa:YJ.1uto<; nvo<; 1tEPl'ypUq>,,), 134 implying a sense of the person. 135 Nevertheless, the 
127 Ibid. 
12K See Basil, Ep.38. 325A, where hypostasis is considered existentially as something different to ousia. 
as Basil stated: "Seeing that many, in treating of the mysterious doctrine of the Trinity, because they 
fail to discern any difference between the general conception of substance and that of the persons, 
come to like notions and think that it matters not whether they use the term 'substance' (ouo{av) or 
'person' (U7t60TQOlV)", 'E7tElO1'\ 7tOAAO{ TO KOlVOV TfI~ ouo{~ btl TUW I1Uat1K&V OO"fl1clTWV 111'\ 
OlaKp{voVTE~ ano TOU T&V U7tOOTcl(Jf:W~ A.6you, tat; autai~ auVEI17tl7tTOUOlV u7tovo{a~ Kal oloVTal 
OlalptpElv I1TJ0tv ouolav ~ U7t6ataolV; translation by Deferrari. Basil I; Letters J -58 (LCL 190), p.197. 
129 Ibid. 
130 S B '1 ee aSl, Ep.38. 325B. 
131 Ibid .• 325A-C. 
132 Ibid., 325C. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 S P . 
ee resttge, God in Patristic Thought, p.189. 
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starting point for the Cappadocians was an emphasis on difference, rather than the 
underlying unity of that difference. 
It was due to the lack of clarity in developing the terms hypostasis and ousia 136 that 
allowed the Cappadocians to use this lack of clarity to mould the term hypostasis into 
a form that could be applied to their outlook. Confusion surrounding these Trinitarian 
terms were especially acute when the terms were translated into Latin. 137 The term 
hypostasis in Latin would indicate substance, having a generic quality, turning the 
Latin Trinitarian definition into three substances in one essence, which would either 
be nonsense or a Sabellian mia-hypostatic formula. 138 Problems such as these allowed 
the Cappadocians to seize the initiative and provided the impetus to focus on 
specificity, 139 where hypostasis came to be related to concrete particular existences in 
the Trinity, while ousia came to indicate what is generic. However, the ontological 
implications of the generic in the Trinity were never fully explored. The Cappadocian 
interpretation of hypostasis, as argued by Zizioulas, did represent a revolution, 140 a 
revolution where the outcome moved the focus to subjectivity and shifted the stress 
away from the divine essence, or did it? Perhaps it was not as much of a revolution as 
Zizioulas would like for at the heart of the notion of difference was a sense of unity 
through the sharing of the divine essence. The upholding of this dichotomous position 
was later argued for by John of Damascus who stated that: 
136 This lack of precision in the use of hypostasis in the Council of Nicaea allowed the term to indicate. 
as Stead shows, either, "'same individual being'" or "'same species'" for there was no clear distinction 
made. See Stead, 'Greek Influence on Christian Thought', p.184. Tixeront therefore asked, "what is an 
ouain, and what is an U1t6(JTaO'l~"? • Tixeront, History of Dogmas (USA: 1914), p.76. In my opinion, 
what Tixeront was real\y asking, was, what was the centre of being in God. or what has priority in 
God's being? 
137 A A . d ' s ugustlOe state ; "Our Greeks have spoken of one essence, three substances; ut the Lattns of 
one essence or substance, three persons; because as we have already said essence usua1\y means 
nothing else that substance in our language, that is, in Latin"; Quod effari nullo modo possumus dictum 
est a nostris graecis una essentia. tres substantiae a latines autem una essentia uel substantia. tres 
personae quia sicut iam diximus non aliter in sermon nostro. id est latino. essentia quam substantia 
sollet intellegi. See Augustine De Trin.7.4.7 (Haddan); also see De Trin. 7.4.9, and 7.6.11; on this also 
see Christopher Stead, 'Greek Influence on Christian Thought', p.183. 
13K See Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Cae sa rea (Washington: 2007), 
PR·82-89. 
As Gregory Nazianzen stated, "what I am talking about is Peter and Paul and John's not being three 
or consubstantial, so long as three Pauls, three Peters, and many Johns cannot be spoken of. We sha1\ 
demand that you apply to more specific nouns the new-fangled rule you have kept in the case ofthc 
~~re generic ones", Gregory N azianzen, Or. 3 J . 19 (W ickham). 
BC, pp.15-50. 
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God is One, that is to say, one essence (ouain) and that He is known 
(u7toatum:crt) and has His being in three subsistences. 141 
The starting point for John of Damascus in Trinitarian theology was to express unity 
and then to discuss "divine generation (and also procession)" through the term 
hypostasis. 142 Nevertheless, the term hypostasis. as did the term prosopon 
(face/mask),143 came to be related to the outer existence rather than the inner reality or 
nature (physis),144 within the Byzantine tradition. The Cappadocians came to be the 
instigators ofthis radical shift in understanding hypostasis.1 4S But as Christopher A. 
Beeley argues, approaches to the Cappadocian formula "one ousia and three 
hypostases,,146 represent an over generalisation of Cappa doc ian thought. He states that 
there has been, in relation to Gregory Nazianzen an "overstatement of the role that 
this secondary formulation plays in his work". 147 Nevertheless, hypostasis has come 
to be understood as a determination indicating particularity or "concrete existence as 
hypostaseis",148 as did persona in the Latin West. 149 Basil's solution was, as was 
Augustine'S (c. 354-430), 150 to resort to define Trinitarian being through terms 
relating to the specific (tOV ioi(i)~) and the generic or common (to KOlVOV), lSI with an 
emphasis on hypostasis to indicate the subject, stating that: 
This therefore is hypostasis (person), not the indefinite notion of ousia 
(substance), which by reason of generality of the term employed discloses 
nothing of stasis. I 52 
The dividing the specific from the generic did nothing to keep unity at the heart of the 
Trinity but seemed to force a gulf between the two, where prosopon. persona and 
141 See John of Damascus, FO, 1.8 (Salmond); Concerning interpretations of John of Damascus' 
trinitarian theology in relation to the trinity, see also Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, pp.96- \08. 
142 
See Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, p.I03. 
143 See Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition (I: Atlanta: 1975), p.126 and Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrines, p.114. 
144 Indeed Andrew Louth comments that this type of distinguishing between the understanding of the 
Trinity in tenns of external persons of the Trinity rather than through the language of physis/ousia 
represented an historical distinction between Antiochene and Alexandrine models (ibid., p.113). 14~S Z" I ee IZIOU as, BC, pp.36-39. 
146 S Ch' 147 ee nstopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and Knowledge of God, p.222. 
Ibid. 
14M 
See Andrew Louth, St John Damascene. p.114. 
149 A . 
ugustme, De Trin.7.5.6. 
150 A . 
ugustme, De Trin. 7.4.7-8. 
151 B '1 aSI , Ep.38, 325A-C. 
152 T - ,. 
OUto ouv tcrttv it \.l7t6crtacr~, oUX, it a6PlcrtO~ tfI~ oucri~ Evvoia, ~'loE~iav tIC tf\~ ICO\v6t'lto~ tOU 
G'1~a\Vo~tvou crtQ(JlV rupicrICoucra, Basil, Ep.38, 328A (Deferrari). 
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hypostasis all came to be included in what was indicated by the specific and particular 
notes of existence in the Trinity, or persons 153 having within this specificity some sort 
of predicated ousia. 
In the development of a notion of person, the subject of that existence becomes the 
individual identity and not an essential reality. Thus, within the Trinitarian theologies 
of the fourth to the fifth centuries, two distinct ontological problems become evident. 
Firstly, in determining what constitutes the specific, the particular or that which is 
hypostatically different, and secondly how the specific is related to a shared reality. 
The question as to the role hypostasis in relation to ousia became not only a question 
of resolving Trinitarian problems, but came to be expressed through differing 
traditions. These traditions sought different answers to Trinitarian and Christological 
problems which have still not been resolved. In the former tradition, which can 
roughly be correlated with the Antiochene schema, 154 a stress was put upon hypostatic 
difference, which invariably leads to tri-theism. In the latter, which can roughly be 
correlated to the Alexandrine schema, 155 unity is vouchsafed but where modalism 
seems to be the outcome. 156 These schemas may not so much represent distinctive 
schools of thought but basic theological patterns which still remain. I H 
153 However this was not new and previously Hippolytus (d. 235) and Tertullian (c. 160-22S) had 
understood that prosopon and persona could indicate otherness (see Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines. 
p.IIS) difference, or extrusive characteristics of the inward united being of the Trinity, or the concrete 
individual existences within the divine unity. 
154 See Sarah Coakley, 'What Does Chalcedon Solve and What it Does Not? Some Reflections on the 
Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian "Definition''', in Stephen T. Davis et al. (eds.), The 
Incarnation, p.14S; and D. Dragas, Saint Athanasius of Alexandria (Rollinsford: 200S), p.l. 
155 Ibid. 
156 For some analysis of this problem see: John A. T. Robinson, Thou Who Art (London: 2006), pp.292-
319; Jiirgen Moltman, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (London: 1981); Thomas G. Weinandy, 
The Father's Spirit of Sonship (Edinburgh: 1995), pp.62-63; Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion 
(Edinburgh: 1996), pp.213-306. For a social answer to this Trinitarian problem of autonomy and inter-
P5~net~ati~n, see Alistair McFayden, The Cal/to Personhood (Cambridge: 1990), pp.69-135. 
This vIew is also supported by Andrew Louth who refers to two distinct theological approaches of 
the Antiochene and Alexandrine traditions, see St John Damascene. p.123. 
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2.2.3 A Compromise 
Through the schemas stated above, a focus seems to be placed either on unity (non-
difference) and difference, but a compromise is needed. Ifa focus (through 
hypostasis) is placed upon difference then a stress on the concrete subject becomes 
the outcome, while if the focus on unity (through ousia) is overplayed the subject 
becomes conditioned to a specific nature and not able to overcome that nature. 158 In 
the former condition, individuality and isolation pushes away any real value of 
person, while in the latter, concrete uniqueness is lost, where personhood is unitised, 
with the result being a loss of what is personal. 
A compromise to the hypostasis-ousia schema is perhaps found in the Biblical use of 
hypostasis in Hebrews (1 :3) which states that the person of Christ was, a1tai)'yacr~a 
Tiic; o6~11C; lCat xapaKTTtP ri\c; u1tocr'tacrEooc; au'tou ("the effulgence or reflection of his 
glory and the exact mark/expression of his substance/person"). 159 This passage allows 
an approach to hypostasis. which utilises the Christological and confirms both a 
personal context in the subject of existence and a context of essential spiritual reality 
of being (or unity, the spiritual physis or Alman). This approach focuses on, in the 
subject or person, the substance of being, affirming a Nicaean type of interpretation of 
hypostasis. 160 while at the same time accommodating the Cappadocian approach. In 
this understanding hypostasis indicates the place for concrete personal existence yet 
also allows for a context of the essential 161 spiritual reality of that existence, the what 
of being. the underlying reality of the experient. When considering this passage 
(Hebrews 1.3) in relation to human existence, the essential spiritual reality of being or 
the substance (ousia) of being can come to be understood as a significant aspect of the 
outward expression of the existential life and as the inward spiritual reality (Atman) of 
that life. The inner (Physis) and the outer (Physis) are not divided from each other. 
The outward existence is qualified as exemplified in the model of the Trinity through 
15K F . I' . 
or Imp Icatlons concerning ontological distinctions of hypostasis and ousia. see Stead. 'Why Not 
Three Gods?' in Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity. pp.159-163. 
159 See George Ricker Berry (ed.). Greek to English Interlinear: New Testament. King James Version 
(Iowa Falls: 2002). 
160 See Albergio et al. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. pp.I-15; Norman Tanner. Decrees o/the 
~~um~ni~al C.0uncils. p.5; and also Adolf Harnack. History of Dogma (London; 1898). pp.5-16. 
ThiS view IS somewhat affirmed by Pelikan. The Christian Tradition: The Emergence of the 
Catholic Faith. p.219. and also argued by Prestige. see God in Patristic Thought. p.240. 
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the inward unity through ousia. This was also the point Tertullian made, 162 where the 
internal substance was understood as the undifferentiated nature of being but which is 
related to, and non-different, from the outward Trinitarian characters, or in 
contemporary terms, persons. 163 
Through the Biblical use of hypostasis the term can indicate either substance or that 
which pertains to the identity of being a particular subsistence or person. Balz and 
Schneider164 consider that hypostasis denoted the philosophical "reality or being,,165 
and under such a determination, in the Trinitarian usage, hypostasis could indicate the 
definite concrete identity of Father, Son and Spirit as persons and the substantial or 
essential reality of Trinitarian being. Perhaps this was what Basil was arguing for, a 
unity within a context of particularity. 166 
2.2.4 Subjectivity and Unity 
For Basil each hypostasis of the Trinity represents the outward individual existence 
(i>7tap~\~)167 of the divine oneness (Evooaew<;).168 Thus it is a mistake to ignore. in the 
interpretation of hypostasis, the relationship of the term to substance or the 
essentiality of being in God, which indicates how hypostasis comes to denote 
ontological unity in the Trinity by the Cappadocians. 169 It is also a mistake to equate 
ousia in the Cappadocian usage only with a generic type of categorising, although this 
taxonomy was certainly present. 170 The Cappadocians understood ()usia to indicate a 
fundamental reality of the divine nature or being. of which the hypostases of the 
162 See Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. p.119. 
16J Ibid. 
164 Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament (3; Grand Rapids: 1994), under \l1t6<noa~ p.406. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Basil stated that the "person (hypostasis) is the conflux of the individual traits of each member (of 
the Trinity)".Ei yap u1tomQalv WtOOEOtilKO~EV £Ivol tt)v (J\)vopo~t)v tuW 1tEpi £KOatOV iOtm~Qt(J)v, see 
~~sil, Ep.38. 336B-337 A (Deferrari). 
Basil, Ep.38. 336B-337A 
16M Ibid., 3370. 
169 S B'I ee: aSI, Ep.38. 325A; Gregory Nazianzen, Or.2B. 48C-490 and Or.29. 76A-77B; and Gregory of 
~ys~a, Tres Dii. 142B-0. Sarah Coakley also points to Ad Ablabium or Tres Dii as being specifically 
slgmficant in the debate on whether person is prior to 'substance', see Sarah Coakley, Re- Thinking 
~~egory of Nyssa, pp.2-3, and in relation to the contemporary influence of de Regnon (ibid, p.4). 
See BaSil, Ep.38. 329C-0; and Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 29. 76A-77 A Or.29, 76A-77 A. See also 
Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, pp.221-222. 
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Trinity shared in the single Godhead. This is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa's work 
Tres Dii, where he underlines the divine unity through the word Godhead (eE6'tTJ~)171 
stating: 
How is it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, 
through confessing the three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of 
nature between them we are in some sense at variance with our confession, 
when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit is one, and yet forbid men to say" there are three Gods"? 172 
W· h' G f . I . 173 It 10 regory 0 Nyssa's works, hypostasis or the concrete particu ar eXIstence . 
cannot be divorced from an underlying reality, 174 where form becomes the outward 
expression of the highest reality. In Aristotle, the existential form becomes related to 
the substances, by which a form is known. In this model, which was probably utilised 
by the Cappadocians, hypostasis becomes related to what Aristotle called the 
"primary substance". 175 The primary subject related to the singular substance, and 
came to denote the personal subject through the term \>1tOKEiJ.lEVOV I76 (underlying 
subject), 177 or as Balthasar states the "concrete bearer of the qualities that determine 
what a thing is". The secondary substance indicated a generic quality, physis or 
universal essence. 178 Aristotle gives complex categories relating to substances and 
subjects, but what is of concern is the use of individual (U7tOKEiJ.lEVOV) to convey 
distinctness in relation to substances. 179 The substance indicates the what. 1110 which 
171 Tres DU. 12\0-1240. See also See Basil. Ep.38. 332A-332CThe use of ouota by Basil to indicate 
more than a generic classification is also argued by Stead, 'Why Not Three Gods'. in Doctrine and 
Philosophy in Early Christianity, pp.149-163. 
172 1[6)~ tnt t6)v J,lUOTlK6)v OOYJ,llltwv ta~ tp£i~ U1[O(JtIlO£~ <>J,lOAOYOUVt~. Kai ouo£lllav bt' aut6)v nlv 
Kata ipUOIV OlalpOpav tvvOUVTf:~. J,lax6J,l£Oa tp6nov tWa tfl OJ,lOAoyU;t. J,llav J,ttv nlV O£6tTJta tou natO~ 
Kat tou Yiou Kat tOU Cty{ou nV£uJ,lato~ AtyOVT£~. tp£i~ ot O£ou<; AtyEIV CtnayopEiloVT£<;; Tres Dii. 117 A; 
translation by Moore. On Not Three Gods (NPNF S). p.331. 
173 Developed from Aristotle. Cat. I b.v.IO-IS. 
174 This view is also owed much to the Stoics. see Stead. 'Greek Influence on Christian Thought'. 
p..183. 
75 Aristotle. Cat.lb.v.IO-15 and Cat.3b.v.10-20; this correlation is made by W. P. Alston. 'Substance 
and the Trinity'. in, S. Davis et aI., The Trinity (Oxford: 200 I). pp.185-187. who states that "Basil and 
Gregory of Nyssa consistently mark the distinction between Aristotle's first and second ousia by using 
?i!os~asis for the first and ousia for the second" (ibid.). 
177 Anstotle, Cat. I b. v.1 0-15; and Maximus, Ambigua (PG 91). 1225A. 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy. p.220. 
17M A . 
nstotle. Cat.lb.v.to-15. 
179 A . I 
. nstot e stated of substances: "Substance in the truest and strictest. the primary sense of that term, 
IS that which is neither asserted of or can be found in a subject (in relation of the universal to the 
particular). We take as examples of this a particular man or horse. But we do speak of secondary 
substances - those within which. being species, the primary or first are included. and those within 
which. being genera. the species themselves contained". QUota ot tOtTlV ~ KUOpuinatll tE Kai np<inw~ 
Kai J,laAlota AEyOJ,l£vll. ~ J,ltlTf: KaO' U1[OKEIJ,ltvOU TlVO~ Aty£tUllltlt' tv \mOK£llltvw ttvt tOttv. olov <> ti<; 
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when translated into Trinitarian terms implicitly related to what is understood as the 
subject. In Christo logical terms the Son has the characteristics of the Logos through 
the primary substance that relates to the Son while sharing the divine nature and 
substance (ousia), which focuses the unity in the Trinity. But here lies the quandary, 
for if the ousia is a secondary substance, how can it be the subject of unity. In 
Aristotle the secondary ousia relates to the category of the generic quality of man or 
species but not of the subject in the sense that a "man" has "manhood" but "manhood 
is not in a man".181 But the divine ousia cannot be understood in this way for it is also 
the subject (Godhead) by which unity is established and not a shared predicated 
substance. 
This notion of primary substance in relation to unity, will in Chapter 3, be correlated 
to Atman, 182 which will be considered the primary of reality of the hYPoslasis. In this 
sense the divine ousia and the Alman can be understood in terms of both primary and 
secondary substances. 183 But in the concept of person, the concept of Alman will 
relate to an individual conscious awareness and not an unconscious substance, but a 
reality that allows the notion of person to be considered in terms of a conscious 
individual, intimately related to Almanic awareness. The primary substance will 
include a notion of consciousness by which subjects become aware of themselves and 
in relation to substances or manifested phenomena. This awareness will relate not 
only to the qualities of the subject, but the reality by which the subject comes to be 
ultimately understood. 
The notion of subject as the centre of concrete existence also presented a problem 
when correlated to Aristotle's term U1tOKElJleYOV for it put too much a stress on 
isolated individual. Thus it came to be replaced with hypostasis by the Cappadocians 
because of the materialistic sense OfU1tOKtill£vOV.184 The notion of hypostasis 
CivOpro1[oc; ~ 6 tic; umoc;. AEUu:pat O£ ouaiat Atyovrat, tv ole; EioEalV ai ltpwtroc; ouaiat AEy61lEVat 
U1[upxoual, taihu tE Kat ta toW Ei06)v tOUtrov rtvTl .... Aristotle. Cat. I b.v.to-15 (Cooke). 
IMO A' I . nstot e, Cat. I a.lv.25-30. 
IMI A' I nstote. Cat.3a.v.I-15 (Cooke). 
1M2 The nature of Atman in relation to personal existence will be examined in Chapter 3 and the word 
hypostasis will be exchanged with puru~a even though a better correlation to puru~a would be 
prosopon, but the reasons for not using prosopon will be explained later. 
1M3 See Aristotle. Cat.3a.v.I-25 (Cooke). In Chapter 3 I will consider how the term Atman relates to the 
concept of primary substance in relation to consciousness, the true subject and the Atman-hypostasis 
model of person. 
1114 As argued by Zizioulas, BC. p.38. footnote 30. 
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qualified the notion of isolated individual through a quality of sharing in Cappadocian 
theology, where a relationship is present in relation to other persons of the Trinity. 
This quality of sharing did not originate hypostatically, but through an incorporeal 
nature establishing unity through the divine nature. Gregory Nazianzen stated: 
He can only be incorporeal. But the term incorporeal, thouih granted, does not 
give an all-embracing revelation of God's essential being. 1 5 
Incorporeality while allowing for a non-material centre, by which divine unity is 
experienced, does not allow for revelation of the divine reality, hence a focus on the 
outer operations then becomes the focus for subjectivity. In the model of this thesis it 
is the essential being which becomes the true subject of divine unity and the 
expression of unity for the divine hypostases, which cannot become isolated or the 
primary subjects of existence. But in Zizioulas' interpretation of the Cappadocians, 
hypostasis starts to gain an outer existential character, indicating an outward looking 
concrete existence. In the Trinity this development would lead to tritheism, hence 
Zizioulas' recourse is to modify the nature of individuality by establishing 
communion as the ontological platform on which this personhood stands. Zizioulas 
states that being a person "cannot be conceived in itself as a static entity. but only as it 
relates to". 186 Although this definition of person allows relatedness to a reality outside 
of the natural physis, it does not indicate how this relational context is to be ultimately 
expressed. A notion of "static entity" does underline its own failure to give itself 
meaning. This meaning can be found through a notion of Atmanic becoming within 
the hypostasis, not only through an outward communion, but through an inward 
relationality, of God to the soul or Alman. Within this model, communion can be 
correlated to an event of substance in an Atmanic event l1l7 of the soul within the 
hypostasis, where through a hypostatic mode of existence, or spiritual life and through 
IM5 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28 (PG 36), 36C-37C; translation by Wickham. On God and Christ. p.43. 
IK6 Z" I IZIOU as. Communion and Otherness. p.212. 
1M? The co~elation of Atman to the world within the human person as an event is defended through the 
Kashmir Saivite notion of manifestation. where the world is a manifestation of Alman. and the human 
person comes to this experience through the grace or saklipala of the master or God. which leads the 
person to understand this reality where the world is seen as pure consciousness. The Paramiirlhasiira 
stated: "Just as one's face appears clearly in a clean mirror. so does this Atman shine as pure 
consciousness in a mind purified by the bestowal of the divine grace of Lord Siva". AdarSe mala-rhite 
yadvad vadana", vibhiiti tadvadayaml .~iva-saklipiita-vimale dhl-Iallve bhiiti bhiiriipab//. PSA. 9 
(Pandit). 
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the Christ hypostasis, the person comes to realise the nature of his or her true 
existence as an Alman-hypostasis. 
2.2.5 Cha1cedonian Influences 
The development of a relationship of essence to a concept of person, or substance 
based relationality within hypostatic difference, especially within the context of the 
Trinity can also be supported through the Council ofChalcedon (c. 451). In this 
context the term prosopon. which will be discussed later, positions the Christ person 
or the particular existential character l88 in relation to the divine nature. This also 
provides a pattern for human beings. But the nature (physis) of the divine is not 
merely an unconscious metaphysical matter189 but has a united awareness, expressed 
in a collective way in Exodus (3: 14) as "I am the Being" (LXX, EYro ElJ.1l 0 vnv). 
There are not different natures ofthe Godhead, but a single nature and awareness, a 
unity of nature and consciousness, and Gregory of Nyssa understood this nature to be 
intrinsic to the "Unity,,190 of the Godhead where there is "no difference either in 
nature or of operation".191 Even though difference is accepted through the hypostatic 
operations of the Trinity, there is also unity to the extent that the essential nature of 
the Trinity in the Godhead establishes the link ontologically between difference and 
non-difference. 
This model of difference-in-unity was initially considered from a starting point of 
difference, which was highlighted in the Council of Chalcedon. Here it was argued 
that the hypostatic difference in Christ constituted not a division from the divine 
nature but a simultaneous hypostatic union. Chalcedon stated that Christ was: 
IKK Albergio et al. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. pp.59-63. and Nonnan Tanner. Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils. p.86. 
IK9 As Gregory of Nyssa argued that. "most men think that the word 'Godhead' is used in a particular 
degree. in respect of nature: and just as the heaven or the sun. or any other of the constituent parts of 
the universe are denoted by proper names", see Gregory of Nyssa. Tres Dii. 121 A; translation by 
Moore. On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5). p.333. 
190 Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. l32D-IBA; translation by Moore. On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5). 
p..336. 
91 Ibid. The relationship of consciousness (Cit) and the revealed divine nature or Logos-cit in the world 
as juxtaposed to the absolute divine reality will be discussed later. 
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perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly man, 
of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his 
divinity, and the same consubstantial with us regards his humanity. In 
The term "consubstantial with us" (OJlOOU<J10V ~JliV)193 also hints at the possibilities of 
human personhood attaining union with the divine through the Christ hypostasis. The 
Christ hypostasis unifies difference, through his particular existence, due to His 
unified condition within the Godhead reflecting a model of difference and unity. This 
is wrought through Christ having an essential divine nature 194 and a human nature, 195 
"in one person and a single hypostatic or subsistent being" (e~ Ev 7tpocr(J)7tOV Kat Jliav 
u7tocrta<J1v (J\)VtpexouOTl<;), 196 where the unity of natures within the Christ hypostasis 
unites humanity to the divine condition. The term hypostasis here indicates the 
particular character, in the term (J\)VtpexouOTl<; 197 (lit. of the running together) having 
an underlying ontological quality. Yet in contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology, 
the sense of the essential nature seems to be ignored and the terms prosopon and 
hypostasis have been stressed to focus on difference. 198 So do the terms prosopon and 
hypostasis indicate the same? If they do, why does the Chalcedonian statement state 
e~ Ev 7tpocr(J)7tOV Kat Jliav u7tocrta<J1v, 199 or is it just repeating itself and seems to be 
meaningless in that repetition? Basil had previously argued that when such a 
repetition occurs as in the statement of the Council of N icaea, the two words do not 
mean the same but one qualifies the other, stating: 
But they did not there state hypostasis and substance to be identical. Had the 
words expressed one and the same meaning, what need of both? It is on the 
contrary clear that while by some it was denied that the Son was of the same 
substance with the Father, and some asserted that he was not of the substance 
and was of some other hypostasis (person) ... they declared (Nicaea) the Son to 
be of the substance of the father, but they did not add the words "of the 
hypostasis" ... We are therefore bound to confess the Son to be of one 
192 rU~lIp<i>vo~ WtavTf:~ EK~hOcioKOIl£V ttA.e\ov tOY autov tv Oe6t'1tl Kai tEUlOV tOY autov tv 
clvOp<onOt'ltl. Oeov cU'10li>~ Kai avOponov cU'10li>~ tOY aUTOV. EK 'V"xfl~ A.OY\lct,~ Kai o<i>llatO~. 
0IlOOUO\OV t4> natpi Kata t1')v O£Ot11ta Kai 0IlOOUO\OV tilliv tOY autov Kata t1')v clvOp<onOt'lta. 
Albergio et al. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. pp.59-63; and Norman Tanner. Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, p.86.15-25. 
193 1b'd I .• p.86.23. 
194 1b 'd I .• p.86.4 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid,. p,86. 39-41. 
197 Ibid. 
19K 
For examples see Sophrony. His Life is Mine; Zizioulas. BC; Yannaras Elements of Faith; and also 
~~e Vlach~s. The Person in the Orthodox Tradition. 
AlberglO et at. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. pp.59-63; and Norman Tanner. Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, p,86.15-25. 
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substance with the Father, as it is written, but the Father to exist in His own 
proper hypostasis (person), the Son in His, and the Holy Ghost in His. 200 
Consequently, when the Chalcedon stated "one person and one hypostasis,,20I it has to 
be concluded that the words prosopon and hypostasis indicate different aspects of 
Christ, the outward face or person and the substantial person. Thus both prosopon and 
hypostasis can indicate different aspects of difference, but the tenn hypostasis allows 
for a movement from ontological non-difference within the Trinity to qualified-
difference in hypostasis through the concrete prosopon or person of Christ. This 
allows the tenn hypostasis to be equated with a term that focuses not only on concrete 
individuality but the essential nature of that reality. Nevertheless, while Sarah 
Coakley argues that Chalcedon did not successfully resolve or explain the terms 
nature and hypostasis but offered a general paradigm,202 it could also be asserted that 
this generality ofChalcedon allows for such developments. Within the possibilities of 
developing the tenns, hypostasis can indicate both the concrete person and unifying 
reality behind the individual, or an Atmanic nature on a human level. This implies that 
in a context of difference there is always present a sense of non-difference, which is 
highlighted through the hypostatic condition. The notion of hypostasis must therefore 
include a deeper ontological meaning than is understood by contemporary tenns, 
which is highlighted through the inclusion of the notion of ousia and will fonn the 
topic in the next part of this chapter. 
2.3 Hypostasis and Ousia: which level of Being? 
In this part of the Chapter, I qualify contemporary interpretations of the Cappadocian 
use of hypostasis by focusing on unity, through the ontological stress of ousia. The 
approach to a notion of ousia also represents a relational application of the tenn. This 
200 Ep. J 24 (Jackson and Deferrari) 
201. • 
Albcrglo ct al. (cds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.59-63; and Nonnan Tanner, Decrees o/the 
Ecumenical Councils. p.86.15-25. 
202 See Sarah Coakley, 'What Does Chalcedon Solve and What it Does Not? Some Reflections on the 
Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian "Definition"', in Stephen T. Davis et a!. (eds.), The 
Incarnation, p.146; see also See, Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.233; Joseph T. Lienhard, 'Ousia 
and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of "One Hypostasis'" in Stephen Davis 
et al. (e~s.), The Trinity (Oxford: 1999), pp.99-121; and Andrew Louth who underlines major 
theologIcal problems in Chalcedon, see St John Damascene (Oxford: 2002), pp.97-114. 
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is to utilise hypostasis within the context of the metaphysical reality of being so as to 
re-address the perceived failings of the Cappadocians to do so. Despite the unique 
Cappadocian approach to hypostasis, in indicating existence on a particular level 
(indicating difference), Grillmeier believed that the Cappadocians exhibited manifest 
failings in their reliance on material categories and their "insufficient definition of the 
relationship between substance and hypostasis (prosopon)",203 which represented a 
failure to qualify a sense of difference in relation to unity. Sarah Coakley also points 
out that Gregory of Nyssa seemed to promise so much in his Trinitarian clarifications 
relating to "individualising versus generic characteristics", 204 but then disappoints by 
withdrawing his terms within "apophatic effacement".20s The Cappadocians were 
reluctant to provide clarity on their terms due to their apophatic approach when trying 
to grasp the nature of God, which for them remained unknown. 206 The stress on 
Cappadocian apophaticism may be over-emphasised for they did attempt a workable 
ontological Trinitarian model. Nevertheless, in this chapter the notion of hypostasis in 
the Cappadocians is qualified in the light of these failings to provide a link between 
difference and unity through an examination of ousia. It must be stated here that while 
Cappadocian failings are accepted through a collective responsibility, most of these 
mistakes can be directed to Basil and his over emphasis on what is particular over 
what is shared.207 
What is clear is that within a collective understanding the Cappadocians shifted the 
stress from ouoia to i)1[6(J'ta~ and in doing so shifted the focus from underlying 
substance to what is specific and concrete, to the individual or the person itself. 
Contemporary theologians such as Zizioulas and Gunton have rejoiced in such an 
outcome208 and interpreted Cappadocian thought as though it clearly expressed a 
distinct pattern different from the Western models. 209 
203 Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. vol.I, pp.368-369. 
204 Coakley, Re- Thinking Gregory of Nyssa. p.3. 
205 Ibid. 
~06 For an example of this see Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. 120A-124C. 
.07 As exemplified in Ep.38 (Deferrari). 
20R S Z" I ee IZIOU as, BC. pp.40-41; and Gunton. The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p.IO. 
209 S Z" I . ee IZIOU as, BC. p.20 and The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p.30, respectively. However 
questions are being asked in respect of the validity of the charges by Orthodox theologians who state 
that Western, that is to say Augustinian theology is "insufficiently personal" (Ayres, Nicaea and its 
Legacy, pp.364-365) and thus "insufficiently Trinitarian"( Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, pp.364-365) 
and thus encourage are-addressing of the Cappadocians to question contemporary interpretations. The 
re-addressing ideas relating to the Trinity is also examined in Lewis Ayres, 'Fundamental Grammar of 
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However, the Cappadocian qualifying of hypostatic difference is placed, in this thesis, 
in relation to unity through ousia or the metaphysical "stuff,2IO of being. This notion 
of stuJJis equated with the concept of Atman within a model of difference understood 
in Pratyabhijiiii. This provides a context that implies that person and the world (or 
difference) is a manifestation211 of the Lord or created by God,212 and related to the 
will and power of God, that is personal but also related to the Absolute metaphysical 
essential reality. Although manifestation may imply something different to creation, 
what is important is the stress on the divine will and purpose and the power to carry 
out that will, which overcomes the natural condition. It needs to be stated here that the 
Cappadocians did not make much use of such a notion of the essential reality of the 
divine nature other than to affirm unity in the divine nature. Gregory of Nyssa stated: 
Yet their nature is one, at union itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not 
capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but is in its 
essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it 
appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals 
who participate in it. 213 
On the whole, the Cappadocians retained an apophatic reticence in relation to the 
divine nature (or ousia).214 Nevertheless, the contemporary emphasis on hypostasis. 
reducing ousia to a predicate of hypostasis has resulted in the negation of the reality 
of heing itself, as Zizioulas states that, the "substance of God. 'God'. has no 
Augustine's Trinitarian Theology' in R. Dodaro and G. Lawless (eds.), Augustine and His Critics 
(London: 2000); Michael Rene Barnes. 'The Use of Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian theology', 
Theological Studies, 56 (1995), pp.237-25I ; Michael Rene Bames. 'De Regnon Reconsidered', 
Augustinian Studies, 26 (1995), pp.5I-79; Michael Rene Bames, 'Re-reading Augustine on the Trinity' 
in Davis et al. (eds.), The Trinity. 
210 Examples of the use and acceptance of the tenn stujJcan be found in Prestige, God in Patristic 
Thought, p.197; and M. W. Ury, Trinitarian Personhood (Eugene: 2002). p.62. This expresses a 
substantialist view without specifically qualifying what stuffis other than to observe that, in the Trinity, 
there is this ontological relationship to stuff. 
211 The word manifestation or iibhasa is a word that will be used in Chapter 3 in relation to creation. 
212 The IPK, 4.9, p.72, stated: "His individual creation, not being common to al beings, remains 
dependent on God's creation. But even such a phenomenon. though appearing erroneously. is 'true' 
because of its being Created but God appearing in the fonn of this individual being", tasyii.~iidhiiratli 
sr$lir iSa-sf$fy-upajivinll sai$iipy ajitatayii satyaivesa-salctyii tad-iitmana/:lli. translation by Pandit, 
IPKp.4.9. 
213'H ot cpuo~ Ilia tOTtV. aUt~ 1tpO~ tau~v tvOlIltvt, Kat aOUltll'1tOl~ aUKplp~ Ilov~. OUK au~avolltv'1 
OUl1tpooO~K'1~ 1l£IOUIltvt, OI'OU Ucpatpto£Ol~ ill' 01t£p totlV fv ouoa. Kav tv 1tA~O£1 cpaiVlltm aoxlto~. 
Kat UUV£X~~, Kat 6A6K'1PO~, Ka! ToiJ; j.l£TtxOUO\V aUT~~ toi~ KaO' EKaoTov OU auvOtatpOUIltvt,. Tres Dii. 
J20B; translation by Moore. On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5), p.332 . 
• 14 For an example of this apophatic approach see Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 3.5; translation by Moore 
(NPNF 5). p.146. 
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ontological content, no true being apart from communion".215 This view requires 
some response in terms of re-addressing the Cappadocians, especially as the notion of 
person or hypostatic difference is to be understood through the concept of an essential 
reality of being. 
2.3.1 Ousia as a Point of Unity 
The term ousia (ou(Jin), or the stufJof divine being. is historically recognised as a 
determination that was initially related to hypostasis (u7t6(Jta(J~) prior to the 
C d · f h "d" t' d" 216 appa OClans, and in Origen ousia was the primary substance 0 t e Ivme na . 
Prestige shows that ousia came to be applied to the "Persons of the Trinity,,217 and 
that even Athanasius referred to the "ousia of the Father",21K where "the Father's 
ousia is the Father Himself'.219 It was also not uncommon to refer to multiple ousiai 
to explain the substance of what was common and the substance of what was 
particular. 22o The language used by Origen also centred on nature (qn)(J~), where 
Origen considered that in the Christological context, it was appropriate to refer to two 
natures, divine and human.221 The focus on physis allowed the terms to be discussed 
in relation to unity as opposed to difference which marks the distinction between the 
Alexandrian and Antiochene schools respectively.222 Origen related the divine 
21~ S Z·· I 
. ee IZIOU as, BC, p.17. 
216 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.191. 
217 (b'd I ., p.192. 
21M Ib'd I ., p.194. 
219 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.195. The term ousia according to Lampe had many 
denotations and could indicate the underlining reality of being and personal subsistent existence (G. W. 
H. Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon; Oxford: 1961, 2005, pp.980-985) but came to be predominantly 
understood in Trinitarian terms through homoousios (Prestige. God in Patristic Thought. p.197). 
220 Prestige. God in Patristic Thought, p.191. 
221 Origen. Princ.I.2.1., who stated "that in Christ there is one nature, his deity. because he is the only-
begotten Son of the Father, and another human nature". 
m This is also argued by Andrew Louth who states, "Hypostasis was also used - in different ways - in 
Christology by theologians of both the Antiochene and the Alexandrine traditions ... the difference 
between these terms and others, as we have already seen and will see in greater detail later in this 
chapter, gave rise to controversy between those who accepted Chalcedon and its assimilation of 
Christological and Trinitarian terminology in the distinction between hypostasis/pro.mpon and 
physis/ousia. and those who rejected this synod and its definition. Those who rejected this assimilation 
of terminology (usually called Monophysites) accepted Cappadocian distinction between hypostasis 
and ousia, but could not accept the distinction between physis and ousia (and saw hypostasis as more 
or less equivalent to physis. at least in some texts), and partly because they drew a line between 
the%gia and oikonomia, a distinction that had a long history, especially in the tradition of Alexandrine 
theology", Sf John Damascene, p.113. 
93 
existence to nature (Physis). where ousia or the substance of God and hypostasis 
indicated the same. This was in the sense that the metaphysical substance of the 
divine unity was correlated to the '''wisdom of God",223 and did not indicate 
"anything without hypostatic existence".224 This was not something impersonal, but 
was related to a metaphysical substance of the divine, a theistically personal essential 
and Self-aware divine reality. Origen rejected the view that hypostasis was a physical 
denotation relating to the body, but that it was related to the incorporeal divine 
substantial existence.225 Origen stated: 
The only begotten Son of God is God's wisdom hypostatically existing, I do 
not think that our mind ought to stray beyond this to the suspicion that this 
hypostasis or substance could possibly possess bodily characteristics, since 
everything that is corporeal is distinguished by shape or colour or size. 226 
This model of unity in relation to hypostasis contrasts with the over personalising of 
individual hypostasis in Cappadocian theology and a seeming negation of a stress on 
ousia, which places the Cappadocians within an anti-Nicaean group. This group 
represented a shift away from a stress on ousia to concrete hypostasis. This was 
exemplified in Basil ofCaesarea's initial aversion to homoous;os and preference for 
homoiousios. 227 which was due to a fear of a Sabellian equating of hypostasis with 
substance, stating "some, moreover, of the impious following of the Libyan Sabellius, 
who understand hypostasis and substance to be identical".228 This Basil thought to be 
a pretext to affix "an improper sense upon the Homoousion".229 Tixeront indirectly 
argued that a stress on hypostasis represented a pro-Arian stance in the J.1la i>7t6a'tacn~, 
one person Sabellian context,230 but, paradoxically also "gave to i>7toCJ'taCJ14 the sense 
of person". 231 Within this sense the Cappadocians affirmed a distinction between 
ousia and hypostasis clarifying the Trinity ontologically, but arguably to the detriment 
of N icaea. This is confirmed by Turcescu who states that: 
"1 0 , •• ngen. Princ.I.2.2. 
224 Ibid. 
mlbid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Th' b' IS esta hshed very well by Hildebrand in. The Trinitarian Theology o/Basil o/Caesarea. p.76. 
22M B '1 
aSI. Ep.125; translation B. Jackson (NPNF. 8). p.194. 
22'1 S B '1 2JO ~e aSI. Ep.125 (Deferrari) . 
. Tlxeront. History o/the Dogmas. p.76. 
211 Ibid. 
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Basil of Caesarea himself not only insists on the distinction between ouaia and 
i)1[60'taat~ in Hebrews 1 :3, but he alleges that the Nicene fathers distinguished 
between the two tenns.232 
In this context, Basil becomes anti-Nicaean233 by focusing on hypostasis as a 
concrete, particular and individual existence. Basil seemed to put a tri-theistic 
emphasis on the Trinity. Stephen M. Hildebrand's resolution to understanding Basil, 
is to view Basil initially, within a pro-Nicaean context where Basil's interpretation of 
Hebrews 1 :3, makes hypostasis synonymous with ousia. He states of Ep.38. in 
relation to Hebrews 1 :3, that "this text hinders those who wish to distinguish ous;a 
and hypostasis in order to give technical linguistic expression to Trinitarian belief,.234 
Hildebrand arrives at his conclusions, because Basil did not seem to wish to equate 
prosopon with hypostasis235 due to Basil's position against the "mia-hypostatic 
tradition,,236 and Sabellianism which modalised the persons of the Trinity. However, 
Hildebrand shows that eventually Basil, while accepting homoousios237 manifested a 
distinction between hypostasis and ousia. 238 which confirms Basil as anti-Nicaean. 
The focusing on the outer operations of the Trinity, or the how of Trinitarian personal 
existence, did seem to move the emphasis away from the Nicaean homoousios. 
from ousia to the act or the existential, which ascribed to the characteristics of the 
Trinity types of existence (tropos hyparxeos). 239 This radicall y shi fled the emphasis 
away from the substance of being to the manner of personal existence. Consequently, 
Vlachos states that the Cappadocians "'separated ousia from hypostasis and in this way 
changed the terminology of the creed".240 Turcescu also shows that because the title 
"'Neo-Nicene",241 given to Basil by Halleux,242 made a distinction made between 
~12 Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, p.52 . 
• 11 Turcescu cites Jean Pepin who asserted that indeed the Cappadocians were indeed anti·Nicene, ibid. 
~J4 Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Cae sa rea , p.61 . 
• 35 See Basil, Ep.236.6 (Deferrari); Tixeront, History of the Dogmas, p.78; Andre de Halleux, 
'Hypostase et Personne Dans La Formation Du Dogrne Trinitaire', Revue D 'Histoire Ecclesiatique 
(1984), p.327; and Toronen, Union and Distinction in the Thought ofSt Maximus the Confessor, p.50. 
236 Lienhard, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of "One 
Hrpostasis'" in S. T. Davis, The Trinity, p.IIS. 
21 Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Cae sa rea, p.76. 
m Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Cae sa rea, pp.S2·S9; Basil, Ep.214.3-4 (Deferrari); 
see also Lienhard, 'Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of One 
H~postasis', pp.112-121. 
2J Basil. Ep.38. 
240 Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition, p.195. 
241 
Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons p.23, see also, ibid. footnote 69 of 
Chapter I, pp.127 ·S. 
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hypostasis and ousia. 243 it can be deduced that some departure from the 
Nicaean formula was evidenced. This departure from Nicaea, in focusing on 
hypostasis, where the divine subjects are existentially distinct, seems supported 
in the Council of Constantinople (c 381). In this Council hypostasis is equated with 
prosopon. "three most perfect hypostases, or three most perfect persons" (tv rplCJi 
n:uloTUTal<; l)1toCJTuCJECJlV llYouv TplCJi TEUiol<; 1tpo(J(i)1t0l<;),244 but where the divine 
subjects are united in the substance (ousia) of the Godhead. The Council stated that: 
"the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit have a single Godhead and power and 
substance" (Ol1Auoi) 8EOTllTO<; Kui OUVUJ.1E<O<; Kui TOU uiou Kui TOU ayiou 
1tVEUJ.1UTO<; mCJTEU0J.1ev,,<;).245 
Through the Cappadocian influence, the term hypostasis came to be equated with 
proper "characteristics" (iOlOTll<OV)246 or that which ascribes difference, but at the 
same time a notion of unity through the term ouCJiu<;247 was included to qualify the 
divine nature (cpUCJE<o<;)248 of the Godhead. It can be seen that what was affirmed was a 
model that simultaneously admitted difference and unity. As a result there was a 
radical movement from the N icaean homoousios249 to hypostasis initiated by the 
Cappadocians and back to a stress on qualifying difference in unity. The Cappadocian 
model appeared to place the Cappadocians at odds with the N icaean formulae2so as 
Catherine M. LaCugna states "the Cappadocians made a clear distinction between 
hypostasis (person) and ousia (substance), in direct contradiction to the Council of 
Nicaea".2sl 
There is also some debate as to what ousia implied. Did it infer a concept, or a 
predicated substance as the metaphysical part of the divine subjects, or itself the 
divine subject out of which the hypostases become part? 252 As already stated, the 
Cappadocians saw the ousia of God as hidden and was therefore beyond 
242 See Andre de Halleux, 'Hypostase et Personne Dans La Fonnation Du Dogme Trinitaire'. 
241 Ibid. 
244 
See Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.28.25-27. 
245 Ibid., 20-25. 
246 Ibid., 30. 
'47 lb· 
> Id., 33. 
24K Ibid. 
249 P . 
restlge, God in Patristic Thought. pp.209-213. ,~o lb· 
>. Id., p.227. 
BI C th . 
a enne M. LaCugna, God For Us p.79. 
m Which is underlined by Prestige, see God in Patristic Thought. pp.209-213. 
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comprehension; hence for them such speculations were useless. They affirmed that 
any conceivable ideas relating to ousia are known by t7rivOla253 (the mental faculties) 
through a focusing on divine properties (iOtcOJ.lata).2S4 However, as evidenced in 
Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory clearly argues that he did not 
consider that being and act (operations) were separate, where act was predicated to 
the subject or being, but both are inseparable, stating: 
I do not think that he (Eunomius) would affirm that we should consider the 
being of God to be heterogeneous and composite, having the energy 
inalienably contained in the idea of itself, like and 'accident' in some subject-
matter.2S5 
2.3.2 The Primary Ousia 
The inability of human understanding to grasp not only divine nature but also the 
deeper noetic meaning of human nature was implicit in Gregory of Nyssa's 
understanding of hypostasis. 256 and this paradoxically placed a stress on existential 
personal unity, not the shared nature or the subject of unity. In this context, the stress 
on ousia is negated, and begs the question whether substance should be viewed as a 
predicated substance or stuff of the divine subjects, as wood is related to a particular 
tree, or plastic relates to plastic cups, plates and the like, or what is primary in the 
Trinity? The relationship I make to ousia and to a primary substance (7tPWtTJ ouoia)257 
allows me to indicate singularity, that which makes individual be: of what is primary 
in heing. and in relation to the Trinity is a difficult area for the outcome of such an 
assertion, depends on the model of Trinity that is being argued. The term 7tpooTTJ ouoia 
m On the concept of Or{vota see Ayers, Nicaea and its Legacy, p.191-2, but the term did allow 
conceptual examinations to focus on theological problems, "intellectual contemplation of the reality of 
things" (ibid., p.193); see also and Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, p.688; 
e~emplified in Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 
2A Ayers considers that such properties relate in Basil's works to divine operations or properties such 
as "door, way, bread light", Nicaea and its Legacy, p.192, but the divine essence is unknown. Here 
Ayres also relates the term i)1tolCd~£vov to the ousia in Basil's which highlights the subject of heing in 
~~f divine which is the point Zizioulas makes in relation to hypostasis, see BC, p.38. 
-. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun.I.17 (Moore). 
256 Humanity can participate in the divine hypostatic intelligence but not know the divine ousia, as 
Gregory of Nazianz en stated, "no one has yet discovered or shall ever discover what God is in his 
nature and essence", Or.2B.17 (Williams): also see Hom.Opif9, 149B-151A, and Hom.OpifI4-16, 
173D-187A. 
257 SA' ee nstotle, Cat. I a.l-11.25; and Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.191. 
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was historically used by Hippolytus and Origen,258 but was infrequently utilised by 
Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. 259 Stead argues that 1tProT11 ouma was not a 
common usage to identify ontological specificity, particularity or precedence.26o This 
however, can be contested, as Alston argues, that Basil's and Gregory of Nyssa's 
forging a distinction between hypostasis and ousia can be considered as utilising 
Aristotle's distinction between the primary ousia and secondary ousia, where 
hypostasis becomes the primary substance and ousia becomes the secondary 
substance.261 This also becomes a distinction of the particular and the general. 262 But 
taking into account Zizioulas' research on the Cappadocians, can hypostasis be 
considered in tenns of substance?263 In addition, how do the obvious references to 
Aristotle's model of primary ousia relate to the Cappadocian use of hypostasis. which 
indicates what is individual and what is concrete. 264 The problem, from my 
perspective, is answered through a focus on consciousness. The notion of 
consciousness isolates the awareness of' I Am' in each situation becomes the 
expression of the primary substance. It is because this 'I Am' cannot be divorced from 
the individual hypostases in the Trinity and also divine unity, that the substance of 
that existence or the collective expression of ' I Am' of the united Godhead, the ousia. 
can be considered as the primary substance by which unity is manifested. This is then 
expressed co-equally within the tri-hypostases. 
In this context both ousia and hypostasis could be viewed as primary substances and 
are implicitly related to the underlying reality of being and existence, which is also 
argued by Prestige. 265 Prestige argues that ()usia, as "concrete entity" is the "primary 
ousia".266 In this thesis, the model of Trinity focuses on unity where the subject of 
unity relates to the nature of the divine or the underlying reality that unifies the 
hypostatic difference. 
25K Ibid. 
2W Origen did incorporate to theological language npWT'l ouaia as contrasting with angels. see Stead. 
pivine Substance. pp.116-117. 
_60 Stead. Divine Substance. p.118. 
261 
As argued by Alston. 'Substance and the Trinity'. in Trinity p.186. 
262 Ibid. 
263 S Z" 
264 ee IZlo.ulas. Communion and Otherness. pp. 105-110; also BC, footnote 30. p.38. 
265 See ~restlge. God in Patristic Thought. p.191; and Zizioulas. BC, footnote 30. p.38. 
, PrestIge. God in Patristic Thought. pp.189-191. 
_66 Ibid .• p.275. 
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2.3.3 Relationality through Substance 
The notion of sharing must be broached here in relation to being in the Trinity. It is 
argued that a substantialist approach was not negated by the Cappadocians but that 
relationality or a sharing of what is common through a notion of substance was 
paramount to their approach to hypostasis. Ifrelationality was conditioned through 
hypostases then that would allow a form of tri-theism in the Trinity, affirming a 
communion of three individuals. Hence, relationality indicated a common element, 
where unity was expressed through the term ousia. The sharing of what is common to 
the hypostasii67 allowed for concrete characteristics to be expressed individually, but 
also expressing a sharing ofa common nature (K01VDV n1<; <pUcrECO<;)?68 This nature, or 
ousia, is not a predicated metaphysical substance, but is the subject by which the 
appellation Godhead is given to express unity. It was argued by Gregory of Nyssa, 
who refers to a "community of substance",269 that the notion of community, while 
allowing for participation through the divine operations, is centred within the divine 
substance. This clearly identifies that which is distinguishable within the ()usia or the 
"undistinguishable character of their substance".27o The substantialist model was not 
negated by Gregory of Nyssa, nor was it expounded due to the incapability of such an 
endeavour to discover the hidden things of God. Consequently, the shared nature of 
the operations of the Trinity was not investigated but was rendered to a safe context as 
an indication of what was common. 
When applied to the human level, ontological sharing indicated for Basil what was 
common (K01VQV)271 to "Peter", "Andrew, John and James",272 but there is no sense 
that the generic substance of "man" indicates a sharing of an immaterial unity as 
understood in the Trinity. Basil stated: 
This common element of the thing predicated, seeing that it refers to all alike 
who are included under the same term, demands a further note of distinction if 
267 In Basil indicated particular existence, Ep.38 32SA- 339C. 
26M ibid., 32SC. 
'69 
- Eun.1.34 (Moore) 
270 . 
'71 Gregory of Nyssa, ad Eustathium de Trinitate (Moore), as Basil's Ep.189 (PG 32), 684. 
- Basil, Ep.38, 32SC. 
27' lb' 
- Id., 32SB-C. 
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we are to understand, not merely man in general, but "Peter" or "John" in 
particular. 273 
The sharing of a common nature of human beings however, for me indicates not only 
a sharing of common elements (a natural physis of human persons), but within a 
notion of soul, a spiritual physis, which is common to all and particular to each 
person. It is not that each person participates in a single soul, but an immaterial 
spiritual nature is evident in each person and through participation with that nature 
deified. individuals become related to each other in a full and mystical sense, but this 
shall be examined in Chapter 2B. 
Even though the Cappadocians used the analogy of human existence to argue for the 
place of particularity in the divine cases, as already shown, their models did not seem 
to allow for these determinations to be completely interchangeable between the divine 
and human cases. While in the divine case the notion of hypostasis indicates a static 
unchangeable type of particularity, which is not identical to the other subjects of the 
heing of the Triune-Godhead; in the human case, the hypostasis is always 
experiencing change. 
In the Cappadocian model, ousia indicates both the generic ontological condition in 
the Trinity and the centre of unity. Conversely, when translated to the human 
condition, ousia through the Cappadocian model indicates only the generic 
ontological disposition. Unity in the human case should be sought, not from 
difference, but from the sharing of the human capacity to he. as deified persons, which 
is not only existentially viable, but related implicitly to the essential spiritual reality of 
being a human person, in having a soul. 
Within the notion of the human soul, a sense of the particular within a material 
existence and the immaterial should both be considered, where the immaterial is 
equated with the metaphysical stuff of essential heing. This Sluff comprises of an 
essence or property of being (ousia) that in the highest sense indicates kinship with 
the divine, but the notion of kinship shall be examined in Chapter 28. The existential 
273. ~ 
11 OUV KOlV6tT1<; tOU OTIllalVolltvou. 6110(00<; tnl nCtvta<; tou<; uno to auto ovolla tEtaYlltvou<; 
~oopou(Ja. xpdav £X£l ti'\<; unoOlaOtoAi'\<;. Ol'~<; ou tOY Ka06AOU iivOponov. nUa tOY nttpov ~ tOY 
IOOQVVllV t7nyvooo61l£Oa. Basil. Ep.38. 325B (Defcrrari). 
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character of the soul when considered through kinship allows the soul to be 
understood within a human model as a copy of the divine. The notion of 
consciousness can be applied to the human noetic hypostasis. which has as its 
foundation kinship and as a copy of the divine applies not only to an intelligible but to 
an essential nature as Gregory Nazianzen stated: "our mind and reason, mingles with 
its kin, when the copy returns to the pattern it now longs after".274 In this model 
God's, own being, the divine "Egoity,,275 exemplified in the declaration EYcO EllllO W!}v 
("I am the being", LXX Ex.3:14), indicates not a self absorbed natural 'I' of the 
individual, but a consciousness within a spiritual (here correlated to the Alman) 
physis. This passage confirms that as the divine being is non-different from the divine 
awareness and as such, the essential reality of divine being, in having cognition of its 
Self, confirms a personal sense to being, or ousia. So too in the human condition a 
cognitive awareness of the divine reality within transfers to a change in 
consciousness. The character of the individual cognition reflects the nature of the 
awareness within a certain nature, in the lower nature a lower consciousness is 
experienced, while in the union with the higher nature a higher consciousness is 
experienced. The awareness of 'I am' within the individual becomes an awareness of 
'I Am That', • I am' true being, reflecting a divine type of existence in this 
consciousness. There is evident in awareness, a relationship to the nature of that 
existence, as expressed in Exodus.276 On a human level, the essential reality of each 
particular existence, or hypostatic difference, becomes the backdrop to that existence 
and when expressed through the highest part of the soul, representing a basis for unity 
in the hypostasis. This reality is equated with the term Alman as the supreme knower, 
in that it is the conscious expression of its own essential reality. 
2.3.4 Subjectivity in the Godhead 
Another important point concerning hypostasis and difference is in relation to unity in 
the Godhead and the Subject of that unity, whether the unity is through the ousia or 
the three persons of the Trinity together forming an existential bond. Gregory of 
274 Or.2B.17 (Williams). 
275 A h' hI' . s Ig Ighted by Mark S. G. Dyczkowski in his contemporary studies of Kashmir Saivism, see 
Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, A Journey in the World o/the Tantras (Varanasi: 2004). 
276 This view is also considered by John A. T. Robinson, in Thou Who Art (NY: 2006), p.319. 
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Nyssa directly linked ousia to the divine being,277 and to the one united being of the 
Godhead (geotTJC;).278 This implies that a single notion of person (hypostatic 
operation) cannot form a whole in the Godhead, but that the three persons Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit together unified are called the Godhead. It is not exactly clear if this 
unity is due to ousia as the cause of unity or predicated to the unity of persons. In 
either case, the ousia attains a relational ontological quality in the sharing of a 
common nature (KOtvT)V <pumv)279 of the divine Godhead, whether expressed as three 
persons united through the ousia or together creating a bond understood as the divine 
ousia. While in contemporary personhood there has been an emphasis on relationality 
to argue unity, on heterogenic models ofrelationality280 or a focusing on the outward 
existence, or outward looking persons, the Cappadocians allowed a focus upon what 
was ontologically shared, not only on how relationality was expressed. This allows 
relationality to be focused on the inner condition, which highlights the nature of the 
bonds ofrelationality and expressed outwardly. Consequently a relational person can 
be expressed not only through a way of existing, but by highlighting the condition of 
unity, which becomes the true expression of the centre ofrelationality. Unity through 
ousia becomes the ground not only for unity but also 'the ground of heing' as a 
foundation of outward existentiality. 
Unity, focused through ousia, described not only the nature of heing but qualified the 
SUbjective reality of the divine hypostases, sharing the ontological quality, that is 
God's divinity. Gregory Nazianzen stated that his theology while safeguarding the 
"distinctiveness of the three hypostases .. 281 allowed the hypostases to be qualified 
through the: 
277 
Gregory of Nyssa. Eun.3.5 (Moore). 
27M Gregory stated: "Since then. as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us. we fashion 
our appellations from the several operations that are known to us, and as we recognise as one of these 
that operation of surveying and inspection. or, as one might call it. beholding. whereby He surveys all 
things and overlooks them all. discerning our thoughts and entering into those things which arc not 
visible. we suppose that Godhead ... is called God ... Now if anyone admits that to behold and to discern 
are the same thing. and that the God who superintends all things. both is and is called the superintender 
of the universe. let him consider this operation. and judge whether it belongs to one of the Persons 
whom we believe in the Holy Trinity. or whether the power extends throughout the Three Persons ... not 
one of the Persons of the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an appellation". Tres Dii. pi D (Moore); also see Gregory of Nyssa. Ad Eustathium de Trinitate (Moore) . 
• 79 8 '1£ as.. p.38.2.3258. 
~:~ As exemplified in emphasis on communion by Zizioulas, see nc. 
Or.31. 10. 113C-116C; translation by Wickham. On God and Christ. p.123. 
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single nature and quality of the Godhead ... The three are a single whole in their 
Godhead, and the single whole is three in properties (idiotes or one's own-
ness)".282 
In the context of revelation, in relation to human beings, the Cappadocians understood 
the divine act to be interpreted through divine operations (EvEP'YEUl),283 not because 
God's being has no ontological content, but because human beings cannot know the 
nature of the Godhead (9E6'tTJ~).284 Gregory of Nyssa affirmed that even the word 
9E6Tll~ implied an operation, for we can know what the word means, but the Absolute 
nature of God is beyond all means of knowledge. 285 This does not negate ()usia but 
supports the place for it, for ousia is so important to the understanding of the 
Godhead, that it goes beyond the realm of human knowing. 
Even though human beings cannot know the Godhead according to the Cappadocians, 
human beings can know about the hypostases. 286 The knowledge of God, because it is 
restricted to his existential operations identified in the hypostases of the Trinity, 
paradoxically highlights the nature of unity within the divine reality, for the 
hypostases cannot stand alone or be divorced from ()usia. This unity highlights, in the 
personal existential operations of the tri-hypostatic Godhead, the underlying 
subjectivity behind the idiotes, united in the one operation of the Godhead. The three 
hypostases of the Trinity are not disconnected parts or disunited from the divine 
nature but all the hypostases work together within this unity, as Gregory stated that 
when Christ operates as a salvific function, so too does the Father and the Spirit. 287 
However, there seems to be implied in the Cappadocians, different levels of 
operations. There is a unified operation of the Godhead, and operations pertaining to 
the specific and particular identity of each hypostasis, "Begetter", "Begotten" and that 
which "Proceeds".288 What is not clear is how the operations of the hypostases are 
different, ifat all, from the operations of the unity of Godhead,28'J and if there is no 
m Ibid. 
2M.l 
Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii 115A-124C. 
2114 Ibid. 
2M5 Ib·d 
. I., 120A-1240 
2Mb This view was lat~r restated by Gregory Palamas, see TDS. 
2M7 
Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii, 120A-1240: translation by Moore, On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5). 
r,.333. 
~:: Ibid; translation by Moore, On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5). 1'.333. 
;M9 Gregory Nazianzen. Or.29.2. 76B. 
Gregory of Nyssa. Tres Dii. 121 D-1240. 
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difference, why state a difference? Does the operation of the Godhead have priority 
(as a 7tpro'tll ouma) over the hypostatic operations, or does particularity have 
ontological primacy? Ifso, why was there a focus on the operations of the Godhead 
(ousia) at all? The answer is that for Gregory of Nyssa, the word Godhead (OE6'tll~),290 
indicates that the divine operations of the Godhead extend "throughout Three 
Persons,,291 of the Godhead, and implying a nature of being which underpins all 
existences. 
But on what level is the distinction between hypostatic operations and that pertaining 
to ousia on an ontological level? Ousia represents the metaphysical stuflof hypostatic 
being, for without ousia the notion of hypostasis is outward looking, an operation 
without depth, or an activity with no centre. Thus an approach to the Cappadocians 
(mainly Gregory of Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa) can be developed that 
acknowledges a balance of both hypostasis and ousia, of activity and heing in the 
Godhead. If the use of ousia was restricted to what is implied by Zizioulas, the 
reducing of essence to a generic quality shared by the persons of the Trinity, not an 
ontological nature, as Stead observes, the result would be a "lucid but undemanding 
pluralistic doctrine".292 This is exactly what Gregory of Nyssa sought to oppose in 
Tres Dii or Not Three Gods. Gregory sought not to overplay the individual existences 
in the Trinity, which would lead to tri-theism, or overplay divine union which would 
lead to Sabellianism or Arianism. But neither does he negate divine nature. 
Hypostasis is not used in isolation but in connection with ousia. which has important 
repercussions in understanding unity-in-difference in relation to the human condition. 
In the human model of hypostasis ouaia, or the essential nature, is non-different from 
who a person is. This has to infer that there are two substances within each hypostasis, 
the material and spiritual substances, which represents that which is generically 
shared and that which is particular. Here lies the crux of the debate. Is it my nature 
that is me or my cognitive awareness? It is both, where both allow a united expression 
of a unique person. This uniqueness is then translated into a higher condition when 
considered relational to unity with the divine. The spiritual nature of a person 
290 Coming from "9ta, or beholding, and it is He who is our 9£atlt<; or beholder", see Gregory of 
~rss~, Tres DU .. 121O-124D, 1210; translation by Moore. On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5), p.333. 
29' Ibid; translatIOn by Moore, On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5), p.333 . 
. Stead, 'Why Not Three Gods?', p.ISI. 
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however, goes beyond considering a general application of just having a soul but 
infers that participation with this spiritual substance, which allows the notion of the 
individual hypostasis to change and become something quite different as a spiritual or 
deified hypostasis. If a notion of person were restricted to an outward looking 
hypostasis with no substantial centre then person would indeed become an empty face 
(prosopon), it is the essential depth of a person that brings depth to a meaning of 
hypostasis. Conversely if there were no unique hypostatic characteristics, person 
would indicate a lump, not able to express itself outwardly. There has to be both for 
person to gain meaning. However the Cappadocians, especially Basil, placed priority 
on what was particular. While Prestige argues that Gregory of Nyssa's views are 
ambiguous for his focus was on specific characteristics, while also focusing on the 
soul and thus to the stuff of being. 293 Basil does not expand on these ideas. 
Concerning stuff. Prestige affinns that this stuff should not be considered as a 
metaphysical character unable to exist outside of a "Subject", 294 but that it is 
implicitly related to an essential reality of equal importance within a stress on 
particularity. In this balance of particularity and essentiality or stuff; person comes to 
be related to difference and non-difference (unity), where the stuD'is not predicated to 
the subject but equally important as the subject. Such a focus on both aspects of 
subjectivity can be vindicated through the Trinity, where the hypostases can be 
considered as ontologically equal to the stuff of the Godhead. However, Basil's focus 
on the specific, the hypostasis. underlines the importance of the subjective individual 
existence and seems to support Zizioulas' interpretation of the Cappadocians,29~ 
where substance becomes, as already shown in Zizioulas' interpretation, predicated to 
hypostasis. If the tenn hypostasis is to attain a full meaning the tenn should however, 
have an immaterial substance related dimension. But in Basil's model it is not clear 
how the inner reality (unity) and outer existence (difference) come together. However 
it can be observed that conceptually, hypostasis has evolved and should evolve further 
with a stronger emphasis on ousia. In the evolution of hypostasis and ousia, the two 
should not be considered as disconnected, but implicitly related to each other in a 
model of difference-in-unity or rather unity-in-difference. 
"13 Ib' 
• Id" p.189. 
"14 
• Ibid., pp.271-28 I. 
1(1~ Z· . 
. IZloulas, BC, p.17. 
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2.4 Some Perspectives on D.TOJlO<; and TOOt Tl 
In this part of the thesis the terms of iito~o<;, auto, and tOOf: t\ will be examined 
within the context of isolated individual juxtaposed to Zizioulas' relational model of 
person (hypostasis). Zizioulas' relationality can be considered helpful if redirected to 
include, within the Cappadocian hypostatic model and Pratyabhijnii, an essential 
reality of being. In this context the concept of individual (iitOJ.lov)296 or difference-in-
isolation shall be addressed, so as to qualify hypostasis through qualified-difference, 
or difference-in-relation in the context of essential being. This relationality can be 
expressed, not as 'I_Thou,297 but as 'I am That' in which the possibilities for union 
with the divine become the basis for understanding human personhood and identity. 
The notion of qualified-difference can then be understood through a notion of unity, 
which can be correlated to the ri (what) of existence, where hypostasis is qualified 
through this what. The idea of hypostasis can then be expressed through concrete 
personhood, but relationally in terms of unity-in-difference. 
2.4.1 Zizioulian Perspectives 
Zizioulas' model provides a platform by which to qualify the notion of isolated and 
disconnected individual where the human person becomes implicitly related to a way 
of existing that mirrors the divine way, or operational way of existing. Hence, he 
argued that the notion of individual indicated, in the Cappadocians, something 
different from person.29K Zizioulas however, while regarding person as different to 
individual, does not necessarily equate iitoJ.lov with individual as the terms, for him, 
2% See Timothy Ware who states in relation to distinction between individual and person that, "The 
difference is particularly clear in the Greek language. Atomon, the individual, denotes the human being 
as unit-turned inward, self-contained. isolated, a bare number recorded in a census. (Prosopon. the 
person, denotes the human being as face- outward-looking. in relationship. involved with others.) 
Whereas atomon signifies separation, prosopon signifies communion". in 'In the Image and Likeness: 
The Uniqueness of the Human Person' in John T. Chirban (ed.), Personhood: Orthodox Christianity 
~nd the Connection between Body. Mind and Soul (Westport: 1996). p.4. 
_'17 Or as face-to-Jace, which was also expressed by Emmanuel Levinas. in Outside the Subject 
(Stanford: 1993) p.23. 
29K ' 
.See Communion and Otherness. pp.174-175. Zizioulas' rejection of the idea of the individual is also 
eVident in his rejection of the term uin6 (self). Zizioulas. BC. p.28. 
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do not coincide in the Cappadocians. 299 He agrees that (ho~ov indicated "the idea of 
'concrete' 'specific' (i~tKil) and indivisible existence of ousia", 300 but if concrete 
specificity is implied in iito~ov in a notion of isolated individual, 301 when applied to 
the Trinity, tri-theism would result. If the notion of individual expresses too much of a 
notion of concrete and isolated existence within personhood, the isolation of 
individuum destroys the notion of persons in relation to a hypostatic model. Zizioulas 
model is useful in highlighting that the notion of individual if indicating isolation and 
delusion (of the natural human physis) , has to be qualified within a concept of 
hypostasis in relation to God But the notion of hypostasis should also express an 
ontological quality not argued by Zizioulas, where the notion of individual is 
expanded in a relational model of hypostasis. which becomes perfected in its essential 
spiritual reality or Atman. 
Paradoxically, the strength of hypostasis to denote concrete identity was why the tenn 
was employed in Greek Patristics so as to convey weight in the speci fic equal 
characteristics of the hypostases of the Trinity and thereby negate modalism and 
subordinationism. This exemplified in Gregory Nazianzen, who stated: 
It is their difference in, so to say "manifestation" or mutual relationship, which 
has caused the difference in names. The Son does not fall short in some 
particular of being Father. Sonship is no defect, yet that does not mean the he 
is the Father. By the same token, the Father would fall short of being Son - the 
Father is not the Son. No the language here gives no grounds for any 
deficiency, for any subordination in being ... The aim is to safeguard the 
distinctions of the three hypostases within the single nature and quality of the 
Godhead .... The three are a single whole in their Godhead and the single 
whole is three in personalities (idiotes). Thus there is no Sabellian "One", no 
three to be mischievously divided. 302 
The tenns hypostasis and iiTO~OV both convey the idea of specificity, such of a 
specific person. The Father is the cause (natpo~ aitia~) "from whom indeed He (the 
2'19 Ibid., pp.174-176. 
11X) Ibid. 
101 I d"d I' I n IVI ua Ity was clear y expressed through the term atol1ov, Hans Urs von Balthasar, in relation to 
Maximus. showed that Iitol1ov, though indicating the generic. can also be indeed equated with the 
e~rticular individual existence or hypostasis, see Hans Urs von Balthasar. Cosmic Liturgy, p.233. 
Gregory Nazianzen, Or.3J.9.1 13C; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ. p.123. 
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Spirit), proceeds".303 Basil goes on to show that particularity is specifically related to 
subjectivity, individuality or person, stating: 
He has this distinguishing note characteristic of His person that He is produced 
after the Son and with Him and that He has His subsistence from the Father . .104 
This is contrary to those who argue that the Cappadocians did not employ a notion of 
concrete individuality. In this context a focus on the type of particularity or the mode 
of particular existence becomes important, which defines the sense of individuality 
within a term. Toronen also demonstrates that the Greek Fathers (in relation to 
Maximus) equated what was particular with individual (iitoJ,lov) or in contemporary 
thought, person.305 He goes on to state that: "for Gregory of Nyssa all the three 
notions - hypostasis, person and individual- are identical".306 Also previously the 
Cappadocians did not view iitoJ,loV as meaning something different from person or the 
individual. 307 However in the context of individual in the Greek Patristic usage. 
hypostasis has to indicate something a bit different to individual as individual implies 
isolation and ignorance while hypostasis is related to a depth of being. How is depth 
conveyed? It is conveyed through the relationship with ousia or the essential reality of 
being. 
Thus the notion of homogenous individual has a context of depth through the property 
of being (ousia). which is an unacceptable development for Zizioulas as this is viewed 
as contrary to Byzantine theology.308 Zizioulas counters substantialist models with a 
focus on an existentialist interpretation of the Greek Fathers.109 so as to focus on the 
101 . . BaSil. Ep.38. 329C (Deferran). 
104 Ibid .. touro YVWPIOtllCOV Tf1~ Kata Tilv un6araotv U;16T'l~ 0'l~tiov ExEI. TO ~ETa TOV Yiov Kal aUv 
autq'l yvwpl~£o9at Kal to £1( tOU natp~ uIP£otaval. 
10~ Toronen. Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Conlessor. p.5 I; see also 
Demetrios Bathrellos. The Byzantine Christ (Oxford: 2004). p. 102. footnote 15 citing Opuscu/e 16, 
197C-D. 
JOb Toronen. Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor. p.5 I. 
107 For examples see Basil. Ep.38. 325B-D; and Gregory of Nyssa Hom.Opi/. 125A-256C. 
10K On being and relationality see: Martin Buber. I and Thou (London; 1937.2004); John Macmurray. 
Persons in Relation (NY: 1961); Zizioulas. Be. Levinas. Humanism of the Other; and John A. T. 
Robinson. Thou Who Art. 
10'l Such accusations are countered by A. Papanikolaou. 'Is John Zizioulas an Existentialist in Disguise? 
Response to Lucian Turcescu·. Modern Theology (2004). pp.60 1-607. who focuses mainly on 
answering the themes of: differences between person and individual; relationality and mode of 
existence. But this is not what makes Zizioulas an existentialist. What makes Zizioulas and 
existentialist is that in his negating a substantialist context. he draws a notion of person to a definition 
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experience of communion, of one hypostasis to another,310 within a model of the outer 
act. This act of communion becomes related to an "event of communion",311 to an 
outer event, and is not related to an inner essence, or a coming out of the biological 
existence through ek-stasis. in an ecstatic experience of the inner reality. In the 
evolution of the terms in this thesis, another word could be employed, en_stasy.312 
which denotes an inward mystical tum within the hypostasis through the Atmanic 
experience. This could add a deeper dimension to the understanding of hypostasis. 
and an ek-static experience. Zizioulas however, does not expand his idea of ek-stasis 
to examine exactly how divine participation as an existential ek-stasis occurs and is 
understood in hypostasis. 
2.4.2 The tOOE tl 
When focusing on the inner reality or essence of the individual, there comes a point in 
which the focus shifts to understanding the nature of the individual, the true nature. 
The understanding of the nature of the subject was for the Cappadocians 
accomplished by examining the properties or operations of a subject, and seemed to 
utilise Aristotelian ideas to do this. However in Aristotle the examination of the 
operations of a thing paradoxically focused the attention on what the thing was, the 
tOOE n (this something),313 or the individual itself. Aristotle stated: 
The term "being" has several senses, which we have classified in our 
discussion of the number of senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the 
"what" of a thing, i.e. the individuality. 3 14 
This was mainly due to the Aristotelian equating of individual with enumerated 
individual thing, the tOOE n. 315 It is this enumerative quality to the individual in 
which is outward looking, lacking ontological depth. and though relational. paradoxically putting a 
stress on the outer person. 
310 Z·· I 
311 ~z~ou as, Communion and Otherness, pp.13-98. 
Zlzloulas, BC, p.22. 
312 S G F . 
J ee eorg euerstem. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga (London: 1990). I3 A · I 314 ~stot e~ Met. VIl.i.1-2.1 028a I 0-20 (Tredennick). 
Ibid., TO OV Aty£Tal 7tollaxu>c;, Ka9wn:p OI£v..6~E9a 7tp6tEpov tv TOic; 7tEpt tOU 7toaaxu>c;' a'l~aiVEl 
yap to !ltv Ti tan Kat t60E tl. 
II I?id. In Be. p.17, Zizioulas, states that individual is equated with t60E ti (this what, what is this), 
but 10 Met. VIl.i.1-2.1028a I 0-20, Aristotle refers to a T60E tl (this something). Has Zizioulas confused 
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Aristotle that Zizioulas and Lossky found particularly unhelpful when interpreting 
person as a theological tenn.316 It also became the ground for a polemic against the 
term individual and the reasoning behind the use of person or hypostasis. 
Consequently both Zizioulas and Lossky argued that the Cappadocians shift the 
attention away from innumerate individual to a sense of person, and yet no such 
distinction exists in the Cappadocians for the Cappadocian use of hypostasis was 
dependent on focusing on specific identity. 
In addition Aristotle's emphasis on ousia in understanding being becomes a problem 
for those who wish to emphasise being through an existential type of personal 
relationality. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics. focuses on substance to understand being, 
where being in the generic case, "being qua being",317 has "inherent properties", 
implying a sharing ofa common nature (cpU<ru;).318 Althoughphysis indicates a 
generic secondary substance,319 it should not necessarily be considered in terms of 
predicated, but that which allows the infonning of the subject. The notion of 
substances related to the classifications of primary and secondary substances. and it is 
thought were equated by the Cappadocians to hypostasis and ousia, the particular to 
the general, respectively.320 The properties of being can imply an inherent quality in 
the individual or the specificity of a thing (ri iart, "what it is"). Hence the individual 
(t6~E n, this something)321 indicates more than just material being. predicated 
substances of outward existential person in the Cappadocians, for there is a 
metaphysical relatedness to the soul. The ri (what), whether used in ri ian, or utilised 
by Aristotle by itself as the ti (what, or the of being, ti to cSV);122 indicates the what of 
the subject. It is this ri in this thesis that indicates. in the human person, the 
metaphysical essentiality of being a person,323 not just merely having metaphysical 
the t{ (what) with tt (something)? Probably not, for in Communion and Otherness this is corrected; see 
p.107. 
~16 S Z" I ee IZIOU as, BC, p.17 and Lossky, In the Image and Likeness, p.113. 
317 Aristotle, Met.lV.i.1-3.1 003a20-b5 (Tredennick). 
31K Ibid., IV.ii.3-6.1 003b20-25. 
319 See Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p.216. 
320 These ideas have already been explored in Chapter 2.3.4. The notion of ousia in Aristotle meant 
being which is divided to the primary and secondary substances. The primary indicates unity of being 
which in the Trinity applies also to hypostasis. while the secondary ousia indicated a "universal 
essence" or physis. 
321 A . I .. 
nstot e, Met.IV.n.3-6.1 003b20-25; and VII.i.I-3.1 028a I 0-20. Aristotle makes use of the 
distinctiveness between ti (what) and tt (something/someone). 
322 A' I .. 10 nstot e, Met.VII.IJ.6-8. 28bl-IO. 
3H Ib'd IX .. I. .vn.4-7.1049a20-30. 
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notes of a person. While the E<Jtt (it is) or tOOE (this something/someone) indicates the 
particularisation of an individual person, the n infers a backdrop to existing in asking 
what, what is it that is? The what. informs that there is an objectification, and that the 
object relates to a subject and the nature of that subject, which becomes in the highest 
sense the real existence. 
An example of the usefulness ofn can be exemplified in the New Testament where a 
metaphysical relatedness inherent in the particular is shown to be indicated through a 
common what. The words <Jro~(l 7tVEU~anKov ("spiritual body") of the Apostle Paul 
(1 Corinthians 15; 44), indicates that the appellation of the general, here implied 
through the words "spiritual body", which indicates the true nature of the particular 
existence. For the Apostle Paul, each particular person can attain to a better 
understanding of their particular existence through the general category of the what. 
Thus the determining of the nature of individual existence indicates the possibilities 
for the particular (hypostasis) existence. A contemporary Eastern Orthodox use of 
hypostasis in this way is exemplified by Sophrony, who establishes the principle. the 
"hypostatic-principle,,324 as a denotation of being. He makes use of both the inner and 
outer existential sense of being, where the person's hypostatic being and existence is 
recapitulated through a personal relationship with the divine, through a relational 
category. Recapitulation is possible because of the inherent capacity of the nature, or 
the what. or the essence (unity) of the human being (hypostasis). Each person is born 
with a potentiality of existence and human stu./J,J2~ which is hyposlalically realised in 
the union with Christ. This confirms the place for a substance based hypostatic model, 
which shall be correlated to an Atman-hypostasis in later chapters. In this language 
hypostasis becomes related to potential substance of heing, although this is not 
exactly what is stated by Sophrony, this allows the fullness of individual personhood 
to be realised. In the Atman-hypostasis, each person has an essentiality both physical 
and metaphysical, in body and nous, which is particularised in the hypostatic 
existence of each person. 
324 Z h . 
ac anas, Christ. Our Way and Our Life. p 17-42. for an example in the works of Sophrony. see His 
Life is Mine p.44 325 •• 
The use of stuffhas already been explained in Chapter 2.4. 
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2.5 Person and npOGO)1tOV 
In this part of the chapter I examine the notion of person through the tenn 
prosopon. 326 which started to gain significance in the fourth to sixth centuries and 
especially in relation to the pre-Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian debates. This 
was very much evident in the works of Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378-444) whose 
emphasis on unity began to change the Cappadocian stress on operations as signifying 
mUltiple subjects within the Trinity. He equated words such as ousia with physis and 
hypostasis with prosopon. 327 to quantify how to vouchsafe the personal attributes in 
the Trinity, and Christologically, without denuding the notion of unity. 328 He used the 
tenn prosopon as hypostasis to underline both a "sense of actual reality as opposed to 
appearance,,329 and a "substantive experience".330 Cyril highlights how unity is 
preserved in Christ, united in a single hypostasis or prosopon. to show how the divine 
operations related to the ontological condition in God and yet expressing the 
existential character of revelation through the communicatio idiomatum. J31 Christ, for 
Cyril, becomes the exemplar of unity, stating that "the incarnate nature of the Word is 
immediately conceived of as one after the union". J32 
326 For a study on this term see Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons. pp.22, 
47; Daniel F. Stramara, 'Unmasking the Meaning ofnp6awnov: Prosopon in the Works of Gregory of 
~rsa', Unpublished Doctoral Thesis (St Louis: 1996). 
, Norman Russell, Cyril of Alexandria (London: 2000), p.40. 
1.H As exemplified by Cyril of Alexandria, see The Unity of Christ /I Prooem (ACO I), 1,6, pp.32.6-
34.9; translation by Norman Russell. Cyril of Alexandria, p.142. See Cyril of Alexandria showed that 
Christ's unified nature comprising of the material and immaterial (here singular) did not indicate two 
persons, stating that, "if anyone ... allocates them to two prosopa or hypostases, attributing some to a 
man conceived ofa separate from the Word ofGod ... let them be anathema", Anathema 4 (ACO I), I. 
5, pp.15.16-25.28; translation by Norman Russell, Cyril of Alexandria. p.1 X\' On prosopa see also 
~~rman Russell, Cyril of Alexandria, pp.42-44. 
Russell, Cyril of Alexandria, p.42. 
no Ibid. 
HI 
Or community of properties, used by Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine, see Grillmeier, Christ in 
~~: Ch~istian Tradition, Vol. I, pp.452-453, 534-537. 
Cynl, Unity of Christ, /I Prooem (ACO I), 1,6, pp.32-34; translation by Russell, Cyril of 
Alexandria, p.142. 
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2.5.1 Studies on Prosopon 
Although the word prosopon initially indicated mask333 or face, it came to highlight 
what was individually unique in a person, especially in the Council of Chalcedon, 
where it was shown that the term indicated fixed individuality. The word prosopon 
could also indicate: the outward being and individual self, a legal term;334 and person 
or a "concrete presentation of an abstract ouain, individual external appearance". 335 
Concerning the use in the Cappadocians of prosopon and especially by Gregory of 
Nyssa, Daniel Stramara's study of Gregory of Nyssa shows that prosopon was 
mentioned by Gregory 313 times. This indicates the importance of the term, 
especially within a Trinitarian and Christological context, and ultimately negating the 
equating of the term with "mask" through a focus on what was individually concrete 
in Trinitarian theology.336 Stramara' s study argued that prosopon equated person with 
a "centre of consciousness" (to KEvtpOV tf\c; 3tavoiac;).337 However, this view is 
rejected by Lucian Turcescu who, while accepting that prosopon meant more than 
mask, asserts that prosopon has to have more than psychological implications. 
Prestige also confirmed that "prosopon was a non-metaphysical term for 
individual".338 Certainly prosopon came to indicate concrete identity as in Chalcedon, 
but this correlation was not entirely evident in the Cappadocians although prosopon 
was beginning to be considered in such a way. Prestige also confirms that the 
HJ Or a character in a drama, see G. W. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon. On prosopon also see also 
Zizioulas, Being as Communion, pp.35, 54. Prestige conforms to the view that Hippolytus uses 
prosopon in relation to the Trinity, by which he means "not mask but individual", God in Patristic 
Thought, p.160); see also Hans Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory. 11/ 
Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ (San Francisco: 1992), pp.209-211; Clark, . Augustine on 
Person: Divine and Human', p.112 
114 Daniel F. Stramara, 'Unmasking the Meaning of np6ow1tov: Prosopon in the Works of Gregory of 
~rsa', see Turce~cu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Penons. pp.14-19.. . 
See np6ownov In G. W. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp.1186-118; and also PrestIge, God In 
Patristic Thought, p.157. Prestige indicates that in the Fathers. hypostasis. pro.mpon and atomon 
indicated the "same thing" (ibid. p.158). Prestige also shows that the corresponding term in the Latin. 
persona. meant the same (ibid. p.159); see also Grillmeier. Christ in Christian Tradition, pp.375, 431. 
316 As exemplified by Gregory of Nyssa, ad Eustathum de Trinitate, as Ep. 189 of Basil (PG 32), 684; 
translation by Moore, On the Holy Trinity and of the Godhead (NPNF 5). pp.326-330. The concrete 
sense of person is also highlighted by Basil in the Hexameron, 9.6 (PG 29), stating "does not the 
second Person show himself in a mystical way", and '''And God said let us make man', tell me is there 
?J~ly on~ Person"; translation by Jackson (NPNF 8), p.1 06. 
DanIel F. Stramara, 'Unmasking the Meaning ofnp6ow1tov: Prosopon in the Works of Gregory of 
~jssa', ~ee Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, p.18. 
PrestIge, God in Patristic Thought, p.179. 
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corresponding term in Latin, persona339 implies not only external but internal 
metaphysical qualities. 
Gregory of Nyssa's model of person or individual, if such a thing can be attested, 
centred on the development of Aristotelian and Stoic views,340 where the centre of a 
person or individual included both material and immaterial elements. The immaterial 
elements included the notion of the rational, the nous or logikos341 within the single 
person or prosopon. Michael Rene Barnes also affirms that in Gregory of Nyssa's 
works, the soul is equated with the rational elements, and thus to the psychological. 342 
Hence it is not clear why Turcescu ultimately dismisses Stramara's interpretation of 
prosopon as initially relating to the psychological. While Stramara seems to focus on 
prosopon as indicating "psychological agent",343 Turcescu notes that both 7tp6(J(J)7tov 
(face) and 7tPO(J(J)7t€10V (mask) indicated something more significant than mere 
personality. Turcescu evolves the terms within a contemporary context by equating 
soul to modem models while keepingprosopon within the parameters of Gregory's 
model to conclude that both 7tp6(J(J)7tov and 7tPO(J(J)1ttl0V related to the soul as the 
"image of God in humans".344 Certainly, in this thesis it is argued that notions relating 
to person such as prosopon must lead to a deeper understanding of being than 
expressed by ordinary consciousness, and must include a deeper, noetic (spiritual), 
and essential reality that informs personal existence. 
It is now generally accepted in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy that the term 
prosopon has become synonymous with person, historically rooted in the Council of 
Chalcedon, where prosopon and hypostasis both indicated relatedness to the concept 
of individual or person.345 In English the term person had its was etymological roots 
B9 Ib 'd . 1.,pp.157-159. 
140 See Prestige, God in Patristic Thought; and Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine 
Persons. pp.14-19. 
341 
Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif.14, 176A-B. 
142 Michael Rene Barnes, 'Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology 
In its Psychological Content', in Sarah Coakley (ed.), Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa, pp.45-66. 
:: Stramara, 'Unmasking the Meaning ofnpooumov', p.54. 
Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons. p.16. ~4S See C. J. Albergio (ed.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, pp.35-40, which states, "and in one 
In face/person and substance, running together" (Kat d~ Ev npoownov Kat ~tav im6ataOlv 
(J\)vtPEXouOTJ~); and also see Brian E. Daley, 'Nature and the "Mode of Union' .. , who argues that 
'''person' (1!POUW1rov)" in the council ofChalcedon from the perspective of Leontius indicated "the 
being and perceptible role of a concrete, historically identifiable individual, who participates - in order 
to be intelligible and real- in particular being", p.168. 
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in the Old French "persone,,346 and the Latin word persona indicating an actor's 
mask which may be dated back to the Etruscan 'phersu'. 347 But as Ury shows, the 
exact root of person remains obscure.348 What can be affirmed is that the term has 
evolved as did the term hypostasis. and has come to indicate what we now mean by 
person. 
In contemporary Eastern Orthodox scholarship,349 hypostasis is preferred to prosopon, 
but if the two terms are synonymous, why have a preference? It is not within the remit 
of this thesis to answer this question but it has been broached in chapter 2.3.5. But it is 
argued that the term hypostasis can indicate a deeper context to person through an 
Atmanic experience. This context may not be apparent in the term prosopon because 
of the overt concrete sense of individuality now implied in that term (prosopon), and 
because of the implied notion of underlying reality contained in the term hypostasis. 
Hypostasis can mean something more significant, that has both existential 
significance, indicating the way of existing, "a way of being" .150 as considered by 
Zizioulas, and also has ontological depth in the inclusion of an essential reality of that 
existence as an underlying substance. The depth to the hypostatic existence can be 
understood as allowed to bear fruition through grace in the fulfilment of personal 
existence and points to an inherent capacity to be a person within what Zizioulas calls 
"authentic personhood".351 This ability to be completed in hypostatic difference points 
to a metaphysical reality (Alman) within the hypostasis, to an underlying substance, 
the what of personhood, which affirms the human capacity to be realised.l S2 in the 
human hypostasis through A/manic potentiality. m 
146 See J. Pearsall and P. Hanks (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of English (Second Edition, Revised; Oxford: 
2005). 
147 But this is also not completely confirmed, see, Mary T. Clark, 'Augustine on Person: Divine and 
Human', in Joseph T. Lienhard et al (eds.), Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum (NY: 1992), pp.99-120; 
a) nd M. W. Ury, Trinitarian Personhood (Oregon: 2002), p.St. 
4~ U T" 
ry, I rtnltarian Personhood p 81 )49 ' • • 
3S0 See L~s.sky, Sophrony, Zizioulas, Yannaras, and Vlachos in already cited works. 
B I Se.e Zlzloulas, Being as Communion, p.15. 
Ibid., p.54. 
B!Th . 
m ~ nO~lOn of capacity will be examined in Chapter 28 of this thesis. 
ThiS Will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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2.5.2 The Cappadocian use of Prosopon 
Within the context of potentiality of being the term prosopon, even though it may not 
have the depth of hypostasis. it could indicate an activity of being. The focus on this 
property is exemplified by Gregory Nazianzen who used it in association with divine 
actions, such as, "His walking", "sitting", "His motion", and His face. "his watching 
over us is his 'face'" (n)v bE E1tt(J1(OmlV 1tp60001tOV).354 But here the use of prosopon 
is used in the context of predications and not the subject itself. Gregory of Nazianzen 
also used the term prosopon to refute a type of monotheism that established a single 
"monarchy", of a "single person", stating "but the monarchy was not in a defined (or 
single) face/person" (J.l0vapx\a OE, OUX ilv tv 1ttpt'Ypaq>tt 1tp6ooo1tov). 3~~ The 
recognition of the dangers of pro sop on to denote a single person or denuding concrete 
identity as an aspect of divine was also exemplified in Basil of Cae sa rea's awareness 
of the connotations inprosopon, which is why he was reserved in his use of the term, 
preferring hypostasis stating that: 
If then they (Arians) describe the persons (prosopa) as being without 
hypostasis, the statement per se absurd; but if they concede that the Persons 
exist in real hypostasis, as they acknowledge, let them reckon them that the 
principle of homoousion may be preserved in the unity of the 
Godhead ... Father, Son and Hol~ Ghost, in the perfect and complete hypostasis 
of each of the Persons named. 3 6 
Hence, Basil was aware of perceived limitations to the term pro.\'Opon and was 
reluctant to use prosopon due to Sabellian mia-prosopon overtones stating: 
This term (homoousion) also corrects the error of Sa belli us, for it removes the 
idea of the identity of person (U1tOCJ'taclotOO<;), and introduces a perfect 
(tEAtiav) notion of Persons unified (1tPOOOO1tOV n)v EvvOWV). For nothing can 
be of one substance (0J.l0oumov) with itself, but with another (EtEPOV 
EttPOO).357 
Here Basil introduces the notion of relationality of "Persons" to negate a notion of a 
mia-prosopon (one person) model of Trinity through the notion of persons of the 
lS4 S . 
m ee Gregory .Nazlanzen, Or 31.22, 157C (Wickham). 
1 Gregory Nazlanzen, Or 29, 768 (Wickham). J:~ Bas~1 of Caesarea Ep. 214, (PG 32). 789A-D (Jackson). 
BaSil. Ep.52.3 (Jackson and Deferrari). On Basil's anti mia-hypostatic formula see also Turcescu. 
Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, p.23; and Halleux, 'Hypostase et 'personne' dans 
la formation du dogme Trinitaire; Prestige. God in Patristic Thought, p.161. 
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Trinity sharing the substance of the divine with the other persons. This passage also 
shows the inability of Basil to conceive of a divine substance as subject, but to 
conceive only of persons in relation to the other, which is Zizioulas' conclusion to 
Cappadocian theology. Basil was correct in stating however, that if the tenn 
i>1tO(J't(l<lO'EOl<; indicates the notion of unity of one mind (1tpoO'Ol1tOV niv EWOlUV), the 
notion of particular subjects is denuded in the Trinity. Basil also develops in this 
passage a sense of relationality of otherness, which is not to be considered in the 
context of isolated and separated individuals. 
2.5.3 Towards Chalcedon and Beyond 
In the fourth to sixth centuries the theological focus on defining prosopon became 
more specifically related to a notion of concrete specificity (person) in the Council of 
Constantinople,358 and in the Christological context, centred on q)l)O'l<; 
(physis/nature).359 This is exemplified by Cyril of Alexandria, of whom Davis states 
that "Cyril develops an Adam-Christ typology that distinctively hinges on the 
language of 'nature' (q)l)0'l<;)".360 Through the notion of physis a focus comes to be 
placed on what defines unity or the centre of existence, where the human condition 
comes into sharp focus through the Christo logical. However there was a not a 
consensus of ideas but many differing approaches to Trinitarian and Christological 
models, as exemplified in the polemics between the Alexandrine and Antiochene 
models. J61 
15K 
See Tanner. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. p.2S. 
15q Prestige stated that physis "denotes the characteristics" of a subject. see Prestige. God in Patristic 
Thought. p.235. Prestige argue that physis was more easily related to generic qualities than ousia. 
(Prestige. God in Patristic Thought, p.23) to the metaphysical concrete reality of the subject which 
became identified with the subjects of the Trinity. Prestige distinguished between hypostasis. which 
had more a metaphysical connotation in relation to "concrete. objective entity" (ibid .• p.235) and 
prosopon. which became was more easily identified with the subject. See also Grillmeier. Christ in 
Christian Tradition. Vol. I; Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ. 
:~ S. J. Davis. Coptic Christo logy in Practice (Oxford: 2008). p.30. 
Andrew Louth argues that the Alexandrine tradition equated physis with hypostasis. see St John 
Damascene. p.113. There has also been a consensus that there is a distinction between these two 
schools of thought. see: Tixeront. History of Dogmas; Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines Sellers. The 
Council ofChalcedon; Grillmeier. Christ in Christian Tradition. Volume I; Studer. Trinity and 
Incarnation; Bathrellos. The Byzantine Christ; But this is denied by Dragas. see G. D. Dragas. Saint 
Athanasius of Alexandria (New Hampshire: 2005). p.2. 
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The schism between these schools can also be understood as reflecting conceptual 
differences in Western and Eastern Christian models not in approaches to Christology 
but also of Trinitarian theology. In the Greek model the Trinity was expressed with an 
initial stress on the three persons, of "three hypostases within the single nature", 362 
while in the Latin Christian world God was defined through the formula "One essence 
or substance, three persons (una essentia uel substantia. tres personae)".363 This 
difference underlined the stress on subjectivity and an increasing substantialist context 
in the Western models. 
Confusion surrounding the exact role of prosopon. through the Antiochene tradition364 
manifested in relation to the role of physis. where Christ came to be related to the 
double prosopa of Nestorius.365 Nestorius claimed that this schema366 related to the 
two natures in Christ stating "you (Cyril) should not have calumniated me as if I did 
not confess a single prosopon in two natures".367 Although Nestorius claims 
innocence, he did stress a double prosopa schema368 and in answer, Cyril of 
Alexandria put the ontological stress onto physis369 so that the nature of Christ 
revealed a single hypostasis and not two prosopa.HO (persons). He thus underlined the 
unity (henosis) of the two natures, "kath' hypostusin",371 that is to say, brought 
together in a single hypostatic unity or prosopon in Christ. The unity wrought in the 
Christ hypostasis indicates that, difference stressed unity. Cyril thus focused 
1(,2 Gregory Nazianzen. Or.31.9 (PG 36). II3C (Wickham); see also Prestige. God in Patristic' Thought. 
rg235 and p.233. 
J Augustine. Oe.Trin. 7.4.7. (CCSL 50). 255; also see Prestige. God in Patristic Thought. 235. 
164 As exemplified in Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350-428) and Ncstorius (c. 381-452). see Grillmeier. 
Christ in Christian Tradition Vol I' Bathrellos Byzantine Christ,' and McGuckin. Patristic Theology. 16S ' ., • 
Ep.17.8 (ACO I), I. I. p.28.3-22. in N. Russell. Cyril of Alexandria (London: 2000). p.43. 
166 While Apollinarius and Cyril focused on unity. Theodore and Nestorius (d. 451) seemed to shift the 
focus to the outward subject, or prosopon. This however. confused the role of proso{Jon in Christ and 
Instead of two natures. two prosopa (persons) were identified. But Gregory of Nazianzen had earlier 
stated that in Christ. "we have QUo Kat QUo not QU~ Kal auo~" (Gregory Nazianzus. Ep.IOI.21. 
PG 37. 180A-B). negating the possibility of two persons. Here the neuter case is used in the 
detennination of other to indicate that in Christ there are not two personal 'I·s·. while as Grillmeier 
shows of this passage that in the Trinity the masculine is used to denote a multiplicity of concrete 
U7tOaTa(n:~or real persons. See also Bathrellos. The Byzantine Christ. p.18 where Bathrellos reaffinns 
what was stated by Grillmeier. see Christ in Christian Tradition. p.370. where in Christ there is not 
Iillo~ Kal QUo~ but QUo Kal QUo. but in the Trinity the reverse is true; see also Kelly. Early 
~~ristian Doctrines. p.297; and John Behr. The Nicene Faith. Part 2 (2; Crestwood: 2004). p.403. 
, Ep.17.8 (ACO I), I. I. p.28.3-22, in N. Russell. Cyril of Alexandria (London: 2000). p.43. 
,11M Ibid. 
369 C '1 f yn 0 Alexandria. Unity of Christ (ACO I). 1.6. pp.32.6-34.9; and Quod Unus Sit Christus (PG 
75).1253-1361. 
no . 
171 Cynl of Alexandria, Anathema 4 (ACO I). I. 5. pp.15-28. 
Nonnan Russell, Cyril of Alexandria (London: 2000). p.42. and J. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of 
Alexandria and the Christo logical Controversy (Crestwood: 2004). p.212. 
118 
hypostasis372 to stress that the union was possible through the super essential-
subject,373 through the stress of the mia physis (one nature).374 There were not many 
disconnected divided parts that implied discontinuity in Christ but the human and 
divine parts had a true union (henosis).375 The stress on unity later came to be 
renewed376 in Monophysitism where the unity in the Christ hypostasis affirmed also a 
unity of natures or nature, in a "single prosopon",377 indicating the possibilities in 
hypostatic difference with the focus upon unity-in-difference rather than mere 
di fference. 378 
Distinctions between how prosopon related to hypostasis and nature seemed to be 
resolved at the Council ofChalcedon, where the model of two natures in one 
prosoponlhypostasis was postulated379 overcoming a ouo xpOo(J)xu model. JKO 
However, Chalcedon did not resolve Trinitarian issues regarding the centre of unity 
and the existential implications of prosopon with regards to a substantialist context. 
Another issue in Chalcedon that was observable related to the nature of the soul, 
where the soul (in Christ) was equated with rationality, \jIum<; AoYlICfj<;JKI or a rational 
soul. This stands in contrast to mainly substantialist notions of soul developed in the 
West. JK2 
172 Grillmeier. Christ in Christian Tradition. Volume I. p.4SI; and see Thomas G. Weinandy and 
Daniel A. Keating. The Theology ofSt Cyril of Alexandria (London: 2003). p.89. 
m Ibid .• p41. 
::: M~Guckin. Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controver.\y. p.207 . 
. Ibid., p.208. 
nt,s p . 
177 e~ r~stlge. God in Patristic Thought. p.280. 
Fairbairn. Grace and Christology in the Early Church (Oxford: 2006). 
l7H For Marie-Odile Boulnois, Cyril's Trinitarian formula moves from the stress of three hypostases 
one essence to "one substance in three hypostases" (Marie-Odile Boulnois. 'The Mystery of the Trinity 
according to Cyril of Alexandria: the Deployment of the Triad and its Recapitulation into the Unity of 
Divinity,' in Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating, The Theology (~rSt Cyril (~r Alexandria; 
London: 2003. pp.88-89) from hypostasis as subject. to hypostasis as the outward expression of the 
unified nature. Boulnois observes that Cyril: uses cpuo~ as the equivalent of ouoia and ltp6oUlltov next 
to il1[6oTaO~ and substance to indicate what is in common and person and hypostasis to describe the 
proper existence of each of the three, Marie-Odile Boulnois, 'The Mystery of the Trinity according to 
Cyril of Alexandria: the Deployment of the Triad and its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity,' in 
Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating. The Theology of St Cyril of Alexandria, p89; see also 
McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy. p.212 
179 See C. 1. Albergio et al. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta. p.57; and Norman Tanner. 
'Council ofChalcedon 451' in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86. See also Grillmeier. Christ in 
Christian Tradition Vol J p 431 lMO ' ••• • 
. See C. 1. Albergio et al. (eds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta. p.57; and Norman Tanner. 
'Council of Chalcedon 451' in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. p.86. 
1M! Ibid. 
1M2 Th' . 
IS IS apparent in Boethius' De Trinitate. 11.30-40 (LCL 74); translation by Tester. Boethius. 
TI~a.ctates: The Consolation of Philosophy, p.ll, where after affirming a substantialist model in the 
dIVine. this essentialist context is then placed within the context of the human soul. This is later 
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Chalcedon used prosopon within a model that upheld a double physis formula, which 
sharply contrasts with the Alexandrine or at least Cyril's' model,383 where prosopon 
was placed within a mia-physis formula. 384 This model stressed unity rather than 
difference and exemplified by Apollinarius (c. 310-390), who focused on unity, by 
highlighting the nature of the incarnate Logos. Sellers explains that Apollinarius' 
fonnula "Jesus Christ is one incarnate nature of the divine Logos (flia <pucr~ tOU BEDU 
Aoyou crecrap1C<Ofl~),,38S underlined the intended unity, where physis indicated the 
divine nature of the prosopon of Christ. The person of the Logos becomes the 
crEcrap1C<Ofl~ (enfleshed nature) of God. Unity was also expressed as the focus point 
in being by Cyril of Alexandria where the model of ",ua - tOU Beou A.Oyou -
crEcrap1C<Ofltvr)" (one ... after the union, God the Logos en fleshed) was employed386 to 
denote a physis-hypostasis. 387 Cyril stated: 
He became flesh, that is became man; appropriating a human body to himself 
such an indissoluble union that it has to be considered as his very own body 
and no one else's. This is ~ow he transmit~ ~h~8frace of sons hip even to us so 
that we too can become children of the SPlflt.· 
In this sense of unity: prosopon came to be understood as something not denoting 
mask or face, but the concrete subject by which difference is qualified through physis. 
The paradox however, is that the ontological strength of prosopon to denote 
singularity or individuality denudes a focus on the divinity in Christ, and becoming a 
model that either promotes Arianism or tritheism. This is why Chalcedon insisted on 
the two natures being united within the subject or person of Christ, which leads back 
to a focus on how unity is to be understood within the hypostasis. Thus the nature of 
the Christ subject has to be equated with an essential physis-hyposta.'iis context so as 
indicate the unity of the divine substance in which Christ, is the "the personal 
qualified as a person is considered as "individual substance of a rational nature (persona vero 
rationabilis naturae individua substantia", Boethius, Contra Eutychen. IV .5-10 (LCL 74); translation 
by Tester. Boethius. Tractates: The Consolation 0/ Philosophy. p.93. lH1 G '11 . n meier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Vol. I, p.301. 
11\4 Ibid .• p.333. 
lHS 
1X6 Sell~rs. T~e Council o/Chalcedon. p.138. 
Cynl. Umty o/Christ, II Prooem (ACO I). \, 6. pp.32-34; translation by Russell. Cyril 0/ 
~~exandria, p.142; also see Grillmeier. Christ in Christian Tradition. p.482. 
Ibid. 
3MX C '1 f yn 0 Alexandria. Quod Unus Sit Christus (PG 75). 1253-136I(McGuckin). 
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bearer".389 While unity should be vouchsafed in the focus on the divine nature, at the 
same time a sense of personal characteristics should also be conveyed to express a 
sense of real person. These characteristics in the Trinity, though personally unique, 
have a centre of divine unity, which is why Cyril of Alexandria insisted that in Christ, 
"the whole q>u<nC; 'tou Ekou A.(yyou produces a 'natural prosopon,,,.390 As such the 
person or prosopon should indicate the whole-ness of being having a unity of both 
physis and outer existential qualities. The notion of unity in prosopon in the 
Alexandrine School became displaced by Antiochene ideas focusing mainly on 
difference or the existential, the outward prosopon. which become a central theme in 
Chalcedon and this debate still has not been resolved.3'JI Hence, the evolution of 
prosopon became embroiled within a debate between the Alexandrian "Word-flesh 
(J\(yyOC;-o6.p~)" schema and the Antiochene "Word-man (J\o"YoC;-iiv9pffi7t0C;)" 392 
schema, for while the Alexandrine tradition stressed unity. the Antiochene tradition 
stressed Christ's outer existentiality.393 
Nevertheless, at the Councils of Constantinople and Cha1cedon. pro.mpon 
(7tpOOffi7tOV).l94 comes to be related to a concept. which can be said to be synonymous 
. h 19<; d . d"d I 1')6 Wit concrete person, indicating single' . or enumerate autonomous In IVI ua.' 
This forged a gap between the concept of unity and difference. In contemporary 
models the necessity to resolve this gap has been attempted by Zizioulas in his 
relational approach to hypostasis. Yet the Council ofChalcedon already provided a 
model to overcome this gap through the concept of the one hypostasis in two natures 
1H9 G 'II' h n meier, Crist in Christian Tradition. Vol. I. p.482. 
1'10 Ibid; Cyril. Unity of Christ. 1/ Pro oem (ACO I). 1,6, pp.32-34; translation by Russell, Cyril of 
Alexandria, p.142. 
WI Sec Andrew Louth on this in Denys the Areopagite (London: 1989), pp.5-6; and also John 
Romanides. An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmas (USA: 2004). pp.63-71. 
192 See G. D. Dragas, Saint Athanasius of Alexandria (New Hampshire: 2005), p.2; and Sellers, The 
CouncilofChalcedon. However Dragas voices doubts as to whether such view is valid, see also on this 
Nicholas lash, 'Up and Down in Christology', in Stephen Sykes and Derik Holmes (eds.), New Studies 
in Theology (1; London: Duckworth, 1988), pp.31-46. However Tixeront in History of Dogma.\', pp.4-9. 
identifies 4 groups, the Alexandrian, the Palestinian group. the Antiochenes, and the Cappadocians. See 
also Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines. p.30; Studer, Trinity and Incarnation. p.92; and Bathrellos. The 
~vzantine Christ. p.17 who affirms the Alexandrine and Antiochcne schemas. h' See Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, p.17; and Sellers, The Council ofChalcedon, p.158. 
1'14 See Chalcedon, (NPNF 14,243-295); Sellers, The Council ofChalcedon (London: 1953); Kelly, 
~~rly Christian Cr~eds (London: 1952), pp.296-301. 
See C. J. AlberglO et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta. pp.57-63; and Norman 
Tanner, 'Council ofChalcedon 451' in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, pp.28, 86. 
19(, Ibid .. also see L 'HuilJier. The Church of the Ancient Councils, p.194, and Bindley, The Oecumenical 
Documents of the Faith p.233. L'Huillier uses hypostasis instead of interpreting it proper. 
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(ouo q>um:mv)397 where the focus is upon the nature of Christ who is to be considered 
through a sense of unity. In this model, difference is underlined in the notion of 
prosopon and a concrete identity, which is to be united to the nature of its own 
existence through the hypostas;s. While Chalcedon did seem to stress the double 
nature within the hypostasis of Christ at the expense of unity, through the model in 
this thesis the focus is upon unity in the hypostas;s. The nature of the subject or 
hypostas;s indicates that an underlying substance or essence of unity is always 
predominant within the subject without denuding the sense of personal existing as a 
hypostasis. 
Although Chalcedon tried underline unity through the stress on the one person of 
Christ uniting the two natures, the stress on operations did nothing to provide a 
solution to the prevailing Christological issues. The result was a continuation of 
Christological polemics exemplified in Leontius of Jerusalem whose response to 
monophysitism and anti-Chalcedonian supporters seemed to continue the debate. He 
rebutted those who believed Christ to have one compound nature, as exampled in 
Eutyches,J98 rather than two natures, which were united in a personal or outer 
hypostasis. 399 But as Prestige argued, this seemed to predicate ous;a to the personal 
subject, or Christ, where the two natures or ous;ai become substrates, or "secondary 
substances".4oo That was not a problem when considering the human nature but is 
problematic when the Logos part of Jesus, his divinity, was to be predicated to an 
aspect of the hypostatic subject reducing Christ to a person in an Arian context. This 
model divides the subject of Christ away from the metaphysical object, reducing 
lJusia to metaphysical aspects of the hypostatic subject, undermining both Christ's 
concrete hypostat;c and essential existence. It divides Christ into separate subjects, the 
Logos Christ and the human Christ,40I where two ous;a; become evident in Christ, 
which is the consequence of a stress on the subject, and historically led to 
Nestorianism.402 When the ontological stress, in the Trinity, is placed on the 
1'17 
See Nonnan Tanner, 'Council of Chalcedon 451', in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, pp.R6-87. 
See also P. L 'Huillier, The Church of the Ancient Councils (Crestwood, 1996), p.194, from ACO, ed. E. 
Schwartz (Strasburg: 1914). See also 'Definitio Fidei Apud Concilium Chalcedonesc', in T. H. 
Bindley, The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith (London: 1899), p.233. 
19K5 hL . 
19'1 ee t e eontlus of Jerusalem, Aporiae (PG 86), 1773A (Gray). 
40() Gray: Leontius of Jerusalem; and Leontius of Jerusalem, Testimonies of the Saints (PG 86), 1805A. 
PrestIge, God in Patristic Thought. p.272. 
401 Ibid. 
4()2 Ib 'd 273 I ., p. 
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prosopon-subject, divine unity can become bifurcated.403 Conversely a stress on unity 
can lead to a dividing of the Christ person away from the divine nature, leading to an 
Arian model. 
2.5.4 Trinitarian Implications 
A concept of person, when understood through a focus on the subject or prosopon. 
should allow for difference, but where the stress is upon the true nature of the subject 
to highlight unity. When considering an emphasis on nature, if there was in Christ no 
existence outside of the divine ousia this would negate concrete specificity and a 
sense of the personal in Christ. Conversely if the focus was totally on the outer subject 
in the Trinity, there would be evident three subjects, who have as part of their heing a 
metaphysical substance held together through a communion of persons. 404 This 
reduces the Trinity to three hypostatic subjects having a predicated ousia,4os where 
God's hypostases have a common element, but where ousia is not the ontological 
primary focus. The solution to this problem is to affirm a model which simultaneously 
affirms the place for hypostatic difference, which has at its centre an essential divine 
substance. and unity through that substance. The Godhead cannot be merely a 
collection of individual subjects together forming a union in an existential relational 
encounter, which seems to be the ever growing consensus in contemporary models as 
being forged by Zizioulas. Rather the persons of the Godhead should be considered as 
having existential difference, yet are in nature, absolutely unified through an essential 
underlying and aware reality. This approach is supported through the Trinitarian 
models of the Councils, where hypostatic difference was related to consubstantiality, 
and where ousia indicates the ultimate essential reality of divine heinlo6 by which the 
hypostases came to be defined as God.407 In the Second Council of Constantinople (c. 
533) this approach is especially underlined in its support for Cyril of Alexandria and 
in its arguing for a single nature or essence, stating that "if anyone will not confess 
~01 Th' . 
IS IS argued by Prestige ibid ~'J4 . ' . 
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought. p.272, p.27\' 40~ Ib'd 
. I., p.273. 
406 Ibid. 
407 
See Gregory of Nyssa, Eun.3.5 (Moore). 
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that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have one nature or substance ... that there is a 
consubstantial Trinity: let them be anathema".408 
When translated into the human model of person, the stress on inner unity transforms 
the notion of the outer person so that a notion of person attains a value not implied in 
outward existential models. 
Thus perhaps the Trinitarian definition could be understood as one essential Godhead 
having three personal yet concrete characteristics,409 which stresses the unity in the 
"concrete ousia,,4lO (the essential reality of being of the Godhead), while 
simultaneously admitting difference or the concrete existences of the persons of the 
Trinity. This sense of qualified difference, through a focus on the essential reality in 
the emphasis on the ousia. puts the stress on what is providing ontological unity. The 
ability to consider difference and unity together in an ontological context is possible 
through the term hypostasis. but may not be possible in the term prosopon for it does 
not clearly indicate a metaphysical reality within the subject, and does not allow for 
an inherent quality of essential being. Taking all these movements and evolving of 
ideas through the dogmatic declarations, the Greek Patristic tradition reflects the 
struggle to assert concrete personhood within inner unity and therefore should be 
considered within the context of evolving terms and ideas to better understand the 
nature of God and thus human personhood.411 
40K See Nonnan Tanner, 'Council of Chalcedon 451'. in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. p.114; 
~d The .Seven Ecumenical Councils (NPNF 14), p.312. 
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought. which is not "three Persons in one Godhead", which has 
relational, perichoretic connotations p 28 \. 
410 b' .. lid .• p.271. 
411 This struggle is also evidenced in the Western theological constructs and exemplified in the 
Trinitarian theology of Augustine (d.430) and Boethius (d.525). The substance based model is also 
taken up by Boethius, Con. Eut. 111.70-95; see also H. Chadwick, 80ethius (Oxford: 1981,2003), p.193; 
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought. p.157; and J. W. Koterski. 'Boethius and the Theological Origins of 
the Concept of Person', American Catholic Philosophical Qllarterly. 78/2 (2004), p.209. In the 
Western model the emphasis is upon substance. see Augustine. De. Trin. 1.9.19. 1.13.28.5.8.10, 7.4.7. 
Augustine stated: "Wherefore the substance, or, ifit is better so to say. the essence of God. wherein we 
understand. in proportion to our measure. in however small degree. the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit, since it is in no way changeable, can in no way in its proper self be visible", Quapropter 
suhstantia uef si melius dicitur essentia dei. ubi pro nostro modulo ex quantulacumque particular 
intellegimus patrem el filium et spiritum sanctum, qllandoquidemnullo modo mutabili.\· est. nullo modo 
potest ipsa per semetipsam esse uisihilis, De. Trin.3.XI.I-5 (Haddan). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
At the start of this chapter it was asked whether the Greek Fathers (Cappadocians), 
had a concept of person and whether the tenn hypostasis could correlate to that 
understanding. These questions go to the very heart of personhood, of defining what 
constitutes human personhood. While Zizioulas looks to interpreting the Greek 
Fathers from a relational and existential position focusing his interpretation on the 
outward existence and viewing persons a modes of existence, the approach in this 
thesis allows a notion of hypostasis to express a simultaneous sense of being. In this 
model the concrete particular life is affinned, but which has at its centre and ultimate 
reality, an essential (ousia) metaphysical substance of being. This does not indicate 
that this substance is predicated to the subject of personhood or hypostasis but that the 
essence of being or Atman cannot be, as the true subjective reality, divided from the 
notion of hypostasis even when expressed through hypostatic difference. Hence, ideas 
relating to non-difference (or Atman) and difference (or hypostasis) are needed to 
successfully express a concept of person. 
The relationship between hypostatic subjectivity and Atmanic subjectivity shall be 
examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Zizioulas' interpretation of the Cappadocians was also 
utilised to indicate something more than what is implied in the natural individual, 
which shall be expanded in the proceeding chapters to include a qualifying of the 
outer mode of existence to incorporate a notion of a deified mode of existence. This 
manifests a bridge between the outer experience of hypostasis and the inner state. 
It was also generally considered that the Cappadocians did have an understanding of 
person through the tenn hypostasis but which has evolved and was generated through 
the tenn hypostasis. They purposefully shrouded their models in apophatic language 
so as to focus on what they could know of God, which explained their focus on the 
outer operations. 
However, this focus was not due to the resting of their philosophical and theological 
stance at that point, but to underline that this was where they were at that moment. 
This has been confused to express the only way to understand the divine, in relation to 
existential differences in the divine, as compared to the divine nature. But the 
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Cappadocian model is not the only model, but one way to understand God. The very 
fact that the Cappadocians evolved the concept of hypostasis. which was continued 
through to the Council ofChalcedon, underlines that the evolution of the terms such 
as hypostasis and prosopon are not only inevitable but necessary. 
This project represents an attempt to evolve the ideas further. Indeed the 
Cappadocian' model offers great scope in terms of contemporary interpretations, to 
develop personhood through uncovering the meaning of o usia , while at the same time 
considering the existential subject, or person, where the term hypostasis allows for a 
metaphysical dimension to individual. In this context, ousia can be viewed as a 
generic term, and in a holistic sense, bringing the notion of unity to ontological 
categories. Even though the hypostasislprosopon model can also be viewed in general 
terms, indicating the physis of human persons and thus the possibilities of 
personhood, these terms tell us nothing of what a specific person essentially is, or the 
essential reality of being in the human person. In this way the terms 
hypostasislprosopon (and also puru,w) infer that that there must be an underlying 
reality to that existence. 
The next chapter is dedicated to understanding the relationship of subjective existence 
in relation to the experience of the underlying reality through deification. While the 
use of hypostasis by Zizioulas and Yannaras in their existential interpretation of 
Cappadocian theology initially led to a re-examination of Cappadocian thought in this 
thesis, these views also revealed that such terms as hypostasis should be qualified. 
This qualifying represents a quest for unity within the notion of difference. 
Hence, in the next chapter the lack of focus on the essential reality of being in the 
Cappadocians are addressed and contemporary interpretations, through a focus on 
deification. The notion of deification indicates what it is to be a person in the 
completed sense while at the same time acknowledging the place for difference. This 
model of person in the human case leads to the inclusion of a notion of deification in 
human personhood where the notion of deification will be juxtaposed to the divine 
will and intention of God to deify human persons. Humanity is deified through the 
hypostatic union of the Logos and world in the Christ, where the uniting of the natures 
of God's soul and body affirms a deifying of matter. This allows the deifying of the 
126 
human person and a model which infonns us how deification should be understood. 
The human person is united in the perfect uniting of its body and soul in a completed 
sense, through the activity of the Christ hypostasis and, in both the divine and human 
cases, this model of perfect union represents a model of both difference and at the 
same time union. 
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CHAPTER2.B 
DEIFICA TION 
2.7 Introduction 
While in Chapter 2A a concept of person was situated mainly through an examination 
of hypostasis and ousia, in this chapter I will specifically consider person juxtaposed 
to the Greek Patristic doctrine of deification or theosis. I Deification will be placed 
within a substantialist hermeneutical approach to person, so as to focus on whole 
person, where in person an immaterial essential and rational nature (the soul) is united 
within a material existence. Through the doctrine of deification, I will consider a 
notion of person as intimately related to what it is to be a person in a completed 
, 
context, to the "attaining of likeness to God and union with him as far as possible": 
This completed context is not to be situated within an isolated experience of an 
individual, but fundamentally related to the deifying work of Christ who through the 
hypostatic union. 3 This allows the human condition to be conformed to the divine, 
culminating in an end experience and perfection. As Maximus the Confessor (c. 580-
662) stated: 
He (Paul) is of course referring to Christ the whole mystery of Christ, which 
is, manifestly, the ineffable and incomprehensible hypostatic union between 
Christ's divinity and humanity. This union draws his humanity into perfect 
identity, in every way, with his divinity, through the principle of person 
(hypostasis); it is a union that realizes one person composite of both natures, 
inasmuch as it in no way diminishes the essential difference between those 
natures.4 
1 The doctrine of Theosis (God-ness) has been considered as mainly connected to the Greek Patristic 
tradition and thus intimately related to Orthodox theology, see Andrew Louth, 'The Place of Theosis in 
Orthodox Theology', in M. J. Christensen and J. Wittung, Partakers a/the Divine Nature (Michigan; 
~OO7). p.32. In Latin deification is from Deus meaning God and/acio to do or to make; man made God . 
• Pscudo-Dionysius, EH 1.3 (PG 3). 376A); translation by Norman Russell. The Doctrine o/Deification 
1n the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: 2004). p.l. 
As expounded by Cyril of Alexandria. Unity o/Christ. /I Prooem (ACO I). 1.6. pp.32-34 and 
Anathema I. (ACO I), I, 5 pp.15-25; translation by Russell. Cyril 0/ Alexandria, pp.140-143, 179. 
4;. • 
tv ~U<JtTJPIOV TO clnoKEKpUJ.lJ.ltvov clno nov aiwvwv Kal clno TG>V YEVEG>V viiv tIj)(lVEPWO'1. taut6v 
')J;ywv OTJAaol'J T4'> x,pI<JT4'> TO KaTa x,pI<JTOV ~\)<Jt~PIOV TOUtO npoO~Aw~ tOt\V lipPTJt~ tE Kal 
clnEpIV6'lto~ 9E6TTJt6~ t£ Kal aovPW1t6tTJTO~ Ka9' im6<Jta<JIV fvwo~. E~ taut6v liyou<Ja Tn 9E6TTJTl 
KaTa navta tp61tov T4'> tfI~ imo<Jta<J£w~ A6y'P tl'Jv clv9pwn6TTJta Kal J.llav clJ.lcpottpwv clnOttAOu<Ja tl'Jv 
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The notion of deification highlights God's purpose for humanity, which can be 
understood as a secret work of the divine for human reformulation. It is an ontological 
and eschatological task, where the "unsearchable riches of the Christ are announced 
and enlighten all (q)(o'ticrat 1t6.vta~) in the fellowship (ICOlv(J)via) of the mystery which 
has been hidden from the ages in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ" (Eph. 
3:8-9).5 Hence, deification will be correlated to an ontological event within the human 
person. It is equated to an awareness of the heing of God within a mystical union, 
where the restoration of the essential nature in person allows for a change and 
awareness of the divine not previously experienced. Of course the question has been 
raised whether the word theosis actually means exactly what it seems to mean. Ifit 
does mean becoming God in a total way, as Louth points out, it challenges concepts 
of justification6 and makes the purpose of the cross irrelevant, for all that would be 
needed was a change in consciousness not ontological reformulation. 
Consequently, the very notion of deification has to be re-addressed so as to qualify 
what is it means and so as to understand the ontological and existential implications of 
the term. It is asserted in this thesis that deification means the union with God as far 
as possible, but which does not throw down God in that union or the purpose of the 
Incarnation. It is argued that deification is the end result of the work of the Incarnation 
who opened the way for the whole human race to be de~fied, not just a few mystics. It 
can be considered as the result of justification, 7 which does not impede justification 
models but supports them through a final experience of the human person in Christ. It 
I1nOOtaolv ailv8ctov, tt'!~ aut(i)v Kara CPUotV oua\(ooou~ olacpop~ ll'loq1lav KaOOTtOUV tnayouoa 
Il£{WOlV, watt Kalillav aut(i)v YEV£aOat, KaOw~ cCP'lV, tt)v un6araotv Kal tt)v CPUotKt)V OlaCPOpaV anaOt'! 
olalltvElv, KaO' ~v KaillEta tt)v £VWOtv avtMttwtO~ aut(i)v Kal ~vwlltvwv ~ Kata CPUOlV olaoljl~Etat 
ltoa6t'1~, Thal.60, (CCSG, 22), 73.5-15; translation from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery ofChri.l't. 
p.I23. 
The Englishman '.I' New Testament: An Interlinear Literal Transliteration (London); NIV translation; 
the Codex Sinaiticus version states, Kal cpwTtoal tt~ ~ olKovoll(a tOU IlUOT'lp(ou tou anOKtKpulllltvou 
uno tGlv alwvwv, focusing on economia, see Barbara and Kurt Aland et at. (eds.), No\'um Testamentum 
Graece et Latine, Nestle-Aland (Germany: 2005), p.507. 
f, Louth, 'The Place ofTheosis in Orthodox Theology', p.32. 
1 This is also argued by Vel i-Matti Kiirkkiiinen who states "that 'justification' can also be called 
theosis, according to the ancient doctrine of the fathers with whom Luther agreed", see 'Justification 
and Deification in Martin Luther's Theology', in One with God: Salvation as Deification and 
Justification (Minnesota: 2004), p.46. Conversely J. T. Billings states that "perhaps the greatest current 
danger in claiming that Calvin teaches 'deification' is that his view could be too quickly assimilated 
into late Byzantine notions of theosis, from which he retains distance", 'John Calvin: United to God 
Through Christ', in M. J. Christensen and J. S. Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature, p.20S. 
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also points not only to an existential restoration, but to an ontological restoration, 
where the whole person, the whole being, as an '"image" (Gen. I :26) of the divine,s is 
transformed and restored to a former state. The implications of deification. also 
becomes important in the thesis because of the comparison to PratyahhijiUi 
philosophy, examined in Chapter 3, and the equating of deification with an Atmanic9 
experience of re-cognition. 
The purpose of human personhood will be set within a dynamic of deification, which 
will correlated to the divine will, and activity of the divine who historically incarnated 
to fulfil this activity, uniting Himself to the world through a deifYing process. God 
deifies the world in '"Himself', 10 where the human hypostasis becomes fulfilled 
through the Christ hypostasis. I I But this is not only a downward motion from the 
divine, but also an upward ascent within a personal encounter. This encounter with 
God is also made possible through an inherent capacity l2 or potentiality of human 
persons to be fulfilled. In the model of this thesis this potentiality indicates the 
possibilities for union where union allows a restoration of the essential spiritual 
reality. Union with the divine overcomes the lower or natural physis. 11 which 
dominates individual lower consciousness, but which is fulfilled in the unified 
experience of de~/ication. 
H This is similar to the Augustinian model of 'imago de;' see Oe Trin.7.6.12 (266). The notion of 
human beings created in the "image" and "likeness" of God shall be discussed later. but I argue that 
that in the highest sense, "image" and "likeness" infers an Almank ontological condition. 
'I The Alman shall be equated with the nous or the highest part of the soul. 
10 God is usually explained in Byzantine tradition through masculine terms such as "Father" and "Son" 
to be expressed in terms of human understanding, but the absolute transcendent God is beyond our 
understanding, see ON (PG 3), 588A. Pseudo-Dionysius stated ..... and it is the work too of the Father 
and of the Son who supremely transcend all divine Fatherhood and Sonship", ON, 2.K, 645B; 
translation by Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Oionysius, (NY: 1987), p.64. 
II Maximus stated that through Christ "we attain, in the future state, the supernatural deification 
(~heosis)", Thai. 60, 77.70-75; translation from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.126. 
I. In Byzantine theology. 'man' shares a 'capacity' within human being-ness to be deified, as Maximus 
stated that "he furnished it (human nature) with a certain spiritual capacity" Thal.6l, 85; tnmslation 
from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ. p.131. 
11 As with the Christ hypostasis, the ontological condition infers a double will and nature in the human 
person, pertaining to lower and higher natures, which does not infer a discord, see Maximus, Opse.3, 
45B-56A; translation by Andrew Louth. Maximus Ihe Confessor (London: 1996), p.193. The lower 
nature in the human condition "introduced into our lives sin and separation from God", but is 
transformed in deification to become a copy of the divine. 
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2.7.1 Categories of Deification 
Ideas relating to a notion of deification in the Byzantine tradition were initially 
considered through the language of recapitulation (apokatastasis) or restoration,I4 first 
developed in a Patristic context by Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 135-200), Clement of 
Alexandria and Athanasius. It was then situated within a cosmic vision for humanity 
by Maximus the Confessor, who argued that through the hypostatic union the divine 
conceived ofa "blessed end" for humanity. IS Humanity finds meaning to his existence 
in the person of Christ, where the event l6 of the hypostatic-union brings to humanity 
the possibility of ontological restoration. Crucial to the Greek Patristic notion of 
deification was the relatedness of humanity to this Christ event. wrought through the 
hypostatic union l7 of God's nature IS with human nature. This union allows humanity 
to be deified and expressed through the axiom God became man so that man might 
become God. 19 This simple equation allowed the notion of deification to become 
related to a spatio-temporal point where the divine nature in the Christ person deified 
material nature.20 God became matter so that matter ("man") might be saved in that 
becoming, and thereby allowing full participation (~9E~~)21 with the divine. 22 
14 See Irenaeus, P.Ap.6 (664); and Athanasius, Inc. 10 (112C'), where the notion of restoration or 
recapitulation was implicit to a concept of deification as Maximus stated "inasmuch as it (providence) 
leads to God, it is the recapitulation of the things he has created", Thai. flO. 40-43(Blowers), which 
represents the final goal or telos of human beings (ibid.30-35). On restoration also see Andrew Louth. 
'The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology', in M. J. Christensen, Partakers o/'Divine the Nature 
(Grand Rapids: 2007), p.34. 
15 Maximus, Thal.6fJ, 73-75; trdnslation by Blowers. On the Cosmic Mystery olChri.l't. p.124. 
II> I will not examine the theology of "event", but to understand more on this see, Paul Collins. 'Event: 
The How of Revelation', in Trinitarian Theology West and East (Oxford: 2001), pp.7-33. 
17 See Maximus Thai. 60, 73. 
IX See 'Council ofChalcedon - 451', in Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.1(6, where the 
ousia is not divide from the hypostatic Christ existence, but there is however. no mixture ("pd(J\~) but a 
".perfect union". 
I See some examples of this axiom see: Irenaeus, Haer.5. Preface. 1120; Athanasius. Inc. 54. 192B; 
Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 29. 19, lOOA-B; Maximus, Amhig. 7, 191(4B-1 091(4C; Ambig.60. 101(5B; Pseudo-
Oionysius. Ep.4, I072C; Gregory Palamas. CapAO, 1480. See also Norman Russell The Doctrine of 
Deification in the Greek and Patristic Tradition, (Oxford: 2004); Stephen Finlan and Vladimir 
Kharlamov. Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology (Eugene: 2006); and M. J. Christensen and J. 
A. Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature (Grand Rapids: 2007). ~fJ Which is exemplified in the works of John of Damascus see, De Imaginihu.l', 1232-1420 (Anderson) . 
• 1 See Maximus, Thal.60, 77.71-75. This understanding of deification in relation to participation was 
developed by Clement of Alexandria (ibid. p.122) and Athanasius through the term 9EonoEw (ibid. 
p.176). Russell argues, that 'participation' referred in the works of Gregory of Nazianzen, to the 
attaining the "imitation of Christ" (ibid. p.214). Later deification, as Russell shows, became more 
expressly related to the personal experience in Pseudo-Dionysius (ibid. p.260), Maximus (ibid. p.262) 
and in the monastic tradition which becomes the focus in Gregory Palamas, see TDS, B-C, and 
Capl5fJ, 1121-1225. 
22 Ibid., and p.27. 
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In the Greek Fathers deification represented one of the basic features in the 
relationship between God and the world (human beings), yet there was no systematic 
approach to deification. Sometimes deification was understood sacramentally,2:l at 
other times eschatologically,24 and at others times understood through a personal 
experience. The emphasis changed according to differing interpretations. In this 
thesis, deification is correlated not only to the reforming of human personhood, but as 
already stated above, to an essential reality of being. This ontological approach was 
also expressed by Gregory Nazianzen who focused on the human person as an image 
of the divine, stating that God: 
took a portion of the new-formed earth and established with his immortal 
hands my shape, bestowing upon it a share in his own life. He infused it with 
Spirit, which is a fragment of the Godhead without form. From dust and breath 
was formed the mortal image of the immortal. 25 
While it is thought that the Greek Fathers correlated their understanding of deification 
in relation to the whole person body and soul,26 they never quite qualify what this 
meant other than to indicate that deification implied the fe/os or end of human heing. 27 
The concept of de~/icati()n2K initially evolved from the pagan language of 
apotheosis,29 Platonic language,JO and came to be incorporated into Clement of 
21 See Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, p.233, which is thc 
common approach in the Cappadocians. 
~4 Ibid. p.212, Russell argues that Basil's understanding of de(/ication is eschatological. 
.~ Kat ~oipav tAWv VE01t'1yto~ ai'1~ Xtip&OtV a9avarnotv £~~v £ot~O'oaTo ~opcp~v, Tn 0' lin'£"~ ~w"~ 
~Otp~oaTo. tv yap £'11(£ 7tVcl~a, TO 9£6T'1tO~ ciEtoto~ £otTtV cinoppilil;. £1( ot xo~ 7tVOt"~ T& 1tQY'1v 
~fOTO~ a9avcitoto cilewv, Gregory Nazianzcn, On the Soul. Poemata Arcana, 425A (Sykes). 
:, See Maximus. Amhig.42, 132IC-D; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery olChrist . 
• Maximus, ThaI. 60, 75.30-35. 
2M The concept of deification has also been considered in relation to: sanctification. perfection (attaining 
one's telos), union (henosis), participation (metousia. methexis. metalepsis, metochos, and koinonia). 
kenosis, transformation, image and likeness. gnosis, adoption. healing. work of Spirit. apophaticism. 
salvation, restoration, and eschatology. see Russell. The Doctrine ofDeiflcation in the Greek Patristic 
Tradition. There has even been some correlation between deification and justification. see Douglas 
Fairbairn. 'Salvation as Theosis: The Teaching of Eastern Orthodoxy'. Themelios 23/3 (1998). pp.42-
~'14; and S. Finlan and V. Kharlamov, Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology . 
. As John Lenz states that Greek Patristics shares many areas similar to Plato's model of the soul being 
akin to divine nature. which is especially acute when considering theosis in relation to apotheosis. see 
'Deification of the Philosopher in Classical Greece' in M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung. Partakers 
of the Divine Nature. p.53; also see Russell. The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic 
Tradition. pp.S. 26. 
10 
See Plato. Theatetus, 176b; Platonis Opera, I (OCT). 
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Alexandria's use ofgeo1tottroJI and 9eo1toi~.32 It was later developed by Gregory 
Nazianzen in the tenn 9Erom~,33 and also utilised by Dionysius34 who stated that "our 
greatest likeness to and union with God is the goal of our hierarchy".35 However, 
Russell argues that deification "only became fully assimilated with Maximus".36 
Later, the medieval writer Gregory Palamas used the tenn 9Ero~17 with great effect 
in relation to a spiritual experience. Generally, in the Greek Patristic era, the concept 
of deification was developed in relation to baptism and "adoption by grace". 18 
Nonnan Russell shows that while the Cappadocians understood deification within the 
experiential,39 they mostly transferred deification to an ecclesiological tenn and 
ethics,40 and not a mystical experience. In this thesis however, the focus is upon how 
the experience of deification relates to infonning the person of the true nature of 
being.41 Archimandrite Sophrony is utilised here to support this view in which he 
stated that: 
like God the persona-hypostasis cannot be thoroughly known from outside 
unless he reveals himself to another person. God is a hidden God, and man has 
depths within him kept secret from alien eyes. God, not man, is the Origin of 
Being; but man is created with the potential of receiving and eternally bearing 
within himself the non-created Life of Divinity ... the human hypostasis 
receives divinization through grace, wherefore the Divine image is actualized 
in him.42 
11 From 9£6<; meaning God and 1[01£0) (meaning to make or do): see Russell, The Doctrine (~l 
Dt'ification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. pp.I-9: and S. Finlan and V. Kharlamov. Thetisi.v: 
~eification in Christian Theology. p.7. 
1. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. Lewis Ayres. 'Deification and 
the Dynamics ofNicene Theology: The Contribution of Gregory of Nyssa'. SVTQ 49/4 (2005), pp.375-
394: and also G. W. H. Lampe. A Patristic Greek Lexicon. 
11 See Gregory Nazianzen. Or.4.72 (593): also see N. Russell, '''Partakers of the Divine Nature" (2 
Peter I :4) in the Byzantine Tradition'. From the homage to Joan Hu.uey KAf)HrHTPIA (UK: 199M), 
and The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. p.214. 
:: Pseudo-D~onysius. DNA. I I. 708D. 
16 Pseudo-DlOnysius. EH, 2.1. 392A: translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysiu.v, p.200. 
The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. p.215: and also Maximus Thal.60 (77). 
17 Th . 
e notIon of theosis is expressed continually in Gregory Palamas' works see. Triads and Cap. 150; 
~Jso see A. N. Williams. The Ground of Union (NY: 1999), p.I04. 
Russell, 'Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change', SVTQ 50/4 (2006). 
r.p.357-379. 
Russell. The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patri.vtic Tradition, p.232. 
4IJ Ib"d I .. and p.9 
41 Here I am relating deification to an informing experience see: Sophrony, His Life is Mine 
(Crestwood: 1977). pp.32-35: G. E. H. Palmer et al.. The Philokalia (London: 1979): Hierotheos 
Vlachos. The Person in the Orthodox Tradition (Greece: 1998): and Russell. The Doctrine of 
Reifica~ion in ~he Greek Patristic Tradition. pp.311-312. 
Archlmandnte Sophrony, We Shall See Him As He Is (Essex: 2004). p.192. 
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In other words, the experience of the fulfillment of personal being in the general 
language of deification, for Sophrony, informs human persons of what he or she is 
and also what he or she should be. Sophrony continued: "the human hypostasis 
receives divinization through 'grace', wherefore the fullness of the Divine image is 
actualized in him".43 This view is affirmed, but also expanded to relate to an essential 
reality within the human person and correlated in the next chapter correlated to 
Atman. Thus it will be argued that the metaphysical stuff of heing in the human person 
(the soul stujj)44 provides the basis to understand being in the highest sense through 
deification. 
The relationship of human persons to the divine was underlined by Gregory 
Nazianzen who correlated the human soul to the breath of God stating that: 
The soul is a breath of God (ii'lJ.1a SEQ\» and, for all its heavenly form, it has 
endured mingling with that which is earthly, light hidden in a cave, yet divine 
and immortal.45 
The natural physis of human personhood, when restored, is conformed to its original 
state through the activity of deification. Thus the nature of human persons when 
deified is to be understood as participating with the operations of the divine and is 
thus "enhypostatic",46 but is also related to the divine essential reality for the essence 
and operations cannot be divorced from each other. 
41 Ibid. 
44 However Gregory Palamas, TDS, E.III.i.29. argued that God could not be seen in his essence but 
"according to His deifying gift and energy. the grace of adoption, the uncreated deification. the 
enhypostatic illumination" (Gendle). In this model however of hYfJ(wasis. there is an unbridgeable gulf 
between the divine essence (the%gia) and divine revelation to the world (oikonomia). Gregory stated 
"his substance remains inaccessible" (~ot ouota aUTO\) Iltv':t a7tp6atto~). Cap.J50. III (Sinkewicz). 
This is considered by Catherine Lacugna who commented that "for a Western theologian this 
assertion" (of a distinction between 'theology' and 'economy' in the dividing of essence and energies) 
"creates grave metaphysical problems. If the%gia and oikonomia are ontologically distinct. the defeat 
of trinitarian theology is total". God/or Us (SanFrancisco: 1991). p.196. Concerning grace in the 
experience of deification in relation to substance. Gregory asserted that. "the man divinized by grace 
will be everything that God is. apart from identity in substance" (lcai 6 Ole} T~~ xciptto~ Tf;9Ewlltv~· 
EO'tat. xwp~ T~~ KaT' ooo{av taUT6T11TO~) Cap./50. III (Sinkewicz). Gregory here is citing Maximus 
from. Tha/.n. 320A. 
4~ Gregory Nazianzen. On the Soul, Poemata Arcana. 447D (Sykes). 
4(,G 
regory Palamas. TDS, E.III.i.9. where Gregory states that "it (human life) is ·enhypostatic· ... but is 
not to be contemplated by itself. but in relation to divine hypostases. nor in essence. but in hyposta.\·is. 
TDS, E.lIl.i.9 (Gendle). 
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While the Greek Fathers did not tend to emphasize a substantialist model, it can be 
argued that this must be the conclusion of the Greek Fathers given their placing an 
ultimate ontological stress on the divine on ousia. 47 Hence, the focus is upon divine 
union or deification within the human person which is correlated to participation with 
the essential reality of being.48 
Deification cannot be merely analogical or mythical, but should relate to a real 
experience. But here lies the dichotomy, for in Greek Patristics, the ontological 
difference between agenetic and genetic49 does not allow for complete unity. Neither 
does the experience of unity indicate something completely somatic. 50 The notion of 
deification however, does represent the divine intention for human persons, where 
God deifies each person as far as possible. This state Maximus called a "preconceived 
goal',51 for all creation in the recapitulation or restoration (anOlcata(JtaOl~) of all 
created beings. 52 
Given the word limitations of this work it is not possible to expand upon deijication in 
broad soteriological terms, or to examine the cosmological implications of the 
deilving work of the Christ, or expand in detail on the Christological ramifications. 
However, deification is not understood in terms of a merely se!j:informing or se!j: 
giving experience of the natural human condition (physis), but in terms of divine 
grace. Even though the human physis is important, what also has to be considered is 
the divine will in the divine wish to deifY, and of the reciprocal wish of human 
persons to be deified. 53 Human nature (Physis) does playa part in de(jicalion, for 
without the fact of being a human person, having the qualities of what it is to he a 
47 
For an example. see Gregory of Nyssa. Eun.3.5 (Moore). 
4H For an example of a similar approach see. Brian E. Daley. 'Nature and "Mode of Union": Late 
Patristic Models for the Personal Unity of Christ'. in Stephen T. Davis et al. (eds.). The Incarnation, 
fcj165. 
The problems ontological problems relating to the genetic (created) and agenetic is highlighted by 
~ndrew Louth, The Origins o/the Christian Mystical Tradition/rom Plato to Denys. p.xiv. 
. See Maximus, Thal.60. 75-79. 
~I Ibid. 
12 Ibid .. apokatastasis was the general term that was used to describe the theology of return. restonltion 
or recapitulation. see: Clement of Alexandria, Str.I.2I. 853A; Origen. Princ.3.i.19; Gregory 
Nazianzen. OrAl. I I, 444B; Pscudo-Dionysius. D.N.4.4. 697B; Maximus. Amhig. 42. 1348B; other 
words were also employed by the Greek Fathers to indicate the same such as ICaropaWOW; (meaning to 
~ake. straight or amend); see Athanasius, Inc. 10, 112C. 
. ThiS idea of will is encapsulated in Maximus dyothelite theology; see Op.6. 65A-68D and Bathrellos, 
'The Dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor'. in the Byzantine Christ. pp.99-174. 
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human,54 deification would not be possible. The physis of a human person implies a 
quality or potentiality55 being made in the "image" (Ei1(OOV) and "likeness" 
(o~oiW<nV)S6 of God (Gen. I :26-27), which through the "activity" (tvEP'YEiae;)57 of 
grace, the theandric energies of the divine or the God-man activitySK restores the 
human person into a new birth in deification. Consequently, deification has to be 
considered as an experience that is given as a gift59 from ahove to that which is he/ow 
to rise up human persons to the divine. 
The Greek Fathers also considered the human physis to be important when 
considering the nature of humanity, which is evident in the Greek Patristic exegesis of 
2 Peter I :4,60 "so that you may become partakers (or have communion) of the divine 
nature" (yEvt,09E 9Eiae; KOlVWVOl </>1>OEW<;).61 This passage was also used many times 
by Cyril of Alexandria in place of the notion of deification62 to denote union. The use 
of this passage by the Greek Fathers6J showed that the humanphysis had a specific 
relationship with the divine or a kinship64 and a capacity. which allows for the 
personal experience of deification. The relationship of being a person with human 
natural physis implies not only that a process or participationM is possible between 
human persons in deification, but that through this experience the true ontological 
condition of a human person is revealed. It is within this experience, which leads to a 
54 Being a whole person consisting of body and soul; see Gregory of Nyssa. Hom.O,Ji{14-16, 17SD-
IXSD. 
S5 See Maximus, Thal.6. 69. 
SI. See Hom. Opi/I 0, 156A. 
51 Ibid., 14,176A. 
SH Pseudo-Dionysius, Ep.4. 1072('. 
5'1 On the relationship between world and "man" within the notion of deification and gift, see Emil 
Bartos, Deification in Eastern Orthodox Theology (Eugene: 1999), p.116. 
I~J For a good examination of this passage in relation to Greek Patristics see, Norman Russell 
'''Partakers of the Divine Nature" (2 Peter 1:4) in the Byzantine Tradition'. See also J. Starr's 'Does 2 
Peter 1:4 Speak of Deification', in M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wiuung, Partakers of the Di\'int' Nature, 
pp.81-92, where he questions whether this passage actually is related to deification, and if so if this 
reflects "Hellenistic, non-Christian thought" citing Kasemann, and asking what does "sharing in the 
divine nature do for a person?", ibid., p.82. This is the crux of the maUer for it is this ontological 
context that provides real meaning to deification. 
1,1 The word communion, or koinonia, has become such a loaded word especially in relation to 
Zizioulas and BC, I will prefer to use the word participation). Another way of puuing it is, to be born of 
~~e divine p~king of (God's) nature. 
Here I am mdebted to the research of Stephen J. Davis, Coptic Christology in Practice: Incarnation 
~lnd Divine Particpation in Late Antique and Medieval Egypt (OUP, Oxford: 2008), p.39. 
See, Norman Russell "'Partakers of the Divine Nature" (2 Peter 1:4) in the Byzantine Tradition'. 
"4 S D . 
ee umltru Staniloae, 'Image, Likeness, and deification in the human person', International 
~atholic Review 13/1 (1986), pp.64-83. 
Example of see Maximus, Thal.60. 77. 
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vision (geropiu)66 of God, that informs persons not only of themselves but also of 
God.67 But deification should not merely relate to unfulfilled or superficial way of 
existing but implicitly related to being. The whole being or nature (Physis) of the 
human person is deified and considered in terms of a grace given condition, a process 
or ascetical ascent,68 or in terms of eschatological ful filment. 
In the early Greek Fathers the concept of deification was not used widely to describe 
an actual experience.69 It was in Clement of Alexandria that deification began to be 
used in terms of ontological fulfilment, as the highest goal in Christian life stating: 
And as Godliness (geo1tptmu) is the habit which preserves what is becoming 
to God, the godly man is the only lover of God, and such will he be who 
knows what is becoming, both in respect of knowledge and of the life which 
must be lived by him, who is destined to be divine (9Ero).70 
Later the concept of deification came to be used by the Cappadocians. 
Christologically, ethically and ecclesiologically.71 There also seems to have been 
some reservations on the part of the Cappadocians to relate deification to a direct 
experiential conclusion, shrouding the language of deification in apophatic 
language.72 The complex historical development of deification has led Russell to 
highlight different schemas to qualify how deification can be understood. He refers to 
the "nominal", "analogical", "ethical" and "realistic" approaches.7.\ where the 
Cappadocians are placed in the "ethical" schema and Clement of Alexandria and the 
Alexandrian school within the "realistic".74 Another important facet to the concept of 
deification was the influence of the ascetical writings. where the notion of union and 
M Pseudo-Dionysius. EH, 2.3.1,3978. 
1>7 This point is also made by Pseudo-Dionysius, see CH, 2.5, 144(' -D. 
bH 
In terms of "purification", "illumination" and "union", see, Evagrius of Pontus (d. c. 399), 'On 
Prayer', in G. E. H. Palmer et aI., The Phi/okalia, pp.57-63; and Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, 
r.r-75-374. 
Russell, The Doctrine o/Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. pp.115-205. 
7(J 
Clement, Str. 7.1, 732-736 (Coxe); see also Russell. The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek 
~atri~\·ti('. Tra~iti()n. pp.115-121. 
ThiS view IS argued by Russell in. The Doctrine of DeUication in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 
rr206-234, and exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa's works Hom.Opi/, Hex .. and V, Mos. 
For an example see; Gregory Nazianzen. Or.28.19, 49C -53C, where Gregory argues that the vision 
~tGod is beyond human understanding; and see Gregory of Nyssa, V, Mos. , 376C-377 A. 
74 See Russell .. The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, p.9. 
Russell believes these schcmas to have been integrated by Maximus , ibid. 
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participation were an important way to describe the concept of fulfilment, 75 especially 
in relation to Orthodox identity. This is because the notion of de~/ication has become 
a central theological theme in Eastern Orthodoxy especially in relation to the 
resurgence of Palamism, 76 
2.7.2 What is a Human Person: Who am I? 
The notion of deification comes to express basic questions of existence, what is a 
human person, who am I? These are not merely existential questions of the outward 
looking person, but a quest to understand the nature of being. The question of 'who 
am I' is also epistemological, focusing the issue of deification on knowing. The 
knowing of who one is, to "Know Thyself,77 was for Clement of Alexandria, the 
premise for true knowledge. The "true Gnostic" was the Christian, who is the knower 
oftruth.78 The axiom 'Know Thyself not only implies a call to self-inquiry but also 
reveals a paradox in that the outward reflection of the prosopon is incapable of 
grasping true knowledge. Indeed, for this reason Diadochos of Photiki (d. c. 486) 
believed that by virtue of the activity of the soul (dwelling in the body), through 
baptism, the individual is renewed, where the soul indicates '"the capacity for attaining 
the divine Iikeness".79 Hence to know one's self(6 aut6e;) is to know the depth of the 
soul. Ware80 also makes the link between personhood, de~/ication, and knowing 
through the language of anthropological apophaticism and potentiality in relation to 
an inquiry into self'!! The inquiry into self allows the person to recognise the 
possibilities of becoming, becoming a deified creature ("Zoon theoumenon,,).K2 
Hence, in a sense, all examinations of person and deification are related to the 
B See G. E. H. Palmer et aI., The Philokalia, and Palladius; also The Book (}IParadi.~e, trans. E.A. 
Wallis Budge ( I; Lady Meux Manuscript 6; London: 1904). 
71> This is argued by Alfeyev, 'The Deification of Man in Eastern patristic Tradition (with spedal 
reference to Gregory Nazianzen, Symeon the New Theologian and Gregory Palamas)', Colloquium; 
Aust. & N.z. Theological Review 36/2 (2004), pp.I09-122; and Andrew Louth, 'The place oftheosis in 
Orthodox Theology', in Christensen, Partakers o/the Divine Nature, p.32. 
77 Th' 
IS expression was utilised by Clement, Str.1.I4 (Coxe). 7M 
79 CI.ement, Str. 7.1-2, 732-736. 
Dladochos of Photice 'On Spiritual Knowledge', in G. E. H. Palmer et aI., The Philokaliu. p.2XO. 
KO Kallistos Ware, 'Foreword', in Panayiotis Nellas, Deification Christ. The Nature o/the Human 
Person. Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature o/the Human Penon. trans. Norman Russell. 
(Crestwood: 1997). p.9. 
XI Ibid .. p.9. 
x' lb' • Id., p.12. 
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question who am I? Historically, it is a question that was extant in philosophical 
literature and exemplified in the words, "Know Thyself,.ln This phrase became 
integrated into philosophy influencing Socrates and Plato. S4 In Plato there is a link 
between self-inquiry and knowledge and thus to a knowledge of what it is to be a 
human person.85 Russell also infonns us that in the ancient world, religious identity 
and realisation were related to knowing oneself,86 stating that "the search for God 
began with an inwardjoumey: ever since Plato, 'Know thyself had been the starting-
point ofwisdom".87 Russell clearly shows how in early Christianity, gnosis had 
moved from a tenn that indicated anthropological inward insularity to become related 
Christologically where anthropological fulfilment is achieved in a Christ related 
deification. The Christian quest for knowing then became an inquiry into the nature of 
one's being and also of God's. Clement had also argued that knowing oneself'S was a 
valid starting point in the quest for true knowledge, true gnosis. and to attaining the 
true "image and likeness of God".89 In the Early Church, self-know/edge and 
revelation became linked to an anthropological task. Christians began to interpret pre-
Christian knowledge within the context of divine revelation in relation to 
understanding human identity and through the Christ who is the "light that enlightens 
everyone".90 Self-inquiry then is qualified through a Christological perspective. 
In the Greek Patristic tradition self-inquiry becomes absorbed into the category of 
deification. In this context, I also examine the notion of de~/ication in relation to the 
cognition as an informing experience. Deification is not be considered a static event 
but reveals what it is to be as a person and correlated to a notion of recapitulated 
consciousness. which implies kinship91 with the divine. 
HI Hans Dieter Betz, 'The Delphic Maxim "know yourself' in the Greek magical Papyri', History ol 
~eligions 21/2, 1981, pp.156-171. 
K~ See Lloyd P. Gerson, KnOWing Persons: A Study in Plato (Ox ford: 200~), .,.,.14-15, 29. 
See Plato, Ph.57A-118, and Betz. 'The Delphic Maxim "know yourself' in the Greek magical 
Papyri', .,.157, see also Peter Morea, In Search of Personality (London: 1997) who links the question, 
'Who am I?' with understanding the individual. See also A. Chakraborty, Mind-Body Dualism (New 
Delhi: 1997), p.167, who links the 'Who am IT question with the concept of person. 
/U'N 
orman Russell, The Doctrine of the Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: 2004), 
n.IO, p.117. 
l7 Ibid. 
KH 
Clement, Str. 1.14, 685-708, 
H'Ilb'd I ., Str.2.19, 709-712. 
'X) Kallistos Ware, 'The Light that Enlightens Everyone', Greek Theological Review, 44 ( 1999), pp.557-
564. 
'II . 
Though Louth IS antagonistic to kinship, Dumitru Staniloae argues that kinship is integral to Eastern 
Orthodox theology. See Dumitru Staniloae, 'Image, likeness, and deification in the human person', 
Communico International 13/1 (1986), pp.64-83. 
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2.8 Being a Deified Person 
The notion of completion or deification in the Byzantine tradition represents a shift in 
person within an ontological restoration of person, where an actual change in heing 
occurs, which allows a shift of awareness from the natural physis to the spiritual. This 
ontological shift or alteration allows for hypostatic life to flourish within a spiritual 
mode of existence, culminating in deification. an ontological reformulation or 
completing of person. The consequent shift in heing. results in a change in the mode 
of the person from the natural mode to a deified mode of hypostatic existence. The 
considering of existence through modes was employed many times by Maximus, 
especially in relation to a Trinitarian or Christological perspective, for example 
stating; "in the same way, leading mankind according to every mode with the word of 
hypostasis to the Godhead". 92 Maximus refers to "every mode" to indicate that the 
considering of many modes within a single reality is possible. When translated to the 
human condition, I use this notion of modes to express, in deification. within a 
context of an ontological restoration. I argue that many types of modes are possible 
within a single entity, but within deification a change in the mode of existence 
includes the possibilities of a Cid-iitmanic mode of hypostatic existence, as already 
expressed in chapter 1.4.6. 
This focuses the discussion, in this and proceeding chapters, towards correlating a 
change in heing to an existential condition through a substantialist position. Another 
point relates to Maximus' use of hypostasis and phy ... i.\' through the hypostatic union, 
which reduced the gulf between the divine nature and human nature. Here the focus is 
upon physis to understand the existential role of hypostasis. which allows for a 
substantialist context, where hypostasis relates not only to an existential context but to 
how this union is accomplished within hypostasis through unity within the essentiality 
of heing.93 Maximus himself directly made a distinction between existence 
(hyparxis)94 and being in the divine in an essential context stating that, the "whole 
<~2 See Thal.60, 73 .12, E~ tautov c'iyol)oa ~ 9E6t'lTl Kata navtu tp6nov t4'1 tf\~ unOOtao£O)~ I..0Y4'1 ttlv 
avOpwn6t'lta, p.123 (my translation with help from Greek teacher H. Lyons); tnmslation also by 
~Iowe~, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.123. 
Maxlmus, Thal.60, 79, \05-110; translation by Blowers, On the CO.\·mic Mystery of Jesus Christ, 
J?4127. 
Ibid., 81,127; p.128. 
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Holy Spirit exists by essence (Kat' oucrlav),,9s and continuing that God "knows what 
he himself is in essence".96 This has repercussions when considering human 
personhood in relation to deification. 
Thus the stress here is upon ontological re-formulation through restoration, which 
becomes a pattern already provided in the Christ, who allows de~fication to be 
considered in terms of ontological restoration. Through the incarnation of the Logos. 
the Logos established a mode through hypostasis that allowed material matter to be 
renewed, allowing for the restoration of the human nature. Irenaeus stated: 
So he united man with God and wrought a communion of God and man, we 
being unable to have any participation in incorruptibility if it were not for His 
coming to us, for incorruptibility, whilst being invisible, benefitted us nothing: 
so He became visible, that we might, in all ways, obtain a participation in 
incorruptibility.97 
Questions then arise such as, what is the exact relationship of de~/icati()n to the human 
physis? How far does the deification of the humanphysis inform the person through 
hypostasis of what or who he or she is, and then how does this translate to a mode 
within the hypostasis? 
2.8.1 Deification and the Soul 
The correlating of deijication to a mode, which also includes an Atmanic: dimension, 
that infers that the whole person is included within that mode but here I focus on the 
implications for the soul. 
9< Ibid. 79. 103; p.127 
(H'lbid .. 79.119-125; p.127. 
(17 Cpll quwPllb u}lwUlphgnJg {!W} CuUlmwb htlwuwpw4mphlb U}lwpwbmp}lhlb CuUlmbnJ hl 
uWJlllnJ qnpbhwg. uhJl n2 4wJlwghtng wn wlpbw4wpwP }lb2 }lgnpllntp}llb {!bllntbht 
qwbUJw4wbmt!hwbb. hph n2l;r bnJlw h4hwt wn bhq : ~wbq}l WbUlhuwbhtlt hl wbhphUlJP 
hlml wbwUJw4wbnt phwbb. hph nll\bl bhq WlqnlUl wnbl;r . wM Ulhuwbhtlt hl}hl q}l {!UUl 
wuhbwJb uwu}lb 4gnJll}ntp}ltb t!bqnlbhtntphwb wngntp qwbwUJw4wbntphwbb. 
Ircnaeus. P.Ap.31 (PO 12.61.683); translation by K. T. Mekerttschian and Wilson (Brepols: 2004). 
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Although the hypostasis cannot be reduced to hypostatic elements such as body, mind 
or nous,98 where there is no real centre in the person, the notion of soul, the noetic, 
allows a focus on what is ontologically going on within a person in deification. While 
the soul here is considered within a substantialist context, and applied to Alman 
indicating the highest part of the soul as the metaphysical stuirofthe soul in the next 
chapter, it also includes a rational element and in Greek Patristics was equated with 
the nous (noetic).99 The rational focus on the soul allows an immaterial context within 
the material as a noetic part within a whole person. Maximus argued that: 
we must distinguish intellectually at conception between, on the one hand, the 
vital inbreathing and the Holy Spirit which underline the noetic essence of the 
soul, and, on the other hand, the enfleshment and breath which underline the 
nature of the bodies. 100 
The nous unites being and mind, but both soul and nous were interchangeable which 
in Byzantine theology manifested a confusion as to what constituted the soul. This 
was somewhat mitigated in that the nous has been considered the "purest part of the 
SOUI".IOI But the soul also indicated the individual existence and discursive reasoning. 
For this reason Gregory of Nyssa, using Platonic categories, 1112 divided the activities 
of the soul into categories pertaining to lower and higher parts,IIl.l having three 
faculties: 'w'Yu:mcov' (the rational/ogikos or nous); C,tlOuIl'ltUcov (the striving); and 
'IN 
A note has to be made here that V. Lossky believed that this type of schema. that rlaces the nous as 
central to being a human has to be rejected. for the now. is only a "hypostatic element" (see Lossky. In 
the Image and Likeness of God. 1'.119-121). But on this Lossky goes into a sophisticated argument on 
what constitutes a person for if a person is reduced to constituted parts then that reduces personhood to 
a collection of natures. but if the person cannot be understood as being reduced constitutive parts such 
as body. soul and spirit then the lack or irreducibility confers on the person only an existential 
awareness ofhimself or herself. This is a dilemma that has not yet been resolved. Because of the 
Christological element in personhood where Christ was defined through two natures in Byzantine 
theology. the nature or physis ofa person cannot be negated. In Chapter of this work I go on to affirm 
that it is the metaphysical nature. the true nature (Alman) of the human person that allows the person to 
re-cognise what it is to truly be. 
'I" H' lerotheos Vlachos. Orthodox Psychotherapy. the Science of the Fathers. trclns. E. Williams. 
(Greece: 2002). pp.118-133. 
IOU Maximus. Amhig.42. 13240-1325(,; translation by Blowers. On the Cosmic Mystery olChri.st. 
~r·87-88. 
( I Ibid.; Hierotheos Vlachos here is quoting John of Damascus see Vlachos. Orthodox Psychotherapy, 
th~ Science of the Fathers. trans. E. Williams. (Greece: 2002).1'1'.118-133. 
10. (PG 46.56). 1440. 36IC-0. 353C; (PG 45) 224C. in relation to Plato's notion of the soul. who 
refers to tJn9uJ.u&v (desires) as part of the soul. or different levels of soul. see Ph.66C -D. Gregory of 
Nyssa also makes a Platonic distinction between the soul and body. Also see J. P. Cava mos. St Gregory 
~)tJNyssa On the Human Soul (Massachusetts: 2000). 
Gregory of Nyssa. Anim. et Res .. 28C. 
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9uJ.10\tOE~ (desire). 104 Aristotelian influences were also evident in the Cappadocian 
emphasis on activity (EvEP'YE\Q)105 or operations, but which seemed to have left an 
emphasis on the outer subject. 106 The operations express the outer existence, but this 
tells us nothing of the nature of the inner reality of being. 
When translating the Cappadocian notion of operations to the human condition. the 
soul is related to the operations of reasoning, the /ogismoi, within a material body. 
This dichotomist model developed throughout Greek Patristics, of body and soul 
united in the individual. while allowing for a unity of the rational and the bodily, did 
not focus on highest part of the soul, but on the rational, which did not explain how 
the highest part of the soul related to the rational in relation to the mundane and 
deification. This lack of focus did seem to be overcome or was at least deflected in the 
unifying activity of the Christ who allowed for a harmony of being and existing 
through his deifYing activity. Gregory of Nyssa stated: 
while two natures - the Divine and incorporeal nature. and the irrational life of 
brutes - are separated from each other as extremes, human nature is the mean 
between them: for in the compound nature of man we may behold a part of 
each ofthe natures I have mentioned. - ofthe Divine, the rational and 
intelligent element, which does not admit the distinction of male and 
female. 107 
But this uniting of body and soul was not the only model considered in Greek 
Patristics. A trichotomist model was also developed similar to Plotinus' Iri-hypostalic 
"Onc", 1011 "Intelligence", 10<) "Soul"; 110 that of mind (vou~), soul (\jIuXli) and body 
11101 For examples see Gregory of Nyssa. Hom.Op!f8. 1440; and V, Mos. 353(', and 361('. This also 
followed the Platonic line which indicated the importance of reasoning in the soul ('lfUX~). see Plato IX. 
Tima('us 36E-37C (LCL 234.72-73). 
II)' In the Cappadocians we see a continuous use of Aristotelian ideas relating to: activities and power 
(dynamis); of actuality of existence as compared to the potentiality of being; and of what is common 
compared to what is specific. see Aristotle. Anim.l.i403a-Il.i.414a; translation by Hett. On the Soul. 
(LCl 288). 1'1'.8-80. In relation to the energy of the soul see Gregory of Nyssa. Tres Di;. I 24C-0; and 
Basil. Ep.38; For the an example of this approach in Aristotle. see Anim.lI.iv.415b.5-15. 
11)/. F 
or an example see Gregory of Nazianzen. Or.29. 76B: and Gregory of Nyssa. Tres Dii. 124C -0. 
11)7 
Gregory of Nyssa. Hom.OpifI6.9. 1770-1850 (Moore). For other examples of this double nature 
see also Maximus. Ambig.42. 1324A: Staniloae. Orthodox Spirituality. pp.96-97: and also Alfeyev. Sf 
~l~meon the New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition. p.I77. 
Plottnus. Ennead V. 1.7. stating that the "intellect certainly. by its own means even defines its being 
for itself by the power which comes from the One. and because its substance is a kind of single part of 
what belongs to the One and comes from the One. it is strengthened by the One and made perfect in 
~(~,bstantial existence by and from it"; translation by Armstrong (lCl 444).1'.35. 
Plottnus, Ennead I. 1.2.65-20. 
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«(J(llIlU); III or nous (mind), logos (reason), and pneuma (spirit), 112 which all represent 
the qualifying of the material existence within a spiritual or immaterial context. In 
Staniloae's view the Fathers also appropriated "the Platonic thesis of the immortality 
of the nous and the mortality of the other two parts", I 13 where the mind as the "soul 
itself', 114 becomes the infonning part of being. 
However, the Greek Fathers did generally adopt the twofold scheme of body and soul, 
and Ware believes the "threefold scheme of body, soul and spirit is more precise and 
more illuminating". 1 15 Gregory Nazianzen also referred to "body, soul and mind,,116 
to qualify how the corporeal life is changed, or made whole in the spiritual through 
divine condescension. This is certainly true when trying to understand the nature of 
the highest part of the soul in relation to mundane life and in the model presented in 
the thesis. The spiritual or noetic aspect in human persons can also be correlated to a 
trichotomist model of body, soul (nous) and spirit, which provides a more 
sophisticated model. This allows the lower part of soul to be correlated to the 
individual soul, while the spiritual or highest part is equated to the Alman and allows 
for a better understanding of what is going on ontologicallY in the person. It is in the 
context of an experience of the spiritual part of the soul of the person that the hidden 
nature of the person is revealed and restored to the person through grace. This was 
also argued by Gregory Nazianzen, stating: "for truly man is the great God's creature 
and image, from God proceeding, and to God returning again". 117 
110 Plotinus. Ennead I. 1.2.5-15; and Ennead IV. 1.2.1 .• where Plotinus stated that: "in our enquiry into 
what the soul's essential being is. we have shown that it is not any body. and. again. that in the class of 
bodiless things it is not a harmony; we have abandoned the concept of entelechy. which is not true in 
the sense in which it is stated and does not make clear what the soul is; the intelligible nature of the 
divine order. we did perhaps manage to say something exact about its essential being". translation by 
~rmstrong (LCL 443). p.9; niv ti'I~ 'lfUXf\~ ooo{av T"; nOTE tatl ~'lTOUVW; o(i)lla ouotv aUTt)v oEl~avw; 
Elval. ouo' tv aowl.ulTO~ au apllov{av. T6 n: TfI~ tvn;uXEla.; OUTE cU'l9E~ OUT~. w~ A.tyETal. OUT/: 
O'lAwTIlCOV OV TOU T\ tOTIV acpEVT~. Kai Ilt)v Tf\~ VO'lTfI,;; CPUOE~ EUtOVTE';; Kat TfI~ 9Ela,;; Ilo{pa~; also see 
Louth, The Origins o/the Christian Mystical Tradition. p.162. 
III See Staniloae. Orthodox Spirituality. pp.96-97 and also Timothy Ware. The Orthodox Way 
(Crestwood: 2001), pp.48-49. 
III See Staniloae. Orthodox Spirituality p.97; this was also developed in a another form by Dionysius of 
"One". "Good", and "Beautiful". see Pseudo-Dionysius. DNA. 7. 704B. 
III S S '1 ee tam oae, Orthodox Spirituality p.96. 
1141b'd I .. p.97. 
lilT' h 
11/, Imot y Ware, T~e Orthodox Way, pp.48-49. 
117 Or, 30.2 I. translation by Wickham. On God and Christ. p.lll. 
Gregory Nazianzen. 'De animae suae calamitatibus Carmen lugubre', Carm, 2. 1.45. 1353-1378. 
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Within the deepest part of the soul a Christological event llK takes place in deification, 
which is due not only to an existential dynamic, not merely an outward activity, but 
an inner operation. The deifYing operation of the divine within the soul in turn reflects 
the characteristics of the divine operations as ontological reforming principles. This is 
vindicated through the material event of God enfieshed,I19 which shows that 
deification is not merely an immaterial event but is stationed in the material 
hypostasis and in a uniting of the spiritual and material natures. The event of the 
Christ indicates the intention for human persons and that, at the very core of person, 
an event can and will occur, which has not only existential but ontological 
implications. The nature of being is changed through this event of restoration within 
human persons reforming them to their intended ontological condition through the 
"economy of salvation". 120 This equating of Christ's manifestation with the uniting 
and restoring of, both existence and being. is also affirmed by Maximus, who stated 
that God deifies creatures by grace I 2 I but who "transcends created beings ... foreknows 
the existence of all his creatures". 122 Through deification the human hypostasis and 
ous;a together is restored. 
For me, the human spiritual ousia represents the str4Tor essential reality of the soul: 
by which in the deification of the hypostasis the natural physis de~/ied allows an 
awareness of the Atmanic condition through grace. In other words ousia cannot be 
relegated to an impersonal substance of material existence. Even though in Greek 
Patristic terms the human ()usia was understood as created, and thus was distinct from 
the uncreated ousia of God, it did have this metaphysical dimension, as Maximus 
stated: 
we must distinguish intellectually ... the vital inbreathing and the Holy Spirit 
which underline the noetic essence of the soul, and, on the other hand, the 
enfleshment and "breath' which underline the nature ofbodies ... Adam came 
11K See Maximus, Thal.6(J. 73. Because of the word limit I cannot examine the theology of event, for 
this see Paul M. Collins, 'Event: The 'How' of Revelation', in Trinitarian Theology West and East, 
r~·7-~3, and also p.96. 
ThIS event (in I John I :2-5) indicates the reality of the world as the "word of life" O.6you TfI~ ~U)fI~) 
"~anifested" (tqlUVEpw9'l) to give "etemallife" (~O)~v T~V aiwvlov). 
1.0 M . 
, aXlmus, ThaI. 60, 79, 116; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ. p.12S. 
1.1 Ibid., 116. 
121 Ibid .. 119-125. 
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into being in a secret way, with a different principle of his soul's being and a 
different mode of its generation. 123 
When relating the noetic essence of the soul to Alman, it should indicate the highest 
spiritual dimension in human beings (metaphysical ousia), where a secret inbreathing 
relates implicitly to the spiritual stufJ of being, and allows the imparting of an Almanic 
nature to human persons. What Maximus continues to argue is that there is a 
difference between the soul and the body which really amounts to two in-breathings, 
one of the soul and one of the body, which almost seems to bifurcate the person. This 
division of being is united in a hypostatic-union where divine unity becomes the copy 
for the human unity.124 Through this idea of simultaneity of disunity and unity, of 
possibility and actuality, a dynamic aspect is brought into the relationship of the soul 
with the body, where the highest spiritual context defines the somatic existence. In 
this context, as Maximus highlights, there are really three births relating to heing and 
becoming, firstly of the creation of "being" ('to dVQ1) which is a bodily birth; the 
second is the "good-being" (to EU Elvm) related to baptism; and the third birth is the 
"eternal being" (to ad dVQ1), m the transfonnation of the soul in true heing, where the 
person by grace is transfonned into "eternal well_being".12h Hence, the person attains 
a state of heing and becoming, where the metaphysical.\'/~U·(soul) when deified, 
transfonns material heing into true being, which is intellectually grasped (cognized) 
by the nous. 
It is important to note here that in contrast to contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, the 
concept of the soul in the West seems to relate more to substance, 127 to SOUI.\'II~tl:12K 
but which has many problems relating to such a tenn and Ury states that: "God is 
substance. This ontological statement, germinating in Platonic and Aristotelian 
constructs, has spawned a maze of tortuous options still unresolved" .12<1 Problems 
revolving around the stufJofthe soul also led Yannaras to state that in contemporary 
times, most people identify the soul with a Platonic "immaterial element, spiritual. 
In Maximus, Ambig.42. 1324C-1324D: translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery o!,Christ, 
fE·K7-88 . 
• 4 Ibid., 1325A. 
I~' Ibid., Ambig.42. 13258-13250; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic A~vstery o!,Christ, pp.XK-X9. 
1./, Ibid .. 
127 E I·ti 
12M xemp I led in Plato, Ph. 78D (123); and also in Augustine. De Trin. \.6 (37-44). 
See also Thomas Aquinas, ST, VoI.I.Q.29.2. and VoI.I.Q.75.2; Duns Scotus, Ord.4. \.I, no30-4.45.2, 
n.12. 
12(1 
Ury, Trinitarian Personhood. p.62. 
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essentially different from our own material composition". 1.10 He believes this to be at 
odds with the Biblical and Greek Patristic model of rational soul or psyche. However, 
the two are not mutually exclusive, but it is incongruent to talk in existential terms of 
which the uniting aspect is a noetic-hypostasis. This thesis accepts an essentiality of 
soul where the core of hypostasis has as its essential reality, the spiritual stujlof 
human persons, otherwise being a person would be determined by a conglomeration 
of elements. Also the term "living soul" (\jIUXTlv ~rooav, LXX, 2:7), used in Genesis, 
for me implies a substantial sense of being as a centre of that existence as a "spiritual 
body" (oro~ata £1toupavta, I Cor.15:40). Of course the "spiritual body" is different 
from the material body as Paul states, but the two are not mutually exclusive but 
rather homogenised in the human person who, as a rational animal (zoon /og;kon), is 
deified (zoon theoumenon)131 soul and body together, as a total or deified person. 
However, Gregory of Nyssa rejected prior essentiality in the human soul which he 
believed pointed to the validity for reincarnation, which he calls "invented 
doctrines". 132 But as argued in the last chapter, reincarnation does not prohibit the 
notion of unity in the soul (indicated in this thesis through the term Alman), but relates 
to the particular individual experience, or difference. Reincarnation applies not to a 
model of unity but to a model of difference or the individual soul Vlvatman), and 
implies that it is not related to Alman but to the natural phys;s. In this context 
reincarnation is related more to an understanding of what is ignorant in human 
personhood and the outer existential condition, not to unity. 
When considering the nature of the soul, Gregory of Nyssa did not argue for an 
outward essentialist approach for his views were consistently Platonic, as were those 
of Gregory Nazianzen. This approach is very much evident in Gregory Nazianzen in 
de exter;or;s hom;n;s vilitate. where he lamented the outward condition of the 
"wretched race of men" 133 and extolled the inward glory of the soul in the 
possibilities of the soul to look "upwards". D4 This 'inward glory' points to the true 
IlfJ 
Yannaras. Elements of Faith. p.55. 
III c' . lregory of Nazlanzus. Or. 38. 1 I. 32IC-0. In 
Gregory of Nyssa. Anim. et Res.; translation by Catherine P. Roth. St Gregory of Nyssa: The Soul 
fl~d the Resurrection (Crestwood: 1993). p.98. 
Gregory Nazianzen. 'De exterioris hominis vilitate·. Carm. 1.2.14. 40. 769; translation by Peter 
Rllbe.rt. On God and Man (Crestwood: 2001). pp. 138-144. 
IbId .. verse 150. 777. 
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nature of the inward soul which is "upward" looking and is intimately connected to 
the presence of God through the divine "breath". 135 In Genesis this breath is "taken 
from Himself,136 allowing for both an intelligible soul and the essential reality of 
human nature. The breath is denoted in the LXX through the words \jIuxTlv and 7tVOllV 
(Gen. 1 :31 and 2:7), and indicates the depth of being within the human person issuing 
from the essence of God. The breath also becomes important Christologically, in the 
regeneration of humanity through the reception of the Holy Spirit in Christ's 
breathing, who "breathed onto" (EvEq>UCJ11<JEV, John 20:22)1]7 the disciples, giving 
them the Holy Spirit. Through the divine breath human beings enter into a state of 
becoming through the soul, being a living soul (\jIUxTlV ~&<Jav), having a nature which 
was created "according to our image and likeness" (Kat' EtKOVa, KaB' oJ,loicoatv, 
LXX, Gen. I :26-28). The word "image" indicates the nature of human existence, the 
soul, while "likeness" indicates sameness, referring to the nature of the "image", 
which was "like" God, having difference (hypostasis) and unity in an essential reality. 
The term "likeness" implies the possibilities for the human person in the restoration of 
human existence through Christ, where Christ united himself with human persons 
purifying "flesh by flesh; soul by soul; and like by like". \JK Gregory Nazianzen stated 
that Christ assumed "the poverty of my flesh, that I may assume the richness of His 
Godhead". 139 
Within this understanding the notion of the soul, as the "breath of the great mind",140 
can be said to include a nature which when deified with the body, attains a new 
"garment ofskin".141 This notion of "perfected form" 142 underlies the potentiality or 
Il~ See LXX Gen.2:7; see also Gregory Nazianzen who uses the notion of breath to highlight 'man's' 
connectedness to the divine, see 'De Anima', Carm.1. UI, 446-456; 'De naturae hurnanae fragilitate'. 
Carm.1.2.12, 754; 'De exterioris hominis vilitate', Carm.1.2.14., 777-77'1,; and Or. 38. I I. 32 \c-D. 
IlI'LXX ,Gen. 2.7, See also Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 3'1,. I I, 321C-D. 
117 The word £VEIPU<J'lOf:V according to G. R. Berry, Greek to English Interlinear (Iowa Falls: 2002) is 
translated "breathed into" but it has also been translated as "onto", from tl1IPu<JQw (See Balz and 
Schneider, Exegetical Dictionary o/the New Testament, Vol. I.), but "onto" implies a movement of the 
Holy Spirit "into" the disciples not merely a placing on them the Spirit. 
11M Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 38. 13, 325B-C' translation by C. G. Browne (NPNF 7), p.349. 
119 ' Ibid., 324A. 
140 Gregory Nazianzen, 'De naturae hurnanae fragilitate', Corm. 1.2.12 9, 754; tr.lOslation by Peter 
Gilbcn, On God and Man, p.130. 
141 Panayiotis Nellas. 'The "Garments of Skin"', in Deification in Christ: The Nature o/the Human 
~~rson (Crestwood; 1997), pp.43-91. 
- Ibid., p.50. 
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capacity in the essential human nature where human beings can attain. as Nellas 
states, a "full unity of himself and the world in God, realised in actuality". 143 
2.8.2 A Macarian Perspective 
Pseudo-Macarius also harmonised the concepts of body and soul within a holistic 
unity in the heart. While Byzantine theology pointed to the idea of a double human 
nature and seemed to develop a bifurcated nature of "man". Pseudo-Macarius l44 
significantly unified the nature of "man" in a holistic notion of the human being by 
emphasising the heart as a centre for the unity of body and soul. 145 Pseudo-Macarius 
qualified his notion of human being where material existence attains spiritual fullness 
through participation with the divine Spirit,146 the two coming together in the heart. In 
Pseudo-Macari us' model of being, the soul has a subtle but substantial existence 
which when mingled l47 with the body, unites the whole being. The Lord himself 
enters into a state of becoming to allow humanity to become. and in this the Lord 
becomes creation itself, not divided or separate, and through divine transformation, 
"recreates the soul and fills it with spiritual happiness". 14K As such. the "body does not 
have life in itself,149 but is given life through the soul. Consequently. a spiritual life 
has to be considered in terms of materially and immaterially. where the divine activity 
in the soul informs and restores the outward condition. completing the whole person 
in deification. 
141 1b·d I ., p.54. 
144 S P . 14~ ee: seudo-Macanus, Hom.Spir .. 449-822. 
I~' Plestcd, The Macarian Lega(~v. p.33. 
147 Pseudo-Macarius. Hom.Spir.).)), 449-822. 
Ibid., (410) 
14K. • 
Ibid., this represents a condescension of God's transcendent being, for an interesting examination of 
God's transcendence and world see John Macquarrie's revelatory typologies in, Principles o.fChristian 
~~eology (London: 1966,2003), pp.166-167. 
See Malloney, Pseudo-Macari us, Hom.Spir. p.43. 
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2.8.3 Palamite Considerations 
In this small sub-chapter I will consider some implications of Palamite theology to 
deification. Gregory Palamas argued, that knowing, in the experience of God, it is not 
mere intellectual symbolism, or a philosophical speCUlation, but a real experience 
where the "hypostatic light is seen",ISO but "ignorantly known". 151 
Palamas referred to the experience of the divine light through uncreated operations or 
energies as the essential being of God, which could not be rationally known. Hence 
deification for Palamas related not to the essence (ousia) of God, but to the uncreated 
operations of the divine. Here the notion of uncreated energies develops an existential 
and ontological gulfnot only between what is genetic and the agenetic lS2 but what 
was spirituality available to humanity. This gulfwould be underlined in the strongest 
terms by Gregory Palamas, stating ··the uncreated is unique. namely, the divine 
nature, and anything whatsoever distinct from this is created". I S.l This distinction of 
the human condition to the divine is however somewhat mitigated in act of 
deification, where ··the man divinised by grace will be everything that God is, apart 
from identity of substance".ls4 This Palamite approach to deification underlined that 
participation (theosis) is operational and not related to the divine ollsia. I S5 for if one 
participates by substance one becomes, in some way, part of that substance. IStl But in 
Palamas' model. does the divine act become divorced from the essential being of God 
and when applied to the human condition, manifests in the human person, a bifurcated 
nature or at least a separation between the outward hypostasis and the inner essential 
spiritual nature where there is no means for unity? This cannot be answered here. but 
if the word tvtPYEUl (in-work)ls7 is applied to operations and not energies a stronger 
1'0 Gregory Palamas, TDS. D.II.iii.8, (Gendle). 
I~I Ibid. 
, ~, 
• For examples of see Gregory Nazianzen, Or.29 (76AOD): and Gregory of Nyssa, Eun .. 22-225. 
'H See Gregory Palamas, Cap. J 50.73, 1172. (Sinkewicz), tv to'TI TO aK'ttO'Tov. ~ ada cpuO'~, ndv ot TO 
?~I~cp~povta TauT'1~ omooouv K'ttO'T6v to'Tt· . 
I"~ IbId., III, 1197; see also TDS. E.III.i.34 . 
.. Cap./50, 104. 1192: 109, 1196. 
1'1, lb' Id., 110-11 1. 1196-1197. 
1~7 Through the Pal amite dogma of un created energies (tvEpyd~) the Greek word tvtPYEtu has come 
to be equated in English with energies, see Cap.15(), C.85 9 (Sinkewicz), p.IS3; also see Lossky, The 
Myst;~·a/.Theology of the Eastern Church. p.70. But this correlation should not be made for in English 
energIes IS a term that has weak ontological implications. Also in the New Testament it related to 
operatIons and to ouva~~, the activity of the divine power not the resulting reflected energies, see Ball 
and Schneider, Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament. In Ephesians I: 19, the use of tvtpyEla is 
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ontological relationship between the divine nature and extrusive divine activities is 
made. While the word operations seems to be relational to the intrusive being of God 
and not a predicated activity, the words uncreated and energies indicated either 
separation or predication, which seems to make a distinction between the inner 
essence and an extrusive activity forging a gulf between creator and created. 
2.8.4 Deification within a Substantialist Model 
What is the relationship of deification to the physis of a person, of hypostasis to ousia 
within a substantialist context? While the Greek Fathers generally did not connect the 
term ousia to the metaphysical stuffofthe soul, IS8 but to rationality, 159 I understand 
person through a substantialist model. To defend this approach I cite Maximus who 
referred to an existential (hyparxis)16o context through the property or essence of 
heing (Kat' oucriav).161 He affirmed that God alone knows what he is "in essence" 162 
while also confirming that created beings are in themselves beings Kat' oucriav l61 and 
that by a grace a knowledge of what they are in essence is bJfanted. He rejects the view 
that the "essence of rational beings is coetemal with God",I64 but affirms the essential 
reality of rational beings. It can then be asserted that the human person shares not only 
a way of existing, having a hypostasis, but also essential being. 
translated in Latin as operationem (operations). Nestle·Aland. NlH1lm T('.~tam('ntum Graen' (,tLatine. 
p.505. Palamas' model was created to manifest such a difference between a source (God) and the 
extrusive power coming from that source. so as to deny human accessibility to the divine source, but 
the energies were open to human participation. But if the energies were to be correlated to an extrusive 
power emanating from a source, these energies would have to be considered of the same substance as 
the source, as with the plasma coming from the Sun. Palamas model denies this, which makes the usc 
of energies reductio absurdum I:: Foran example see, Grego~ of Nyssa, Hom.Opifll·I7, 153C·187A. 
I As exemplified by Gregory of Nyssa, who referred to a "reasoning activity "or Aoyud'~ tvtPYt(~ 
(See Hominis Opijicio, 14.2, 176A·B; translation by Moore, On the Making olMan, NPNF 5, p.403), 
and that there are three parts of the faculty of the mind (soul), the third being "rational, perfect and co· 
extensive", where the "true perfect soul is naturally one, the intellect and immaterial". He thus states 
the soul is the rational soul (ibid.). See also Maximus, Mystagogia. 23, 7ooD· 701 A: which is 
confirmed by Hans Urs von Balthasar, in Cosmic Liturgy, as '''intelligible structure of being', (A.6yo~ 
toU dvat)", p.219. 
160 M ' aXlmus, Thal.60, 81,127, 
1611b'd 
, I" 79·80,95·130, In this passage alone the term is found at least 7 times, 16. M ' 
aXlmus, Thal.60, 79, 124·5, 
161lb'd I ,,80,127, 
If>4M ' 
aXlmuS, Thal,60, Maximus. Thai. 60,8 I , 130·140; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery 
o/Christ, p,128, 
151 
As such, person can be considered as particularized through hypostasis. which 
highlights that persons have an essential reality of being. 16S Gregory Nazianzen stated 
that: 
He bears the title "Man" not just with a view to being accessible through his 
body to corporeal things - being in all other respects inaccessible, owing to the 
incomprehensibility of his nature - but with the aim of hallowing Man through 
himself, by becoming a sort of yeast for the whole lump. He has united 
himself all that lay under condemnation, in order to release it from 
condemnation. 166 
When relating ousia and hypostasis in deification. the uniting of the two natures in 
Christ l67 provides a model to understand the human person, having the two natures 
the somatic (material) and the soul (immaterial). Thus there can be said to be two 
ousiai l68 of human beings, the natural ousia and the spiritual ousia which Maximus 
called the essences of the body and soul, 169 but which, for Maximus, related to the 
"intelligible structure". 170 This does not mean that the spiritual ousia is predicated to 
the person, but indicates how concrete person is related to a spiritual essential reality. 
The bodily nature or stuff of the individual or material existence can thus be viewed as 
part of the outward person, but should not be confused with the spiritual essential stujI 
of heing. It is the spiritual stuff' which can then be considered. as the highest part of 
the soul, to be individually contained in each person and unitised within a singular 
reality. 171 
If the human person is to participate with God through a union of its natures there 
must be an essential bridge that unites the divide between the inner with the outer. 
If,~ This follows the Western model which is exemplified in Augustine. De Trin.5.H.9-7.6.12.217-266; 
and Duns Scotus, Ord.I.5.l.un .. n.1 O. 
If,(, Gregory Nazianzen. Or. 30.2 I ; translation by Wickham. On God and Christ, p.lll. 
167 Alb . 
erglO et at. (cds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. pp.S7 -63; and Norman Tanner. Decrees oIthe 
Ecumenical Councils p.86. 
16H .' 
On the notion of two oU.\·iai see Prestige. God in Patristic Thought. p.273. 
16'/ . Maxlmus. Ep.12. 488B-C. 
171) Ibid. 
171 Th' I' IS rea Ity can be understood in tcrm of being the individual in the truest sense. It could even be 
understood in terms ofunoK£l~tvov, as Aristotle stated that "a\l substance appears individual. And this 
is indisputably true in the case of the primary substances. What each denotes is a unit". ndoa ot ooota 
OOl(d T60£ tl 0'1~a{VtlV. tni ~tv oov T6)v ItpWTWV ouol&v ava~cplopi1tT1TOV Kai Q).'19t~ tOttV Ott T60£ tl 
O'1~a{v£l' ato~ov yap Kai £V cip19~(j') TO 0'1A.ou~tv6v t(Jtlv', Aristotle. Cat.V.3a.IO; translation by H. P. 
C:ooke (LC'L, 325), p.29. This reality will be equated with Atman as the as the primary substance, sec 
Cat.V.lb.15- V. 2b.35. 
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This divide is overcome through the restoring activity of the divine operations and 
because the activity of the divine cannot be divorced from its own essential reality, 
human hypostases must participate in some way with the divine essence (ousia), 
whether in some known or unknown way. It is because the whole Trinity is revealed 
together, the divine hypostases and ousia: participation must indicate a communion 
with the whole God. This does not confuse the distinction between the divine and 
human realities, but confirms that participation is not just a superficial communion 
and that it must have ontological implications. Thus a model that is akin to that 
developed by Augustine and Duns Scotus, who argued that the divine suhstance. the 
essential divine reality, is not divided from the process of revelation and to whom that 
revelation and participation is given. 172 Human persons are able to participate with 
God in this way because of the nature of the relationship of the Christ with the Father, 
as Augustine stated: 
Further, that fonn of man which He took is the person of the Son, not also of 
the Father; on which account the invisible Father, together with the Son. who 
with the Father is invisible. is making Him visible. But ifhe became visible in 
such a way as to cease to be invisible with the Father. that is. if the substance 
(suhstantia) of the invisible Word were turned by a change and transition into 
a visible creature, then the Son would be so understood to be sent by the 
Father, that He would be found to be only sent; not also with the Father 
sending. 17.1 
The Augustinian model above also affinns that the reality of divine substance in 
relation to sending. or revelation, and thus participation. Without the ontological pre-
disposition, human participation with Christ and thus God becomes empty. 
Consequently the soul. which had for Scotus an essential reality. 174 must in some 
known or unknown way participate in the divine substance manifesting a participatory 
172s A . ee ugustme, De Trin.7.1V.7, 7.V.6; and Duns Scotus, Ord.I.S.I.un.,.n.IO. Augustine argued for a 
model of distinction and unity in substance stating that in the Trinity "some things are separately 
affirmed, the Persons being also each severally named; and yet are not to be understood as though the 
o~her Persons were excluded. on account of the unity of the same Trinity and the One substance and 
Godhead of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit", De. Trin.I.lX.19; tr.lOslation by A. W. 
Haddan (NPNF. 3). p.2S. where Persons and substance. the whole Trinity together are revealed to 
humanity. 
111 
Forma porro ilia suscepti hominisjilli persona est. non etiam patris. Quapropler paler inui.~ibilis 
un~ ~u.m jilio secum inuisibili eundem fUium uisibilem laciendo misisse eum dictus est; qui si eo modo 
U/s'.b~"s jierel ul cum palre inuisibilis esse desisteret. id esl si suhstantia inui.~ibilis uerbi in crealuram 
umhtl'em mulale ellransiens uerlerelur. ita mi.uus a patre intellegrentur filius ut tantum missus non 
f~!am cum patre mittens inueniretur. De. Trin.2. V.9 ; translation by A. W. Haddan (NPNF, 3), p.41. 
Duns Scotus, Ord. 4.1.1, n.30-4.32.2. n.17. 
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union in the individual and unifying the human person to the divine, which becomes 
what it should be in such a union. 
This notion of union through participation was also echoed by Dionysius and 
Maximus who considered that divine revelation through de(/ication 175 had significant 
ontological implications on the human level relating to the true reality of being. While 
they distinguished between the agenetic and genetic, the mystical experience of 
deification seems to somewhat reduce any gulfin the fullness of that experience, for 
Maximus stated that, (at the resurrection) "humanity is born in an unchanging state of 
being". 176 While the Cappadocians bridged the ontological gu(lthrough an ethical 177 
and ecclesiological approach to deification. 178 and the use of apophatic language, 179 
Dionysius and Maximus' approach allowed for a bridging of the ontological gu(l 
between the genetic and agenetic in a satisfactory model. 180 They seem to harmonise 
notions of being and existence within a model that highlights what could be attained 
in human beings. Maximus stated: 
God as it were, connected for me the principle of my being and the principle 
of my well-being, bridging the separation and distance between them that I 
had caused, and thereby wisely drew them together in the principle of eternal 
being. By this principle, it is no longer a matter of humanity bearing or being 
born along existentially ... wherein humanity is born into immortality in an 
unchanging state ofbeing. IKI 
In the works of Dionysius and Maximus the highest state of being in the human 
person is not ignored or relegated to the apophalic. although certainly the apophatic 
language is also incorporated, but being is incorporated into the language of 
existence. IK2 The notion of unity in the human being must include the material and the 
immaterial and consequently, the total human being participates with the triune God 
who as the cause of beinglKJ unites that being to Himself. Thus Dionysius stated that 
171 S P d D' . , I 176 ee ,seu 0- 10nyslUs, D.N.9.6, 931C; and Maximus, Thai. 60, 73-76 respective y. 
177 Maxlmus, Ambig.42. I 349A; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic My.ftery ofChrisr, p.95. 
See Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Parristic Tradition, p.9. 
17M Ib'd I . p.233. 
179 
IHI) Fo~ example see Gregory of Nyssa, V.Mos., 32HA-429D. 
ThiS also seems to be the conclusion of N. Russell, see The Doctrine 0/ Deification in rhe Greek 
Parristic Tradition p 9 IKI, ' . . 
Maxlmus, Ambig.42, 1348D-1349A; translation by Blowers. On the Cosmic Mystery o/Christ, p.95. 
SI.c,e also Ambig. 42. 1316A-1349A' and Pseudo-Dionysius DN 7.1-4 8658-872C'. 
" Ibid. ' , , , 
IM1 
Pseudo-Dionysius, DN. 11.2, 949('-9526. 
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"He brings everything together into a unity without confusion. into an undivided 
communion where each thing continues to exhibit its own specific form". 1114 The 
notion of being is taken out of what cannot be accomplished or understood and related 
to what can be accomplished, that is to say that in deijicat;onll!~ the restoration of the 
whole of human personhood is attained. It is a glorious vision of God and humanity 
reconciled, as Dionysius declared that "He illumines all men" (6 q>(t}ril:;Cl1tUV'tU 
av8p(t}1tov).186 But humanity is not illumined merely by the natural human physis. but 
through the grace of Christ, whereby the human nature gains access to the higher 
nature and God 187 through that grace. 
Christ came to restore broken human nature and recapitulate lKK humankind to 
Himsel f,I89 where humanity attains the restoration of its nature and makes the human 
person whole. However, this restoration is not merely a matter of the mending of a 
previous state but also of reciprocation. There has to be a personal wish to participate 
and be saved or made whole. Through the divine will (8tATUlU),I<JO God creates 
humanity and wishes human persons to be restored, but it is the human wishl'J\ to be 
restored, where divine participation begins a process of restoration. But how does the 
lower. 192 fallen or passible (xaeo<;)191 will come to accept the divine. to allow 
restoration? This is where divine grace plays a part. 194 where the divine grace allows 
that lower nature to accept the gift of grace. 
The divine thus, places within the human nature a potentiality and a wish to be made 
whole or a willing disposition in accepting the possibilities for restoration in 
1114 Ibid.; translation by Luibheid. Pseudo-Dionvsiu.~. p.122. 
IK~ P d D' . . seu 0- lonyslus. CH. 1.1-2. 121A. 
IXh Ibid.; translation by Luibheid. Pseudo-Dionvsius. p.145. 
IK7 Ibid. . 
IKK Pertaining to WtolCaTa(JTa(Jl~ meaning restoration. see: Clement. Str. 1.21. 853A; Origen. 
Prine. li.19. and on the restoration of "all things" (WtolCaTa(JTa(J~ nI'lVTlov). see Prine. I. vi. I ; 
Gregory Nazianzen. Or.4LII. 4448; Pseudo-Dionysius. D.N.4.4. 6978; Maximus. Amhig.7. 10808; 
~K~d in relation to return (apostrophe). see Maximus Amhig.42. 13488. 
See Basil. Ep.38. 3298-D. 
1'10 . On WIll see Gregory Nazianzen. Or.36.7; and also 8athrellos. The Byzantine Christ. pp.117-122; 
also see Zizioulas. Communion and Otherness. p.12!. Iql 
, See Bathrellos. The Byzantine Christ. pp.117-122. 
I~- The gnomic will is an unwilling will or yvWIl'l. see Thal.6. 69; see also Bathrellos. The Byzantine 
Christ. p.155. 
I'll . Maxlmus. Amhig.7. 10738. 
I~S M . ee aXlmus. Thal.60. 77.69. 
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deification. 195 This restoration, effected through the event of Christ, continually 
affects a state of deification for humanity, not only personally but as a whole, 
changing the nature of human personhood. 196 The act of deification is accomplished 
through a conversion not only ofwillingl97 but infers a context of substantial being, 
where whole being is restored This corresponds to a conscious awareness within the 
human intelligence and being where a participatory willingness accepts the activity of 
the divine will within the human person through the deifying divine operations. The 
divine operations renders in the person, a condition of ontological restoration to the 
likeness of the "One,,198 or the subject of knowledge that is Christ, who affects true 
participation. 
2.8.5 Deification and Preexistent Transcendence 
The relationship of the divine with the human persons is not only a matter of spiritual 
feeling but a reforming of essential heing. wrought through principles of creation 
"which pre-exist uniformly in him". 199 Maximus argues that Christ as the stability 
(stasis) of created beings, with whom participation is had, allows a "stability wherein 
no created being will know any change at all". In this context. a focus on principles 
that stream forth from the highest ousia (inu:pouaia). the Super Essential Godhead. 2011 
mani fests a pattern of substances, from the Godhead, to pre-existent principles and 
then to human essentiality. Through this flow from the divine of reforming principles, 
the ontological condition changes and acquires a permanent condition. This 
restoration of the essential or higher nature was correlated in Dionysius201 to the 
noetic; where in the highest experience of deification the nature of the transformation 
of being itselfis grasped. The stress however, is not merely on the awareness of the 
outer hypostatic experience in deification. but also on the whole being. The notion of 
wholeness contrasts with a separate or broken humanity, which comes to experience 
Iq~ M . 
. aXImus, Thal.6. 69-70. 
1'If. See Irenaeus. in already cited passage p.136. P.Ap.31. 683; and Athanasius. who stated that "He 
became man that we might become God" Inc. 54. 1928 197 ,
As understood by Maximus. Thal.6. 69-70. 
I'IK Ibid. 
IW . 
Maxlmus. Tha1.60. 81, 130-140'. translation by Blowers. On the Cosmic Mrsten' Of' Christ. p.12S. 
'00 . . ~ 
. Pseudo-Dionysius. DN. 1.2. 588C; translation by C. E. Rolt. Dionysiu .... the Areopagate (London: 
1920), p.S3. 
201 
See Louth. The Origins of the Christian My .... tical Tradition. p.161. 
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perfection because the nature of the "Cause" is wholeness and perfection. This very 
nature manifests pre-existent principles ofthe "Preexistent",202 contrasting with the 
previous condition of persons and allowing for ontological change to align the human 
condition with the divine. 
In the ontological change within the soul the divine brings the soul into total 
completion. where in the soul an awareness of itself and God arises and the 
capabilities for person. Through the divine activity of the 'Transcendent",20J created 
beings attain knowledge of the totality of being through deification for as Maximus 
affirmed, because each person is a "portion of God,,204 the human person has the 
capability to become so close to the divine as to be considered deified. 2(J~ 
The created human being was not considered in isolation but implicitly related to the 
divine being or divine "Transcendence".206 This relational quality of the human being, 
due to the ontological condition of having a soul, allows the soul to be considered an 
ontological principle207 where that condition becomes juxtaposed to the divine being. 
This is exemplified by Dionysius who argued for relationality through the ontological 
reality of being situated in relation to the divine through his model of hierarchies. This 
model affirms not only the ontological disposition of existing in situ in relation to the 
divine Transcendence but through the inner participating with that Transcendence, 
indicates the nature of that participation. This is exemplified in the Angels who exist 
existentially, not only in relation to the divine, but because they are "godlikc .. 2IlK and 
have "the most real experience .. .in the anteroom of the transcendcnt Trinity".20'/ 
Angels exhibit an ontological relatedness to the divine, which is intimately linked to 
the nature of their participation with the divine. Consequently this participation 
reflects a condition of the inner reality within being and in relation to existing for 
"beings are never without being, which, in turn comes from the Preexistent 
(np06vTo<;)',.210 He does not say that beings have only existence, but that being. which 
~(J2 Pscudo-Dionysius, DN. 5.H, H21 D-824A, 
.01 Ibid. 
204 Maximus, Ambig.7, 1348D-1349A 
'O~ • 
: Pscudo-Dionysius. DN, 1,5. 593C'. 
2.(167 Pscudo-Dionysius. DN, 5.H. 821 D; translation by translation by Luibhcid. Pseudo-Dionysius, p.1 00. () Ibid. 
20X Ibid. 
2(1'1 Ibid. 
210 lb'd I .• 5.H. H21D-824A; translation by Luibhcid, Pseudo-Dion,rsius, pp.IOO-IOI. 
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is derived from the essentiality of the transcendent divine "Cause", gives rise to 
existence and thus being. Dionysius stated: 
Being is of Him and not Him of being; also in Him being is. and not Him in 
being; and being has Him and He has not being; and he is also the eternality of 
being. and the beginning (first), and the meter, before essential being and 
existence (this) and eternity II 
Being is completed in "Him" (God), having the "final goal,,212 as "Him" (God), who 
is the "All" in all persons, which allows persons to be.211 
Hence. the human condition of being and having the capacity for restoration in 
deification mirrors the "Pre-existent,,214 divine intention of the divine to restore. 
Dionysius calls this "Pre-existent" the "capacity to effect unity":21~ a principlellfl that 
affords ontological return217 in deification through an "unknowing union".2IK The 
capacity to be in a perfected condition is wrought through the power (dynumis)21<) of 
God who is the "Cause" of being. existence. substance and nature. 220 For Dionysius 
"He" (God) is the essence of being. 221 and yet not-being: "He is not" heing. 222 "He" 
is that which can be known. and that which is not-known. and yet "everything 
participates in him and none among beings falls away".221 The very God (aut69EO<;) 
is in "Himself'. the essence of the Godhead itself (aut09c6t11<;)224 and brings all 
persons to "Himself' because of the created condition of heing. while at the same 
time is beyond all things and beings. 22~ 
211 I(a\ athou ean TO £IVaI, 1(0\ OUI( OUTO~ tOU £IVOI' KO\ tv Out41 tan to elVOI, 1(0\ OUK OUtO~ tv T4I 
elva\' 1(0\ OUtOV txtl to £IVaI, KO\ OUI( outO~ txtl TO £IVaI" KO\ OUtO~ tan tOU £IVaI KO\ ohi.lV, 1(0\ apx" 
~~I Jittpov, ItpO OU(J{O~ WV 1(0\ Ovt~, KO\ o{&vo~, (ibid)., H24A; translations form Luibheid and Roll. 
: I. Ibid., DN. 5.H, 821D . 
• 11 Ibid., 7.3, 872A. 
~ 14 Ibid., 4.12, 7090, and 5.4, 820A . 
• Ij Ibid. 
2161b"d 
, I., 5.5, 820A-B . 
• 11 Ibid., 4.12, 7090. 
21M Ib"d 1.,4.11,7080. 
li'Ilbid., 5.4, 817C-0. 
no Ibid .. 
W Ibid. 
", 
••• Ibid. 
m Ibid., 5.4, 820A. 
"4 
•• Ibid. 11.6, 956A. 
m Ibid. 
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2.8.6 Deification and Principles of Being 
This view is also expressed in Maximus whose approach to human beings becomes 
even more developed in relation to existence. In Maximus' model the concept of 
being becomes related to the principles of creation. where pre-existent principles of 
divine knowing or logoi226 become integral to the understanding of being and 
existence. highlighting the relation of existence to being. The logos (logoi) or active 
principles make specific things be. for example Maximus states that: 
a logos of angels preceded their creation, a logos preceded the creation of each 
of the beings and powers that fill the upper world, a logos preceded the 
creation of human bein.rs, a logos preceded everything that receives its 
becoming from God.22 
This underlines the importance of being. not only in relational or existential models. 
through modes of existence, but as significant in itself. as the inward reality of all 
modes of existence. 
Maximus' use ofOrigen's use of logoi22K was also developed to conceive ofa 
rationaI22') ontological principle. where logoi become intellectual principles of heing. 
The logos pertaining to human being-ness. along with many other logoi of divine 
powers. indicates the nature of human persons in relation to de~/icati()n. which 
become an ontological principle. 210 In this thesis this model is related to the notion of 
union which reflects the reality behind the nature of the human subject and the value 
of cognition in the essential reality of being with an Atmanic: nature. When the 
awareness of this reality is attained in fullness. the person de~fied attains a completed 
mode of existence. a spiritual or A/mank mode of hypostatic existence. and this 
spiritual mode of existence can be considered as relating to a principle of heing. 
Maximus stated: 
~~h Maximus. Amhig. 7. 1077A-1084D. Maximus' use of logoi has come to be understood in terms of 
divine uncreated energies though this whole area is much debated; see Joseph P. Farrell. Free Choice 
~~7St Maximus the Conje.Hor (Kansas: 1988). p.139. 
Maxlmus the Confessor. Amhig. 7. 1080A; tr.lnslation by Blowers. On the C(J.\'mic My.\·tery ofChriJt. 
r· S5 . 
::: See Origen. De PrincipiiJ I. viii.1. 
;~/J See ~arrel\. Free Choice in St MaximuJ the Con/essor. p.133. 
Maxlmus. Amhig. 7. 1077 A-I084D. 
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the mode thus innovated, while the natural principle is preserved, displays a 
miraculous power, insofar as the nature appears to be acted upon, and to act, 
clearly beyond its normal scope.23\ 
The admittance of a scope of activity and being beyond the natural one in human 
persons, through principles of the divine, infers that the scope oftrue being goes 
beyond the natural or the mundane human existential condition or existential 
communion. The negation of essential being in human persons, as argued by 
Zizioulas,232 would constitute two problems. Firstly, there would be a negation the 
logos (principle), which comes from the "Preexistent (1tP06V'tO~)"233 divine being to 
create the essential reality of human being-ness234 through the activity of the Logos. 235 
Secondly, the negation of the essentiality of being denies the active principles of the 
divine to transform being and thus the natural physis to its original state through 
deification. The notion of active principles confirms the place of a reality of being 
which creates the principles for being and precedes activity, not the other way round. 
The logo; activity or active principles of the divine originate from the being of the 
Logos.236 which allows human persons to be and then be recapitulated through that 
activity. Thus human persons attain a state of being and then the telos of being or 
personhood through the activity of the principles of being. emanating from the Logos. 
Maximus affirms that: 
This same Logos, whose goodness is revealed and multiplied in all the things 
that have their origin in him, with the degree of beauty appropriate to each 
being, recapitulates all things to himself. Through this Logos there came to be 
both being and continuing to be. 237 
It is because the logoi (principles) originate from the divine reality or substantial 
being, they are en-hypostatic. that is they come from the hypostasis of the Logos. they 
have source or a centre of origin, which as Maximus affirms makes things be. 238 If 
231 M . 
23 aXlmus, Ambig.42, 1341 D; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.90. 
2 See Zizioulas, BC 
233 P d D' . seu 0- lonyslus, DN, 5.8, 821 D-824A. 
234 Which will be correlated to the highest part of the soul or Alman. and which pre-cedes human 
existence as the Godhead which shall be equated to the terms Paramolman or Parameivara. see the 
Hindi Bible, Gen.l: l, "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth", ~ it ~~ ~ ~r 
~ ~ *t ~ *t. 
HI M' A b' 7 aXlmus, mIg .. 1077A-l084D. 
236 Th" h .. 2J7 IS .relterates t e Gospel of John 3-11, 'Ev apXn 'lv 6 )..6yo~ ... navra Ot' aUTou tytvr:ro. 
m M~xlmus, Ambig. 7. 1080B; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Myslery of Christ, p.55. 
IbId .. 1077 A-I084. 
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being was considered only in terms of an activity or communion there would be no 
centre by which the divine principles could emanate. There has to be a centre to God's 
being by which these principles originate otherwise the logoi would not be able to 
fulfil the human condition of being and would be dispersed in an abstract 
communion 239 If being were to be considered only in terms of an outer communion, 
there would be no defined characteristic of being by which the notion of being could 
exist in the first place. Hence, it can be argued that where non-being was evident 
before creation, being entered into a state of becoming as material existence and 
essential reality at the depth of the soul, because of the essentiality at centre of the 
Godhead. Through this essential unity the creative will provides a centre in the human 
condition by which human existence comes to be expressed. 
When correlating this to a personal level, to deification and being, it is the event of the 
hypostatic-union24o of Christ that manifests a change in being and thus existence, 
through the principles of divine being. Being and existence come to be significantly 
related to the activity of the being of the Logos.241 who manifests a change of being 
and existence through the activity of deification. This change of the natural physis 
creates a new condition in human persons through restoration, where being and 
existence are conformed to a new spiritual condition. 242 The new ontological 
condition is however, not really new but appears to be so, in comparison to the former 
condition, and represents the true nature of the human being. This true ontological 
human condition for Maximus was an original condition that was meant for human 
beings before the "fall,,243 and thus represents an authentic244 ontological condition. 
The notion of being is not ignored or related purely to an outer existentiality but both 
being and existence playa part in the unfolding human narrative. 
Human personhood also implies a capacity245 and it is due to this capacity that 
participation in the divine can be experienced. It is this capacity that implies that in 
the human person there exists a nature not known, or not communed within the 
239 Ibid., 1077e. 
240 M . 
aXlmus, Thal.60 73-81. 
241 ' 
In the next chapter this activity will be correlated to a Logos-cit activity. 242 0 , ngen, Prine.lI.x.\. 
241 M . 
aXlmus, Thal.61. 85. 
244R fi . 
24S e e!ymg to the "truth", aA~9£la, see Maximus, Amhig.42. 1348B. 
Maxlmus, Thal.61. 85. 
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human natural physis, which should be known and experienced, and informs us of 
how the person should be understood. This becomes significant on two levels: firstly 
persons, as hypostatic creatures, can attain the fulfilment of their spiritual nature 
having the "likeness" of the Christ hypostasis,246 which is made possible through 
deification; and secondly the experience of deification reflects what is known in the 
true experience of human personhood. The whole being is deified, as the whole 
person of Christ deifies. Thus, within the human person, if following the 
Christological model, there are two unions; firstly of the material body (the natural 
physis) with the immaterial (soul), and then of the particular unique existence 
(hypostasis) with its spiritual physis or the essential reality (ousiaIAtman). Also being 
a person is not merely a matter of existence, for Maximus does not say that Christ was 
God by existence or became "man" by existence, but by nature. 247 In other words, 
there is an ontological relatedness in the essential nature of Christ to that existence. 
When again applying the Christological to the human level. the human existence or 
particular hypostasis attains its true understanding of what he or she is as his or her 
essential reality through grace and restoration of that nature. 
Maximus also shifts the focus away from the existential in his use of kinesis or 
movement, for being precedes movement; as he states, one cannot have "movement 
before something has come into being". 248 This is to negate the Origenist idea of pre-
existent movement, for that would imply a pre-existent soul, but rather movement is 
part of the genetic or creaturely condition.249 With regard to the re-incarnation the 
notion of movement comes after the soul and does not pre-exist the soul. In the same 
way, a being as communion through relationality cannot pre-exist the soul and hence 
communion cannot relate to a pre-existing movement but reflects an intended reality 
of the soul, meant for the soul when it was created. When placed within the model of 
the soul presented by this thesis and correlated to a notion of Alman, reincarnation 
cannot apply to this original state, but to the existential activity or movement within 
the lower nature. As such reincarnation only applies to a sense of separation and has 
no part to play in the notions of deification or re-cognilion. 
246 M . 
aXlmus, Thal.60 73-81 247. ,. 
Maxlmus, Ambig.42, 1316A-1349A 24K • • 
249 MaXI':IlUs, Ambig. 7, 1 DnA; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.47. 
On thIS see Farrell, Free Choice in St Maximus the Confessor, p.134. 
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Maximus' view on movement would seem therefore to negate existence as having 
priority over being and thus negating an outer existentialist interpretation of the Greek 
Fathers, which places the stress on hyparxis as replacing essentiality of being.25o 
Existence and movement are subsequent to being. and although they are important 
factors in restoration, cannot replace or precede being. While Maximus confinns that 
the noetic experience of EI(Jta~ is an intellectual motion,251 coming from a 
subjective point and moving as it were outwards, this movement comes from a point 
of being. This is confinned in his understanding of the mode of existence (tropos 
hyparxeos),z52 which results from the human ontological condition, the "principle of 
human nature,,253 (constituting soul and body).254 The tp61toC; indicates activity and 
that which is acted upon, or that which changes, without changing the principle of 
human being-ness. However, Maximus states that God changes the mode of existence, 
not the principle of existence, and that in renewing human nature, change occurs in 
the natural tp61toC; not in the principle ofexistence,255 which seems to put the 
emphasis back on the existential. 
This can be understood, in the emphasis on the Atman in this thesis, in relation to the 
Iropos (mode) of human personhood. The essential principle of being in personhood 
indicates the mode that the person attains hypostatica/ly in deification in an Almanic 
mode of existence. This also relates to the principles of the mode that comes into 
being. It is because the principles or logoi. are simultaneously perfect in God in the 
beginning and the end, their nature in manifesting deification indicates a true mode 
for human persons and implies the nature of the telos of human personhood, which in 
this thesis is understood as Atmanic. In other words, the activity of the divine being 
changes human existence, which culminates in the recognition of the truth of the 
ontological condition. This mirrors the nature of the principle of perfection, through 
the activity of the divine, where the human tp61toC; of existence is deified. through the 
principle of existence and being or Alman. 256 
250 S z·· 1 ee lZIOU as, Communion and Otherness, pp.43, 105, 110. 
251 M . 
aXlmus, Ambig.7, 1073C-D 2n . . 
Maxlmus, Ambig.42. 13410-13448. 
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2.8.7 Conscious Awareness in Deification 
Conscious awareness in the experience of deification allows for the transformation of 
awareness of the despoiled human nature257 and thus consciousness in deification. 258 
The notion of the transformation of consciousness then can relate to the 
transformation of self-awareness, to the attaining of an awareness that understands not 
the potentiality of the human person but how the human person can come to 
understand its true essential value in that experience. 
The validation for the seeking ontological significance of transformation through the 
cognition of a higher experience can be sought through the book of Exodus where the 
reception of the "image" of God, and "likeness" through the breath of God infers that 
each person has a kinship with the divine in the attaining of that likeness. Through 
this potentiality of being, kinship is offered to each person through the transformation 
of human nature and awareness. Kinship in this thesis relates to an ontological value 
expressing an Atmanic characteristic of human beings that when restored, allows the 
potentiality of kinship to be fulfilled. But where kinship implies participation, 
potentiality indicates separation in the notion of what can be attained and what is lost. 
This loosing of the true human condition and consciousness can relate to the notion of 
the fall which paradoxically highlights the human ability for divine participation in 
that a promise for this restoration has been given in the Christological context. The 
consequent fall manifested a covering259 of the soul with "garments of skin" (Xttrovuc; 
bePflunvouc;, LXX, Gen. 3:22),260 which further highlights a gulf that separates 
humanity from the divine and, in Greek Patristic terms, indicates a fallen spiritual 
condition261 in which the soul covered by a fleshy covering loses its sense of the truth 
of its existence. However, it is this very notion of separation that becomes the benefit 
to the human condition in that the covering of the soul allows the restoration of the 
whole person where the Christ, endowed in the same garment, restores humanity to be 
257 See Irenaeus, P.Ap.16 (670-671) 
2~ . 
See Athanasius, inc. 54 (1928). 
m This notion of covering shall be equated to coverings, kaiicukas or sheaths of limitation in Kashmir 
Shaivism, see Pandit, !svarapratyabhijifakarika of Ulpaladeva: Verses on Recognition (Delhi; 2004), 
rJ68. . . 
See also PanaYlotls Nellas, 'The "Garments of Skin'" in Deification in Christ: The Nature of the 
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"like" the divine. "Garments of skin", while initially indicating the separation of 
humanity from God and the irrational nature ofhumanity262 also highlights the 
manner by which humanity is restored and the type of consciousness that is to be 
experienced. Consequently the restoration of the human nature represents the 
.. 263 
restoration of human conSCIousness and the telos of the human person. 
2.9 Recapitulated Consciousness 
In this last part of the Chapter and as a way of concluding the notion of hypostatic 
particularity and essential reality of being, or Atman. and consciousness is brought 
together through the affirmation of a cognitive unifying experience. In the context of 
awareness, in the experience of deification, awareness indicates a divine 
consciousness (Cit) of the highest reality within an Atmanic consciousness. What is 
argued is that the hypostasis or person becomes aware of its true reality through a 
unity with divine in deification. The conscious subject who experiences deification 
attains a new awareness, represents a restoration ofthe lower nature in human 
personhood within a recapitulated consciousness. In the human person there is 
evident, the possibilities of two types of knowing and experiencing, one relating to a 
lower nature and the other to a higher nature. 
Maximus also highlighted that there can be considered two types of knowledge in 
human persons: the first is relative and relates to the natural physis, the ordinary 
life;264 the second is that which is authentic, and relates to the experience of 
deification, to "total perception".265 This "total perception" allows the individual to 
experience deification, in a unified cognition where the human person is completely 
united with God in hypostatic experience. The principle of deification revealed 
through the activity of the Logos. and after the birth of the Incarnate Logos through 
the hypostatic union in the Christ. Maximus allows us to consider that this experience 
262 See Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. el Res .. 11-160. 
26} Telos (end) is mentioned 720 times in LXX, and in the New Testament 40 times but attains an 
ethical and ontological dimension in "be perfect" (tEA£\O<;, Mat. 5:48). See also references to 
'Perfection' (tt4:lO<; and t£4:\6t1'\<;, Heb. 6: I), and " will complete' (tEl..£\6ol, Acts 20:24); also see 
Maximus Ambig.42. 1 345A-D. 
264 Maxirflus, Opsc.34B-D (Louth). 
261 Maxirflus Ambig.42 (Blowers). 
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is not merely for the few, but is "unceasingly in effect",266 in the future and in the 
now. The restoring of the material nature allows the experience, and the possibilities 
for a change of conscious awareness in relation to the divine, to be opened to all, for 
all persons share a nature restored in the Christ. The possibilities to access this 
restoration within the hypostatic allows for the recapitulation to be grasped within a 
recapitulated consciousness, where the divine hypostatic union of the natures in 
Christ opened the way for the experience ofthe higher knowledge in the refonnation 
of all human hypostases. 267 
The idea of restoration (apokatastasis) in Greek Patristics continued the theme of 
restoration exemplified in Acts 3:21, which referred to the "restoration of all things" 
(ci7t01(atacrtu(Jf:ro~ 7tUVtroV).268 It also allows for a correlation to a knowledge rendered 
in perfection.269 The notion of recapitulated consciousness thus utilises this idea of 
restoration or a recapitulation consciousness within the human condition that is 
rational or intelligible, so as to include that which cannot be known in the ordinary 
consciousness. 
The notion of knowing was somewhat confined to what could not be known and 
hence related to an apophatic knowledge in the Greek Fathers, which allows for the 
ideal of penetration of the human mind into the unknowable divine. 27o The total 
transfonnation ofthe natural mind271 could be developed where the transfonnation 
and the exploration of the possibilities for the human person could be experienced in 
the cognitive experience of deification, but in the higher experiences the natural 
awareness gives way to a consciousness that is beyond the mundane state. In this state 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
26K This also correlates restoration with the notion ohou 1tA'1pc.O~UTO~ T(i)V KUtp(i)V ("fullness of times", 
Ephesians 1: 1 0); 7tA.tip{J)~u TOU Oeou ("fullness of God", Ephesians 3: (9); and 1tAT\pc.O~UTO~ TOU XPlO"TOU 
("fullness of Christ", Ephesians 4: (3). See also Origen, Prine. Lvi. I. And related to a sense of 
deification, see: Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opifl4, 1750; and also Justin Martyr, Apol. 1.23, 364B; 
Irenaeus, P.Ap.6, 7, 32, 664-684; Clement Str.1.21, 289A, SIr. 2.22, 1085B, Str.3.9, 1168A, Str.4.21. 
1344B; Origen, Prine. 1.6.2, III.1.l5, III. l.l 9, 111.6.6, 111.6.7, IV.4. 9; Athanasius, Inc. 10, 112C-Il3C; 
Gregory Nazianzen, Or.30.6, 109B-112B; Gregory of Nyssa, Con.Eun.3.2 and also see Anim. el 
Res., 12; Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 7.2-4, 868B-872C; Maximus Ambig. 7, 1080B. 
269 S M' b 270 ee aXlmus, Am ig.7,I077A-B. 
Through an unknowing knowing or aphaeretic experience, as exemplified example in Gregory of 
Nyssa, V.Mos .. 333B; see also Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith (Oxford: 2004) 
fi,34 and footnote 3. From the Greek aphaeresis meaning to 'take way'. 
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the person is restored to a former noetic condition and attains a recapitulated 
consciousness. The inability of the natural human mind to translate the experience 
into adequate theological terms in Greek Patristics keeps the truth of deification 
hidden and thus allows the cognition of deification to be understood in ways that are 
unknown in the ordinary human experience.272 The only way to gain access to this 
knowledge is in the cognitive experience of the essential reality of being. The 
cognitive experience of this reality is understood here to be correlative to an Atmanic 
experience, as will be discussed in the next chapter, which can also be considered 
beyond the ordinary awareness and accessed through a Cid-iitmanic condition or 
recapitulated consciousness. Within the hypostasis a change of being in deification 
facilitates a change of consciousness expressed in a different mode of existence that is 
not only Atmanic. not only indicating a static essence, but is active through the will, 
power and conscious awareness of that condition. This consciousness, equated to the 
experience of deification, allows a dual consciousness, which is simultaneously 
experienced and attained in the hypostasis. The nature of consciousness as understood 
within a dual context can be said to have been expressed in the New Testament when 
Paul stated: "we have the mind of Christ" (l Cor. 2: 16).273 In this context a 
simultaneous knowing within the mind points to a static experience and the 
possibilities of a higher consciousness within the mundane. This mundane 
consciousness relates to a common nature contained within the word "we" but is also 
connected to a spiritual nature, which when restored facilitates an experience and 
awareness of the Christ mind. 
Thus the word for the intelligible soul, nous. in Greek Patristics,274 expressed a 
knowing of both potentiality and actuality, so as to indicate something more than 
mundane thought €1t1V01.a275 Mota (intelligence),276 oUlvota (understanding, 
reasoning) 277 and A.6'YtaJ.lo~ (reasoning).278 
272 P d D' . seu 0- IOnyslUs, ON, 7.3, 872A. 
273 0 - - v r vouv XPlOtOU £'VO"£V. 274 ,.. t' 
'7 For an example, see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif., 153C-D . 
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276 ~r a very good explanation of £1[(VOlU in Gregory of Nyssa, see' EnINOIA' in NPNF 5, p.249. 
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In Gregory of Nyssa the attaining of awareness beyond nonnal consciousness was 
related to the aphaeretic experience.279 As the mind of the individual comes closer to 
the mind of God it transfonns, loses its ordinary sense of self and becomes what it 
should be.280 In this model, the differences between "earthly consciousness,,281 and 
heavenly consciousness can be considered as reconciled through the hypostasis where 
through this ontological condition a way is opened that allows for the mundane and 
the incomprehensible experience of the divine vision.282 This flexible approach to 
accepting both experiences is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa's mystical theology. In 
this theology the mind, as it moves to the divine, experiences a movement outwards of 
its ordinary condition, which he calls epectasis ("expansion,,)283 where the growth of 
the soul leads to a stripping of its earthly identity.284 It allows a letting go 
( h . )285 fd" . ( I' d d' .) 286 d th " ap aeresls 0 Iscurslve reasonmg natura mm or lanOIa, an e common 
limits of our human nature".287 Gregory stated that in illumination: 
as the soul makes progress, and by a greater and more perfect concentration 
comes to appreciate what the knowledge of truth is, the more it approaches 
this vision, and so much the more does it see that the divine nature is invisible. 
It thus leaves all surface appearances, not only those which the mind itself 
seems to see, and keeps on going deeper until by the operation of the spirit it 
penetrates the invisible and incomprehensible, and it is there that it sees God. 
The true vision and the true knowledge of what we seek consists precisely in 
not seeing, in an awareness that our goal transcends all knowledge. 288 
This 'true vision' can be correlated to an experience in which the original awareness 
intended for human persons is recapitulated, where a person attains a recapitulated 
consciousness. which reflects an ontological fulfillment in deification. This does not 
'79 1b'd • I., pp, 65, 90. 
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negate a limited self-awareness, but rather fulfills it where the person becomes aware 
of this fulfillment through an expansion or movement to the "presence of God".289 In 
this movement the mind penetrates the "impenetrable and enters the darkness where 
God dwells",290 and thus the intended consciousness for human persons is 
recapitulated. The outer person becomes informed, restored and united to its true 
condition through the inner personal experience, which is translated outwards within 
the hypostasis in the deified person. 
This transformation is due to a participation that occurs in a meeting or a divine event 
(theophany) and reflects the type of existence (hyparxis) that should be experienced 
by persons. The ordinary consciousness, or outer awareness, is transformed where a 
person re-cognises his or her authentic inner state of being and shifts to a divine 
conscious awareness, changing the understanding of person. The natural • I' ceases to 
be contextualised in the restrictive sense of isolated self, and through a theocentric 
correlation attains its telos. Consequently, deification allows, in a recapitulated 
consciousness. the focus in personhood to move away from the animalistic and the 
ordinary awareness, and is an outward expression of a profound inner experience 
through Christ. As Gregory of Nazianzen reflected concerning the deifying work of 
Christ: "being so human as to make me God instead of human". 291 The human nature 
and vou~ 292 is restored to the former image of God, which according to Gregory 
Nazianzen proceeded from God and "to God returning again". 293 
2.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter a model of person (through deification) was sought in which existential 
difference (or hypostasis) was qualified through the notion of unity identified in the 
term ousia. There was also evident the beginnings of the correlating of Alman to the 
highest part of soul. which will be examined in the next chapter. It was considered 
2X9 Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith. p.l 09. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Gregory Nazianzen, 'De Christi Incarnatione', Carm.1.1.1l 470-471 (Gilbert). 
292 ' For examples, see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif.l1 (153C-D), and 14 (175D). 
293 Gregory Nazianzen, 'De animae suae calamitatibus carmen lugubre', Carm.2.1.45, 1353-1378 
(Gilbert). 
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that the notion of hypostatic difference attains a full sense of what it is to be a person 
through deification or union with the divine in the essential reality of personal being. 
It was argued that a model of person that does not affirm that the metaphysical reality 
of a person confines this metaphysical reality as merely part of the hypostatic subject. 
The notion of the essential reality of being has to be intimately related to subjective 
awareness; otherwise personhood becomes correlated to outward existential acts. 
Hence, a notion of person was developed through a union of essential being and the 
concrete person, which attains its telos in deification. The question was posed 
whether the Greek Fathers had a concept of person in order to focus the rationale for 
the model argued herein by utilising the Cappadocian notion of hypostasis and 
evolving those ideas to include a stronger focus on ousia to indicate the essential 
reality of personhood. This was then integrated with the notion of deification, and 
again with a strong emphasis on the essential reality of being-ness or the immaterial 
stuff of being. The contemporary Eastern Orthodox models of person were examined 
giving special attention to Zizioulas in order to argue for a contrary model of person 
that includes the notion of essential being. Paradoxically, the Cappadocian notion of 
concrete particularity was utilised to incorporate ideas relating to deification which 
are achieved through the Christ hypostasis. However, the Cappadocian focus on the 
subject of existence as hypostasis manifested problems in that it seemed to predicate 
the metaphysical reality of being (Atman) to the subject or hypostasis. This was 
resolved by correlating the notion of deification within a material and immaterial 
(substantialist) context, which qualifies the Cappadocian use of hypostasis through the 
focus on the metaphysical essential reality as primary in being. rather than only the 
outer subject. 
But it seems that in the Cappadocian model, it is difficult to reconcile notions of the 
existential, or outer physis, and the interior physis. This problem was overcome by 
utilising Zizioulas' notion of relationality with a focus on a type of existence that 
reflects the highest level of being, which is be correlated to a Cid-a/manic mode of 
hypostatic existence. 294 This indicates a way of being not only within an existential 
context but also allows for an awareness of the essential reality of being (Atman). This 
294 Ad' 
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model will be further examined in the next two chapters. A model of person was 
affirmed in which the outer person is informed through the inner experience of 
deification which transforms both the inner and outer, leading to a true understanding 
of being. This could however, result in a model of person that is perceived as having 
Platonic overtones or as elitist, in only focusing on an experience which is had by the 
sacred few. Not so, as such a model was presented as the te/os for all human persons 
in a soteriological context, which could be understood either, personally, 
ecclesiologically or eschatologically. 
What was important was the stress on ousia in the hypostatic model in deification, or 
the stuff of being-ness, which allows a union of both the outer and inner, difference 
and unity, in the human person. Consequently, the notion of person constructed within 
this chapter would seem to veer to a model that has more in common with that of 
Augustine, Boethius and Duns Scotus, hence it may be asked, why were the Greek 
Fathers utilised at all? The answer to this is two-fold. Firstly, the Greek Patristic 
notion of deification needed to be incorporated in a model of person that stressed 
concrete and particular human existentiality, but also allowed the incorporation of 
ousia. Secondly, it was necessary to be demonstrate that the Cappadocian notion of 
hypostasis did not indicate a polemic against a concept of individual as argued by 
contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians but that the use of hypostasis itself lends 
to an evolution of ideas which must include ousia and deification. 
What has been extrapolated from the Greek Fathers is that a human individual or 
person is to be understood as a concrete and real person (hypostasis) and that a human 
person can become more than his or her natural physis in deification. This model does 
not reject the notion of the world, but values ordinary existence as an expression of 
the divine and I shall expand on this aspect of divine revelatory activity in the next 
chapter so a so as to create a bridge between the metaphysical notion of Alman and 
the concrete human person. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERSON IN PRATYABHIJNA 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will examines person in the Pratyabhijna tradition in relation to: a 
concept of individual; relationality; deified person as discussed in the Chapter 2; and 
in relation to re-cognition. Re-cognition will be considered through unity and the term 
Atman. 1 The notion ofpersonlhypostasis will be equated withpu11I,.\'a and evolved in 
such a way to include not only a sense of difference, but also unity. The relationship 
of Alman with pU11I$a (person). within the Pratyabhijna tradition, will also be placed 
in relation to consciousness or Cit. 2 which will qualify not only separation or 
difference, through the divine activity, but also Alman where Alman and 
consciousness will be intimately related to each other, The examination of person will 
thus be placed in relation to an experience of the unity-of-being. where unity will be 
qualified through unity-in-difference. This is fundamental to the development of a 
concrete notion of person. 
In both the Byzantine and Pratyabhijna traditions much of the theological rhetoric 
was directed to resolving the problem of reconciling God to the world, without 
diminishing the truth of either, and so the examination of person will be placed within 
this context. However, this leads to another important issue, that of how Pratyabhijiiii 
itself, understood the nature of the divine reality, what constitutes divine existence 
and the relationship of that existence to the human condition. While the Byzantine 
I The Alman is the metaphysical reality of everything: it is the principle that transcends the phenomenal 
universe yet immanent in the universe. K~emarlija stated that the Alman is "both immanent in the 
universe and transcends it", PBHs, p.68. K~emarlija qualifies a total non-dual stance by stating that 
while the followers of tantra believe the Alman to transcend the universe and the texts of the Kula to 
believe that Atman to be in the universe, the TrUw followers (including PratyabhijFlii) believe that the 
Alman is both transcendent and immanent (ibid.) 
2 Cit or Citi is the Universal consciousness, which as K~emarlija stated is "the form of the limited 
su~ject. descending from its stage of Cetana (universal consciousness) disposed to comprehending 
obJects ... becomes ciUa (individual consciousness)" PBH commentary on Sutra 5; translation by Singh, 
PBHs, pp.60-61. 
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tradition came to adopt an apophatic approach in relation to understanding the 
absolute God, highlighting the ontological difference between the human and divine 
conditions, Pratyabhijftii's approach focused on unity and consciousness and a 
singular "knowing subject". 3 One could know of God, not through mundane 
consciousness, but through an experience of an awareness of divine being through re-
cognition. It is through this experience that the individual comes to understand that 
the nature of everything, including one's own limited condition, is nothing other than 
the divine reality. This experience highlighted unity rather than difference, but also 
accepted the simultaneity of both. 
Due to the theistic implications in Pratyabhifftii, the human condition was recognised 
as not self-caused or self-contained but so completely related to the divine, that non-
difference is re-cognised as the ultimate ontological condition. When considering 
person, the starting point is not a focus of finite individuality or separation but from 
the perspective of unity, which has apparently been lost through false identification 
and has resulted in delusion. Consequently, both traditions tried to overcome the 
notion of separation in different ways, and it is through the overcoming of this notion 
of separation that an examination of person in Pratyabhijnii will be placed. 
Pratyabhijftii philosophy emphasised unity or non-difference to explain difference 
and was not concerned with ignorance, but an emphasis was paradoxically placed on 
difference as the Atmanic experience was not considered in isolation. Its monism was 
placed in relation to the world and thus a focus on the divine activity or Cit,4 also 
became important, where its monist position was qualified through the term Citi. 
Notions of separation and ignorance consequently became important aspects of 
Pratyabhijftii. This was due to an affirmation that separation and ignorance are not 
considered unreal, but states in which the higher truths come to be revealed and 
ultimately viewed as the divine itself. Within this qualifying of the mundane, Citi 
becomes the mediating activity by which revelation is made possible and by which 
'IPK, 2.64, p.26,; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.7.1, p.8t. 
4 Although Citi was, in Pratyabhiji'la. generally considered as an aspect or extrusive power emanating 
from the divine monist reality, (PBHs 3 and 4, pp55-.59) it was sometimes personalised as 'she', as the 
PBH states "by the power of her own will, she unfolds the universe as a screen (consciousness)" 
f<h.CO<Q1 ~ fct'dJj, .... sj'lC'l4f?t I, svecchayii svabhittau visvam unmilayali (translation by Singh, 
PBHs, 2, p.5t), where the power of God has this feminine aspect. This was common in the Tantric and 
Agamic traditions. 
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human persons attain unity with the divine consciousness. Pratyabhijnii equated the 
differing states of existing with the modes of existence or guIJas.5 Here the Byzantine 
notion of mode or tropos will be utilised and equated with the Pratyabhijnii use of the 
gUIJas, which highlight the importance of being in relation to a way of existing in 
relation to the unity of being. The model of tropos hyparxeos, taken from the 
Cappadocians and Maximus the Confessor and adapted by Zizioulas to indicate an 
existential outcome as shown in Chapter 1, will be qualified to show how the essential 
underlying reality relates to the existential character of a particular concrete 
individual. 6 The notion of modes of existing will be transferred to Pratyabhijnii 's 
model of re-cognition, and affirm the place of mundane existence as a mode within 
the context of the highest level of personal being as a mode of existing. The type of 
existence experienced within the spiritual condition will also be equated with a Cid-
iitmanic7 mode of hypostatic existence, or a mode of existence that relates to an 
Atmanic consciousness within the hypostasis, without negating the place of ordinary 
existence. 
3.1.1 What is Pratyabhijiia? 
What is Pratyabhijnii, what does it mean, where did this philosophy arise and how 
does that meaning relate to human personhood? The word Pratyabhijnii means re-
cognition,s the re-cognising of who one is, and the philosophy of Pratyabhijnii was 
5 Utpala stated in the IPK, 4.4, p. 71, that the "knowledge and action of a pati or enlightened master are 
aimed towards objects taken by him as his own, as well as his power to manifest the viewpoint of 
diversity and become respectively (the three gu~as) sativa rajas and tamas ofa bound being", 
f<I~'''I'(Ic)1II ~ Q('"4 ;ffl1i1 ~ ~ "ml J1FQI~~ (t ~ tflIT: ~ '(;;tfC"Ftl: II~ II, sviinga-rupe$u ~ ~ ~ 
bhiive$u patyur jiJiina", kriyiica yaJ mayii-trtiye te eva pasob sativa", rajas tama/:lll; translation by 
Pandit, IPKp, 4.4, p.194. 
6 This context in PratyabhijiJii is explored through such terms as purU$a. jiva. a~u, pasu, and nara, 
concerning purU$a see IPK, 2.19-20, p.44; concerningjiva, a~u see IPKp, p.168, but not directly 
mentioned in the text; concerning pasu see IPK, 3.7, p.61, and 4.4, p. 71; also see Sanderson, 'The 
poc~ri~e of the MalinTvijayottaratantra', p.297. 
ThIS IS taken from the IPK which argues that all manifestation and existence is due to ltman-
consciousness (cid-iitmam) which is responsible for the world "appearing diversely", IPK, 2.51, p.57; 
~ranslation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.19, p.149. 
PratyabhijiJii, Jaideva Singh defines as, "Prati + abhi + jfia = Pratyabhiji'lii ... though known, now 
appearing as forgotten through delusion 'Abhi' means facing i.e. close at hand. 'Jfia' means 
il.lu,:"ination or knowledge. So PratyabhijiJii means re-cognition of the real self' (PBHs, p.117. For a 
SImIlar definition see Tagare, The PratyabhijiJii Philosophy, p.46). See A Descriptive Analysis o/the 
Kashmir Series a/Texts and Studies, p.5.The word Pratyabhiji'lii according to Gopinath Kaviraj, 
"literally means a flash of light, - a revelation, is usually found in literature in the sense of wisdom 
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intimately related to an epistemological and ontological quest to uncover the truth of 
being. emerging out of the Trika Saivism of Kashmir in the ninth to twelfth-thirteenth 
centuries in Kashmir. 
Pratyabhijiiii refers to a self-recognition, to an experiential event where the person 
discovers who he or she is, by grasping the essential reality of being (or Atman); 
through knowledge or awareness that one's self is the true Self.9 Re-cognition thus 
infers Atma-Pratyabhijiiii (the re-cognition of Self) or Atma-jiiiina (knowledge of 
Self). 10 but the word also implies a remembering (smrti) ofthings and a knowledge of 
being already known by the true knower or true subject, as Utpala stated; 
A memory although risen out of the impression of a past experience, is 
essentially limited to its own self. It is therefore not the knower of that 
previous experience. II 
This is not mere memory but a flash, a throb (spanda)12 of an inward metaphysical 
reality (or Atman) within the individual puru$a. In this context two natures and 
cognitions are evident, that belonging to the lower natural physis and that of the 
higher in which true participation takes place. Hence, the whole philosophical system 
of Pratyabhijiiii can be understood to be dedicated to understanding how the highest 
spiritual experience relates to the concrete individual. While Pratyabhijnii viewed the 
notion of separated individual within a negative context through the terms purU$a. 
jiva. a1.1u, pasu. indicating a bound, limited ignorant and finite existence, the 
experience of re-cognition unites the mundane with the highest reality. To develop a 
notion of person in Pratyabhijiiii both the metaphysical and the concrete have to be 
characterised by an immediacy and freshness", see 'The Doctrine ofPratyabhijna in Indian 
Philosophy', Annals of the Bhandakar Oriental Research Institute. 5, 1921, pp.I-18, 133-132. 
Pratyabhijna is also stated as meaning "intuitive light" (see PBKt. 1.7.1, p.136). 
9 Abhinavagupta stated that: "Recognition means shining (JiJii-jiJiina) as facing oneself (iibhimukhyena) 
of what was forgotten ... not that the consciousness of the Self has never before been a fact of 
experience, because it always shines: but that...through His own power, it appears as though cut off, or 
limited. Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared once with what appears now", IPV.I.I 
(commentary); translation from Pandey IPVp, p.6. 
10 Pratyabhijna is not only a theological system and school but also is a philosophical term, see K. 
Mishra Kashmir Saivism (Delhi: 1999), p.80 and pp.253-6. 
11 D=i- tZ-::r fc!I . ~ f.!I . ~ 
'\"l\'1 '''''j f1 \:7I1i1 r'-J"'''''\"l~''': I "I1(1""1C4Ic-""I e (1 'I1<iI"jitCi e;Cfi""l.. II tb II, Satya", ki",tu smrti-
jiJiina", purviinubhava-sa",skrtebl jiitam apy iitma-ni$lha", tan niidyiinubhava-vedakamll. IPK, 1.17, fi7; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.3, p.27. 
The Spanda theory forms an integral part of Non-dual Kashmir Saivism, see Spanda Kiirikii (KSTS 
5). Also see: laideva Singh, Spanda Kiirikiis (Delhi: 1980); S. Mukhopadhyaya (ed.), Spandanirnyiiya 
by K$emariij (Delhi: 1986); Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, The Stanzas on Vibration (Varanasi: 1994). 
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considered within a unity of both. This is achieved through the construction of a 
model of purU$a (as an Alman-hypostasis) that considers personhood in terms of 
modes of existence that are informed by the essential reality of that existence, where 
the mode of that natural existence becomes transformed through divine participation 
within a Cid-iitmanic mode of hypostatic existence. In this context, relationality is not 
only to be considered in terms of intercommunicative hypostases. but through an 
essential reality that binds and informs hypostases of their true nature and mode of 
existence. The notion of hypostatic existing through modes of existence will also be 
correlated to types of awareness, that of the mundane consciousness (cilia) and that of 
the divine consciousness or Cit. 13 Within a concept of person, a unity of both is to be 
attained where the focus is ultimately the highest conscious experience of re-
cognition. which is related to the highest experience and knowledge of God. 14 
3.1.2 Did Pratyabhijfza have a Notion of Person? 
The question then has to be asked whether Pratyabhijnii had a notion of person in 
relation to a modern understanding. The answer to this question is probably no, but 
this does not negate the quest to relate Pratyabhijnii 's notion of individual to a person, 
developed through the termpuru$a. The notion of person will also be qualified 
through types of existing and consciousness, where the type of existence of person 
that a person experiences mirrors a type of consciousness that comes to define the 
individual. This approach to person will ultimately be considered as juxtaposed to 
unity. The concept of person will not be confined to a specific type of consciousness 
but will indicate that many levels of person are possible within personal existing, 
culminating in an Atmanic awareness. 
IJ I . h 
n uSlOg t e word Cit here, I am incorporating ideas relating to the whole of the PratyabhijFlii corpus 
and accepting the influences of Abhinavagupta and K~emariija on such tenns, considering in particular 
the influences of K~emariija on many of the Kashmir Saivite works. Sanderson has been critical of 
academic research that has not considered such nuances, see Sanderson's book review of Lillian 
Silburn's work Sivasutra et Vimarsini de K~emariija, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies. University of London 46/1 (1983), 160-161, bttp://alexissanderson.comlaboutus.aspx. 
14 Sanderson makes the point that such an experience of enlightenment in Saiva practise have not been 
related to liturgical and cultural nonns as, "for most will occur only at death" (see Sanderson, 'The 
Doctrine of the Miilinlvijayottaratantra', who cites Abhinavagupta' s Tantriiloka. 1.43). However in the 
IPK this is not what generally being expressed, but it points to an existential attainment while alive (see 
IPK.4). 
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The notion of individual in Pratyabhijiiii was situated within a complex philosophical 
system, which underlined non-duality and yet accepted the world as real, through a 
complex cosmological system of tattvas (principles). This places a notion of person, 
as the puru$a-tattva. 15 firmly within its system and allows person to be considered 
through its acceptance of concrete phenomena as manifestations (iibhiisas).16 
Through the puru$a-tattva. the notion of person, which has already been established 
as synonymous with hypostasis in chapter 2. will also be equated to the term puru$a. 
The term has been historically accepted as equated with person within Indian 
Christian approaches to personhood. 17 
PurU$a in Pratyabhijnii was an existential determination indicating the outward 
individual (fiva) and as such, inferred: limitation, egoistic 'I' (ahamkiira); finite-ness 
(alJwnara); and bound-ness (paswbeast).18 As such, puru$a. when understood as 
separate, finite individual and beast seemed to be used in a pejorative context, 
especially when considered in relation to Pratyabhijnii 's non-dual ideal, for it implied 
a sense of distinction or difference and thus separation rather than unity or non-
difference. This is exemplified in the word pasu. which denoted a bound animal. 
Utpala stated: those under "delusion and seeing objects as different from him is called 
a pasu or a bound being". 19 Abhinavagupta had also argued that the pasu has to be 
considered as a reflection of the Lord, stating that: just as "a pure and colourless 
crystal takes up the appearance of different types of hues reflected in it, so does the 
Lord also take up the different types of gods, human beings, animals, and plants".20 
However, Abhinavagupta overplays his non-dualism, which is not so much the case in 
Utpaladeva, who allowed for a concrete sense of person but which attains fullness in 
the context of the Absolute awareness who "feels like this 'I am He' ... all this is my 
own being".21 Utpala shows that the individual person is not negated but has a 
15 Implied in IPK, 3.9, p.62. 
16 
Utpala stated that the world's activities "whether pure or impure are experienced within the Lord, 
who shines, decorated by the manifestations of various different phenomena", 
~I1C"<1~~FtnSlRl~ fin:ltl ~ ~ ~ ~ae:l{ls~I""", ittam aty-artha-
hhinniirthiivabhiisa-khacite vibhaul samalo vimalo viipi vyavahiiro 'nubhiiyatell, IPK. 1.77, p.32; 
~~anslation b~ Pandit, IPKp, 1.7.14, p.92. 
As exemplified by Bede Griffiths, 'The Advaitic Experience and the Personal God in the Upanishads 
~d the Bhagavad Gita', Theological Studies 15/1 (1978), p.80, 
See IPK, 4.4, p.71. 
~: IPK, 3.14, p.64; translation from Pandit, IPK, 3.2.3, p.173. 
PSA, 6 (Pandit). 
21 IPK, 4.12; translation by Pandit, IPKp, p.201. 
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concrete sense of existence, where the pasu attains a higher condition through the 
divine and comes to understand a true reality. This higher condition is attained 
through the reception of grace or Saktipiita, which allows for a full sense of person to 
be developed Abhinavagupta stated that: 
Just as one's face appears clearly in a clean mirror, so does this A,tman shine as 
pure consciousness in a mind purified by the bestowal of grace (Saktipiita) of 
Lord Siva·22 
Hence the terms jfva. pasu and purU$a, while indicating a sense of isolation, do affirm 
what is existentially real and imply the same as a notion of person when viewed from 
an ontological perspective and so allow for a sense of person to be explored through 
these terms. However this notion of concrete existing, in Pratyabhijitii. was qualified 
through an experience of unity. This sense of unity in Pratyabhijitii. implied through 
the term pati (lord),23 can also be correlated to person because the di fferences between 
purU$a and pati do not imply ontological difference, but a change in consciousness. 
The word pati indicates that the pasu is transformed through a relationship with the 
divine and hence the term person can include ideas relating to both the terms purU$a 
and pati, where person indicates the whole human being. It is in this context of whole 
person that I argue, that Pratyabhijitii developed a model of human existing and being 
that can be equated to a concept of person. 
3.1.3 Person and Atman 
A concept of person, however, is not to be considered in the same way as in the 
Byzantine tradition, as highlighted in the previous chapters where the focus was on 
specificity, but has to be developed firstly by focusing on unity, which does not 
displace difference but rather qualifies it through the Atmanic experience. In 
Pratyabhijiiii models of existing were considered through the Atmanic reality, but this 
22 ~l ~(it{1t~ ~ ~ fcnnfc!t C1';C~~JOf..I1lrcnlf~\qIt1~~~  mfc!t~: 1I'l.1I, Adarse mala-
rahile yadvad vadana", vibhiili tadvadayaml Siva-saktipiita-vimale dhi-tattve bhiiti bhiirupab, PSA, 9 
(Pandit), p.24. 
H IPK, 3.14, p.64. 
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reality was not situated within a closed monist isolation, but in relation to the world 
through Cit. 24 Nevertheless PratyabhiJfiii argued that any models of individual 
(person) hinged on how one understands cognition in relation to specific existing, 
who is the true "knowing person",25 and this will be examined in part 3.6 ofthis 
chapter. Pratyabhiffiii argued that since the individual is completely dependent on 
some other reality, for plainly no human can cause themselves or another's existence 
or consciousness due to mere will: human existence and cognition is a condition of 
dependence26 and this dependency allows for a focus on the cause of existence. This 
distinction between dependency and non-dependency, non-etemality and etemality in 
Pratyabhiffiii is important, for it highlights the superiority of the one as compared to 
the other. If knowledge or consciousness were related to non-etemality then it would 
be correlated to an unconsciousness nature and as Utpala stated, if consciousness was 
"unconscious by nature, then how can it illumine anything".27 It could also be argued 
that the faculties of person such as buddhi,28 "bears in it the consciousness of the 
Alman".29 But this is refuted by Utpala, as such an outcome would necessitate that 
Alman would become sentient, that is bound to material nature, or be understood as 
insentient not having existence in itself, but in either case "it cannot illuminate 
anything".3o For both Alman and person to gain significance, the characteristics of 
each must be preserved, where the former brings meaning to the latter. 
Hence, the focus on cause is not from a position of ignorance but of knowledge, for 
while certain knowledge of the body and other bodily existences may allow "a means 
to infer the existence of knowing,,31 this knowing is conditional, where "the real 
significance of the Selfis not usually grasped because of delusion (moha)".32 The 
divine Cause is continually illuminating through its divine powers to raise or restore 
the consciousness through re-cognition33 and it is in this context that a notion of 
person will be sought through the Atmanic experience. 
24 PBH, I. 
~: IPK. 1.5, p.3; translation by Pandit, [PKp, 1.1.5, p.ll . 
• IPK, 1.4-5, p.2-3. 
27 P . 
2M I K. 1.12, p.5; translatIOn by Pandit, [PKp, 1.2.7, p.20. 
[PK. 1.13, p.6. 
:: [P!<. 1.13, p.6; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.8, p.21. 
IbId. 
:~ IPK. 1.5, p.3; translat~on by Pandit, [PKp, 1.1.5, p.ll. 
n IP!<. 1.3, p.2; translatIOn by Pandit, [PKp, 1.1.3, p.9 . 
. IbId. 
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This experience is possible because of two factors, firstly because of the Atmanic 
reality within each person, and secondly because of the ability to cognise such an 
experience within the human condition, which is due to the activity of the divine 
consciousness or Cit. Without consciousness, the Atman would be a "useless lump,,34 
of immaterial substance having no connection with material phenomena and 
generating a gnostic outcome. So it could be argued that through person the 
significance of Alman is really appreciated in the conscious awareness to perceive 
such a reality within the human condition, which reflects how the Atmanic reality 
experiences consciousness as an out flowing of divine will and purpose. The activity 
of Cit allows consciousness to be considered as an outward movement of the divine, 
where the rational element within the human person mirrors equivalent dynamics 
within the divine. This rational element will be equated with the soul within a 
substantialist model through Atman. 
The focus on rationality shows that material existence reflects types of consciousness 
that become aware of a harmony of individual existence through a unity with the 
Atmanic nature. The highest mode of person expresses a freedom to be, not only in an 
existential context but in relation to the essential nature not dominated by the natural 
physis or the bound nature. A defence of this model will be provided by emphasising 
the Christ model as an example, where the hypostatic union of natures, as already 
examined in chapters 2A and 2B, shows how in divine unity. the lower natures are 
transformed through the higher within the human person. The Christ model 
emphasises the importance of considering three points in relation to person; firstly 
that there is possible within the existential person both unity and yet distinctiveness; 
secondly, unity in the higher nature does not detract from a complete union with the 
lower; and lastly the unity of the lower nature with the higher infers a simultaneity of 
a higher awareness within the lower. 
Within the human person the unity of consciousness can be considered as expressing 
an awareness of the essential reality of being. or Atman through the faculties of the 
individual. Although the Atman can be experienced through these faculties, the 
14 Also as Pandit argues, IPKp, p 18. 
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faculties are not to be viewed as the Alman, as discussed above; otherwise Alman 
becomes reduced to thing of nature. There is a continual stress on the concept of doer, 
Who is the real doer, and dependency. Hence, through the perception of the divine, 
through the faculties of perception, the Alman is eventually understood to be the very 
subject of existence and a substratum of person. This allows a unifying condition, 
through those faculties, to be expressed and thus intimately related to a process of 
transformation, where the faculties change and are transformed within that process. 
The faculties of person can be equated with the mind (manas), intellect (buddhi) and 
the senses of perception (jiiiinendriyas) in Pratyabhijiiii. 35 and to the laltvas of 
manifestation as will be shown in Chapter 3.4.1. The faculties of a person can also be 
related, within the highest sense, to the highest part of the soul or Alman. While the 
highest spiritual nature, in the human condition, can be correlated to the Alman. in the 
context of the divine, it shall also be correlated to a Paramiilmanic nature. Thus an 
ontological distinction will be made between the divine ousia or Paramiilman and the 
essential reality or Almanic nature of human beings. The latter will be recognised as 
different according to the measure and awareness of the former, but allowing for 
participation according to the sluff of being. 
Even though such an ontological distinction is not immediately obvious in 
Pralyabhijiiii philosophy, such distinctions between the Supreme and the human can 
be discerned in Pratyabhijiiii's laltvic categorisations and the differing experiences of 
the pramiitrs (cognitive subjects) according to their experiences.36 In other words, the 
relationship ofthe Alman to the cognitive subject is re-cognised as being the same as 
the divine but in addition there is some level of difference in that the "highest Siva,,)7 
'~A . fi 
s 10 erred in IPKp, pp.167-170; see also Tagare, The Pratyabhijila Philosophy. (Delhi: 2002), 
ff'2~-3.2. 
This IS evident in K~emaraja's commentary of PBH where he describes the levels of experiences of 
pramalas in relation to 'I am' (aham), 'that' (tal) and 'this' (idam), which shall be examined also later; 
~e also PBHs, pp.52-53. 
~ee PBHs, p.55. Also Abhinavagupta in his Vimarsini of the IPK. the IPV, 4.7, which states that 
while the "pati is identical to Tsvara ... there can possibly be no talk of object in relation to the Highest 
Lord, Pru:am~iva", trans~ation by Pandey.IPVp, p.224. Though this is stated in the context of pure 
non-dualism, It also provides a distinction between the Absolute and human conditions. 
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is differentiated38 in the tattvic manifestations. Such distinctions are also apparent in 
the theistic devotional salutation to Mahesvara by Utpala39 stating that: 
having somehow attained the position of a servant of the Great Lord 
Mahesvara, and now being desirest to do good to other people as well, I am 
presently expounding the doctrine of His recognition. 
This devotional context of some measure of ontological difference is highlighted by 
Pandit's translation, where the tenn MaheSvara is understood as "the great Almighty 
Lord".40 While there is this sense of difference, which is highlighted through the 
tattvic manifestations. the phenomenal universe is ultimately related to the divine as 
the "different states of the Lord Siva in His universal aspect" (paramiitmanab 
.. ~ambho/:l). 41 
The nature of the divine Godhead as distinguished as a Supreme condition is 
exemplified in that it was correlated to the Brahman. This reality was for 
Abhinavagupta the transcendental unmoving reality beyond everything, which reveals 
itself through its Sakli. 42 However the lines between this non-different reality and 
difference, of the nature of Atmanic will and activity in relation to the human 
condition are often blurred. While sometimes the Alman is equated with the divine 
condition, and indicated an unchanging reality,43 it also seemed to be conditioned 
through the human context for the difference between awareness of the higher Self 
and cognition in the individual self is not that apparent, otherwise Utpala would not 
have dedicated so much time in the first chapter of !svarapratyabhi.inii to highlight 
this difference. This is not evident in words that indicate the divine, such as 
MaheSvara.44 This tenn (Mahesvara) implies a condition that can be correlated to 
ideas that relate to a notion of God, which also stand independent and outside of the 
human reality as its Cause. Tenns such as Mahe.svara and Paramasiva come to 
indicate points of encounters of divine and the world, as Abhinavagupta stated: 
1M The power of differentiation as a manifestation of the Lord to create difference was called Apohana 
~akl; in Abhinavagupta's IPV, 1.4; IPVp, p.40. 
40 IPK, 1.1-2, p.l; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1. \.I, p.5. 
Ibid. 
:: Which will be correlated to the Absolute God (Paramasiva), PSA, 26 (Pandit), p.37. 
- PSA, p.43. 
H 
The IPK stated that the Atman "does not change at all during its different functional activities", 1.11, 
p,;5; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.6, p.19. 
See IPK 1.1, p.l. 
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Sometimes the Lord may Himself unbound and reveal His real nature by 
means of yoga that illumines the infinite luxury of one's self-knowledge. 
Paramasiva, the Absolute God, plays thus His wonderful game of bondage and 
liberation.45 
These points of encounter are made possible because the human nature shares a 
pattern similar to the divine, which becomes the real nature of humans and is 
indicated through the term Alman. It is through the encounter with the divine that 
persons come to experience their true nature and understand the true condition of 
person. 
3.1.4 Person as a Point of Revelation and Encounter 
In Pratyabhijiiii, through an encounter with the divine within the individual, an 
ensuing change of consciousness takes place in re-cognition,46 where revelation and 
individual consciousness meet. Through this meeting a restoration takes place where 
human awareness recognises that it is the Lord that has appeared "as one's finite 
Self',47 within a "renewed understanding", which is called pratyabhijnii or "the 
recognition of the divine nature as the Self,.48 This allows for a change in the 
understanding of individual through that encounter as person. This flexibility in the 
notion of person allows for a change of what it means to be a person. But the notion 
of divine revelation was not confined to an inner experience but considered in terms 
of an outer revelation where divine scripture was given to humanity and in this sense 
the singular experience is expanded to include all humanity, to all persons, which is 
exemplified in the Siva Sillras being revealed to Vasugupta on a rock.49 Also Utpala 
stated that the !svarapratyabhijiiii was composed "for the purpose that people attain 
perfection". 50 
45 ~--m;r -fcnrcr-am:r.r-4Mi1~ h~"'1 \:111 fJi 1ti1 11..1 $fc!t irrtT -~-fmlt strr!t \4C1~ffi ~: II ~ ~ II, 
Sva-Jniina-vibhava-bhiisana-yogenodve~/ayennijiilmanami iii bhanda-mok$a-cilraffl kri(iam pralanoli 
~aramaJivah PSA. 33 (Pandit), p.40. 
See IPKp, p.133. 
47 Ibid. 
4H Ibid. 
49 A h . 
50 S S own In Chapter 1.4.4 
IPK, 4.18, p.74; translation by Pandit, IPKp, p.207 
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While in the Byzantine tradition, this encounter with the divine was expressed 
through a downward movement from the divine to the world, where participation with 
God was afforded through grace, which allowed an ascent to the divine, in 
Pratyabhijiiii there is no real movement but a perceived movement in that the human 
person is viewed as nothing other than the highest reality. This perception of 
movement also reflects shifts of awareness in the divine within the transcendent being 
and is considered in terms of fluctuations of consciousness, from the pure' I Am' to 'I 
am this' and then 'I Am that',51 to allow the appearance of manifestation through the 
tattvas or principles, which shall be examined in part 4 of this chapter. 
These perceived movements of consciousness reflected the will of the divine to create 
manifested phenomena and thus individual persons. But this creativity also allowed a 
reciprocal movement where human persons through the power of cognition come to 
understand their true nature and in this experience the notion of isolated individual 
comes to be understood through the term person or puru$a within a relational context. 
The different levels of cognition, of 'I see' allows awareness and knowledge to be 
become related to the subject of perception. But what is the subject of perception? In 
Pratyabhijiiii it is the Self that is the true Subject of cognition, which allows for all 
types of knowing and not negating those differing perceptions. Utpala stated that the 
many cognitions, although "arising at different times, do have mutual unity ... unity is 
actually the single subject (the Self), shining as both 'this' and 'that"'.S2 Hence, 
phenomena are not self caused but it is the divine that manifests subjects, the relative 
finite individuals, and objects. This allows for the awareness • I am' a limited person 
and 'this is' the world and also a united field of consciousness. where both 
perceptions come to be understood as having as their cause the divine awareness. This 
divine awareness allows for a sense of person in a limited and expanded context. 
The personal is not negated but finds meaning through the higher awareness. 
The implications of the relationship of the divine with human persons, allows the non-
dualism of Pratyabhijiiii to be viewed as qualified through the light of consciousness 
II 
I' IPK, 3.1·30, pp.59-68. 
·IPK, 1.26, p.ll; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.3, p.40. 
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(prakiisa).53 In this context of the activity of prakiisa the notion of individual attains 
meaning through this activity or perceived movement from the transcendent God to 
the world. The world is not viewed "from below", 54 where the lower nature can never 
understand its true reality, but is understoodfrom above, from the highest viewpoint 
or consciousness or Citi which is the cause (hetu)55 of the world. As Abhinavagupta 
argued, all phenomena including individual finite beings are "none other than Lord 
Siva Himself, having taken up such a form of the bounded being".56 
When considering the implications of the Pratyabhijnii understanding of divine 
revelation and activity, the notion of person has to be considered through both a sense 
of difference, or an awareness of concrete mundane reality, and non-difference or an 
awareness of the highest reality. The awareness of a higher reality experienced 
through mundane consciousness allows an apparent movement from citta (the 
mundane mind) to Cit (supreme consciousness), from the deluded cognitive subject 
(miiylipramlitr)57 to the personal God (Mahiipramlitr). This indicates not only a 
change or shift of consciousness and thus a shift in how the terms are to be considered 
but a reciprocation, which allows the human person (hypostasis/puru,\'a) to be 
considered within the context ofrelationality. Within this relationality a person can 
said to exist within a mode that experiences its own sense of difference, within the 
hypostasis/ purU$a. while at the same time re-cognising non-difference through the 
experience of unity with the divine nature, or essential reality, within the human 
person. 
Thus a notion of person will be approached by incorporating aspects of difference, 
through the terms hypostasis/ purU$a. in relation to the highest reality, or non-
di fference. which will lead to the construction of a single model of person, the A tman-
hypostasis to be examined in Chapter 4. This single model will adapt a notion of 
concrete existence (or hypostasis), to consider person through relationality as a mode 
~J PSA, p.30. 
54 The distinction of what is below as compared to that which is above has already been discussed in 
Chapter I of this thesis; see also Lipner, The Face of Truth, pp. 44-45. 
55 S K . , 
56 ee ~emaraJa s commentary of Sutra I of PBH. 
PSA, 5 (Pandit), p.22. 
57 
As the PBH, Sutra 6, stated that the "mayapramata consists of it (citta)", ~ "'1 F41 SI"'1I(11 I; 
translation by Singh, PBHs, p.62. 
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of existence, that explains how re-cognition or the deification experience relates to the 
transformation of the natural physis and to a model of whole person. 
3.2 Philosophical Background 
While the model of person developed in this chapter (through Pratyabhijflii), accepts 
a notion of concrete personhood, qualified through the essential reality of being (or 
Alman), it is also accepts that Pratyabhijnii philosophy is ultimately non-dual. But 
this stance is in itself qualified in that it accepts both the Atmanic reality and the world 
as the "Highest Real, (Le. Siva)",58 where that-ness (tat) of manifestation (the world) 
is accepted as rea1.59 The tension between the metaphysical reality (Atman) and what 
is real, in Pratyabhijnii. related to the philosophical tension between non-dualistic and 
dualistic influences respectively. 
Although the philosophy of Pratyabhijflii is thought to be predominantly non-dual, 
especially in the works of Abhinavagupta, exemplified in the VimarsinT of Utpala's 
Uvarapratyabhijfliikiirikii, it is also considered dualistic terms as having relational 
elements.6o This dualism was exemplified in its inclusion of the Trika Siistra. or the 
"threefold science",61 where the resurgent Trika. having its roots in the older 
Tryambaka School, put an emphasis on triadic (thus dualistic) archetypes, concepts 
and iconography. From this triadism the term Trika62 evolved, which was religious 
and philosophical in character, developing constructs of parii (supreme), aparii 
(lowest) and pariiparii (combination of highest and lowest), and which related to 
deities and also to philosophical divisions.63 This followed the schema of the 
Miilinivijayottaratantra. which developed into the theological distinctions of; non-
dualism; the world (indicating dualism); and revelation or the qualifying dualism in 
~K See PBHs, p.61. 
59 
See also Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies. p.2. 
60 As highlighted in Pratyabhijifii's philosophy of dependency, where phenomena are dependent on 
Alman, and come to be realised as Alman. see IPK, 1.7, p.5. This relationality is not a relationality 
wi~hin difference or of mutual relational entities but relationality that is ultimately expressed through 
unity or non-difference 
61 S . 
62 ee A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, p.1. 
61 Peter David Lawrence, Rediscovering God wilhin Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999), p.29. 
See Sanderson, 'Saivism and the Tantric Traditions', p.673; and Lakshmanjoo, Kashmir Shaivism, 
p.129. 
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unity. The term itself, Trilw, indicating three-ness, can hardly said to have come from 
a monist imperative, and must therefore have had ancient roots that pre-date the later 
pure monism with which it is usually associated. 
Thus, the new Trika philosophically reflected Agamic influences64 in its incorporation 
of a qualified monism which continued the divisions extant in 
MiilinTvijayottaratantra. of the three classes pertaining to Siva. Rudra and Bhairava. 65 
This also reflected a conceptual three-fold division of duality (bheda), duality-unity 
(bhediibheda) and non-dual monism (abheda).66 Trika established triadic conceptual 
models and even the ontological triadism of, God, activities and the world. In Trika or 
Trika-siisana, Trika-Siistra. or Rahasya-Sampradiiya67 (secret lineage) philosophical 
approaches were expressed to suit certain philosophical or theological problems and 
established a basis and methodology of revelation, philosophy and faith through 
triadic (and thus dualistic) archetypes, which the new Trika used within a non-dual 
context. 
The triadism of rrika was also reflected in triadic methods of praxis (upiiyas), 
evidenced in K~emaraja's VimadinT ofthe l~iva Sutra of: Siimbhavopiiya (way of the 
divine); l~aktopiiya (energetic way); and A~avopiiya (way of the individual).68 So even 
in the non-dual text of the Siva Sutra. in K~emaraja' s VimarsinT. dualistic teachings 
are evident. This teaching emphasised spiritual practice and thus echoed the teachings 
of MiilinTvijayottaratantra. But as Abhinavagupta argued, there cannot be total duality 
due to the monist nature of the Absolute, and neither can there be non-duality due to 
duality, but rather both shine in effulgent consciousness, the Cidrupa of the Lord.69 
64 Ibid. However these influences are shown by Abhinavagupta to relate to non-dualism stating, "non-
~5uality is based upon the authority of Agama" IPVp. p.186. 
MT.p.vii. 
(,6 Ibid. and Chatterji. Kashmir Saivism, pp.8-9; see also Hanneder, Abhinavagupta 's Philosophy 0/ 
Revelation, p.193. 
67 Chattel]' i, Kashmir Saivism p.3 6H • • 
SSVs. pp.\, 82, 126 and Pandit. The Trika Saivism o/Kashmir. The qualifying of non-dualism is 
extant in the influences of the Siva Sutra in the new Trilw schema, in the inclusion of the iiIJavopaya in 
K!iemarlija's VimarsinT, SSVs, pp.126-127. This reflects the acceptance of the concept of individual self 
or a!lU. which has ciUa or human consciousness and buddhi (intellect), manas (mind). and ('1-
ness'). but which in truth is Cit. 
69 IPV. 2.4.20-21. 
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3.2.1. The Contemporary Debate 
The tension between dualism and non-dualism in Kashmir Saivism has raised 
consequent problems in contemporary scholastic interpretation, as highlighted by 
Alexis Sanderson.7o The dualistic tendencies in Kashmir Saivism, as Sanderson 
argues,71 have been ignored in contemporary interpretations and have consequently 
led to non-dualistic approaches. This has also led to interpreting human individuality 
through pure Advaitic models.72 Pratyabhijiiii, not with-standing the non-dualistic 
influences of Abhinavagupta who as Sanderson shows superimposed his ideas onto 
the Miilinivijayottaratantra, 73 expresses dualistic notions through the admittance of 
manifested tattvas. The Miilinlvijayottaratantra74 was simply for Abhinavagupta, as 
Sanderson states, the "core-text of the Trika Tantras ... embodying the very essence of 
the non-dualistic tradition".75 However, as Sanderson demonstrates, the 
Miilinivijayottaralantra was also dualistic,76 which points to the dualistic influences 
on the new Trilro 77 and exemplified in Pratyabhijiiii. 78 
Hence, these influences have to be considered when constructing a model of person in 
Pratyabhijiiii. While the Miilinlvijayotlaralanlra had clear dualistic implications in its 
philosophy, its conclusions were ultimately non-dualistic in accepting .~iva to be the 
ultimate monist reality/9 which allows the incorporation of ideas of difference within 
non-difference in a concept of person (puru$a). This paradoxical model was continued 
in the Siva Sutra and in the later resurgent Pratyabhiji'lii, which was a theistically non-
dualistic polemical text composed to refute dualism and other "erroneous' 
70 See Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MIUinTvijayottaratantra'. See also JUrgen Hanneder, 
Ahhinavagupta's Philosophy of Revelation. MiilinWokaviirttika I. /-399 ~Groningen: 1998) who 
shows that it was far from clear whether the resurgent Trika of the 8th - 1 t centuries was non-dualistic 
in that, and he cites Somllnanda who in the third chapter of his Sivadr$li seems to condemn pure non-
dualists (ibid. p.5, footnote 9). 
7\ Ibid. 
72 As exemplified by Kamalakar Mishra, Kashmir Saivism (Delhi: 1999). 
13 
Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlllinTvijayottaratantra', p.306. 
74 Sanderson clearly makes a connection between the dualism of the MTand the impact upon the Trika 
tradition including Pratyabhijnii, see 'The Doctrine of the MlllinTvijayottaratantra', p.282, footnote 7; 
also see Koshalya Walli, A Peep into the Tantriiloka and Our Cultural Heritage (Delhi: 1998). 
7~ S 
anderson, 'The Doctrine of the MiUinTvijayottaratantra', p.282. 
76 Ibid., p.293. see also Hanneder, Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Revelation. pp.5. 89, 172. where 
Hanneder states that MT shared the "basic dualism of many other Agamas" (Ibid. p.I72). 
77 I will refer to the resurgent Trika of the 8th_to I t h centuries as the new Trika. 
7M Th' 
79 IS can also be corroborated by Hanneder, see Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Revelation. p.5. 
See Madhusudan Kaul's introduction of MT. in MTpp.i-xxxvi. 
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doctrines".8o Despite this, Sanderson shows that dualistic influences of the 
Mfllinlvijayottaratantra were apparent in Abhinavagupta's work and thus in the 
resurgent Trika. This refutes the claim that the new Trika was completely non-
dualistic. Sanderson concludes that non-dualism has thus been superimposed upon 
Kashmir Saivism,81 or Tri/w, but both Siva Sutra and Pratyabhijnfl were clearly non-
dual. What has to be concluded is that the new Trika. as exemplified in Pratyabhijnfl. 
represented a stronger emphasis on non-dual interpretation than the older Trika. 82 
Because of the theological implications to personhood pertaining to the non-dualism 
of the resurgent Trika. in the context of the older dualistic systems,83 the need to refer 
to the resurgent Trika as new is underlined, for where did this new non-dualism arise? 
The answer is that the new Trika was not as non-dualistic as it first seems and that the 
older dualism was not as dualistic as Sanderson maintains. Conversely, although 
Chatterj i dates the Trika-sasana to the eighth or ninth centuries in Kashmir, 114 
confusing the older dualistic Trika with the new monist Trika to underline the non-
dual association, he also admits that Sivflgama on which Trika is based is far older, liS 
which was more dualistic. But he never explains how this new non-dualism sits 
within the older dualistic corpus. 
KO Chatterji, Kashmir L~aivism, p.ll; and Pandit, lPKp. p.xxiii. 
K: Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra'. 
K. Sanderson argues that consequently there were three phases to Trika, the "cult of the three 
goddesses" (see Sanderson, 'Saivism and the Tantric Traditions', p.696) the 'Koli' phase and then the 
philosophical phase of the "Pratyabhijno·based Trika of Abhinavagupta" (ibid.). This last phase also 
had various developments. that of the Siva Sutra; the Pratyabhijno non-dualism of Soma nand a and 
Utpala; and then the Trika of Abhinavagupta (ibid., pp.694·696). The last phase did not negate 
dualistic praxis and ritual, but clearly had at its core the theological belief that the ultimate reality, 
though expressed as a theistic personal pramotr (Siva), was non-dual. Tthis is evident in the MT where 
in the categorisation of the pramotrs. the highest is Siva who is undifferentiated (see MT, p.xxiii) and in 
IPK where this idea is extant. 
Kl See Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra'. 
~ Chatterji. Kashmir Saivism, pp.3-5. 
I Ibid., p.5. When trying to clarify ideas within the two different types of Trikas in relation to a model 
of person, what has to be considered relevant are the influences on both types of Trika and the 
consequent philosophical stress. Both Trikas drew from Agama and Tantra. see Flood, 'Shared 
Realities and Symbolic Forms in Kashmir Saivism', p.226. But as Flood shows, the non-dual focus 
becomes underlined in the "Trika theologians" (see Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, p.168) such as 
Abhinavagupta and K~emarlija. He clearly links the Trika to what I call the new Trika schema and yet 
also he highlights that Trika.is a generalistic term that indicated a philosophical ideal, and the "ritual 
sys.tem or basis of Kashmir Saivism" (ibid., p.167) the former being non-dual and the later dualistic. 
ThiS contradictory position was also emphasised by B. N. Pandit who argued that the philosophy of 
Somlinanda was both monist and theistic, where the 'Lord' has a "theistic nature" and "transcendental 
unity", see B. N. Pandit. A History of Kashmir Saivism (Srinagar: 1990), p.31. 
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Hence, Trika seems to have evolved, emerging out of the landscape of dualistic 
Saivism. 86 and the philosophy-theology also has evolved, gaining a non-dual emphasis 
especially in relation to Abhinavagupta and his superimposing a non-dual stress on to 
Miilinfvijayottaratantra. 87 Hence there are not only two notions of Trika but various 
philosophical models being applied simultaneously. While one could refer to a 
collective tradition, as Singh does under the umbrella of Trika. 88 where a synthesis of 
all systems is developed,89 the philosophical landscape is made clearer if a new 
schema is offered, that of a new Trika. This is also supported by the evidence given 
by Mark Dyczkowski, who informs us that the form of Trika learnt by Abhinavagupta 
did not even originate in Kashmir,90 so it is not even clear if Trika can be stated as 
being exclusively Kashmiri. Dyczkowski also argues that the landscape of Tantric 
literature had another dimension in which the Kula and Krama schools played an 
important part.91 In Dyczkowski's in-depth study, he highlights that the lines between 
each school were blurred, and in many instances Trika. Kula and Krama, though 
remaining distinct, shared "common roots". 92 Abhinavagupta also seemed to have 
brought these systems together within a collective basket in a unifying and 
encompassing system. 
Consequently, the new TrUw schema can be understood conceptually as a monist-
cum-theistic doctrine in the post Siva Sutra age that applies to the doctrines put 
forward by the new rrika theologians, but which utilised dualistic ideas from the 
older Trika. The re-introduced form of Pratyabhijiiii from the resurgent new rrika of 
the eighth to eleventh-twelfth centuries, developed within this sphere of many 
influences including that of the Siva Sulra which along with Spanda. form a part of 
the new rrika doctrine, as Lakshmanjoo argued, thus forming "one thought", which 
was non-dual. 93 While Sanderson does not accept this, in that for him the older Trika 
was not completely non-dual. 94 he does agree that the resurgent Trika. culminating in 
K6 Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism, p.13. 
M7 See Gavin Flood, 'Shared Realities and Symbolic Forms in Kashmir Saivism', Numen. 36/2 (1989), 
rr-225-247; and Vasudeva, The Yoga of the Miilinivijayottaratantra, p.xi. 
See SSVs, p.Xy. 
: As argued in the A Descrip.tive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Text and Studies, p.I, 
see Mark ~.G. Dyczkowskl, The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices 
of Kashmir Saivism (NY: 1987), p.12. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
~ See Lakshm~njoo, Kashmir Shaivism, p.129. 
Sanderson, 'Saivism and the Tantric Traditions', p.703. 
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Abhinavagupta and K~emaraja, was essentially non-dualistic. 95 The vast majority of 
scholars 96 argue that the resurgent non-dualism was not to be considered in isolation 
but as a continuation of the non-dualism inherent in Trika. and therefore it would be 
incongruent to refer to different types of Trika. Moti Lal Pandit also states that the 
"Trika Saivism of Kashmir, whose philosophic content and orientation is 
characterised by a non-dualistic mode of thinking, and has its basic source in such 
primary revelatory texts that are known as the Agamas or Tantras".97 This echoes the 
views ofChatterji, who stated that Trika was a system that was idealistically monist,98 
but this is not the full consensus for example J. Rudrappa had stated that in the 
resurgent Trika (Pratyabhijiiii), there was a "synthesis of monist and dualistic 
approaches".99 
3.2.2. Double Cognition 
Consequently, the experience of the non-dual state of re-cognition can be said to 
qualify the apparent dualism of the new Trika, where the human dualistic 
consciousness was corrected within the experience of re-cognition. This evidenced a 
development ofa double cognition schema, one of the divine and another of the 
mundane, where "several cognitions although arising at different times, do have 
mutual unity". 100 Through unity, true self-awareness arises, which is not the result of 
an impersonal force or due to a natural consciousness or physis. in Pratyahhijiiii is 
seen as "impure")O) and cannot reveal the truth. The distinction between what is pure 
and that which is impure reveals differing levels of cognitions, or a double cognition, 
~ ~ Sanderson, 'The Doctrine of the MlilinTvijayottaratantra' , pp.281-309; and '~aivism and the Tantric 
Traditions', p.695. 
'16 
For examples see: J. C. Chatterji. Kashmir Saivism. Delhi: 1914,2004; J. Rudrappa, Kashmir .~aivism. Mysore: 1969; Jaideva Singh, SSVs. p.xv; P. E. Muller-Ortega, The Triadic Heart of.~iva. 
Delhi: 1989; B. N. Pandit, A History of Kashmir Saivism; Kamalakar Mishra, Kashmir Saivism. Delhi: 
1999; Moti Lal Pandit, The TrikaSaivism ofKasmir. New Delhi: 2003. 
97 Moti Lal Pandit, The Trika Saivism of Kashmir, p.ix. 
: J. C. Chatterji Kashmir,Saivism, p.4. 
J. Rudrappa, Kashmir Saivism, p.9. 
100 • 
101 IPK, 1.26, p.ll; translatton by Pandit, IPKp. 1.4.3, p.40. 
See IPK. 1.77, p.32; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.7.14. p.92. 
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one of purity and another of impurity in relation to phenomenal existence 102 As 
Utpala stated that: 
Phenomenon, in such a state (of vidyii), seem imperfect and inferior because 
they appear a non-Self (non-Atman). These are at the same time perfect and 
superior by virtue of their being invested with I-Consciousness. Such a state of 
vidya is thus superior and perfect, on one hand, and inferior and imperfect on 
the other hand since it is a state of unity in diversity, indicating both purity and 
impurity. 103 
The condition of many levels of perception and cognition is reflected in the 
acceptance of many levels of knowledge, where the double cognition schema of 
Pratyabhijfiii can be viewed as an epistemological basis by which to approach person. 
It is because mundane knowledge, though revealing some aspects of truth, cannot 
reveal the whole truth. Hence, another awareness apart from the mundane becomes 
observable as acting upon ordinary consciousness. This higher cognition reflects a 
higher willing and acting in person through a unity, which also represents a single 
cognition in a completed context. Only in the highest condition of Siva there is total 
perfection, but due to the relationship of the divine will (icchii) and activity (Sakli) the 
individual comes to ultimately realise that one's selfis non-different to the divine Sell 
While initially a double cognition is apparent and is expressed in the difference 
between the willing and activity between divine and human conditions, these 
cognitive differences are overcome through unity in the divine Self. This distinction is 
also apparent in the outward cognition of manifested phenomena as Utpala stated: 
It is thus established that two types of phenomena, the relative finite subject 
and the object, appear within one basic subject while considering: 'This is' 
and 'this is being seen by me' or 'that was' and 'that was seen by me' .104 
Through the awareness of' I am' in relation to 'this is' , the finite subject comes to 
reflect a way of cognising and being of the divine who manifests diversity through his 
10' 
- As Utpala stated that the activities of the world which reflect differing levels of cognition, "whether 
pure or impure, are experienced within the Lord" (ibid.). 
101 • ~ 
,jj'llq·tc"CI 3'Mliiic"JOi Iii ~I q«(1IEirti41't.31t;1("q«IQ«Mrr ~ ~ II" II, atriiparatva", bhiiviiniim 
aniitmatvena bhiisaniit/ paratiihantayiicciidiit pariipara-dasa hisiill, IPK, 3.5, p.60; translation by 
Pandit,IPKp, 3.1.5, p.161. 
104 c=rrmrr n~ met If $C"4 I JtflfC"4'ftt I ~ mcrr "IJOiI(1~ 1I3t II, tan mayii 
dr.iyate dmo 'yam sa ity iimrsaty api/ griiha griihakatii bhinniiv arthau bhiitaf/ pramatiirill, IPK, ).3), 
p.13; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.8, p.46. 
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own subjective reality. While the cognition 'this is', seems to affirm objectivity and 
thus the separation of individual subjects, it actually reflects a cognitive ability to 
experience 'I-ness', which later comes to be realised as conditional to the divine'!'. 
It is in this understanding that the term person is placed, within the context of divine 
movement (or revelation) to the world and how this movement is understood and then 
correlated to reciprocation and unity, through the experience of re-cognition. The 
external objects or manifestation (iibhiisa), through '"appearing in one's 
perception",105 come to be re-cognised as part of the divine activity firstly through 
mundane perception, through the'!, condition and secondly in re-cognition. In re-
cognition the pure 'I' replaces the impure'!' and as such person attains the fullest 
mystical condition and the vision of God (Siva-dr$!i) 106 within a concrete existential 
context. 
Consequently, in Pratyabhijiiii it can be stated that two types of knowing were 
developed, the ordinary knowledge (vidyii), and jiiiina or a deeper level of knowledge 
and consciousness which qualifies the natural physis. The lower natural physis is not 
capable of self-revelation (through its own nature) but is understood through a 
modified form of knowing in which the individual comes to slowly understand a 
higher experience through the Vidyii-Sakti l07 of the Lord through the Lord's power of 
differentiation or apohana-sakti. 108 In other words, through the Lord's power creation 
understands itself as different but comes to the divine through modified forms of 
difference in a movement from miiyii (illusion indicating delusion) to vidyii 
(knowledge), and then to pure knowledgejiiiina and '"pure consciousness".IO'J There 
are not many ontological types of persons, but depending on different types of 
knowing, the modes or types of existence change according to a specific experience or 
a specific level of consciousness or knowing. The varying forms of differentiation in 
I~~ IPK. 1.32. p.14; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.1. p.50. 
116 Utpala refers to Sivahood. becoming Siva. and the vision of Siva. making reference to Somamanda's 
work Siva-dmi, see IPK, 4.16, p.73.ln fact Utpala states that the whole the Pratyabhijitii system was 
created to enlighten an aspirant "about his real character" (IPK, 4.15, p.73; translation from Pandit 
IPKp, 4.15. p.204). and "for the purpose that people attain perfection without ant arduous effort" (IPK. 
4.18, p.74; translation by Pandit, IPKp. p.207. 
1()7 IPK, 3.6-7. p.61. 
10K Utpala argued that it is the Lord who manifests the "powers to know. to recollect and differentiate". 
{~K, 1.23, p.lO; translation by Pandit, IPKp.l.3.7, p.34. 
IPK. 3.6, p.61; translation by Pandit. IPKp, 3.1.6, p.163. 
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PratyabhijiUi allow for types of existing that comes to reflect a deeper reality of 
being. both existing simultaneously within the puru$a (hypostasis) and allowing for a 
sense of difference and non-difference. 
The ability to re-cognise objects in relation to true being and the relationship of divine 
activity with past actions, present actions and future actions, which consists of 
affirming a double consciousness. Within this double awareness of the lower and the 
higher, free will, activity and consciousness of the individual subject depends on the 
will and power to do so, which ultimately rests in the will and consciousness of the 
Absolute Reality. As a consequence, when an "object shines" 110 the cognition to 
perceive the object, and the power of being the object, is due to the will, activity and 
being of the Absolute Subject or Alman. The relation of the subject to the object, 
manifests not a negation of the objects for if that were so, how is duality recognised? 
Thus two cognitions are accepted, the ordinary and the Absolute where both are 
considered equal for both are manifestations of the Lord. 
The paradox of difference and non-difference existing simultaneously reflects a 
continuous movement of consciousness from the pure 'I Consciousness' (aharhkiira) 
to this-ness (idanta), and then to that-ness (tat) I II or the phenomenal universe 
(object). This movement also constitutes a reciprocal movement back to the pure 'I' 
(Subject) and manifests a relationality between the objects of perception (grahya) and 
the subject perceiver (grahaka),112 between the relative' I' and the Supreme 'I' .113 
Through the knowledge and experience of God the object of that knowledge or the 
individual, comes to know the true subject or divine "Egoity", 114 the divine' I Am'. 
110 I pVp, p.136. 
III PBH, Sutra 3, describes tat (that) as the universe or differentiation, where "that is manifold because 
of the differentiation of reciprocally adapted (anurupa) objects (griihya) and subjects (griihaka}", 
~ 31"1,,,q"JllQ;{j~Cfi~I, tanniinii anurupa-griihya-griihaka-bhediil; translation by Singh, PBHs, 
p.S2. 
112 Ibid. 
III Mark Dyczkowski argues that the influence of Pratyabhijilii on Rajanaka Rama in his development 
of Spanda, was apparent in the emphasis on "two types of egoity", A Journey in the World of the 
Tantras. p.36. Dyczkowski also highlights the problems of understanding the texts which referred the 
term "iitmii" when refering to the relative self(iitman) and the divine Self (Atman or the essential 
nature of self). I make the distinction between self and the Self to make a disctinction between the 
natural physis and the divine nature (also within the Alman-hypostas;s model), but which also affirms 
!hc place of both natures. However, as understood in Pratyabhijilii the relative 'I' rests or is completed 
In the Absolute 'I'. 
114 See Mark Dyczkowski, A Journey in the World of the Tantras. p.36. 
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This becomes related on an intimate level to the human 'I-am' within the concrete 
human experience. 
3.2.3 Atmanic Unity 
At the centre of this paradoxical dynamic is the unmoving supreme reality, which 
allows a sense of unity to be grasped through the term Atman. which has to be 
considered at the centre of any model of person developed in PratyabhijiUi. This 
reality provides the metaphysical backdrop to all philosophical considerations. 115 In 
this thesis, the notion of Atman taken from the Pratyabhijiia tradition will indicate the 
essential nature of the puru$a (hypostasis), by which the specific individual 
characteristics are unified within an essential reality of being and consciousness. 
While the notion of Alman provides a sense of unity within human persons it also 
raises issues of how to overcome the ontological dilemma of bridging the gulf 
between the monist essential divine being and the world. It also provides a platform to 
overcome the existential dilemma of the relativist individual but at the same time it 
infers that person is not denuded in a total absorption with the divine. The isolation of 
the individual is not overcome at the expense of destroying any real sense of person. 
Pratyabhijiiii resolution was to affirm that the mundane consciousness is not denied, 
even when experienced in apati, but is viewed as a manifestation of the divine and 
thus intimately related to the divine. Utpala stated: 
The Lord, being all powerful, manifests spatial sequence by creating 
wonderful variety in the forms of creation, and He also brings about time 
sequence by manifesting variations in action. I 16 
III This is evident in Utpala's countering erroneous doctrines in IPK, 1.2, p.2. where he argues that the 
the "Godhead" is the independent authority, whose nature is the "pure Consciousness" is the Self of 
every human person. giving "every person the power to know"; translation by Pandit. IPKp. I. I .2. p.7. 
It is the ability of each individual to cognise that shows the reality of Alman shining through as the true 
nature of that cognition. 
lib ~afil >4e'1) ~ISh<J1<J1I31If1:qC"'QtIt I fi);:q I afil >4~3flfll("CfiIt'tSh<J1J1tf1'tR:. murti-vaicitry ato deSa-
kramam iibhiisayaty asaul kriyii-vaicitrya-nirbhasat kala-kramam apiSvara/:lll. IPK. 2.5. p.38; 
translation by Pandit IPKp. 2.1.5. p.l 10. 
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The individual person is thus not denied but affinned as a manifestation of the divine. 
Difference and non-difference were not disconnected, where the former is dissolved 
in the latter, but accepted for it is the Lord Himself who assumes forms and at the 
same time does not deny those fonns. As Abhinavagupta stated that, "the act of 
assuming or entering into different forms" 117 becomes possible due to the freedom of 
the divine whose essential nature is Pariimarsa or the "will in the form of desire to do 
so".118 In this condition (of unity) the individual lives "within the Lord" 119 and not in 
separation. This model is due to an accepting that creation is a manifestation (iibhiisa) 
of the Lord and not disconnected from the divine reality. Utpala stated that difference, 
which is the base of time, is based upon manifestation and non-manifestation and 
"such manifestations and non-manifestations are due to the Lord". 120 Therefore 
person cannot be rejected within a context of non-being through total absorption, but 
created by the Lord, and thus has to be accepted as real. 
3.2.4 Unity as Conditional Relationality 
Through the concept of unity, difference is established as dependent on the subject of 
manifestation, or the doer (Atman).121 This doer relates the differing substances as a 
single substance "residing simultaneously in more than one substance,,122 and is 
essentially one, where phenomena attain a relational condition through "a single real 
fact". 123 The dependence of difference indicates that difference gains a relational 
context, between subjects and objects and between impure and pure realities, within a 
condition of unity. The condition of existing as a subject in relation to objects and the 
divine reality is made apparent by Utpala, who refutes Vijfliinaviidins (Buddhists) and 
cites their objections to a concept of Alman 124 to highlight how phenomena are 
dependent and relational to the divine within the condition of the Alman. This 
117 
IPV, 2.4.20-21 (commentary); translation by Pandey,lPVp, pp.186-187. 
11K Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
:~~ IPK, 2.4. p.38; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.1.4, p. \09 . 
. See IPK, 1.\6, p.7. 
1!2 IPK, 1.16, p.7; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.2.11. p.25. 
121 Ibid. 
124 
.Utpala states that the Vijniinaviidins believed "what is seen is the rise of some particular 
obJects ... and nothing beyond that. Only such is the relation between cause and efTect...The concept of 
doer is imagination", IPK. 1.15-16, p.7; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.2.10-11, pp.24-25. 
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condition allowed Pratyabhijiiti to accept that iibhiisas are real, which qualified its 
non-dualism through a model of unity-in-diversity (bhediibheda).J25 In this model, the 
focus is on the relationships between subject and object highlighted in the medium by 
which this reiationality J26 was to be achieved. 
Pratyabhijnii worked within a double philosophical schema, allowing for elements of 
the dualistic. such as accepting the world, within a non-dual context. This non-dual 
context was not divorced from mundane existence and awareness, where "determinate 
cognitions .. J27 of individuals, perceiving the universe and themselves in differentiation 
and multiplicity, ultimately rested on unity. Without the "right consciousness"J28 only 
difference or multiplicity is seen. The relative position (dik), where objects are 
cognised as external to the Absolute subject and thus separate, is to be considered 
firstly in relation to unity, then diversity and then unity-in-diversity. 
The relationship of the Lord in respect to objects evidences the concrete reality of 
objects, not their non-reality, and points to the unity inherent in the relation between 
subject and object. In this context this relationality is to be conditional to unity and 
understood in terms of the "manifestation of the universal power of action". 129 
Within Pratyabhijnii philosophy, a relational approach was also evident in its 
philosophic categories: non-dualistic; dualistic-cum-non-dualistic; and dualistic 
divisions within the different schools. DO Again the triadic divisions of I, you, helshelit 
(aham. tvam. sab)I3J affirmed a philosophical relationship of the transcendent subject 
IB See IPV, 2.2.5-7. 
:~~ IPV, 2.2.6; translat~on by Pandey,lPVp, p.13S. 
I'M IPV, 2.2.S; translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.134. 
:, IPV, 2.2.6 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.13S. 
1.1 Ibid. As stated in the IPK, 2.17, pA2, that "attainment of purpose by means of an object that has 
both unity and multiplicity, is possible for a subject, who seeks causal efficieny, only according to the 
view that has been stated above. Therefore, ideas of revelation etc. are not erroneous", Qqkll~~ft: 
f<l1 ... J1i(j«~Sfl41~: I ~e;CI(1ltM AAet' 3I1Irrc=tt'l£~TtIi 'Ii II, evam evartha-siddhi/:l syan matur artha-
lcriyiirthinal,J! bhediibhedavatiirthena tena na bhriintir idrsi!l; IPV, 2.2.7; translation by Pandey, IPVp, 
fiol36. '. . . 
Of Srva. Sakll. and Nara m SSVs, p.xv; also para (Supreme), pariipara (Supreme-non-Supreme), 
and apara (non-Supreme); and abheda (non-difference), and bhediibheda (diversity-in-unity) and 
hheda (difference). See Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism p.8; see also Gavin Flood, Body and Cosmology in 
Ka.~hmir .~a;vism (San Francisco: 1993), p.12; also see Pandit, Aspects of Kashmir .~aivism. p.18. This 
fJ~ilo~ophy i~ outlined in IPKp. pp.116-120. 
Jaldeva Smgh, Abhinavagupta. Para-TrWkii-Vivara~a. The Secret of Tantric Mysticism, cd. Bettina 
Baumer (Delhi: 200S), p.xvi. 
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with divine manifestation, but qualified in the unity of being. This relationality was 
evident in the relationship between the divine subject and objects, where the objects 
were fulfilled through the essential reality of being and not only in an existential 
dynamic. This contradictory approach led to the Tantric dictum: "sarvam 
sarviitmakam, everything relates to everything else". 132 Hence Pratyabhijnii did not 
view the dichotomy of dualism and non-dualism as necessarily presenting a 
philosophical problem, but rather representing different levels of consciousness which 
are ultimately expressed as the divine reality. 
Pratyabhijnii. while using dualistic philosophical constructs, viewed the relationship 
of subject-to-objects as real confirming the real-ness of human existence and the place 
for the totality of being. Hence Pratyabhijnii accepted the notion of concrete person 
but through a non-dual context. This model reconciles notions of transcendence 
(viSvoltlrna) and revelation or immanency (viSviilmaka) in a model that incorporated 
the metaphysical and the concrete person within a single model. This was 
accomplished by the re-addressing of how Self-realisation or knowledge of Self was 
to be attained by admitting the place for iibhiisas or manifestations,l.H but which are 
ultimately re-cognised as non-different to MaheSvara or the Supreme. IJ4 In this 
respect Pratyabhijna was both the path and the goal where "self-re-cognition"m is 
the means and the end in determining the value of both existence and being. 
112 Ib'd .. I ., p.XVII. 
In See IPK: 1.32; 1.35; 1.40; 1.54; 1.60-61; 1.78-81; 2.4; 2.6; 2.8; 2.35. 
1141b'd I ., 1.1.; and see IPV. 1.1.1. 
IlS IPV. 1.1.1. The state of becoming in re-cognition could be had in a "flash", SK (KSTS 5), as stated 
in the Spanda philosophy or as a process of awakening (IPK. 4.11-12; IPKt. chp.l, 1.1, p.85; and IPKp. 
pp.200-210), which allows a correlation to be made to the concept of becoming in deification. see Moti 
Lal Pandit, The Trika Saivism 0/ Kashmir, (New Delhi: 2003), pp.1 08-9. The notion of deification in 
relation to re-cognition is also broached by Motilal Pandit who argues that the state of the perfected 
one (the Siddha) lives in the state of perfection (deification) in which the body too is deified. In the 
deified or re-cognised condition, life becomes a "divine wonder" (ibid., p.114) in which the cosmos is 
seen (dmi) as a vision of the play of the Lord, a, "play of consciousness", see Swami Muktananda, 
Play o/Consciousness. A Spiritual Autobiography (South Fallsburg: 2002), Deification and re-
cognition are both words that can conceptually expresses ontological fullness of being and exemplified 
by Utpala who referred to an awakening in the form of grace through SalcJipiita. see PSA. 9, p.24 
(Pandit); Tantriiloka. 5,1. pp.52-53, citation taken from N. Rastogi. Introduction to the Tantriiloka 
(Delhi: 1987), p.13. This awakening culminates in the Ie/os of human existence, in an experience of 
fullness or rather an ontological re-cognition of union with the Lord, and this experience of re-
cognition represents the fullness of being, of what it is to be a person. 
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3.3 Developing a Concept of Person in PrafyabhijiUi? 
It is due to the Pratyabhijiiii double schema, of accepting both dualistic and non-
dualistic models, that a concept of person can be developed. This double schema did 
not however, indicate a bipolar philosophy, or when contextualised to the ideas in this 
thesis, a bipolar approach to personhood. Such a schema highlights unity in the face 
of multiplicity where the "ordinary every day life" 136 is not negated, but accepted and 
raised to the divine level. The deification or transformation of the thought processes 
within are-cognition of the truth of divine unity is very similar to those ideas already 
expressed in Chapter 2B in relation to the Byzantine model of deification. where what 
is above raises up that which is be/ow. Pratyabhifiiii in re-cognit;on also accepted that 
which is helow by allowing for a transformation of consciousness. In this context both 
that which is pure or impure is accepted, as Utpala stated: 
Thus the whole world's activities, whether pure or impure, are experienced 
within the Lord, who shines, decorated by the (reflective) manifestations of 
various different phenomena. \37 
Thus as Abhinavagupta argued, "practical life is experienced as resting on the 
omnipresent Lord,,13K whose "essential nature,,139 is not changed by manifested 
phenomena. In the experience of re-cognition the ordinary life is not dismissed but re-
cognised to be "identical with the level of Siva, which is characterised by the 
realisation of the essential nature of the subject". 140 As a consequence, difference is in 
itself impossible, as argued by Abhinavagupta, "unless there be one substratum of all 
111· IPV. 1.7, 13-14; translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.IIO. As Abhinavagupta stated: "Not only relations 
of cause and effect, of remembrance and of contraries, which characterise all the general transaction of 
ordinary every day life, but the particular transactions also such as purchase and sale, which are 
impure, and relation of teacher and taught etc., which are pure, depend upon one SUbject, because 
transactions depend upon some kind of unification" (ibid). 
117 ~J1c=:4~FtUSi~c!t fcn:ft'l ~~CfI1tt Uja~Hh~lIb"II, ittham aty-artha-
hhinniirthiivabhiisa-khacile vibaul samalo vimal vapi vyavaharo 'nabhiiyalell,IPK, 1.77. p.32; 
translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.7.14, p.92. Pandey's translation of the verse in Abhinavagupta's IPV 
(lPVp. p.IIO) is: "Thus experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or impure depend upon the 
omnipresent Loed, in whom all the objective manifestations. so very different from one another. are 
reflected". 
11K 
IPV, 1.7.14 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.llO. 
119 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
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these",141 whereby difference when intimately related to non-difference, which is 
accepted as having both concrete existence and meaning. 
When considering a notion of person or purU$a in Pratyabhijna this simultaneous 
accepting of two natures, pertaining to the divine and the objectified world, indicates 
that in the human person there exists a double nature of essential being and outward 
existence. There must also be affirmed a double consciousness of willing and acting, 
where the two are unified in the experience ofre-cognition. This is very similar to 
Maximus the Confessor's dyothelite Christology, 142 which argues that in Christ there 
is a natural human will and an "essential divine will".14J Both are simultaneously 
united in Christ without separation or change to the divine nature. In the same way in 
the human individual there are two natures, which are united through the divine 
activity. In the natural physis. a feeling of bound-ness (pasu) exists which is overcome 
when united to the essential divine nature or the Alman within the human person 
(hypostasislpuru$a), through divine grace. However, the distinction between the 
divine and human, although remaining in Byzantine theology, is dissolved in 
Pralyabhijna, as Abhinavagupta explains that Bhagavan (God) is both the "knower 
d d ,,144 d . an oer, an contmues: 
Although in reality there is only one SarilVid, which is nothing else than pure 
light of consciousness and free consciousness, yet this difference has been 
brought about by Himselfin order to make others understand (true nature of 
Siva).145 
3.3.1 Personhood through Means of Knowledge 
The single entity or individual subject (pramalr) reflects a person's ability to cognize 
the essential reality, from which self-shinning, self-awareness (vimada) extends and 
from which comesjnana (knowledge) and kriya (act). The individual subject 
(pramatr) experiences his or her personhood because of the Supreme Person, the 
141 
142 1PV. 1.8. (commentary); translation by Pandey. IPVp, p.lll. 
Opse. 7. 800-840, and Opsc.345B-560; also see Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, pp.99-174, who 
~!fnificantly highlights the strengths and shortcomings of Maximus' Christology. 
Opse.7, 80C (Louth). 
144 
IPV, 1.8 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.lll. 
145 Ibid. 
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absolute Subject (pramiitr), who manifests persons through His own personal 
existence. Utpala explained: 
It is only He (pramiitii, the Absolute Subject) who is almighty God 
(mahdvara/:l), by virtue of His constant Self-awareness (vimarsa). because 
Self-awareness is the pure knowledge Ufliina) as well as the pure action (kriyii) 
of the Lord,, 46 
Human personhood, therefore, is a reflection of the divine personhood. having self-
awareness and the ability to be and act. having also freedom, volition and power. This 
awareness, being, freedom and action though limited in the individual and bound by 
the lower nature indicates the possibilities inherent through the higher or divine 
awareness, being, freedom, and action. The ability to act and be acted upon, reflected 
through the ontological condition of being a human person, affirms that the bodily 
existence is manifestly real but does not exist in isolation. It exists in relation to the 
divine reality where the higher ultimately informs that condition of its truth. as Utpala 
stated: "exterior existence of such entities is the eternal Truth". 147 Consequently. an 
individual entity has to be considered in terms of material existence or "determinate 
consciousness",148 which relates to the attainment of exterior knowledge. This exterior 
knowledge is attained through pramii~as (means of valid knowledge), whereby 
knowledge indicates not only the nature of subjective cognition, but also the 
limitations to this knowledge and awareness. But there are limitations to pramiif)a and 
Pandit relates the term to "mundane activities" 149 not capable of revealing God. 
However. as Abhinavagupta argues that pramii~a\' although they express certain 
exterior qualities. "shine determinately as dependent upon another ... having the nature 
of Sariwid". 150 and are not separate from Cit. Pramii~as are not independent in that 
they do not shine independently but are fundamentally dependent on the divine. and 
related to that which allows them to shine. This Dependence on the divine indicates 
the nature of the cognition of the limited subject, and to that to which it is related. 
Thus the pramii~as are related to the relative consciousness; as Abhinavagupta goes 
on to state that: 
14(, lf~~~ ~:a~ti1 ~Jij"{: I faml1:.'Cf~ ~rt"':nIti1fi\;~ ~: IIH II.IPK. \.88. p.36. 
147 ~ 
14X IPK. 1.5. p.34; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.8.5, p.95. 
14'1 IPV. 2.3.1-2 (commentary); translation by Pandey. IPVp. p.142. 
IPKp. p.12\' 
150 lP V. 2.3.1-2 (commentary); translation by Pandey. IPVp. p.140. 
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Ifthisprama~a be not related to the limited subject, the consciousness 'I who 
had consciousness of Nil a, am now having that of Pita' will not be possible. 
But such personal experience is undeniable and is never contradicted. This the 
Abhasa (extrovert light) which shines as related to the limited subject and 
appears every moment in a new form, because of its facing object, is called 
pramfu)a because it operates to bring about cognition. lSI 
While prama~as indicate exterior knowledge, they relate also to self-determinate 
consciousness, which has as its characteristic the ability to "produce the determinate 
knowledge",152 to determine "this" (idam).IS3 The ability to allow an external 
recognition of another condition outside of the initial cognitive awareness, infers an 
ability to attain other types of consciousness in relation to individual awareness, the 
attaining of higher knowledge. The relationship of knowledge to manifestation (tal or 
abhasa) and the relationship of such abhasa (that-ness) to cognitive subject will be 
examined later, but it is the determination of such objectification, which consequently 
leads to an awareness of something other than "this" (idam), a reality by which "this" 
comes into being. The relationship of individual conscious awareness to manifestation 
(abhasa), or that-ness, indicates a movement of exteriority, which through a means of 
valid knowledge, allows an inward movement and awareness to 'this-ness' (idam) and 
'I-consciousness' (aham) or 'I am', confirming a sense of personal awareness. In this 
personal awareness a sense of difference is attained through the power of 
differentiation or apohana-sakli. 154 It is because this difference is the Se(/:luminous 
I~I Ibid .• p.141. 
I~' Ib'd 
. I., p.142. 
I q Utpala stated: "The means of right knowledge (pramiifla) is that because of whose power the object 
shines determinately as "this" (idam) and "of such nature". That is also self-luminous and rises afresh 
every moment. That (tat or pramiifla) as determinately cognising within itself(this light, whose essence 
is the inner reflective awareness, vimariiitamii) an object. for which a single expression stands and 
which is free from temporal and spatial limitations. is the cognition (miti), provided that it is 
uncontradicted or invalidated (not an illusion)", $"AC1I'itll~a ~1I,;qa~I!!c!l1 ~~rn=ms~ 
mmrrmS~II1C1',,;q: II t~ II mS"'C1ft1ttl~AIt~~~1 
f1I~ch:<jr4i11~1I tb II (Idam elii·drg ity eva", yad vasiid vyavali$,hatelvaslu pramiiTJa", lal so 'pi 
sviibhiiso 'bhinavodayabhinavodayab/I so 'nlas lalhii vimadiitamii dda·kiiliidy·abhedinil 
elciibhidhiina.vi$aye milir vasluny abiidhila//), IPK, 2.16-17, p.43; translations from: Pandey, IPVp. 
f· 140; Torrela, IPKt, p.161; Pandit.IPKp, pp.121-122. ~4 Ibid .• and IPKp, pp.27-35; Rudrappa observes that in Kashmir .~aivism. being seems to be 
"bifurcated as Brahman and JIva" (Rudrappa, Kashmir Saivism p.69). However this bifurcation 
represents a unity-in-manifestation, a unity in the nature of differentiation, for all cognitions are the 
shining luminosity of divine consciousness (IPV, 1.4.8). Rudrappa notes, in Kashmir .~aivism, 
"everything is the manifestation of the Godhead ParamaSiva" (Rudrclppa. Kashmir Saivism p.19) hence 
the unity of person is also safeguarded. The "individual self is none other than the Lord Himself with 
limited powers" (ibid. I 12). 
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principle (Samvedana),155 a notion of personal difference comes to indicate a sense of 
non-difference, in that, difference cannot stand independently outside of unity, but is 
dependent on the divine. 
3.3.2 Person as a Mode of Existence 
The reality of being a person, having a sense of difference, and the consciousness of a 
particular individual on a particular level, in PrafyabhijiUi. depends on the mode of 
existence (gu~a)156 ofthat individual. Thus the type of existence of a person reflects 
the gu~a in which that person exists. 'S7 In the higher gu~a (mode of existence) of 
sattva. pureness through knowledge (jiUina) is attributed, even in differentiation. In 
the lower modes of rajas and tamas lS8 existence is related to action (kriya) and 
bound-ness or illusion (maya) and to impurity, implying negative attributes to these 
types of existences. While the Supreme Person (puru$a) remains beyond the gu~as. 
the human person can be expressed through types or modes of human existence in 
which the highest existence, as already stated, 159 can be called a Cid-atmanic mode 
(tropos) of hypostatic existence. 
This mode expresses the freedom to overcome the natural physis or lower gutlas in a 
tropos which relates to the subject of pure consciousness (cid-atmana/:l) , 160 where a 
person (pati) experiences divine consciousness. This model utilises Cit to develop a 
I ~~ 
. IPVp.p.41. 
'~tThc philosophy of the three gu~as are accepted and developed in Pratyahhijitii, see IPK. 4.4-5, p.71. 
I ~7 Utpala stated "the knowledge and action of a pali (liberated one) aimed toward objects taken as his 
own. as well as his power to manifest the viewpoint of diversity. become respectively (these gu~as), 
sattva, rajas and tamas of a bound being. These gul:las. becoming transformed into instrumental and 
objective elements, are not spoken of as the powers of the powerful One (puru$Q) because (as taltvas) 
they are separate from puru$O" <t1ql~'"I'''~''' ~ qC"ljilii ~ tJ ~I J11~11('f1:lt ~ ~ tnlt: lrrCi" 
~"'f(1J1: 11\111 3)~~~ ~Tfffi;rc:r: ~Tftt:;c:<t ~~I v1IIt 1J17Tr.rt CfI~OICflF6c=a4~Ollflli1IJ1I1'i II, sviinga-
~ , 
riipe$u bhiive$u potyur jitiina", kriyii ca yii I miiyii-Irtiye Ie eva paSo/J saltva", rajas lama/:rll bheda-
.flhile/J sakti-malab .vaklitva", niipadisyoleJ e$a", gul:/iinii", karal:/a-ktiryatva-paril:/timiniimll. IPK. 4.4-5. 
p.71; IPKp. pp.194-195. Because of this sense of the personal. Mishra concludes that the "whole 
Pratyabhijitii system centres round the concept of person", see Kamalakar Mishra, 'Person in the Light 
of PratyabhijM Philosophy' • Indian Philosophical Annual. 8 (1972).206-214. However, Mishra never 
quite states what this means other than developing a broad notion of person. In my opinion he uses 
general philosophical and psychological terms to establish that. in Pratyahhijnii. God should be 
understood in an Absolute, theistic. personalist sense, having a personal consciousness. which 
si~nificantly reflects the need for a personhood category (ibid., pp.207 -208). I~r IPV. 4.4-6. 
I ~(l 
See Chapter 1.4.6. 
I/,O IPK. 3.23. p.67. 
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link between being and existence within an event of CW. where the hypostatic tropos 
cannot be divorced from the essential reality of Atman. Cit or the Citi-Sakti thus 
establishes an existential and ontological link between the divine being, having will 
(icchii) and the power of action (kriyii), in relation to the world. In a mode of essential 
being this infers a relational context of essential subject to object, of God to the world 
through the activity of Cit, where the "common" manifestation comes to understand 
the "uncommon,,161 through the activity of Citi in a mode of divine existence. This 
represents a model of unity within diversity, of being within a mode of existing, 
where the "light of consciousness (prakiisal:z),,162 becomes existentially available to 
the individual (narab)163 who attains an awareness of non-difference, and thus can 
relate to a Cid-iilmanic mode of existence. 164 
Through existing as a mode, a person comes to know the nature of his or her 
personhood, through the dynamic activity of Cit, which reveals the true nature to the 
person. CW. the conscious activity of Alman. 165 the luminous being-ness (PrakiHab) 
of the Absolute as Para-Samvit (supreme consciousness), 166 or vimar.~a (shinning 
free-consciousness), 167 purifies the lower modes of existence or gutlas, raising up the 
consciousness, while at the same time heing all levels of consciousness and gUtla.'i. 
Utpala explains that Cit is non-different to His own Self-awareness as the Absolute 
Pramiilr 16K (divine experient or Maha-Pramiitr) and this fundamentally relates to how 
to understand human personhood, heing and conscious existing. Cit has a revelatory 
function in informing relative consciousness and modes of existence of its true nature 
in the individual pramiitrs (experients), it also has the ability to cognise divine 
unfoldment (unme.)'a) 169 or manifestation (iibhiisa) 170 of the universe, which highlights 
the relationship of divine activity to revelation. Through transcending h modes,,171 of 
existence, the divine exists as these modes as a "mass of prakiHa (light of 
It''IPV.4.11. 
11,2 Within this mode an experience is had as Sanderson states where: "the result is said to be the state of 
duality within nonduality (dvailiidvailam. bhediibheda). Siva consciousness arises when the objective 
universe ... dissolves entirely into non-dualistic self-representation (aham-vimar.~ab)", see Sanderson, 
'The Doctrine of the Malinlvijayottaratantra', p.295. 
Ihl1b'd I ., p.295. 
1104 Ibid. 
IMpS ~ 
. A, 7, p.23; and Chatterji, Kashmir .laivism, p.47 
Ilol'T 
117 agare, The Pratyabhijifii Philosophy, p.75. 
, IPV. 1.5.14-15; translation by Pandey IPVp. pp.74-76. 
16M IPK. 1.88, p.36. 
1t,9 1PK 
.3.3, p.60. 
170 I PK. 1.83, p.34. 
171 
PBH, SUlra 4 (commentary); translation by Singh, IPKs, p54. 
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consciousness),,172 for the states or "modes" are only "the form of prakiisa". 173 The 
revelatory or extrusive aspect of the divine (unme$a) as compared to intrusive 
(unme$a) divine inwardness l74 indicates how Pratyabhijiiii overcame the problem of 
being and act through the notion of prakiisa, by including the revelatory medium of 
Cit to overcome any ontological gulf. 
The overcoming of this ontological gulf within the human person can be correlated to 
a consciousness, as stated above, to a Cid-iitmanic mode of personal, or hypostatic. 
existence which lives in the divine consciousness. This existence can be said to relate 
to a bodily existence through the term puru$a, where the puru$a attains the highest 
level of consciousness. The term puru$a itself is considered a principle of the 
extrusive divine activity as a laltva and this shall be the subject of the next part of the 
chapter. 
3.4 Puru~a Taltva 
The notion of person is equated withpuru$a. m as the twelfth principle (tattva) 176 of 
the thirty-six principles (Ialtvas) of manifestation (iibhiisas), consequently, it is 
important to examine this term in relation to the taltva.\'. The pUru,'ta tattva becomes 
important not when considering a notion of person in Pratyahhijifii, but also in terms 
of revelation, of how the divine reveals Himself to the world. This process of 
172 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
174 1PK. 3.3. p.60. Unme~a means "opening of the eye" and nime~a indicates "losing of the eyes" (ibid). 17~ Even though in the term purU$a can be correlated to a notion of person and expressed as such in the 
ta/tvic categories, the preferred term to indicate individual is not purU$a which is only mentioned once 
directly in the text of the IPK (see IPK. 2.19. p.44). Neither is itjiva which is mentioned once in IPK 
(ibid., 1.4 .. p.2); or pasu. which I could only find mentioned four times (ibid .• 3.7. p.61; 3.14. p.64; 4.4. 
p.71; 4.6, p.71); ora~u. of which I found six references (ibid .• 1.3. p.2; 1.8. p.4; 1.9. p.4; 1.39. p.17; 
2.24. p.46; 2.47. p.5S) not including the references to the ii~ava-mala or coverings of finitude (ibid .• 
3.15. p.64); but pramiitr (experient) which is mentioned at eighteen times (IPK. 1.57. p.24; 1.65. p.27; 
1.67. p.27; 1.69. p.2S; 1.70. p.29; 1.76, p.31; 1.83. p.34; 1.85. p.35; 1.88. p.36; 2.12. p.4l; 2.31. p.49; 
2.38, p.52; 2.44-45. p.54; 2.48. p.5S; 3.9. p.62; 3.13. p.63; 3.14. p.64). Also Abhinavagupta in PSA 
seemed to prefer the term pasu (PSA. 5-6. p.16) to indicate individual. though he does utilise purU$a at 
least once in the same text (ibid. p.36) 
176 • 
From tat or that. hence the tattvas describes that-ness. The PBH stated that. "Tat (that) means the 
universe" (translation by Singh. PBHs. p.52). or the exterior aspect of divine action in relation to 
personal consciousness. See also. A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. 
p.4; Chatterji. Kashmir Saivism. p.89; Swami Lakshmanjoo. Kashmir Saivism. (USA: 2003). pp.I-1 0; 
Tagare. The Pratyabhijiiii Philosophy. pp.24-31. 
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revelation through the tattvas also related to the movement from the divine '1-
consciousness' to that-ness, or manifestation (libhlisas). This relationship of the divine 
to the world comes to indicate on the human level types or modes of existence and 
consciousness by which the divine is expressed. As such the tattvas were related to 
the divine act (kriyli), or revelation, as principles of manifestation (iibhlisas) in the 
Agamlidhikiira of Utpala' s !svarapratyabhijiilikiirikii. which included the puru~'a­
tattva. 177 However, the term puru~'a-tattva is not expressly stated but inferred through 
the word pramlitr which indicated finite subject. Utpala stated: 
That subjective condition, void, having entities other than itself as its objects, 
and being wrapped by five limiting elements known as time and so on, is itself 
an objective element, appearing as a subjective one. 178 
This part of the chapter examines the relationship of how the experient (pramii1r) 
relates to the tattvas, especially the puru$a-Iattva. to understand how concrete 
existence is to be understood in the light of Pratyabhijiiii seeming negation of 
individuality. 
3.4.1 The Tattvas of Manifestation 
The tattvas of manifestation or cosmological categories of Utpala in the 
l~varapratyabhijiilikiir;kii were not given as a straight forward list, but were expressed 
through a philosophical-cum-theological context. 179 Within this context, the notion of 
person related not only to principles of manifested existence, but how individual 
consciousness is raised to a level where divine participation changes the mode of the 
puru,\'a from impurity to purity. 180 The definition of a notion of person also has to be 
considered within this context, where any term does not rest at a certain level but 
evolves until placed within a context of pure existing within the category of tattvas. IKI 
177 IPK, 3.9, p.62. 
17K" ~ t~ ~ &Qffi~l\;fil'IlIj I ;:m:rr If mr: 't1~I(i4lfaCfiq;)oilCfiaeC1: lit II. yas ca pramiilii 
siinyiidib vyalireki~i/ mala sa meyab kaladika-pancaka-ve$/ilab. IPK, 3.9, p.62: translation by Pandit, 
{~Kp, 3. t .9, p. t 67. See also Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism p.54: and MT. p.xix. 
IPK, 3. t -3.31, pp.59-69; IPKp, pp t 55- t 88. IKO • • 
IbId., pp. t 59- t 63. 
INI Th . . ,4 
. . c laltvtc categones related to the first five "pure", the first being .. ~iva. The second laltva was the 
dIvine Sakli which expresses the desire and power to create which is dynamic, having movement, 
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The first laltva was Siva, who as the highest deity (Anuttara) was ontologically and 
existentially undifferentiated with the highest Alman or Paramiilman. 182 This divine 
state was not to be considered an unconscious substance but was "the very essence of 
Consciousness",183 having the highest 'I Am' awareness. This conscious awareness 
allows for the second laltva, which was the dynamic aspect of the first lattva. The 
second laltva, SakI;, was also onto logically undifferentiated to the "divine essence" 1 114 
but becomes existentially differentiated in that it indicated how the activity (act or 
kriyii) of the Self-contained Absolute reality comes to express itself in an outward 
movement, creating the world and then revealing itself to the world. 18S Here, the 
notion of person comes to be better understood in this dynamic of non-difference and 
difference, and in the observed downward movement or unfoldment (unme$a) of the 
divine activities by which person (puru.~a) attains being. 
In the third tattva (relating existentially to Sadiisiva or Siidiikhya), 186 interior divine 
movement increases, where the interior aspect of the divine knowledge and action are 
further revealed, and where the revelation, aham asmi idam ('I am this') is born. 187 
This movement allows expansion to the fourth laltva, lsvara, 11111 where the 
extroversive aspect of divine unfoldment (unme'>'a) is reflected in the understanding 
where there is both 'I am' (ahanta) and this-ness (idanta), but where divine activity is still intrusive. 
Through God's infinite consciousness and kriyii-sakti, tattvic manifestation occurs. The first two 
laltvas are expressed in the first stanza of the Agamadhikara of IPK where .~iva is inferred by evam 
(thus or alone), see IPK 3.1, p.59; see also S. Vasudeva working on the seven perceivers' in The Yoga 
(~ Miilinivijayottaratantra, p.152. 
I 2 Which states that consciousness indicates "Self-sufficiency of God as well as His extraordinary 
~jlvine essence (paramiitmana/:l), IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62 . 
. IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62. 
I~ IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62. 
I ~ Utpala states: "Thus the divine action, vibrating inwardly as well as outwardly in accordance with 
time sequence, belongs to none other than the infinite Subject of knowing. Therefore infinite 
knowledge and action are mutually inseparable", QiVIrc=tt6ftctfi': h 4'lI<'IiiJ111"1I1 ~ 
C1~i"4>jr;qI~<J,ffl :tI11rl4'lAut) II til, evam antar-hahir-vrtti/:l kriyii kiila-kramiinugiil miitur eva tad-
anyonyiiviyukte jniina-karmanlll, IPK, 3.1, p.59; IPKp. 3.1.1, p.155; see also MT. p.xxiii. IPK. 3.1, 
p.59; IPKp. 3.1.1, p.155, There has to be made a distinction between eva and evam, the first emphasises 
really, actually, just, alone, entirely, while evam means like this, thus, in this way. The text actually 
states evam to mean thus, as to support what went before, which is the conclusion of RafTaele Torella, 
see IPKt, p.189, and then eva to indicate "knowing subject alone" (ibid.) 
IKIo IPK, 3.2, p.59. 
IK7 I . . 
. t I~, as Tagare states, "the first creative aspect or vibration of Parama Siva (Anuttara, the highest 
~K~lty) ,see Tagare, The Pratyabhijnii Philosophy, p.26. 
IPK. 3.3, p.60. 
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"this is I (idam asmi aham)".189 The /svara laltva had also been correlated to 
lalpuru$a by Abhinavagupta 190 to underline this extrusive activity of divine 
consciousness which comes to indicate, in the notion of divine person (purU$a), a 
concrete sense of movement to the objectified universe, but which manifests a 
consequent gulf between the divine and the world. 191 The subject of how this gulfwas 
resolved in Pratyabhijnii will be examined in the following parts of this chapter. 
In relation to the tattvas this gulfbegins to allow the notion of individual to become 
more concrete, but at the expense of participation with the divine. In the fourth lattva 
or the /svara laltva the notion of divine person becomes specifically related to how 
the divine comes to communicate with the world and hence there is a context of 
relationality, which paradoxically resolves the dilemma of an uncommunicative 
unmoving essence in relation to the world, through the revelations of personal divine 
principles. This relationality is expressed in the further outward movement from the 
divine centre, and expressed in the fifth laltva, suddha-vidya (correct knowledge or 
sad-vidyii), 192 which allows knowledge of the divine to be grasped. At this point 
Utpala refers to individual entities experiencing these types of consciousness, yet 
retaining some form of individuality, where partial unity is experienced in a state of 
diversity. 
(This viewpoint is pure and correct knowledge) because one may see even 
entities that are well known through an idea of 'this-ness', through the correct 
perspective; that is, Consciousness is seen as their essence. Il)l 
In the .~uddha-vidya laUva there is a distinction between 'I-ness' and 'this-ness'. This 
tattva is the last pure laltva. which represents a dual consciousness of both unity, of 
pure 'I' and this-ness, where there is purity and impurity. The sad-vic/ya laltva 
indicates a state of qualified unity or pariipara (highest-non-highest-knowledge).194 It 
is in sad-vidyii that a model of unity-in-diversity comes to be apparent (hhediihheda), 
IR9 
IIj(J See !agare, The Pratyabhijnii Philosophy, p.27. 
Abhmavagupta, Miilinislokaviirtika (200-212); translated by Hanneder, Abhinavagupta 's 
Philosophy of Revelation. pp.93. 205. 
191 Ibid .• (207-209); p.205. 
192 IPK. 3.3-6. p.60-61. 
I'll . ~ .~ . • ~ qq .... II;:II<t1"lI"1IJiI ~~<t1I'(c=qI<l~lqfC"Ctq<'tjCfii1I(1I1\1I1. ida",-
.;).;) - -
bhiivopapanniinii", vedya-bhiimim upeyu$iiml bhiiviinii", bodha-siiratviid yathii-vastv avalokaniit. IPK. 
:<i44• p.60; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 3.1.4. p.160-161. 
IPK, 3.5. p.60. 
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which allows individual personhood to be expressed in terms of concrete existence in 
relation to unity. This points to the qualifying of subjective awareness, the pure • I 
am', with some impurity, which allows the pasu (bound creature) to discover his real 
nature in the connection between the pure knowledge and impure consciousness. 
Although these five principles are often taken to indicate the first aspects of 
revelation, actually only the last three represent true tattvas as the first two, .~iva and 
Sakli do not represent a dualism, but aspects of Absolute being. But this too is 
incorrect for from an absolute point of view in Pratyabhijiili. all manifestation is 
nothing but the light of divine consciousness. Hence in Pratyahhijiili, as Pandit 
poetically remarks, there is '"a beautiful and satisfying unity between theism and 
absolutism of a monistic character". 195 
While the first two tattvas indicated purity, the next three indicated purity-impurity, 
all the rest related to impurity. As the divine unfoldment becomes greater so the 
principles (the sixth to the eleventh tattvas) become equated with the metaphysical 
coverings of ignorance (kaiicukas) 196 that have wrapped self-awareness in finitude and 
limitations as Utpala stated: 
All bound beings, including the gods in heaven, are undergoing rebirth and are 
defiled by the three impurities; but among these, the defilement caused by past 
deeds is the most important cause of their transmigratory existence. Subjective 
consciousness, being wrapped in finite creative power (kala, counted among 
the /cancukas), and appearing finite in character, stands here as a quality of 
. I I' k h . d ( . - ) 197 unconscIous e ements let e VOl sunya. 
It is due to these coverings that the deluded souls come to experience reincarnation. 19K 
I'I~ IPKp. p.15!. 
1% IPK. 3.21. p.66: also IPKp. pp.165-168. The five kancukas are: kalii (brings limitation in respect of 
doer-ship); vidyii (brings limited knowledge): raga (brings worldly desire): and kiila (brings idea of 
limited time): also see Chatterji. Kashmir .~aivism. p.81; and Rudrappa. KQj'hmir Saivism. p.78. In the 
thirteenth laltva relates to the notion of matter. praicrli (IPK. 3.10. p.62) which is "the diverse 
manifestation of the objective world. when it appears under the effect of that very impurity is called 
maya" (IPK. 3.16. p.6S; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 3.2.5. p.175). 
Iq7 ~ ~ .. ~ ~~ ........,.Q,. ~1l~' .. , ~ 11 
c,qc,I.,1 'il' oC1q"'lI ct1lq.,1 I ~Iq~ ~I ("1 '111'1 Cfil q; ~ tIti HCfiI {OI#i.,11 to II Cfi<'ti, (1 (1~ij 
fmrr:ct q;¥IA<Q'JOt..l 31RH;Q'flj ~k.r:ala~<1 aJol(1<Q1 ~II t til, deviidiii", ca sarve$ii", bhavinii", Iri-
vidha", malamllatriipi kiirmam evaika", mukhya", sa",siira-kiira~aml/. kalodvlilam elac ca cit talIVa", 
karlrliim ayaml acid-rupasya sunyiider mila", gUflataayii sthilamll. IPK. 3.21-22, pp.66-67; translation 
by Pandit, IPKp. 3.2.10-11. pp.179-180. Icfx 
Because the above passage refers to reincarnation it is appropriate here to state that the Byzantine 
tradition rejected reincarnation in the Second Council of Constantinople. see 'The Anathemas Against 
Origen' in The Seven Ecumenical Councils (NPNF 14). pp.318-319. Reincarnation seemed to deny the 
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From a position of consciousness, reincarnation only points to the path of bound-ness, 
to limited consciousness, and does not relate to fulfilment and thus is irrelevant from 
the position of completed consciousness. Nevertheless, in relation to the concrete 
identity of a single and unique individual, reincarnation seems to denude such a 
concept, especially the relationship of that identity to the physical body. But this 
should not be considered as an unmoveable obstacle, for what is argued in this work is 
a qualified sense of individual through the term person, where the emphasis is first on 
unity which negates the stress on reincarnation. As the focus in thesis is upon the 
relationship between a notion of person to consciousness and essential being, 
reincarnation points to an incomplete notion of person, a deluded individual, and as 
such only indicates the natural physis. The natural condition has to be overcome 
through a union with the highest nature which can be experienced within a "flash of 
true knowledge,,199 through the activity of the "brilliance of the real subject pure 
Consciousness (samavesa)". 200 
In the light of consciousness, reincarnation is dissolved, as within a notion of 
deification. In the experience of samaveSa while in the body, the yogi lives in what is 
called the lurya state (or tutyatfta),201 which can be called a Cid-atmanic mode of 
existence, and because it is in the body that it can also be affirmed as hypostatic. 
relating to a concrete existence. The relationship of the transformation of 
consciousness and thus the overcoming of the bound state, or reincarnation is 
confirmed in Pratyabhijfla 's focus on the release from bondage. This release is also 
expressed through the four states of consciousness, waking, dream, deep sleep and the 
lurya state. 202 In the bound condition, relating to the coverings of maya, the individual 
experiences the first three states of consciousness, where there is an erratic and 
unequal rhythm of being in the forces of existence (priilJa and apiina), to the energies 
of the body, mind and breathing.203 This is rectified in the upward energetic 
freedom of grace and salvation. and God's creation of each new individual soul at the human birth. 
However. from a philosophical point of view. the individual consciousness reincarnates or changes 
many times even in one life and as discussed in the last chapter. Maximus referred to many types of 
births of a single person. of the physical birth. baptism and new birth in the resurrection. see Maximus. 
Amhig. 42 (PG 91) 1316A-1349A. 
''I'IIPK. 3.23. p.76; translation by Pandit.IPKp, 3.2.12, p.18\. 
2(X) Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
W2 IPK. 3.23-31. pp.67-69. 
201 
IPK. 3.29-30. p.68. which also relates to inhalation and exhalation. 
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movement (of udana force) which was "fiery in character and functions,,204 and refers 
to the kU1J(ialini energy,205 which rises up in the central spiritual channel to the 
sahasrara-cakra and brahma-randhra giving enlightenment. This points to the secret 
experiences of the Siddha Yogis and yogic texts dealing with such ideas. 206 The 
upward movement of this energy and union with Siva establishes the yogi within the 
Iurya state. 
These practices relate to the process by which enlightenment is experienced and had 
within a concrete individual or purU$a. The term purU$a was equated with the twelfth 
category of the laltvas and also related to types of sentient creatures. Hence the 
generic term purU$a indicated a category of life, not particular human life. 
The thirteenth faltva was pra!crli or nature, which allowed a generic category for the 
lower or impure nature of objects and finite beings. The impure lal/vas represented 
levels of maya descending from the finer aspects to the subtle and the bfJ'OSS aspects of 
existence.207 Also the impure laltvas were not systematically explained in the 
l~varapralyabhijjjakiirika. but were considered in the text in verses 10-11 of Chapter 
1 of the Agamadhikara. 
The fourteenth to the sixteenth lal/vas related to mental operations. huddhi (intellect). 
ahamkara (ego) and manas (imaginations. concepts of mind): the seventeenth to 
twenty-sixth laltvas were related to the senses and activities of living and deal with 
the five senses, objects of action and perception: the twenty-seventh to the thirty-first 
to the qualities of the elements: and the rest of the lattvas dealt with principles of 
materiality, the earth, or the five bhulas. 
~04 IPK. 3.31. p.69; translation by Pandit.IPKp. 3.2.20. p.187 . 
. ()~ As it states in the Halhayogapradipikii. 1.27. that "with daily practice it arouse the ku~~alini". 
~: fosfc:t;?ic;Ut)ti ~r¢lf~H<::d ~ ~ ~II; translation by Brahmiinanda. 
Hafhayogapradipikii ofSviitmiiriima (Madras: 1972). p.13. also see chapter 3. verses I-III of the same 
work. 
~~ As highlighted in the Siva Sutras; the Halhayogapradipikii. and the Kuliirvana Tantra. 
• See IPKp. p.209. 
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3.4.2 The Tattvas and the Seven Pramatrs 
The levels of tattvas also correlated to levels of consciousness within seven 
classifications of experients (pramiitrs) or types of souls, which experienced specific 
cognitions on specific tattvic levels. When correlating these classifications to person, 
the focus is to be placed on many types of awareness possible in categories of person. 
The first type of experients in the !svarapratyabhijniikiirikii related to purity208 and 
those souls who experienced unity with the Siva pramiitr. On this level, everything is 
.~iva and there is no differentiation. This level also corresponded to the .~akti laltvas 
and Sakta pramiilrs. where beings experienced Sivahood or aham-vimada. The .~akt; 
prami'llrs were incorporated into this first experiential mode of existence as non-
different to Siva These levels correspond to non-difference within a concept of 
person. 
The second level of experients corresponded to the tattva (Sadi'ls;va) and to purity-
impurity. These were the mantra-mahdvara experients (prami'llrs) who had a dim 
consciousness of the world. The next level (third) of experients were the mantrdvara 
prami'llrs who corresponded to the l~vara-tattva having self-perception (aham), and 
consciousness of the world (this-nesslidam). Both the mantra-mahdvara and the 
mantreSvara pramiitrs related to pure knowledge or Vidyi'l. The last, or fourth level of 
pure pramiitrs. were called the vidyesvaras who experienced partial impurity, having 
pure-impure knowledge. They were called Mantra beings. having both 'I-ness' and 
this-ness, and related to the .~uddha or Sad-vidyi'l-tattva and represents a focus on 
relationality in person, which is exemplified in Utpala's arguing that Suddha or Sad-
vidyii pointed to pure knowledge qualified through impurity and represented purity-
impurity qualifying the unity of these subjects as unity-in-diversity. 
10K According to the PBH (PBHs, p.30) the pure pramiiliis are: (t) Siva (Sakli). (2) SadiWva. (3) lSvara. 
(4) SUddha vidyii and (5) Mahiimiiyii. correspond to the first five pure IallVaS and divine operations. 
After this come ,the remaining pramiiliis within miiya. These 5 levels relate also to differing levels of 
pure souls: (I) Siva Pramiila; (2) Mantra-Mahesvara; (3) Manlresvara; (4) Mantra; and (5) 
Vijilanakala-pasu covered with slight individuality (pralayakala-pasu covered with individuality and 
karma. sakala-pasu covered with individuality, karma and slight delusion). The impure priimiitas have 
total individuality, kiirma. delusion and total difference. The first five pramaliis also relates to 
conscious awareness of: (I) pure 'I-ness', Aham vimarSa, 'I Am' Siva; (2)'I-ness' with faint this-ness 
(idam); (3) 'I-ness' with more this-ness and notion of that-ness; (4) balance of 'I-ness' and this-ness 
wit.h that-ness; (5) this-ness and that-ness; and then in the impure universe only that-ness and deluded 
or Impure 'J-ness'. For a full list and chart of categorisation see Tagare, The PratyabhijiJii Philosophy, 
p.KO. 
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The fifth level of souls related to impurity, to souls who begin to experience a mode 
of existence under the power of Mahiimiiyii and thus difference in manifestation. 
Although these souls are under the control of maya, they too have to be considered in 
relation to divine unity as Abhinavagupta highlights that this level has to be 
considered in non-dual terms through the highest experience of consciousness. At this 
level, the experients are also ultimately non-different to the divine and identical to Cit. 
which is the reality of "both perceiver and doer,,.209 The souls under Mahamaya are 
able to experience the lower states in relation to considering the higher. At the maya 
pramiilr level the experients can be correlated to a sense of individual and were 
divided into four levels. The first had a "finer aspect" 2 10 of consciousness and were 
called Vijiiiinakalas or Vijiia-kevalins (kevalin indicating alone-ness) who were bound 
only by coverings of ignorance or aIJava-mala. This also represented a dualistic 
category. The next category related to impure beings, who were called pralayakalas. 
which represented a type of existence of bound (pas us ) with aIJava-mala and lciirma-
malas. The third category of impure pramalrs were called Sakala beings having a 
gross aspect and related to bound pa.~us having aIJava-mala, kiirma and mayiya-
rna las. and the last level indicated those beings having gross bodies. 
The sixth level of pramatrs. were under the maya laltva and related to sunya (void) 
pramatrs. experienced lower states relating to void. The last experients in the seventh 
category experienced the remaining tallVas and see complete difference, having a 
beast like consciousness. 
3.4.3 Philosophical Implications of the Puru$a Taltva 
The notion of person or puru$a211 cannot be reduced to an object, or mere principle of 
~: IPV, 3.1.6 tanslation by Pandey, IPVp, p.195. 
• See IPKp, p.208. 
211 Th 
e teon purU$a was well understood as indicating the individual person, and mentioned in the Rig 
Veda 10.90.1-2, stating "a thousand heads hath puru$a, a thousand eyes a thousand feet...this puru$a is 
all. t~at yet hath been and all that is to be", translated by Griffith (Pelikan). This refers to the embodied 
SpIrit ofHMan" as a collective teon, a principle of the personal in all animated humans, hence referring 
to "a thousand", see footnote. The teon puru$a is also mentioned in the Upani$Clds, exemplified in the 
Kalha Upani$ad. l.iiLII, in a theistic context stating "the Puru$a is higher than the unmanifested. 
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manifestation (iibhiisa),212 hence further explanation is needed to describe how the 
tattvic categories213 related to a real and concrete concept of person. This approach 
was affinned by Utpala who argued that conscious awareness (of the pramiitr or 
puru~'a) and existential life is intrinsically related to the "Subject of knowing",214 
which provides meaning to a concept of person. This meaning allows person to be 
considered as something more than an isolated, material and "self dependent entity,,215 
as argued by the Vijniinaviidins. The individual or person is dependent on the divine 
and thus is relational, but also real. This does not detract from what is spiritually real 
or negate person as existentially real, for without the divine, person could not attain its 
sense of real existence. There is a relationship quality of pramiitr, as a created being, 
to the divine being (Paramiitman), power (Sakli), will (icchii-sakli) and activity 
(kriyii-sakli) of divine consciousness (Citi), which infonns the experient of the true 
nature of itself. Also Citi is not a material cause for that would bind God and 
individuals to that nature and deny divine freedom, consequently K~emaraja stated. 
"Cit and free will are inseparable".216 This freedom is not bound by the natural physis 
or created principles, but allows the conscious subject to rise above that nature to 
attain an awareness that moves from that-ness (tat), to 'I am this' (this-ness or idanlii). 
or a bound mode of existence to a mode of existence that expresses the true' 1 am' 
state. This represents not only a reciprocal movement of human persons to experience 
the divine, but indicates in the divine (Siva) the desire and freedom to create. 
The desire to create allows a higher mode of existence to be attained, which is 
intimately related to the divine being in that it is God Himselfwho desires to manifest 
Himself as creation: 
There is nothing higher than the Puru~a. He is the culmination. He is the highest goal". ~: 
Q«J1C4ffiJ1C4Cf("q'(>1!I: tR: I Q,(>1!I1nt qt rcflRlC"'A1 itiTm' lIT q'U ilfc!t: II t t II. (Swllmi GambhTrananda) . 
.;) .;) 
This model was also taken up by the Bhagavad Gnll (8.8. 10) which refers to the Supreme Person 
(paramam purusam) and stating, "This is the Supreme person. 0 Son of Pritha! In whom abide all 
existence and by whom all this is pervaded. who is attainable by answerving single minded devotion". 
~: ~tr{: ~~(if):lj'k"CIi1r:44114f4lrc1:~ ~$r~iic=I'J{lI~~II.purusab sa parab 
piirtha hhaktyii labhyas tv ananyayii yasyiintab-sthiini bhutiini yena sarvam idam tatam Bhagavad GTtll. 
M.22 (Vaidi~). This notion of Supreme Person or or Parama Purusa will be correlated to the Supreme 
?I~ Parama Si~a in Pratyabhijnii. see PBHs. p.54. 
For the phIlosophy of Abhiisavada see Rudrappa. Kashmir ,~aivism. p.44; Tagare. Philosophy of 
Pratyabhijnii. p.3 7. 
211 IPK 32 59 •.• p .. 
~14 IPK, 3.1. p.59; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 3.1.1. p.155 . 
• 11 See IPK. 1.12, p.5. 
216 PBH. Sutra 2 (commentary); translation by Singh. PBHs. p.5t. 
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Sadasiva and other appropriate forms flashes forth (prakii.~amanalayaa 
sphurati) at first as non-different from the light (of consciousness) 
(prakiisabhedena) but not experiencing the unity of consciousness ... He 
unfolds Himself in the totality of manifestation (laIIVas), worlds (bhuvanas), 
entities (bhavas) and their respective experients ~ramiiliiras) that are only a 
solidified form of (iisyiinaliirupa) of Cit-essence. 17 
The mode of the higher existence then becomes the divine mode of existence intended 
for the lower modes and tatIVas. When relating the movement of one mode to another 
to consciousness, the movement from tat to pure I-consciousness indicates a 
disturbance in which pure consciousness (vimarsa) itself becomes pure-impure 
consciousness (parapara).218 This vimarsa then reveals itself to itself. The pure 
consciousness experiences a throb or movement (Sakli) which re-cognises this-ness 
(idantii) and then the pure' I am' state. The levels of a descending movement of 
consciousness, from non-difference to levels of difference (pure • I-am' to that-ness), 
corresponds to descending levels of tatIVic manifestations and created phenomena. As 
the process of divine unfoldment (unmesa) continues, the descending movement 
within the divine, or outward movement from God ad-intra (nime$a) to God ad-extra. 
manifests a greater space and distinction between the divine subject and the 
objectified world and a difference between modes of existence. 
There is also in the beginnings of tatIVic manifestations within the divine, a 
corresponding distinction between 'I-ness' (ahanta) and this-ness (idantii) so as to 
fulfil the free will to create. The movement outwards from the divine being allows the 
vidyii-.~akli (revelatory operations) to manifest, which are then juxtaposed to 
manifested phenomena. This also corresponds to the differentiation of awareness in 
the movement from 'I Am' to 'I am this' or an awareness of otherness, in which 
unity-in-diversity is expressed. In this awareness the notion of person comes to be 
related to an inner reality through the outward expression of concrete existence. In the 
awareness of otherness, there is purity and impurity in the middle level of manifested 
, 17 
• PBH, SUlra 4 (commentary)' translation by Singh PBHs p 55 
21K ' " • 
. Utpala stated that "such a state (ofvidya) is thus superior (to phenomena) and perfect. one hand. and 
mfcnor and imperfect. on the other hand since it is the state of unity in diversity. indicating both purity 
and impurity. q'(C1I~rC1~1~31~i('N,(lq'(~~rr ~ mil. paraliihantayiicchiidiil pariipara-daSii hi sQ/!, IPK. 
3.5. p.60. 
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diversity l9 in which this-ness indicates a move from pure consciousness to an 
outward awareness. The outward expression of consciousness, or an outward looking 
individual, represents a movement in which total difference (indicating also impurity) 
is experienced. Difference indicates that individual conscious awareness of 
manifested phenomena is experienced, or that-ness. That-ness (the tattvas) or a 
complete identification with objectified universe results in a continued identification 
with impurity and levels of concrete identity with the lower physis (tat). The 
movement from pure 'I-consciousness' to this-ness and that-ness is attributed to 
differing operations of vidyii-sakti and miiyii-sakl;220 which are equated to differing 
levels of experients (pramiilrs). Through these descending levels of consciousness, 
consciousness itself moves from pure divine awareness to a limited condition. It is 
this true knowledge or vidyii-sakti that allows an ascent to the divine where the 
aspirant begins to understand his or her divine nature while living as a bound being. 
While the divine activity of knowledge that allows a movement to the divine, it is 
another divine activity, the miiyii-sakli that "conceals the truth under ignorance".221 
It is in a concept of person that both knowledge of the divine or ignorance is 
experienced and thus becomes a vehicle of the divine to express the divine in both 
conditions. 
As a consequence, the individual soul (jTva), or purU$u. that comes to represent a 
principle of being and consciousness by which the divine is understood within a 
concrete individual, and by which an existence is had. This existence can be called 
personal,222 but also reflects the possibilities of many types of consciousness, 
ZI'IIPK, 3.5. p.60. 
zzn IPK. 3.5-6. pp.60-61. 
m~~~mrct~I~~:~~~:I,,".tasyaMvarya-wa­
hhiivasya paSu-bhave prakiisikal vidyii-sakti tirodhiina-kari mayiibhidha puna/,JII.IPK. 3.7. p.61; 
~~~nslation by Pandit.IPKp. 3.1.7. p.I64. 
-_. Mishra believes that in Pratyabhijnii the term puru$a has a central role in the understanding of 
heing, in relation to divine revelation. and the nature and activity of God and states: "it would not be far 
from the truth to say that the whole Pratyabhijna system centres around the concept of person. It seeks 
to know the real nature of the person and his relationship with the rest of the World. The Divine or the 
Absolute is in reality the divine one; reality is absolutely personality". Kamalakar Mishra. 'Person in 
the light of PratyabhijM Philosophy'. Indian Philosophical Annual (1972). pp. 206-214. Also unlike 
the pure absolutism ofSankara's monism, Pratyahhijnii does not view manifestation in a negative 
context as illusion, maya, but views manifestation as non-different to the Absolute. For this reason, 
Aleaz argues that in Sankara's philosophy, there is no real anthropology (see K. P. Aleaz, A 
Convergence of Advaita and Eastern Christian Thought, p.177) as individual persons do not have any 
real e.xistence, which is not the case in Pratyabhijflii. While the absolutism of Advaita presented a 
seemingly unbridgeable gulf between transcendent and immanent, in Ovaita, an ontological gulfis 
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culminating within a full sense of unity while existing as a person. However, even in 
ignorance, at the core of tattvic diversity is unity. Unity is vouchsafed even in lattvic 
distinctiveness through the activity of Citi-sakli. which is the light of consciousness 
(prakiisa). The prakiisa allows a sense of freedom (sviilanlrya)223 within the 
individual to be experienced as it mirrors the freedom of the divine, which is the very 
nature of the divine existence. This freedom is expressed in the active CW. will and 
luminosity of the Alman. which is continually active, unfolding itself as the lattvas, 
including the purU$a laltva. 
Within these complex models of principles, experients and types of consciousness, the 
model of pure and impure manifestation (iibhasa) in Pratyahhijnii allowed the term 
purU$a to take on a dual role, indicating bound-ness and also limitless in re-cognition. 
within a dual cognition. To underline this point K~emaraja gave a long list of 
philosophical traditions224 to argue that Pratyabhijnii accepts a paradoxical position, 
of the one and the many, accepting both the immanent and transcendent (Alman), 
where unity is simultaneously expressed as multiplicity. 
He is a single centre in universal consciousness but he becomes twofold form, 
threefold, fourfold (iilma) as a subjective reality, and appears as seven pentads 
(tattvic pramiiliis) in the expression of his inherent nature in manifestation. 22~ 
In the state of unity amid taltvic diversity, the empirical self (individual puru~'a) is to 
be understood as the Absolute Self, where ··mundane manifestation,,226 relates to the 
unfolding of His nature (Paramiitman). This unfoldment is also continuous through 
divine maintenance (sthiipakalii)227 where the act of grace (anugrahTtrtii)22K allows a 
developed between Tsvara andjiva making true participation difficult to argue. For this reason Panikkar 
stated: "in fact neither dualism, nor pure monism can solve this problem. Dualism digs a gap that it 
cannot afterwards overcome. Monism over simplifies the issue, and does not so much explain the 
~;oblem as it explains it away", see Panikkar, 'Tsvara and Christ as a Philosophical Problem', p.IO. 
::1 PBH, Siilra 1 (commentary) . 
•• 4 From the Ciirviikas (who believe that the selfsame as body), to the Nyiiya (materialists who 
consider selfas the intellect), the Vediintins (who view priina as Self), and the Siinkhyas (who see 
duality), see PBH, Siitra 8 (commentary), PBHs, pp.65-68. 
~~~ ~ ~ ft'f\Qflh14"1Cj{1c-fJ11 <t1l'N>ilCflfCI3mf:, sa caiko dviriipas trimayapas trimayaS caturiilmii 
suplu-paFlcakasvahhiivah. PBH, Siilra 7; translation by Taimini. The Secret o/Self Realization (Adyar: 
1997). 
~~6 PBH. Siitra 10 (commentary); translation by Singh, PBHs, p.74 . 
• _7 Ibid., p.75. 
mlbid. 
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continuous relationship between the manifested world and the "unfoldment of the 
essential nature (of consciousness ),,229 
This continuous relationship or communion of the essential nature of the divine in 
relation to phenomena, followed on from the teachings of MiilinTvy'ayoltaralanlra 
where the manifested world becomes intimately related to non-difference. As Kaul 
shows, the jTvas were included in the list of ontological "acceptables" (pure universe) 
for the jfvas or purU$a and can participate in the pure universe and in an 
undifferentiated experience.230 The notion ofpuTU$a indicates a subjective and 
concrete existence, in an immaterial-material sense, and thus juxtaposing the 
individual existence to the divine reality. Hence the human level becomes infonned 
by the divine, which changes the way in which the type of existence of the pUTU,-,a is 
understood. Even the tenn pUTU$a indicated a certain type of limited existence as the 
twelfth tat/va in the relational capabilities of that existence to experience the higher. 
However, the lower nature cannot by itself understand the divine without the grace of 
the divine. It is L~iva who, as the supreme PUTU$a. gives this grace, and it is b'Tace 
which allows the observation that it is God who enters into a state of becoming so that 
individual puru,\'asB 1 can attain a pure consciousness. The bound soul realises his 
,~ivahood. which at the same time does not detract from the concrete human experient. 
In this context the concept of person can be equated with the tenn pUTU~·a. where the 
nature of the divine person or puru~'a infonns the human person or pUTU,-,a of his or 
her true nature, so that the human experient rises above the natural physis in the 
experience of divine consciousness. 
There is consequently a relationship of the personal God to the human person 
(puTU,\'a) where the pUTU$a becomes more that an empty principle. evident in the free 
divine power (Sakli) and love of the divine Puru$a. through the extrusive Citi232 to 
commune with the created world through the creation of individuals. Also the light of 
119 Ibid. 
210 MT, p.xvii. Tagare argues though that puru$a: "means not merely human being but includes all 
sentients, Puru$a is Siva who has subjected himself to the Kancukas of Maya like Kala, Vidya etc. and 
due to the absence of his original omniscience. omnipotence etc .. got himself reduced to an atom 
~f,~u)". see Tagare, The Pratyabhiji/(i Philosophy, p.29. 
'I' See Hanneder, Abhinavagupta 's Philosophy of Revelation. pp.63. 93 . 
. . Or "the power of unme$a (cid)", Abhinavagupta. Miilinislokaviirtika (206-207); translation by 
Hanneder. Ahhinavagupta's Philosophy o/Revelation. p.93. 
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consciousness (prakiisa),233 becomes intimately related to the subject awareness of the 
puru$a (person). This relational and thus outward motion of God was expressed by 
Abhinavagupta, who referred to the "face of God which is consciousness",234 
recognising the relationship of objects to the divine, but which remains "unstained" 
by them. Abhinavagupta stated: 
When therefore God through the power of his will truly wishes the objects, 
they become grounded in his will, yet the will remains unstained by them, for 
they are in contact (sprsanti) with the unity of consciousness, by being 
identical with it. The objects, however, are then hidden by the will that is 
affected by limitation as a cover. But God remains in his own will. This face 
of God, which is consciousness, is turned away from the light is not occupying 
the highest, replete state and therefore appears to be in deep sleep.235 
The term 'face' as an abhasa (manifestation) qualifies the single Sellof 
Mahdvara. 236 as the 'face' in manifestation, which becomes the 'face' of the 
individual (puru$a). The termpuru$a in this context, as the 'face' of the Self, becomes 
the outward 'face' and indicates the possibilities of the concrete person. This is 
affirmed by Abhinavagupta who argued that the "highest face",237 is of .~;va. 
Pratyahhijna's categorization of the individual reflects this sense of difference and 
unity, through the term pramatr (experient), 238 for "every pramiitr is .~;va in a 
contracted form",2.19 the "Highest Lord".240 God consistently experiences His own 
aham or 'I-ness', as an "unbroken consciousness, 'I am this universe"',241 and 
manifests existence (ahhasas)242 as ;dam or this-ness, which is the object of the 
"Lord's consciousness".243 Through .~iva entering into a becoming as the world, in a 
'11 Ib'd • t, p.63. 
~14Ibid. (216), p.95. 
m Talo hhiiviin yadii smayag kchalicchiivihhuliia/:JIl21311 ladecchiiyii", samiirrudhii/:l sii c:ec:chii c:aiva 
nirmaliil yena lanmyaliiyogiil sa",vidailcya", sprsanty amiJl214/1 
ki""upiidhyuparalctecchiisa",chiidana,irohilaf! I Ie ladiini", sthi/o bhiivii devas tu svai$anosthita/:JI1215 
parocinitasa",viltivaklro na ca paro", slhiliml purnom adhyu$itas tena JU$upta iva bhiistel121611, ibid., 
(213-216), pp.94-95. 
2\(' Ibid. 
'17 lb' 
• td., (20); commentary pol43 
2111 ' • 
See IPKp, 3.1.9, p.167; and PBH, 4. For a good analysis of pramolr and the seven experients or 
r~rceivers, see Vasudeva, The Miilinivijayollaralanlra, ppoI51-178 . 
• 11 PBH, 40 
~~1) IPV, 4.1; translation by Pandey,lPVp, po219o 
.~ Ibid. 
'4' lb' 
• - tdo, 4.7, po225. 
~41 Ibid. 
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simultaneity of common and uncommonness, experients come to understand their 
bound-ness and also their true identity.244 This indicates simultaneity of modes of 
existence which does not point to confusion, but a layering of existence on multi-
experiential platforms united through the Atman. While the bound individuals see 
difference,245 the liberated, the Siddha experiences Sivahood and experiences non-
difference246 This Sivahood also has a revelatory context for .. ~iva '!;' being (Satta)U7 
and is also non-different from the "mass of endless Tattvas".248 
3.5 Personhood and Unity of Being 
In the remaining three major parts of this chapter a notion of person will be correlated 
to: the unity of being (Atman); conscious awareness (Cit) within divine activity (Citi-
.(:akti). which discloses levels of consciousness; and revelation in manifested 
phenomena (iihhiisa) through a model of unity-in-diversity. Each part will correlate to 
the theological discussion of Siva, Cit ( .. ~akli). and manifestation (ahhiisa) respectively 
in relation to person. These divisions also correlate to modes of personal existence 
within the puru,'ta and which have. on each level. a basis in unity. The three parts 
constitute an apparent downward or outward flow of consciousness. The emphasis is 
firstly upon the reality of being (or Alman) and then secondly. on how this level of 
being reflects unity within manifestation. The focus will be upon revealed levels of 
consciousness within person, from Cit to citta and then back to Cit, and how 
separation is overcome or at least accepted in a qualified model. 
~« Ibid., 4.7-4.12; pp.224-228. 
~4~ Ibid., 4.13; p.227. 
24(, Ib'd I .,4.16; p.229. 
247 1b'd 7 I ., p. 5. 
24M Ibid., 4.14; p.228. While the first tattva can be said to represent philosophically that which is non-
dualistic, the rest of the categories evidence dualism in varying degrees (see MT, p.xvii; see also 
VaSUdeva, The Yoga o/Miilinivijayottaratantra). The first five classes of beings in the 
Miilinivijayottaratantra were the list of acceptables. as ,~iva. Sakli, Vidyesa. Manlra, Mantrdvara; and 
the .!i,·as. which were added to the list. The last two. the avoidables. were the impure experients and 
actions. who experienced modes relating to Miiyii and the world. Within the seven levels of experients 
of the lsvarapratyabhijfliikarikii and Pratyahhijfliihrdayam the souls corresponded to the pramiifr 
levels in the Miilinivijayottaralanlra. see MT. pp.xxi-xxii; IPKp. pp.157-163; PBH. K~emaraja's 
commentary of sutra 3; and Tagare. The Pratyabhijnii Philosophy. p.80; see also Vasudeva, The Yoga 
of Miilinivijayottaratantra, pp.151-167. 
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3.5.1 Person through Atman 
In this part of the chapter, I will examine a concept of person (puru$a) in relation to 
unity through Alman. Although the Alman can be viewed as a monist static reality, it 
is also, in Pratyabhijiiii. connected to everything as the substratum of being and thus 
also has this quality of reflecting activity. Abhinavagupta describes the Alman in 
relation to the world in the following way: 
Just as the disk of the moon appears to be moving when reflected in flowing 
waters and just as it looks to be static in still waters, so does this great Alman 
appear in multifarious variety in the different categories of bodies, senses, 
organs and worlds. Just as Riihu (shadow of the earth) shine and appear in the 
disk of the moon, though otherwise invisible, so does this Alman shine only in 
~he mirror of psychic aE~aratus while witnessing objective reflection, though it 
IS present everywhere. 4 
The essential reality of Alman as viewed from below. or in relation to being a unique 
but separated person, is to be considered in three ways: firstly, as a generic term that 
can be applied as the metaphysical centre of all persons and secondly, in relation to 
the world, where the Alman is to be considered as having a revelatory and thus 
relational value. Lastly, the Alman is to be considered in relation to the personal 
experience, which informs the person who she or he is and thus allows a change in the 
way in which that individual perceives the concept of person itself. 
The Alman, while ontologically appearing beyond material being having a non-dual 
centre, has from a position of individual "an appearance of duality"2~O in that it is 
viewed as distinct from the individual. This vision of the individual allows Alman to 
be considered not only as the form of absolute being. or being beyond being, but 
allows a sense of divine relatedness to the world. Relatedness is not constricted within 
149 m;uFrt ~ ~ ~ 1t11q;'(~Ri ~ ~I ~ c:rtIF411 kl1 I ~nrr: """ 
~ ~ mcn~sftt mrr 'lrftlr.. ... ftt: WfiT'lTa ~I ~SC4~l1kI11 ~~ ~"tll, .. ~.-. - ~~ 
gucchati gacchati jala jva himakara-bimba", sthite sthiti", yiitiltanu-kara~a-bhuvana-varge 
tathiiyamiitmii mahesiinabJl riihuradrsyo 'pi yathii sasi-bimbasthab prakiisate ladvatl sarva-
~\at() 'pyayamiitmii vi$ayiiSraya~ena dhimukurell. PSA, 7-8 (Pandit), p.24 . 
•. f) SS, 'First Section'; translation by Singh, SSs, p.l. 
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a static substance, but has the quality of freedom, the freedom to aci. and in relation to 
the bound individual. Abhinavagupta stated that: 
He (the Lord) is free ... and that His freedom is manifold and consists in 
bringing about diversity in unity and unity in diversity by internal 
unification. 251 
This passage includes the three aspects of the Almanic reality in relation to person or 
diversity; the value of diversity through unity and how unity expresses itself within 
itself as an expression of freedom; and the character of that freedom (in unity) from 
an ontological perspective, which implicitly relates to the existential characteristics of 
person. The nature of this freedom can initially be said to expresses a dynamic of 
unity in relation to an internal movement within the divine person allowing person in 
the human context to express individual characteristics. These characteristics, even 
when considered through an experience of unity with the divine, are indicative of the 
general ontological disposition of person that are expressions of the divine being. 
While this appears to be tautological it shows how Alman leads to person which leads 
back to Alman. The movement within the divine manifests a slir, pushing outwards 
from the divine reality and manifesting the world, which cannot be viewed as separate 
or self-created but is created by divine will and power. 
The movement of the divine as an expression of free will (sviilanlrya) to create and to 
reveal itself is initially expressed through a divine pulse (spanda). 2~2 This pulse or 
throb of the divine is not due to an indirect impersonal force but a free act of the 
divine being. This implies that the Alman is not to be considered as an impersonal 
nature, only capable of expressing itself to itself, but related to a movement of itsel f 
outwards through its consciousness (Ci/).25.1 Within this understanding, a notion of 
person is conditional to the Almanic reality and thus consciousness. 
The conscious awareness of the Alman. as the Siva Siitras state, is the very 
characteristic of Atman,254 and expresses the Absolute 'I Am' in an outward flow in 
the desire to create within a personal Self-aware existence. Thus implicit to a model 
~:~ [PV, 1.1.' p.II;,translation by Pandey. 
Spanda IS the Sakli or power of God to create the world. It is the essential nature of the divine and 
~~f creative pulse, svarupaspanda (Spanda Kiirikii, ed. J. Singh, Delhi: 1980, p.3). 
B4 Se~ the 'Commentary' of the text of Sutra I of SS; SSs, p.7. 
Callanyamiitmii, SS.I; translation by Singh, SSs, p.6. 
222 
of person, developed through PralyabhijiUi philosophy. is the qualifying of the 
Almanic ontological condition through consciousness. Alman is static and yet has an 
extrusive activity and thus a relational dynamic. This relationality expresses the 
dependence of creation upon the Lord's will and grace. Consequently, there is always 
this relational dynamic between the extrusive activity of God and the world, of 
subjects and objects in relation to the true subject,255 through the admittance of the 
real-ness of creation. By considering the divine freedom, will and activity of the 
divine to create, and the "One develops multiplicity,,256 through the Atmanic nature, a 
sense of person is developed in the admittance of multiplicity, where person also 
reflects those same qualities due to the inherent nature of person. This affirms the 
importance of person to express concrete existence as an act of unity in multiplicity, 
while also indicating the inherent nature Alman. This nature allows person to be 
considered as not superficial or outward looking but having ontological depth. Even 
though this is approach to person is tautological, where Alman allows the nature of 
person to be revealed which in tum points to the truth of Atman, it allows person to be 
considered as the field of experience, within a concrete existence, by which Alman is 
revealed as the underlying reality of existence. This is possible due to person being an 
expression of the Atmanic effulgence or the "light of consciousness" or prakii.~a. 2H 
3.5.2 Person as an Expression of Prakasa 
The constructing of a model of person through Pralyabhiji'lii. as a concrete entity, is 
also supported when considered through the ·light of consciousness' (prakii.(:a).2~R It is 
the theological use of prakiisa which upholds a relational condition of the divine 
activities to the world, while affirming the validity and concrete identity of both. The 
prakii.<:a is the support of creation, which is the pure ·Self-awareness' of the divine 
and: 
m ,This argument is developed in the first chapter of the IPK from verses 12-30, pp.5-13, through its 
epIstemology which rests on the premise of the unity of phenomena through a single entity, the 
Absolute God. 
l~6 
'q IPK, 2.10, p.40; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.2.2, p.116. 
• IPV, p.187. 
m IPK, 1.42, p.18. 
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described as a (shining) pulsation, as supreme existence not conditioned by 
time and space, and as the very heart of the Supreme, because it is the real 
essence (of all existence). 259 
The "Lord manifests His own Self ... the objective world is not a thing existing 
separately from Him".260 Here the objective world is affinned and so too a sense of 
person must also be admitted, while yet confinning person through prakiisa as 
intimately related to the divine. Through prakiisa. the activity of the highest reality 
expresses itself as the aspect of divine consciousness, or vimarSa. by which 
"phenomenon becomes evident".26I This illuminates the manner by which ordinary 
knowledge (vidyii) gives way tojiiiina in an inward infonning of the nature of being, 
where the discovery of Self leads to are-cognition of the true nature of heing in an 
event of Atman within the purU,\·a. It is within the experience of re-cognition that the 
value of person, of moi, is comprehended as an expression of prakiHa, which allows 
the other, that is other persons, to be comprehended through prakiisa. This does not 
negate concrete person but places person within a context of a true value and 
qualifying person in the same way as hypostasis qualifies individual in the first two 
chapters of this thesis. This value underlines that, within an ontological context, 
person indicates the possibilities of heing through the condition of having not only a 
mundane nature, but a higher nature. This higher nature is not an unconscious lump 
within the person, but the substance of eternal conscious heing. The higher nature 
allows person to he what it should be, for it has at its very core, Sell-awareness which 
is reflected within each person and allows the notion of finite se(l As K~emaraja 
stated: 
"Therefore this (i.e., Caitanya or consciousness which is Absolute Freedom) is 
Atma or Self, not anything else of varied nature as assumed by pluralists 
(those who propound the doctrine ofbheda or difference among selves) (Are 
these different selves conscious beings or non-conscious beings?) If Atma or 
varied nature is assumed to be non-conscious, then it would be inconscient 
matter and thus not Self. (fit be considered to be of the very essence of 
consciousness, then there can be no valid reason for considered to be of the 
very essence of consciousness, then there can be no valid reason for 
l~Q m ~ Ae;FtklJ ~ICfil(itl~t~1 ~ 'A I 't(1 <II ~ ~ q'tileii: 11\1'1 II, sa sphuralta 
mahiisatii dda-kiiliivise$ilJi/ sai$a siiratayii proktii hrdayam parame~·lhinalYl. IPK. 1.45, p.19; 
translation by Pandit, IKPp, 1.5.14, p.63. The very nature of the prakiiSa is the divine essence, which is 
the underlying reality of ellistence lW . 
'bl IPK, 1.46, p.19; translation by Pandit. IKPp. 1.5.15, p.64. 
• IPKp. pp.156. 176, 233. 
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considering on atma or self as different from another self. Difference in the 
case of cit or consciousness cannot be established either by means of space or 
time or form, for if these are different from cit or consciousness then being 
deprived of the light of consciousness, they cannot appear at all and are thus 
unreal; if they appear, then the~ are consciousness itself (for it is only 
consciousness that can appear. 62 
For this reason the Siva Sutras state that the very nature of the Atman is consciousness 
(caitanyamatma),263 and thus at the very core of selves is the activity of divine 
consciousness. This definition of the Selfis at the heart of Pratyahhijfla and thus at 
the heart of a theology of person. Utpala himself cites the Siva Sutras. stating that the 
"Self has been defined as Consciousness as the activity of awareness,,264 and due to 
the reality of Absolute being, the Alman. 
In each conscious being. this essential reality and awareness manifests the unique 
consciousness specific to that experient (pramatr), which in tum is a reflection of the 
highest awareness and reality, even in mundane consciousness. This is because the 
mundane consciousness shines as the light of consciousness (praka.(:a). But what is 
prakii.<:a? Firstly, Utpala approaches this question by affirming that matter has no 
independence, stating that "independent existence cannot be proved even through 
inference,,/65 and argued that matter is due to prakii.(:a. where the "entire phenomenal 
existence (is) contained within Himself(His divine potency); otherwise the throb of 
His will (iccha) to manifest it outwardly could not proceed".266 If this were not the 
case then prakiisa "even though bearing the appearance of an object, could at most be 
compared to some insentient elements like crystal".267 Divine awareness is the 
"essential character of consciousness",268 which itself has the character of divine 
luminosity expressing itself as each person, for every conscious being, or person, is 
aware of himselflherself. This consciousness then is a reflection of the divine 
consciousness or vimada. 
~I,~ 'Commentary' of the text of Siilra I of Ss. 
"6\ 
:1>4 As already stated above; SSt Siilra I. 
: IPK. 1.43. p.18; translation by Pandit IPKp. 1.5.12. p.61. :6~ IPK. 1.40. p.17; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.5.9, p.58. 
;: IPK. 1.401 p.17; transla~ion by Pandit.IPKp, 1.5.10, p.59 
, IPK, 1.42, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.5.11, p.60 . 
• 6K Ibid. 
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Hence, this double dynamic is expressed in relation to person, firstly, in the condition 
of a specific consciousness in each person, and secondly, where this consciousness 
reflects the power and capabilities of the divine consciousness. If praklisa implied a 
mundane consciousness and an ordinary luminosity "devoid of vimada,,269 then it 
could be likened to a reflective light or an insentient nature. Consequently, prakiHa 
itself highlights the condition of the divine essential reality contained within the Self 
and the divine awareness contained within that nature. This also indicates the 
capabilities of person and the ultimate resting place of consciousness within person. 
As a result Utpala stated: 
To be Self-aware is the very essence of Consciousness. It is the supreme 
speech, rising out of its own ecstasy, and is itself the special Self-sufficiency 
God as well as His extraordinary divine essence. 270 
When correlating this notion of person to the divine Person and to the awareness of 
supreme consciousness, there is evident within the divine essence the awareness and 
freedom to act in relation to objects or the world. Utpala declares that this apparent 
movement is due to the Lord Himself objectifying Himself where "objective existence 
is not a thing existing separately from Him".271 Through the capabilities of free will, 
the Absolute essence (Mahesvara. Paramasiva)272 creates all things, manifesting all 
phenomena. However, the Alman entering into the process of creation does not get 
"enmeshed in any sort of diversity". 27] 
Here, Utpala expressly indicates that the Alman is not a static reality and is perceived 
through movements, where the Alman enters into manifestation but does not 
experience change within the many activities such as individual consciousness 
(huddhi or intellect) within a person. Thus there is a succession of perceived 
movements within a process and single intention. This makes apparent, in the many 
movements or series of movements, a dual cognition, will and activity within a united 
cognition, will and activity of the divine. There is one relating to ordinary or mundane 
21.'/ IPKp, p.60. 
17(J ~ J.-...-.. '~ ..110' ~.-" rTTJ:n=D= 
IQI('1 ';k~Cli1~II(,"~1 q;(I CI I Cf"f<H ffiia(11 I fCtl(1r>q;f1(1rlj&4 ('1CO~<4 Q«i1IC"J1"": 11\1\111. citi/:! 
pratyavamarsiitmii pariiviik sva rasoditiil sviitantrayam elan mukhya", lad ai.fvarya", paramiilmana/:!II, 
{~K. 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit. IPKp.I.5.13, p.62. 
'7' IPK, 1.46, p.19; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.15, p.64. 
"IPK, 1.1; 1.2; 1.7; 1.64;4.1. 
m IPK. 1.48, p.20; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.17, p.65. 
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existence and that relating to the divine, but where both are intimately related to the 
Atman. In these movements an indissoluble link, or relationship, is established 
between being (Alman), act (kriyii), and will (icchii). 
While Pandit argues that "at the level of the limited self (puru.)·a) , the sense of non-
duality is totally lost", 274 this is not the case in Pratyabhijiiii as it accepts that 
mundane existence is intimately related to the non-dual state, whether it is re-
cognised as such within the dualistic condition. A sense of person does not negate the 
highest reality but is confirmed through that reality for Pratyabhijiiii accepts many 
types of existences. Abhinavagupta's Vimarsini endeavors to explain this antinomic 
model through a balance between being. awareness, and act, stating: 
The Lord is naturally self-luminous and preserves the world by bringing about 
its existence ... His being freedom ... That is transcendental motion -
characterized by a slight flutter, quiver or motion. 27~ 
This motion is to be correlated to the light of consciousness (prakii.~a), which is 
inseparable from Seif:consciousness (vimar.~a) as the power of action. 27/l 
Due to the dual aspect of being, awareness and activity, the bound individual 
experiences both aspects, though they are unaware of the higher. Thus Abhinavagupta 
argued that "the limited subject has both being and its negation. bliss and its 
negation,,277 because of the apparent power of limitation or obscuration, emanating 
from the lower nature. It is only the revelatory activity of the Alman. through Cil-.\:£lkli 
that allows both a sense of individual and whole or de~/ied person, of a limiting 
condition and an unlimited awareness, where all conditions are accepted as the 
prakii.\:a. 
~:: Pandit, The Trika Saivism of Kashmir, p.21S 
, IPV, 4.6 (commentary); translation by Pandey,IPVp. p.222 . 
• 7/0 Ibid. 
'77 b' 
• lid., p.223. 
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3.5.3 Allowing for Modes of Person 
Thus through Pratyabhijiiii the notion of person has to be accepted as an activity of 
prakiisa and that person also indicates concrete existence, otherwise a negation of 
either statement negates the purpose, will and activity of the Lord who manifests the 
conditions for both. This allows person to be expressed as a material and concrete 
existential experient and yet allowing for an essential reality underpinning its 
existentiality. Hence, a person has the freedom to exist and to be in truth, reflecting 
the freedom and being of the divine, which through the prakiisa, reveals the true 
nature of being to the person (puru$a), and a way in which persons should exist. 
The prakiisa. while conferring a sense of personhood, allows a person not to be 
dominated by the lower nature, but encourages ascents to the higher. This freedom is 
constitutive of the nature of Alman, and allows the person to live within a 
consciousness and type of existence in the world that is relative and also Atmanic. In 
the highest condition the person can be said to exist within an Atmanic consciousness 
that is reflected within a Cid-iitmanic mode of (hyposlalic) existence27K through the 
experience of re-cognition. The prefix Cid. implies that the Atmanic nature exists 
within an awareness of its own reality and having awareness of the world. This 
implies, within the human condition, that there exists within each person a dual 
consciousness, one pertaining to the limited awareness and the other pertaining to the 
divine state. The experience of re-cogni!;on. of the divine reality (of being) as the true 
reality of existence, does not preclude cognition of the ordinary Ii fe but allows 
mundane existence to be considered in a true way as a play of the light of 
consciousness. In this sense the human person living in the Cid-ii/manic mode of 
hypostatic or personal existence, as an Arman-hypostasis. attains an awareness in re-
cognition of the divine reality that can also be expressed in terms of a communion of 
substance, through this Almanic nature. This experience indicates a sense of unity 
within the individual experience of the Atman through the communion with the 
essential reality of being. In Pratyabhijiiii the ontological reality of the Arman allows 
God to force Himself into the world through the divine consciousness, piercing the 
~7K . 
As stated In chapter 2.4.6 of this thesis. 
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levels and coverings of ignorance through the active awareness of God's Sell 
allowing a communion or relationship with the world. 
The very fact of being pushes the notion of the world into a sense of objectification in 
relation to the subject (Atman), but in Pratyabhijnii the world is not to be considered 
in terms of separation as an outer object, or something different to the Atman, but 
intrinsically related to divine being. The objectification of phenomena from a view-
point of the divine reality does not hinder a sense of real existing, or a type of 
existing, from the perspective ofthe object but affirms two things. Firstly, the object 
is real having a real existence apart from the divine condition and secondly, that the 
true sense of reality of that object relates to its interior nature, the Atman. The 
conscious awareness, of the subject, objectifies the world as that-ness (idanlii), which 
has as its backdrop the Atman, or the what of being. but which is not divided or 
separated from "that" or objectified phenomena. Thus the way in which persons come 
to understand themselves relates as much to their own existence as a material type or 
mode of existence, which is comes to be understood in relation to the light of heing, 
and to the underlying reality or the what of heing. Through the experience of the 
higher consciousness, a person comes to live in a higher type or mode of existence. 
Thus there are not different types of heing but types of existing, where all modes of 
existence reflect a particular existence within a specific nature, but which exist 
through the essential reality of being. The type of existence a person experiences 
reflects the level of consciousness of a particular subject (personlpuru,\'a), where 
consciousness allows an awareness within the existential condition or type of 
existence a person is experiencing, and then the evaluation of the nature of that 
existence. 
The conscious awareness of an individual can experience a movement towards 
accepting a notion of unity, but this initially does not disclose a higher level of or a 
change in the type of existence. Through the limited cognition in the individual, true 
cognition underpinning that existence comes into the field of the person's 
consciousness. It is important here to underline again that consciousness is informed 
by Alman and not itself, for if that were the case, unity would be based on a 
consciousness associated with the natural or biological physis. In this condition 
consciousness would not be able to disclose truth to existence, and unity would stand 
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distinct and separate from multiplicity. The lower nature would also not be able to 
create itself for this would make unity impossible to attain within an inescapable 
prison. The natural physis can neither reveal the truth to itself or manifest itself to 
itself without the activity of the divine being. Consequently, in the natural model 
individuals could not attain knowledge or awareness of themselves but exist within a 
mode of existence that would be incapable of experiencing another. Hence it is the 
divine consciousness, whose nature is self-awareness and has the characteristic of 
consciousness (Cit) that allows not only for awareness of individual persons, but of 
the highest heing. It is the luminosity and activity of Cit in manifestation which 
overcomes the gulf between the divine and creation, where the natural physis becomes 
a "reflection" (pratibimba)279 of the divine. 
3.5.4 Existence and Non-existence 
The correlating of creation to prakiisa and does not indicate the non-existence of 
objects or person, or non-being, but rather it reflects the fullness of objects and 
persons. Pratyabhijnii does not imply a non-existence of manifestation or person as 
with a reflection of the moon in a mirror, it affirms that objects have a dependency. 
This does not denude a sense of heing or existence but rather confirms that the 
ontological existence of a thing or person is affinned in its difference, through the will 
and power of the Lord to create. The Lord (Paramdvara) is the 'cause,2KO of 
substances and objects, which do not have themselves as cause. Utpala stated: 
It cannot be within the power of any inanimate object to bring into existence 
anything that is non-existent. Therefore the essence of the relation between 
cause and effect is in fact, the relation between a manifesting subject and a 
manifestable object. A non existent entity is always non-existent; the existence 
ofa non-existent entity is not possible ... even when the cause-and-efTect 
relation is talked about in the world, (the effect) can (at the most) be just an 
exterior manifestation of some internally existent entity (the cause, which 
assumes) the position of an object of knowing through (a persons) interior and 
179 . ~KO Abhmavagupta. Tantriiloka. 111.11. (Walli). 
IPK, 2.40, p.52; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.4.8, p.140. 
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exterior senses. Such a thing can happen only through the divine power of that 
unknowable Authority (God).281 
In other words persons do not manifest God: God manifests persons and through this 
relational position a sense of person acquires meaning. It is because all substances and 
objects have as their cause the divine substance and radiance, which reflects through 
those substances and objects, that the solidity of material form is accepted. The world 
has to be thus considered real and existent due to the cause and reflected through the 
activity of prakiisa. 282 This reflection is not the type perceived within a mirror, where 
in that reflection forms are confused and having no true reality. But as Abhinavagupta 
shows, through Cit. 283 hollow objects gain significance where just as in a mirror, the 
mirror acts as a medium by which the exterior object is perceived. So too it is through 
Cit that reflected objects attain significance. But the notion of reflection may cause 
some problems due to an inherent lack of concrete existence of the reflection. 
Conversely, the clarity of the image of the reflection in the mirror may indicate that an 
object has a real or self-caused nature. Another dynamic relates to the perception of 
objects by the senses of the human person, which allows individuals to gain a 
concrete sense of themselves and through false identification with the objects, a sense 
of separation and ignorance. 
However, objects and the subject perceiver, all shine with the light of consciousness 
and are consequently able to be perceived and perceive through divine consciousness. 
In this sense person, while in one condition can be viewed as a reflected object, 
becomes related to the source of reflection and attains a sense of true heing through 
that context. It is the nature of perception itself which allows objects, and thus 
persons, to reflect the nature of the true Sell They may appear to be false from a 
position of truth, but are themselves true having concrete existentiality due to the 
activity of Cit. Cit manifests as such objects and due to the nature of Alman. allows 
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objects to be considered real. Consequently, the reality of objects is not conditioned 
through their own existence for otherwise how could objects be perceived outside of a 
self-awareness and reflected through the divine awareness? Objects do not attain a 
sense of reality through sense perception, but because of the essential nature inherent 
in the perception of objects, allows for such objects to be perceived as real and yet 
highlighting the reality of the essential nature of the subjects and objects. 
It is because unity shines through the objects, due to the radiance of the divine heing 
and the activity of the light of consciousness radiating from the Alman that objects 
attain a sense of real-ness and this is not due to self-causation or material causation. 
Due to the true cause of objects, God, perceived as non-existence, becomes real 
because of the real-ness of that causation. If objects were unreal then the source of 
that unreality would also be unreal. As a consequence objects are to be considered 
real, as is the perception of them and of the perceiver. However. ifany sense of 
falseness arises. this also due to the Alman. for nothing arises or exists without the 
Alman whether good or bad, pure or impure, for without this luminosity no 
objectification would be perceived at all. But when the mind shines as the light of 
consciousness all objectified manifestation is viewed as related to the Lord. In this 
sense the objectified world and concrete persons can appear to be real but at the same 
time unreal, and attain a true sense of reality through the light of consciousness. As 
Utpala stated, the world's activities whether pure or impure are experienced "within 
the Lord decorated by the (reflective) manifestations of various different 
phenomena".2114 
Conversely, if oneness and unity of the Self were to be argued without affirming the 
reality of manifestation, then the world would have to be admitted as unreal or maya 
or avidya. But it has to be asked, to whom does this non-knowledge belong? Not to 
Brahman which is pure heing, or to itself, for an unreality cannot be real to itself. 
There cannot be non-duality in itself for there is plainly duality, or duality in itself for 
dualily cannot support itself. Even the admittance of non-duality implies an exterior 
element in the affirming of the non-ness of duality in the first place. In other words it 
~JI.I $(=tl~("'Q~~FtH51~~ fim11 ~ ~ ~ e:Qa(\l:(Is~II""II. ittham ary-
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p.32; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.7.14. p.92. 
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would seem duality is prior to non-duality for non-duality would not mani fest avidya 
on account of its own perfect being and knowledge. But even this would be true if it 
were not the activity of Citi-sakti creating duality. The Supreme personal Lord, 
Mahesvara, desires to manifest and does so out of His will and capacity to do so. 
As such, the human experient, person, cannot be called a product of maya or avidya, 
but as his or her essential being is Atman. the human person is intimately related to 
the divine Citi-sakti. However, the individual consciousness may be covered with a 
lack of awareness of this truth (kaiicukas), living certain types of modes of existence 
(gu~as) that support a limited view, and thus is unaware of the true nature of his or 
her reality. Indeed any awareness that supports finitude (a~ava-mala) is only due to 
an apparent "a~ava-impurity".28s It also seems that separateness and bound-ness or 
individuality has come to be considered as a proper definition for a human person, 
when according to Utpala the opposite is true. The human person is not truly a whole 
person in the natural condition, where an entity experiences a loss of an "independent 
active power and active identity".286 In the deluded and separated condition the 
individual cannot understand its true condition due to the Hloss of the awareness of 
one's real nature".2H7 
This loss of ones real nature, due to perceived coverings (relating to /caikukas) of 
ignorance, can be correlated, in the Byzantine tradition, to the coverings of Adam and 
Eve with "gannents of skins" (Gen 3:21). This, Maximus the Confessor argued, could 
be correlated to the covering of the true nature of human persons in the blending of 
the soul and body together. 288 This blending of the immaterial and the material 
natures, due to transgression, paradoxically allows for a capacity for change, and it is 
this capacity for change that allows an existential movement from individual to 
person. The notion of change, a change of awareness and existential conditions in 
both traditions, were at the root of an incorrect mode of existence, which is full of 
irrational love (fp<.t><;),289 and opposed that mode oflife which leads to truth and 
ful fillment. 
'X5 
: IPK, 3.16, p.65; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.2.5, p.175. 
:1167 IPK, 3.15, p.64; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.2.4, p.174 . 
• M Ibid. 
~KM Maximus, Ambig. 8 (PG 91), 11 04B-C (Blowers) . 
. K'Ilbid. 
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The fulfillment of the human person, the moving out of a natural condition in 
Pratyabhijiiii tenns, was equated to an experience of re-cognition of one's true 
condition, as being non-different to the luminous shinning Self of the Lord. But if 
one's being is divine, then is one's ego, .~iva·s ego? This is the crux of the ontological 
dilemma in the qualifying of the non-dual condition in concrete existence and the 
need not to completely nullify dualistic existence in non-dualism. In complete non-
dualism a kind of gnostic dualism becomes evident in the separation of the divine 
from the world, or the development of a complete monist unity, which dissolves 
individuality. In a qualified dualistic model however, as in Pratyabhijnii, duality is 
affirmed but then contextualized through the light of consciousness (prakiHa). Utpala 
argued that prakiHa is the "essence of an object",290 otherwise, objects would remain 
unmanifest, thus they have "consciousness as its very soul".2'JI Indeed, all existence 
would be non-existence if it were not for the light of consciousness, or the activity of 
Alman which remains the basis for all "mundane activities".292 
It could be argued that the Pratyabhijnii model, which views everything through the 
light of consciousness, may denude a notion of concrete person in reducing a person 
to a divine manifestation, but as already shown, a notion of concrete person is only 
understood as such when the person experiences the freedom of true heing rather than 
conditioned through iiIJava-mala. Hence, personal egoity attains a sense of true heing 
and freedom only when related to divine "Egoity".21).1 But iiIJava-mala and egoity do 
not imply a kind of non-being even though the teaching of non-being (abhiivaviida). 
in Trilw has been applied to the divine. 294 Dyczkowsky argues that the philosophy of 
abhiivavilda in the Saivism of Kashmir is more common than previously thought?)~ 
He demonstrates that in Pratyahhijnil the concept or "absolute ego,,29(1 reflects a 
positive ontological context, 'I am' heing (ahambhilva) rather than 'I am' not heing. 
This sense of heing, allows for a full sense of being where the ego experiences its 
selfhood, and yet unity when related to divine 'Egoity' through the light of 
")f') 
• IPK. 1.33, p.14; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.2, p.50. 
2'11 Ibid. 
~:~ IPK. 1.37, p.16; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.6, p.55. 
Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, 'Self-Awareness, Own Being and Egoity', in A Journey in the World of the 
;~ntras (New ~clhi: 2004), p.29. 
"I' Dyczkowskl, A Journey in the World of the Tantras, p.13 . 
. . Ibid. 
~tH) • 
Dyczkowskl, 'Self-Awareness, Own Being and Egoity', p.29. 
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consciousness. This type of existence (Cid-iitmanic), which is had in a "flash of true 
kn I d ,,297·. C' f hiS b' t" 298 th t ow e ge, gIves flse to pure onsclousness 0 t e "rea u ~ec, or e rue 
knowing person. 
3.6 Knowing Person 
In this part of the chapter the question is asked, who is the knowing person or 
"knowing subject,,299 and what are the implications to person? These are difficult 
questions for while PratyabhijPlii affirmed that subjects and objects are dependent on 
the divine cause and this dependency infers that perceptions, non-perceptions, 
reasoning. faculties of existing, all emerge "fundamentally out of one common 
knowing subject".30o As Pandit stated that according to PratyabhijPlii: 
all knowing is thus in fact, an inseparable quality of the inner divine knower 
who alone shines as Himself in the form of such activities as perception, 
conception, recollection, imagination, contemplation, reco!,1J1ition, realisation 
and so on. 301 
The question of how knowing relates to person and a single Se(j'becomes not an 
ontological question in the sense of awareness, but dependent on how one perceives 
consciousness within a concept of person. The consciousness of person when directed 
to false perceptions becomes incomplete in those false perceptions, but when directed 
to the divine consciousness, to a relationship with divine consciousness (Cit), 102 the 
individual consciousness becomes transformed through a union with the true knowing 
subject. The question of a knowing subject, as person, does not become constrained 
within mundane consciousness (cilia), but related to the real subject or person. This 
model considers a notion of concrete person 10J in relation to a unifying field of 
m IPK. 3.23. p.67; translation by Pandit IPKp. 3.2.12. p.181. 
2'IM Ibid. 
2W IPK. 1.67. p.27; translation by Pandit.IPKp. 1.7.4. p.84. 
1m Ibid. 
lUI 1PK 46 p. p .. 
Ill! Or Supreme Consciousness. see PBHs.l. pp.46-51. But Cit can also be understood as Citi (singular). 
as the .~akti of the divine within a sense of conscious aware energy (ibid.). Citi is viewed as the cause 
of the universe as the Lord's power (ibid.). 
101 B P d' I . 
. an It never exp alns how purU$a indicates person. In one instance he tends to see the terms 
indicating "finite persons" (IPKp. p.193) and in another in absolute terms without satisfactorily 
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consciousness or unity within an Atmanic experience and how this experience is not 
in conflict with, or invalidated by, a simultaneous condition of divine consciousness 
and mundane consciousness. The knowing person at once indicates the vehicle by 
which mundane awareness and a true cognition takes place, the material condition, 
and the nature of true knowing, where the person is transformed, within an experience 
of unity with the divine and attains an awareness or consciousness of the "knowing 
Subject".304 
3.6.1 Difference and Subjectivity 
In Pratyahhijifii. the stress on difference and subjectivity was to affirm the nature of 
dependency in those conditions, and to highlight where doer-ship belongs. The notion 
of concrete person, while partly relating to a concrete material existence also includes 
an aspect of awareness, or the identification of doer-ship. In this identification, 
objective phenomena become can be considered as isolated and disconnected or 
established through and in relation to a unity of being. Without this unity, materiality 
and the body becomes a fleshy lump of useless substances. It is the unity of awareness 
that establishes a link between material substances and cognition, even that of 
finitude, which is established through the unity of Self. Hence there has to be a focus 
on how particular subjectivity relates to awareness in relation to doer-ship. Who is the 
real doer? Of course most persons would affirm that they are the doer, but the task of 
Pratyahhijifii was to question this assumption. If finite beings were the real doers they 
would become independent beings, which would have two effects. Firstly, they would 
be self-caused, and secondly, they would not be able to communicate or even be 
aware of other self-caused entities, for what would be the unifying relational 
constituent by which relationality could be affected. Hence, Pratyahhijifii asserted that 
worldly activities are conditional to unity, which is provided by the "unity of prakiNa: 
PrakiHa is the common Subject',,305 whereby subjectivity and objectivity are existent 
and conditional to a single 'I-consciousness' or "knowing Subject,,306 established 
bringing the two models together where a notion of person can mean different things in Prol),uhhijna 
~~pending on whether a pure or impure promiilr is being discussed. 
IPK, 1.83, p.34; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.8.6, p.96. 
101 
IPK, 1.87, p.36; translation by Pandit, IPK, 1.8.10, p.IOO. 
lOt. IPK, 1.83, p.34; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.8.6, p.96 
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through an inherent unity. All observable phenomena attain subject-to-object 
relationality or "mutual unity,,307 due to the dependency on divine unity and divine 
doer-ship. Consequently, when relating doer-ship to a "single cogniser: the Self,30K 
individual doer-ship is negated, which may seem to negate the place for concrete 
individual and consciousness, but this is only from a position of ignorance. 
In Pratyabhijiiii, cognition thus was intimately related, not only to ordinary 
knowledge,309 but to divine cognition, where the divine power of differentiation 
(apohana-sakti)310 manifests in knowing subjects (pramiitrs) the notion of difference 
(bheda). But even within a concept of difference there are acceptable levels of 
difference and unacceptable levels of difference. This is highlighted by Utpala, who 
develops a complex cosmological system, based on already accepted constructs as 
exemplified in the Miilinlvijayottaratantra,311 where Siva and Sakt; form part of the 
J07IPK• 1.26, p.ll; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.4.3. p.40. 
10M Ibid. 
10'1 As highlighted by Peter David Lawrence, see D. P. Lawrence. 'Aspects of Abhinavagupta's Theory 
of Scripture', Satya Nilayam; Chennai Journal of Intercultural Philo.mphy 5 (2004), pp.5-26; and D. P. 
Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999). Lawrence focuses on the 
role of word (V,k), speech and syntax (Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Tran.~('endental Argument. 
p.24) mantra, ritual and gnoseology (Lawrence, 'Aspects of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Scripture', p.5) 
in the role of 'self-recognition', and in relation to the 'transcendental argument' as a "contemporary 
interpretation of monist Kashmiri ,~aiva Philosophy"(ibid.). He highlights that any new interpretation 
has to be placed within the prevailing theological discourse and philosophical narratives such as 
postmodemism, relativism and "non-epistemic factors" (ibid. 1"1".2-33) of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
Thomas Kuhn, and Michael Foucault. Lawrence otTers an adapted form of epistemological relativism 
to understand Pratyahhijitii through "cross cultural dialogue" (Lawrence, 'Aspects of Abhinavagupta's 
Theory of Scripture', p.24) in which he highlights the deconstructive role of Pratyahhijitii. which 
undermines previous discourses of other traditions without denuding the truths of those traditions. He 
places his approach to Pratyabhijitii within a model (Lawrence, Redi.H·tH'ering God with 
Transcendental Argument, pp.14-16) where epistemological categories (pramii~a.f or . means of 
knowledge'; see Lawrence, 'Aspects of Abhinavagupta 's Theory of Scripture', p.7) are self-informing 
principles. and this becomes the foundation of his methodological approach. lawrence seeks an 
interpretation which relies on the external. the phenomenological. where transcendence is disclosed in 
"philosophical rationalisation" (Lawrence. Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument. 1".23) 
and identifies relation and action as constantly the manner in which Pra~l'ahhijitii is understood in a 
"narrative or mythico-ritual narrative ontology" (ibid.). But in using Western philosophical models to 
contextualise Pratyabhijitfl, does he miss the ontological implications of Pralyahhijitfl? It can also be 
asked whether he reduces Pratyahhijitii to a narrative of syntax of the metaphysical and transcendent. 
capable of being accessed merely epistemologically, viewing Pratyabhijitii as "an exercise in 'pure 
reasoning· n (Lawrence. 'Aspects of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Scripture'. p.17) where the Agamic 
epistemological categories inform the experient of re-cognition. While Lawrence understands ontology 
in Abhinavagupta in a Heideggerian type model where a rclationality becomes the focus in 
understanding heing. where form, action and relation are coalesced through scripture and syntax. I will 
relate person in Pratyahhijitii to true heing, to a re-discovery of being and consciousness. Lawrence in 
his over-stating of the epistemological argument. develops his interpretation of Pratyabhijitii to 
accomplish an over-nuanced narrative as a polemic for a post modem deconstruction of the 
meta narrative. but does not inform us how to approach a whole model of heing and existence. 
1I0 1PK. 1.22-23.1".10. 
111 See Mfllinivijayottaratanlram (KSTS. 37). ed. P. M. K, Shastri. 
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"pure" planes of existence3l2 and the pure-impure universe correlated to Sadiisiva. 
Nvara and Sadvidyii. 313 The impure universe was related to the rest of the tallvas 
includingpuru$a. 314 The important point here, which will also be explained in the 
next part of this chapter in relation to manifestation (iibhiisas), is that a dual aspect of 
purity-impurity (or non-difference-difference) is incorporated within a single model, 
enabling me to argue for a simultaneous acceptance of multiple cognitions. Even 
though the notion of individual (a~u) initially indicates finitude and separation, it also 
indicates the possibilities of a higher consciousness through a process of purification 
and prayer (mantra repetition). Through this process the a~u begins to change its 
perception and thus the relationship of individual to the divine changes, as does the 
perception in relation to the world and God. This intimate relationship between 
cognition and iibhiisas reveals the philosophical depth of Pratyabhijnii to overcome 
the dilemma of the divine reality and revelation in relation to apparent diversity. 
There is, in this revelation a perceived movement from the divine to the world where 
the divine consciousness (Cit) comes to participate on an intimate level of activity 
(kriyii) with individuals and thus raises the level of individual awareness (dtta) to the 
divine awareness (vimar.~a). This divine activity is exemplified in the force of mantras 
or miitrkii-sakti which "brings about knowledge in a limited form such as 'I am 
imperfect' (ii~avamala) .. ·115 in the covering of finitude. This is highlighted in the .~;va 
Sutras which stated that the "subtle basis of mundane knowledge lie in the properties 
of sound".3\(, Consequently, it is the Lord's power or covering (ii~ava mala) that 
makes an individual believe himself or herself to be incomplete and have a sense of 
mundane difference as compared to other objects of manifestation. In this context of 
,~akt;. which is the power of the mantra, ordinary awareness (dlla)' 17 through the 
repetition of the mantra allows a person to attain an identity in the highest reality 
(Annutara),31K whose power is contained in the mantra and thus "becomes identical 
l\~ IPK. 3.1, p.59; and also Pandit's 'Cosmology of Kashmir Saivism', IPKI', (' Appendix'), p.209. 
III 
IPK. 3.2-6, pp.59-61; also see part 3.4 of this thesis. 
II~ IPK. 3.7-29, pp.61-69. 
III SS.I.4 (commentary); translation by Singh, SSs, p.26. 
Ilh tt· . . i11ft11 1!1ft1 ~II\/II; Jniiniidhisthiinam miitrkii, SS.4; translatIOn by Stngh, SSs. p.25. 
117 A · . ~ S It states 10 SS that the mind-consciousness is the nature of mantra, Iqn ;rnr: II t II. cilia", 
mantrab, SS, 2.1; translation by Singh, SSs, p.82. 
11K Abh' mavagupta stated, that '''the anuttara or the unsurpassable one is the unsurpassable even to the 
proximate one' or 'anuttara means even the answer amounts to no answer'. The plan of creation in 
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with that Reality".319 Cognition then becomes related to the perceived movement from 
Para (Supreme) to aparii (non-supreme) which come together in a model of pariipara 
(supreme-cum-non-supreme).:120 This allows, in the experience of the Supreme, a 
unity of consciousness and change in cognition. In the pariipara cognition there is 
both the experience of the concrete personal existence and the cognition relating to 
difference, which allows for the possibilities of Absolute consciousness (indicating 
non-difference) and difference. Both levels of consciousness are possible through 
pariipara for they simultaneously exist within a person. J2l It is within the higher 
consciousness, relating to Para. that there is both the experience of concrete identity 
and re-cognition or divine consciousness. 
In the aparii state the cognition of a particular experient (pramiitr) is bound within an 
"impure" state and to a perception which views objects and God as completely 
distinct from itself. This does not indicate that there are different types of persons but 
that there are different levels of consciousness within the human condition. But as 
Abhinavagupta argues, that if such a limited cognition rests not on pure '(-
consciousness', then that pramiitr would not be able to experience a COb'l1ition outside 
of its own subjectivity or would only be able to assert "I am this" or "I am that". m 
Cognition is always expressed through the words 'I-am'. which reflects the self-
luminous expression of the 'I' (Aham) of the divine and through the determinative 
knowledge which follows. In determinate knowledge there is an awareness of the 
specific reality of an individual and the objects of perception. which come to be 
expressed through and eventually as the cognition of the divine as luminous 
expressions of the true subject. Utpala stated: 
Whether the form of determinate knowledge be 'I see this' or 'this is jar', it 
implies that the indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with it. 
Because the experience or perceiver has various cognitions: .( see', .( saw', 
accordance with kula abides in the ether of my heart", uttaraasyiipyanuttaraml kauliko )'a", vidhirdL'Vi 
~~m hrd~yomnyavasthita/:l. Parii-TrWkii-Vivaraf.Ja (Singh). p.65. 
Smgh. SSs. p.82 
1~1J Para- TrWkii- Vivarana (Singh) p 209 
l~ I, . ,.. 
K. Mlshra sees equates personhood only with cognition and personality. confusing a notion of 
person with aspects of personhood such as personality. or abnegation of the concrete person in divine 
union. He states that. "Pratyabhijifii is the total spiritual transformation of the person ... a transformation 
ofthe personality" (Mishra. Kashmir 'saivism, p.259). But he does develop a complex epistemology. 
identifying two types of ignorance and two types of knowledge or illumination to explain types of 
~,~owing in human personhood (ibid.). 
-- IPV. 1.4.1 (commentary); translation by Pandey. IPVp. p.41. 
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'this', 'that', therefore, it is clear that both the knower and the known in their 
distinctive nature, shine in the subject. 323 
3.6.2 Non-Difference and Subjectivity 
Utpala continued to argue that if the objects are not one with the light of 
consciousness (prakasa) then objects would remain unmanifest. Consequently, the 
"subjective light is not essentially different from the objective"J24 and this light is the 
essence of objects. Knowing cannot be divorced from the subject of knowing 
otherwise knowing would only be related to a limited knowledge of the object. If an 
object were only able to know itself, then it would be constrained to the limits of that 
knowledge. Hence, that knowledge arising from the light of consciousness is the basis 
of all cognitions as Utpala stated: 
If the light of consciousness (praka.~a) be different from the object and 
homogenous in itself, then confusion of one object with another would follow. 
Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, is not different from light. For. 
h t . I' h 'd' "~ w a IS not Ig t cannot sal to eXIst. •. 
If the subject perceives objects as "the other (bimba)"J26 and as other than itself and 
unrelated to itself, then the subject become isolated within a self-conditioned reality 
and not able to observe anything outside of the subjective experience. Another result 
would be that the subject would become dependent upon other objects for its own 
identity and knowledge. However, the objectified or detenninate knowledge is not 
known or experienced in isolation but related to the universal 'I-consciousness', being 
the divine conscious light (praka.~a). This universal consciousness. which has the 
freedom (sviitantrya)327 to act, allows the objects to be, as the object and the objects 
are not divorced from this activity. As Utpala argued. there is the possibility of "both 
1~1 ;~ tr Ql<lI?4e:~~ ~s~ CfTs~1 ~ ~ 't11C:cHH11(1~ ~~II"II ~ 
n~ ms~ ~ $\""<II~~I i.lllQi.lIe:Cfi(1I~ror:tlcttt'f m<=J: CjfAI('1~ lilli, ya ca pasyamy aham 
ima", ghal() 'yam iii viivasal manyale samavela", sopy ava.~olari darsanam// tan maya dr.ryatl! dr$IO 
~~'am sa ity iimrsaty apiJ griihya griihakalii hhinniiv arthau bhiitaf/ pramotariJ/, IPK. 1.30-31. p.13; 
~~~nslation by Pandey IPVp. pp.SO-SI. 
1~1 IPK. 1.33. p.IS; translation by Pandey, IPVp. p.5S. 
1 ~' IPK. 1.34. p.IS; tmnslation by Pandey. IPVp. p.S7 . 
• u Ibid. 
121 IPV. 1.6.&; IPVp, p.95. 
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the jar and not-jar. which are essentially different from each other" 12M and although 
these objects seem different from prakiisa, the prakiisa shines in these objects and the 
objects exist in the light of consciousness. Therefore differentiation (apohana) is due 
to both objectified difference and yet indicates the reality behind this differentiation. 
Utpala stated: 
Thus there is no doubt about it that the objects shine within the universal 
subject in remembrance, detenninate knowledge, which depends upon the 
differentiation, and in indetenninate cognition. 329 
Thus individual pramiitrs and objects are "one with the knowing Subject"nO for they 
are one with "pure Consciousness .. 331 and it is due to this consciousness, by virtue of 
His "Self-awareness ... pure knowledge ... pure action,,,JU that the pramiitrs not only 
attain cognition but attain a higher cognition through the absolute subject (Pramiilr). 
But in relating the concept of person to knowledge and to cognition, which is actually 
God's cognition, the question has to be asked whether those puru\\'U.\· who have not 
attained true knowledge, are to be considered as non-persons? Praryahh~ii'tii does not 
have a concept of non-puru\'tas. or non-persons, it is just that di fferent experiences of 
knowing indicate different levels of awareness or consciousness. This view is 
supported in Abhinavagupta who affirmed that, regardless of the levels of experience, 
we are all ·"persons .. ,33J for persons are from the Lord and do not exist in isolation. 
Abhinavagupta argues this from the point of "Universal Consciousness",H4 which is 
responsible not only for fulfilment but also obscuration or relative cognition, due to 
the divine freedom of the Lord to create. In manifestation relative cognition reflects 
this freedom within the concrete person. However true freedom is reflected in a way 
of existing where union with the divine reflects in a particular cognition, the '1-
consciousness' of the divine. 
1'M 
. IPK, 1.54. p.23; trdnslation by Pandey.IPVp. p.87. 
1"/ . ............". ~ , , ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
. mf '("rI(11 Iq,"<"'i qlC44j~i1q,(lliul j 0711., QIC4i(Hlimf: 1't"<l(1 ~q 1(1C1i1..II~O II I eva", 
·~",rlau vikalpe viipy apohana-pariiya~el jilime vapy anlar·ahha.wb sihita eveti niseilam/I: IPK. 1.60, 
0.25; translation by Pandey IP~p p 94 
'10 ' ,.. 
IPK. 1.83. p.34; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.8.6. p.96. 
111 Ib 'd 1 ., 1.84. p.34; 1.8.7. p.97 ::~ Ibid .. I.XX. p.36; 1.8.11. p.IOI. 
Pandey, IPVp. p.9. 
114 IPV 2 ,p .. 
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It is freedom that allows the act of re-cognition. where the Sellor Alman brings into 
existence of the one who has had the experience of re-cognition the freedom to he. for 
the individual by himself or herself cannot alone achieve true Self-hood or even 
perfect knowledge of the relative self. It is not any ordinary act that brings re-
cognition. but only the grace or Sakt; (power) of God for the Lord is both the subject 
and the object of grace, or individual pramiilrs. The light of knowledge is imparted 
through the activity of Citi-sakti as the light of consciousness (prakii.~a). by which 
knowledge informs the nature of being through the Self-luminosity of Cit, for without 
this, all manifestation would be in darkness and no cognition could occur. The 
awareness of T reflects this activity and of Citi. which also has the quality of a divine 
throb (!ipanda). This allows a movement from the divine to the limited T (cilia) and 
then to a true 'I-consciousness'. In this activity, of CW. the individual person is able 
to experience hislher own sense of individuality and at the same time experience true 
personhood in a unified experience with the divine pramiitr (.~iva). 
The notion of person is therefore to be conceived on many levels and intimately 
related to the divine functions, which manifests a sense of person in the first place 
within the individual in a self-cognition, or knowing person. The ability of the person 
to recognise his or her true personhood, as the "knowing subject" m is due to the 
relationship of an individual with the divine. It is the divine person who reveals His a 
true sense of knowing within the knowing human person. Through this relationship an 
individual experiences relational self-awareness, which become expanded to include 
re-cognit;on. or an awareness of one's true condition. This again is due to the activity 
of divine Self-awareness (vjmar.~a), which pushes outwards from its own condition to 
reveal jifiina and kriyii to limited knowing, to the limited knowing person. This 
activity refonns limited knowing through the experience of re-cognit;on within a non-
dual cognition, even though experiencing degrees of difference. Within a concept of 
person, this acceptance of difference through non-difference indicates the place for 
multi-cognitions to be accepted. But the experience and awareness of the divine 
becomes the true experience meant for human persons, whose very nature and 
existence reflects the divine nature and existence. 
ll~ IPK, 2.11, p.4l; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.2.3, p.117. 
242 
3.7 Unity-in-Difference: Revelatory Context 
In the last part of this chapter I will examine a notion of person in relation to 
difference (diversity/ bheda) or created manifestation (iibhiisa). This highlights that 
Pratyabhijflii allowed for a sense of what is concrete through the admittance of 'this-
ness,336 and 'that-ness', where "the relative and finite subject and the object appear 
(manifestation) within one basic subject,,337 (the Alman). The metaphysical focus in 
Pratyabhijiiii is not disconnected from the concrete but becomes the concrete essential 
nature and the principle of existence. allows for a real revelatory principle and 
context. Utpala stated that: "it is because of this that the Lord manifests His own Self 
objectively. Objective existence is not a thing existing separately from Him".31K 
Hence dependency not only becomes a feature of difference. and thus of person, 
which is to be viewed from a context of finitude as conditional to the divine. and also 
relational. This allows revelation to become fruitful in that phenomena attain fullness 
through that dependency. 
In the context of relationality, between 'mundane objects', objects become 'justified' 
only through relations with the divine, "established in one and the same knowing 
subject". WI From the perspective. of being justified through a single 'knowing 
subject'. person becomes directly related to a single reality and pure • 1-
consciousness'. This may seem to denude the notion of person. and indeed in the 
l<:varapratyahhijiiiikiirikii the tone in the latter part of Chapter I (Ji'liiniidhikiira) 
shifts, stressing more dynamically a non-dual stance where "exteriority is just an 
outward attribute". 340 Here Pratyahhijnii philosophy seems to become Platonic in is 
stress on interiority as a focus for "eternal existence" and the negation of exteriority. 
where objects "are brought into outward manifestation by miiyii". 141 This seems to 
negate a previous stress on the divine will creating the universe, not as a predicated 
principle. It certainly has repercussions for a notion of whole person, but this will be 
11(, 'This-ness'. or 'idantya' (IPK. 1.51. p.21) is an important issue in Pratyahhijnii in relation to 
awareness. which shows how individual consciousness of otherness <objectified universe. iihhiisas) 
reflects the divine movement from pure " am' to 'this is' and thus accepts the universe as real as 'that' 
\~~'). 'This-ness' reveals the true nature of Seifbehind 'this'. 
IPK. 1.31. p.13; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.4.8. p.46. 11K 
IPK. 1.46. p.19; translation by Pandit. ,PK", 1.5.15. p.64. 
11'1 
IPK. 1.65. p.27; translation by Pandit IPKp. 1.7.2 P 83 \40 , • • 
141 IPK. 1.82. p.34; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.8.5. p.95. 
IPK. 1.84. p.34; translation by Pandit. IPKp. \.8.7. p.97. 
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broached in the Chapter 4. This view is later qualified by Utpala in a unity-in-
diversity model where a relationship between 'self limited' objects and Se(tis 
established because of the single reality and not through a limiting condition. where 
Utpala's monism or "absolute realism,,342is clarified. This clarification is based upon 
dividing existential reality into three categories: 'absolute realism'; conditional 
realism and that which is non-real. 34.1 The first category conditions manifested 
phenomena through the Absolute reality. 
The Lord, being all powerful, manifests spatial sequence by creating 
wonderful variety in the forms of creation, and also brings about time 
sequence by manifesting variations in actions. 344 
The second category admits that subjects, objects, actions, substances time, and the 
like, are real, and emphasizes the real-ness of entities, while the third category 
considers thoughts such as imaginations to be unreal because they have no substantial 
reality. As a consequence, the whole tone of Pratyabhijitii is qualified to allow for 
difference, while contextualizing difference through non-difference or the "one 
knowing subject", 34~ through a model of unity-in-diversity (hhedahheda). 346 
Pratyahhijna argues that the "objectives of a person desirous of mundane attainments 
are fulfilled,,'47 having both "unity and diversity as their character. Such a thing is not 
illusion".'4K The model of hhedahheda allows a sense of concrete person to be argued 
while at the same time qualifying existential person (puru~'a) through the completed 
state of re-cognition. Through this model, difference, or hheda. is qualified through 
non-difference within a simultaneous acceptance of both conditions. It is the 
admittance of the divine activities in the world and the intention behind those 
activities that allows person to especially gain significance through the relational 
context implied in those activities. 
14, IPKp. p.IIS. 
141 Ibid. 
144 ~att ~(::{j ~ISfiIU11»1FfFlIRl'A't I fi\;lIl!tt ~r.tiflfll(4!flI<'lSfiAAcf'I~: 11'111, miirti-\'aicitry alO 
de.fa-Icramam iibhii.~ayat)' asaullcri)'ii-vaicitrya-nirbhii.~iillciila-Icramam api.v\·ural.J!l. IPK. 2.5. p.3R; 
translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.1.5. p.1 10. 
~I IPK. 2.12. p.4l; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.2.4. p.11 K. 
loIh See IPK. 2.15. p.42; 2.51. p.57. Bhediibheda is central. for it allows an acceptance of all relational 
activities and mundane activities in relation to the Absolute being and activities. For a full 
understanding of the philosophy of bhediibheda see. P. N. Srinivasachari. The Philosophy of 
Bhediihheda (Madras; 1934. 1996); see also Mishra. Kashmir ,<;aivi.~m. p.166; and Sanderson 'The 
Doctrine of the MalinTvijayottaratantra·. p.295. who shows that this development comes from the MT. ~1 IPK. 2.15. p.42; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.2.7, p.120. 
14K Ibid. 
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3.7.1 Revelatory Activities 
Through the divine activities or revelatory activity (kriyii_.5akti)J49 of the divine the 
world comes to be accepted in Pratyabhijiiii as real. This real-ness allows person to be 
accepted as a real ontological condition, without denuding that condition by relegating 
person to a mere principle of manifestation. Although the concept of person can sit 
within such a category, the reality of being a person must have existential and 
ontological significance. This significance is vouchsafed through the free will 
(Svalantrya-L~akli)J50 and activity ofthe Lord, divine consciousness (cid-iitmani)BI to 
create each unique person. But person cannot be left in this isolated condition as a 
separate individual within a material nature, which is taken in Siinkhya to be the cause 
and effect,352 but attains true significance through a relationship with the divine. This 
relationship is established through the divine will and activity, as are the relations 
between persons, due to "their dependence on the knowing subject,,;m for the 
Absolute Consciousness is the basic cause and source of all phenomena".1~4 This 
activity is not 'justifiable' in the case of the nature (prak{1i). B~ because it could not 
allow both unity and diversity, only diversity, and is justifiable through Atman, which 
"consists of pure consciousness (cid-iitmani) cid-atmani with the capacity of 
appearing diversely".J56 Through the experiencing of the divine state, the truth of this 
position is re-cognised by the person who "becomes a citpramata"m and attains full 
personhood. This becomes possible through the movement of the divine to and in the 
world through the kriYii-.5akti. The .~iva Sutra.\· stated: 
The divine consciousness with a desire to display the variegated panorama of 
the universe, at first adopts the principle of contraction, assumes the state of 
limited experients Ulvas) who are a form of prii~ii - the universal life force 
which brings about the manifestation of the entire universe in a limited form 
and also appears in the form of the world as griihya or object. '~K 
14'1 
IPKp, p. \05, which establishes the divine active power of the Lord to negate atheistic or Buddhist 
ar1uments of non-being or creation by some natural condition (ibid.). 
::1 SS, 111.43; translation by Singh. SSs, p.225. 
IPK. 2.51, p.57. 
1~' 
. IPK, 2.49. p.56. 
1~ 1 
1'4 IPK. 2.48, p.55; translation by Pandit. IPK. 2.4.16. pp.146-147. 
IPKp. p.147. 
I'~ 1 ~· IPK, 2.51. p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.19, p.149 . 
. ~ Ibid. 
1<7 
. SSs,p.lxv. 
HH Ss, 111.43; translation by Singh. SSs. p.225. 
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It is the Lord who becomes so related to the world so as to allow the world to be 
expressed in a real way and in tum provides meaning to person for the world is not 
negated as in a Advaitic model but is viewed as real. Hence a dual approach was 
evidenced, which allowed for both unity stressed in the Almanic experience and 
difference through the levels of iibhiisas. However, this view was also qualified for 
the world cannot reveal truth to itself, as Utpala stated, "the activity of creation is not 
possible at all on the basis of the two apparently different realities (Alman and 
world)".359 Utpala also argued that "such a thing is not justifiable in the case of an 
insentient entity (matter), on account of contradiction between unity and diversity" ,160 
but this dilemma is overcome in that the Alman. which is pure consciousness and has 
the capacity to 'appear diversely'. Utpala stated that: 
The Lord, by virtue of His divine power, manifests these apparent phenomena 
simply through the power of His divine will (without resorting to the use of 
any other cause or means). That is what is known as His active nature and His 
creative aspect.361 
It is because the manifested world is due to divine activity, and not is separated from 
God, that the mundane activities are fulfilled by the divine, where entities have both 
"unity and diversity (hhediihheda) as their character". 162 which are not illusions. 
However, such a viewpoint is only from he/ow for in the highest awareness, all 
manifestations (iihhusas) are viewed as intimately related to the divine, as Utpala 
stated: "God is taken to be numerous types of finite persons". 161 The sense of finitude 
infers that a dual consciousness and will is apparent, that of relating to the divine 
experience and that of the entity experiencing his or her existence as the object of 
existence or the egoistic • I'. This sense of finitude or a~ava-mala indicates that 
ordinary or mundane thoughts and life are not rejected but ultimately are also 
considered as the divine. There is an implicit relationship of the divine consciousness 
WI IPK. 2.S2. p.S7; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.4.20, p.ISO. 
\I'(~ tl' ~ "'s~q ~:I ~~elC"'J1~ Cj ~1I'i'II:na('aYllkfa", 
jaf/as),aivam hhediihheda-virodhafab/ iihhiisa-hhediid ekafra cid-iifmani fu.mjyafell, IPK. 2.S1. p.S7: 
translation by Pandit,IPKp. 2.4.19. p.149. 
lid ~ ~'i1rC1~'fffi('(Uaq&fll1ltt~("'QIi1..1 I1lcll~~6Iqt~ ~ ~&fhtC1I'Ft1 lIT II ~~ II e~a 
cllnanta-saktitvlid evam abhllsayaty amOni bhavlin icch! vasad e~li kriya nirmatrtasya sa//33111PK, 2.33. 
f..,sO: translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.4.1, p.13S. 
I •• IPK. 2.IS. p.42: translation by Pandit.IPKp, 2.2.7, p.120. 
11.11PK 
. 4.3. p.70; translation by Pandit, IPKp. p.193. 
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to the world and so the Atziivopiiya of .~iva Sutras develops a process by which the 
individual comes to know his or her true state, 
While Pratyabhijiiii developed a more sophisticated philosophical explanation of the 
divine activities in relation to the world than the Siva Sutras, the .~;va Sutra.\' did begin 
to express how the divine comes to be related to the mundane condition through the 
aphorism, "Atmii is Citta".364 This statement allows the divine nature to be directly 
correlated to the lower condition without confusing either. In the individual 
consciousness (cilia), the Self becomes self, where knowledge in that condition 
becomes bondage Uiiiinam bandhab).36S The Atziivopiiya thus concerns itself with the 
yoga of the individual, so that the individual can attain the consciousness (Cit), which 
is its true reality. Cit becomes "reduced to citta,,366 in the apparent movement to the 
world from the divine, and then there is an apparent reciprocal movement from the 
world or individuals to the divine in which the yogi experiences "over and over again 
the awareness of the divine both inwardly and outwardly". '67 This view is confirmed 
again in the Pra~vabhijiiiihrdayam, which affinns that the individual experients 
(pramiitrs) are "Citi in a contracted form"J68 or a "solidified form (ii.\:viinatiirupa) of 
Cit-essence".369 
3.7.2 From Individual to Person 
The movement of the divine to the world is reciprocated in an upward movement. 
These movements can be viewed as continuous expressions of the divine activity and 
at a certain point seem to attain a sort of stasis in which a pause is evident. There is a 
simultaneous affirmation of all conditions. At this point there is evident, difference 
and non-difference, absolute being and individual human existing. This allows 
individuals, as iibhiisas, to be considered as real, having as their cause the divine 
Cause. The real-ness of individual in Pratyahh!ii'lii is not denied but confirmed in the 
1/04 c::a.-..... ~ l'qn"1..11 til, Atma Ottam, SS, 3.1; translation by Singh, SSs, p.126. 
1M Ss. 3.2. 
I/o(, Ib'd 'E .., 1" Xposltlon. SSs, p.128. 
\(, 1 snr fc!l ~ 
-" ~: f'Qlc1\! St1<'4ti1"'f..lI\l~ II, hhiiyab sytit pratimUanam, SS, 3.45; translation by Singh, SSs, p.230, 
I(,K PBH, 4; translation by Singh PBHs, p.SS. 
\(,~ Ib'd 1 ., (commentary), 
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context of iihhiisas. as Abhinavagupta argued, because of the knowledge of 
differentiation or detenninate knowledge,HO difference is expressed. However, due to 
the continuous activity of the divine, individuality does not rest but changes within a 
continuous movement, and can be viewed as evolving to a sense of person, where a 
divine mode of existence becomes the goal. Individual (a~u) becomes personJpuru.>·a 
(hypostasis), which allows a sense of true being (Atman) to be experienced. 
In differentiation, iibhiisas do not to appear to have any relational context to the 
divine in themselves, which is true of human individuals who exist according to the 
nature of each specific individual. It is because human individuals experience 
themselves in difference that the quality of difference continually changes due to the 
force acted upon it by the divine activities. If this were not the case the material nature 
of individuals would not allow a fluctuation or change of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, initially individuals only exist as a fonn of manifestation as does the 
knowledge relating to difference. Abhinavagupta stated: 
The iibhiisas of time and space impart particularity and exercise the function 
of as it were destroying etemality and omnipresence ... among the best known 
iihhiisas mentioned above, the iihhiisa 'man' is the best known, because in 
'man' &: d -hh - 171 are loun many a asas .. 
Consequently, there are iihhiisas relating to love, desires, greed, and the intellect, in 
short, relating to all things that indicate differentiation. Even the power of 
differentiation or ap()hana-.~akt;37} is an iihhiisa of the Lord. But it is because all 
iihhii.m.\· are a consequence of the true 'I-consciousness'. becoming objectified 
manifestation, fluctuations, changes and movement occur in individuals, even when 
considered as iihhiisas. which in tum allow for changes in awareness. These changes 
allow an individual to be considered as relational to the divine as a person and then as 
a deified person. 
As the perception of manifested phenomena comes to be recognized as "that" and 
different to the cognition of 'I Am', a space is created between objectified phenomena 
and individual consciousness. This initially is observed as such affinnations as cogito 
no 
, IPV, 2.3.4-5 (commentary); translation from Pandey, IPVp, pp.148.149. I., Ibid. 
17~ IPVp, p.40. 
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ergo sum,373 which relies on a sense of separation and observance of objects 
(iibhiisas) outside of one's own existence. These observations provide conclusions 
with regard to the nature of objects and individual subjects in relation to existence. In 
addition, the power of differentiation allows the beginnings of an exterior perception 
and awareness of the divine reality. Through this differentiation the individual comes 
to perceive an awareness of 'I am' in relation to 'Thou Art', and so the 'I-Thou' 
relational model begins to develop in which a sense of relational person allows the 
individual to develop a relationship with the divine. In addition, Utpala relates the 
notion of individual to a context of pra/crli374 and shows how individuals enter into a 
process of becoming for the !svarapratyabhijniikiirikii elucidates how to understand 
this process. The aim is to "initiate a concern with God,,·m so that, through the 
revelatory divine power (.~akli), the world can be overcome and the delusion of false 
perceptions, fall away. Utpala explains that it is the Lord Himself through his infinite 
power Oakli) and will (icchii) who creates the world, and it is His power and will that 
allows a human reciprocity.376 Even though there is the affinnation of the individual 
consciousness and a distinction between the states of consciousness, such as the pas" 
(bound), there is also a recognised movement from this state to that of the patio or 
realised J77 condition of super-conscious, the luryii or fourth state . .l7K In this state of 
awareness mundane knowledge and experience comes to be fulfilled in divine Self-
awareness, which penneates all realities. 
The outward flow of the divine kriyii or activity manifests a link between the internal 
divine state and the outer world, or iihhiisas. Within a sense of difference. non-
difference allows the individual to attain the highest consciousness. This is because 
within the depth of a personJpuru$a,379 there is an ontological relatedness to the 
1'1 
114 Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings, (UK: 1997). p.19H. 
See IPKp. p.149. 
m IPK. 2.32. p.50; translation by Pandit,lPKp, 2.3.17, p. \33. 
171, IPK 
177 .2.33. p.50; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.4.\, p. \35. 
IPK, 4.6. 
17M IPK. 3.31. p.69. 
17~ The difficulties of interpreting how person relates to puru~a. is exemplified by Bede Griffiths who 
determined that purU$a in the Brahman and Alman non-dual model points to an impersonal underlying 
Rt'alily. Bede Griffiths ('The Adwaitic Experience and the Personal God in the Upanishads and the 
Bhagavad Gita', Indian Theological Studies 15/1; 1978, pp.71-86). where personhood is correlated 
through an impersonal experience of Alman. Even though Bede Griffiths presented an Admitic 
Christian perspective, he highlighted the problem of the antinomy generally present in Admita. that of 
the personal in relation to the impersonal. 37'1 See Chandog)'a Upanisad, 6.2.1. It could be interesting 
also to correlate ideas relating to personhood in Pratyahhijitii to Vedanta in the context of Neo-
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divine, who as the Cause allows difference as a reflection of divine freedom. 
Mundane or individual consciousness is not denied, but as an iihhiisa, is related to the 
divine act. Utpala stated: 
His individual creation, not being common to all beings, remains dependent on 
God's creation. But even such a phenomenon, though appearing erroneously, 
is 'true' because of its being created by God appearing in the form of this 
individual being. 380 
Thus Pratyabhijnii in its accepting of the world as an iihhiisa of the Lord and thus 
real, had to incorporate notions of revelation, within a theocentric model, to allow 
reciprocation, otherwise the iihhiisas would only be relational to themselves. To 
accomplish this revelatory activity, Pratyabhijiiii, as already shown in Chapter 3.6, 
utilised the notion of Cit. 3R1 The iibhiisas, as the contracted fonn of Citi, come to 
reflect the divine reality because of the awareness of Cit in iihhiisas, which can be 
said to leak out and it is this leaking or outward flowing of the divine consciousness in 
iihhiisas that starts to reveal how iihhiisas are related to the divine consciousness (Cit). 
In this respect the individual starts to attain an existential condition more related to 
relational person. It was not sufficient to express Cit purely within a non-dual 
doctrine, but God and the world were to be brought together through the outward 
flowing activity of Citi-.~akti, which ultimately reveals the true nature of the iihh,i.\·us. 
This relationship between iihhiisas and Cit was underlined through the philosophical 
Vedanlic understanding of the concept of person where the Alm()pani\~ad·.~, notion of purll~;a could be 
utilised. see Swami Madhavananda, 'Atmopanishad', in Minor Upani.\·hads (Calcutta: 19KK). In this 
model. purU$a has three Almanic components, the "Outer-Atman. the Inner-Atman and the 
ParamAtman", Swami Madhavananda, Minor Upanishads, verse 2, p.12.The Oll/('r-Alman refers to the 
body. the Inner-Alman to the individual perceiver or the one who experiences, and the Paramiilman to 
the Supreme Lord who dwells within. The Supreme in the AlmOpani$ad is non-dual, non-being, but 
also has a personal quality in Subjective awareness, and thus it is stated: "He is the Puru~a who is 
called the Paramiilman" (ibid.). He is the awareness of being Paramiilman. Thus the Alman indicates 
what a person truly is and how the person in truth reflects an essential reality of being. What 
distinguishes this model from that of Pratyabhijitii is that in Pralyahhijitii the all-pervading Cil of S('/r 
distinguishes being from act, though at the same time upholding unity. and that it is this Supreme '1-
Consciousness' that informs the person of his or her true identity. Thus the Lord enters into 
participation with the individual through the activity of Cil, although the individual or purU$a may not 
understanding in what way, but ultimately participating as Cil. 
IKf)~~~ ~fct~ ~ ~ \1~I'C'1I~I'("'1I Ftte<N~j ~j l'IIICQiI(1<H 'C"I~qdl~ (1ek<l1l11: II~ II; lasviisiidhiirani 
,~ . 
fmir i.Sa-smy-upajivinil sai$iipy ajnalayii salyai\'eSa-.saktyii lad-iitmana~. IPK, 4.9, p. 71; translation 
by Pandit, IPKp. pp.19K-199. 
IMI PBH, 1-20. 
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usage of bhediibheda. 382 which allows difference within the non-different state. It 
must be stressed here that bhediihheda does not impinge on the non-dual outcome of 
Pratyabhijnii. but rather complements it by incorporating it in a sense of the dualistic 
and the accepting of iihhiisas as an aspect of divine condescension, where the 
presence of the Lord exists in those iibhiisas. This exemplifies an acceptance of both 
unity and diversity,383 and the admittance of the real-ness of the world. Manifestation 
(as iibhiisas) in the context of revelation and immanency (visvamaya) '84 is not unreal 
or dreams of the impersonal, but rather is a tangible and luminous manifestation of the 
divine Cit-.~akti. and due to this luminosity are ultimately non-different to the 
transcendent (visvottfrna) personal Absolute. Abhinavagupta states that "Paramasiva, 
the Absolute God, thus plays His wonderful game of bondage and liberation". 38~ All 
iibhiisas are not independent but dependent upon the divine luminosity which reflects 
within the iibhiisas not only the objectification of manifestations but within each 
lK1 K. Mishra refuses to accept that the Absolutism of Kashmir .~aivi.~m (new Trika). can be considered 
in a qualified manner. He also seems to centre his criticism of qualified models through Hegelian and 
rWniitNaitic notions (Mishra, Ka.~hmir .~aivism, p.l 0 I). In the former model the notion of free act is 
negated through evolution of matter, and the latter distances the Divine from creation. While I accept 
this, I would state that the bhediibheda of Pratyabhijitii is not of the type considered by Mishra, in that. 
it views the world as a luminous expression of Supreme consciousness. While Mishra negates a model 
that would affirm a qualified position and a Hegelian type interpretation. Manor.lnjan Basu embraces a 
comparison of Hegelian doctrine with Pratyahhijitii (Manoranjan Basu. Fundamt·ntal.~ of/he! 
Philo.Wlphy of Tantras. Varanasi: 1986, p.141). I believe that such a comparison only reflects Basu's 
interest in Hegel and Kant and is not viable. for Pratyahhijitii docs not purport an impersonal moral 
imperdtive or a phenomenological cosmogony (as in Siinkhya). but allows the place for divine will and 
freedom, which is not evidenced in a law of "logical necessity" (Mishrd. Kashmir .~aivism. p.101), Nor 
docs the qualified nature of Pra~vahhijitii imply a dualistic role in its concept of the divine act (.~al(fi). 
As Sudhendu Kumar Das shows, .~akti is a "sort of reflex relation of self-Identity" (Sudhendu Kumar 
Das, .~akli of Divine Power (Calcutta: 1934). p.600 . • ~akti is an appellation of the divine power. but it 
also came to take on its own existential character. representing a dualistic consort to .~iva. but as Kumar 
(Jas argues in MT •. ~akti "belongs to the one unified Self of .~iva. and is not really a distinct principle at 
all" (Ibid .. p.72). In Pratyabhijitii •• ~akti is the 'vimmarOpl' or "the vibration of Consciousness of real 
Egoity" (Ibid .. p.60). For Mishra the notion of kriyii-.~kli docs not necessarily indicate dlla!i.\'m as in 
the case of the qualified non-dualism in the Vira .~ail'i,fm of Southern India which gives a dua/i.~ti(' 
character to revelation. This is not what is being developed in non·dual Ka.~hmir .~aivi.\·m. Mishra states 
that "Sakti is not an attribute. or quality. of Siva. but the very nature of Siva" (Mishra. Kashmir 
.<'uivism. pp.1 0 I. 102). But the very affirmation of kriyii-.~akli in itself seems to qualify in some way 
Mishra's absolutist view of non-dual Kashmir .~aivism (new Trika) and so in Pratyahhijitii we too have 
to conclude that divine act and the world are not at odds. and while there is non-differentiation. there is 
at the same time some kind of differentiation at play. 
1"1 See IPK, 2.14. p.42. 
1"4 D 'd P 
aVI eter Lawrence argues that the dichotomy of immanence and tr.lnscendence is overcome 
through a model of "unity to unity-in-multiplicity" (David Peter Lawrence. Rt'disco\'t'ring God Within 
tht' Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999) pp.136-137). Lawrence interprets appearance through 
emanation and addresses the issue of mani festation and being in a relational context through 
"soteriological retum,,3K4 trough the unity-in-multiplicity parddigm. The Supreme engages in a descent 
through principles in unity-in-manifestation. which firstly involves being. it is the Lord who descends 
and is conscious in that descent. and secondly through act. through the will (icchii) of the Lord to 
descend. 
1M~ PSA. 33 (Pandit). p.40. 
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subject, individual cognition and the possibilities to experience true 'I-consciousness'. 
It is this experience of true 'I-consciousness', reflected through mundane cognition, 
that allows the ability to observe objects as different, but ultimately allows a re-
cognition of Self. The sense of difference that a subject experiences, paradoxically 
becomes the medium by which manifested phenomena and finite subjectivity are 
qualified through non-difference in the highest experience through the nature of Citi. 
which establishes the bridge between libhlisas and the world. JHfl 
Hence, ~emaraja concludes that what is important is the focus on the perception or 
awareness of a SUbject, that "when the bliss of Cit is attained, there is stability of the 
consciousness of the identity with Cit even while in the body".lK7 The consciousness 
attained in Cit. in the attainment of samlivda or the experience of unity of 
consciousness with the divine Self(Atman) within the body. paradoxically allows the 
observance of manifested diversity and limited consciousness. In the experience of the 
mundane consciousness of the individual. the force of impressions. due to an 
association with manifested phenomena, prohibit the consciousness of Cit to be 
experienced. But in the experience of unity with Cir. these impressions are "left 
behind in the unity-consciousness"lK8 by the jlvanmukri or the one who is liberated 
(saved) while alive. In this consciousness, Smhvir or universal consciousness is 
experienced in which the manifested world lihhii.'iCl.\' are experienced. Also in this 
condition, the role of miiyii-.~akti is dissolved and the various types of lihhii.\'a 
mechanisms, which K~emaraja considered as having a "descending" movement, from 
Brahman to the "rib of a palasa leaf',lK,) and are cognized, not through the lens of 
differentiation, but through universal consciousness. Being is therefore. not a question 
of considering ontological di fference, but of how types of consciousness are 
expressed, and how individuation relates to becoming as person. One type recognizes 
(individual) material manifestation as different to the divine, and another (person) 
perceives the possibilities of participation with the divine. 
IMI. See IPK, 2.11<-20, pp.56-57. 
IM1 Rlelii;r:ec;llR ~ 'd("<j41I;!js:q~ Rl~CflI('"F4'11rnq~eI4<i diQ~: I: cidiinandadaliihhe 
dehadi$1I cetyyamane$~'api cidaikiitmava-pratipatti-dar(ihvafl/ ji,'anmuktihl. PBH.16: translation by 
Singh, PBHs, p.91. . . 
INK Ib'd I . (commentary), p.92. 
1H9 
PBH.17 (commentary); translation by Singh, PBHs, p.93. 
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3.7.3 Relational Person and Re-cognition 
The hermeneutical approach to person in this chapter has been constructed by 
qualifying a notion of outward looking person, or what has come to be known as 
concrete person in contemporary personhood studies, so as to consider person as 
related to both difference and non-difference. The development of a model of whole 
person will be considered in the next chapter, but here the notion of whole person is 
focused within a relational context through an experience of unity through re-
cognition. 
In Pralyahhijiiii the world has to be as considered as intimately related to the divine 
activity and presence, as equated with "manifestations of a single. changeless 
entity".]<)o As such, when placing person in a relational context to the divine, the 
notion of relationality has to be re-considered. A Pralyahhijifii type of relationality 
based on unity does not indicate a person-to-person type of relation but of person as 
Alman. Pralyahhijifii does not consider this as a contradiction, for while a person-to-
person model is usually constructed to place person in relation to others, or as an 
objectified manifestation, Pralyahhijifii structures its relationality through unity. It 
questions the validity of seeking a relational construct. of objectifying others, when 
considering the lack of inherent unity between objects. It argued that unity and thus 
relationality can only be developed through an existential realism\'H of the true 
subject. through dependence, where the notion of concrete person becomes, not 
isolated or se({-reflective. but unified through a "unitary awareness" W2 within an 
essential nature. 
Personhood reflects the divine condition through the Almanic reality and the will of 
the divine to bring individuals out of their state of isolation otherwise there could be 
no se(f:cognition and no perception of the divine state. Se(f:cognition cannot therefore 
be only related to an inward condition of divine consciousness but also to observable 
manifestations. An awareness of manifestations also reflects a relational context to 
person, for the ability to be aware of these objects within a sense of se(f; in 
I'll) IPK. 2.18, p.56; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.18, P 148. 
I'll . IPKp. p.IIS. 
1'1~ IPK. 2.52, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.20, p.150. 
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Pratyahhijnii. is due to the nature of self-awareness reflecting the capabilities of 
divine awareness. In a purer or higher fonn of awareness the natural individual 
condition can be said to be raised to another, which can be correlated to a notion of 
relational person. This does not mark the end of awareness of person but the 
beginnings and culminates in an experience of re-cognition. 
In the pure state of consciousness the world and oneself is re-cognised as existing as 
the light of consciousness, while still admitting the reality of those cognitions that 
seem to be outside of this re-cognition. Without limited perception there could not be 
a cognition of the Atman, which would be self-reflective, having an inward perception 
and not able to consider the world. Hence, there is a need to affirm the place for the 
outer perception in the individual as well as the inner in the highest cognition (of 
Alman) by which the hypostatic existence comes to experience its sense of worth. 
There comes to be evident existence (diversity or difference) and also unity through 
the A/manic experience within a model of person which can be called an Alman-
hypostasis. but this shall be examined in the next chapter. 
Through differentiated cognition there is the admittance of the differing states of 
experience because of the nature of the revelatory activity (kriyii-Jakti) I'H of the 
divine. This activity manifests the world and then interacts with the world in the most 
meaningful way where there is also the acceptance of difference and objectified 
phenomena. The human person comes to be correlated to a fonn of manifestation. yet 
the human person having self-cognition is able to understand its true sense of person 
and allows the notion of person to change and be restored. thus changing the way 
manifested phenomena are viewed. The model in this thesis, allows the cognition of 
Atman, within a Cid-iitmanic mode of existence, 194 to affinn that the personal 
consciousness of individual soul deified does not detract from both the speci fic 
concrete existence and also unity. The notion of unity within manifested diversity can 
be argued through the words "while in the body" .19~ so as to make clear that the 
divine state is not divorced from the somatic existence. The bodily existence reaches 
1<11 IPK, 3.53, p.5R. 
1'14 
As already stated in Chapter 1.4.6. 
I'll PBH.16. 
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its pinnacle in true' I-consciousness', which affirms the true reality of the human 
person, as K~emaraja stated: 
Then is attained the awareness of the ultimate reality as a result of entering 
the perfect I-consciousness or Self which is in essence Cit and ananda (bliss) 
and of the nature of the power of the great mantra. There is the attainment of 
the lordship over the one's group of deities of consciousness that brings about 
emanation and re-absorption of the universe. All this is the ultimate reality or 
the nature of Siva. 396 
Consequently, mundane eexistence is ultimately due to the divine Cause (.Siva), who 
accepts that such manifestations are due to Himselfas a perfect expression of "His 
own Self',397 where the spatial sequence (objects), pertaining to finite subjects, appear 
to be "the infinite Subject, His Self ... and filled with His own existence".l'lK In this 
condition the (interior) reality is one, and that "One alone develops multiplicity". 199 
Objectification does not infer a disparity between mundane consciousness, or objects 
and the divine, for such objectification is the external unfolding of the divine,4()() and 
thus the universe and persons are in essence the nature of ,Siva.401 
3.8 Conclusion 
At the start of this chapter it was asked whether Pratyahhijitii had a concept of person 
and how can such a concept be understood within Pratyahhijitii philosophy? There 
was a focus on the term purU$a to correlate ideas of concrete personhood to that term. 
whilst recognising that this notion of personal concrete existence (hypostasis) is 
1% em ~1I~~,"I(-#1t:I#1d-dhn("JfCfl'jO~~(1I-~rrc:{ ~ ,"~,"~~~I<Cflrft ~\iI~~tq(1r­
~~ -~ ~ I, tadaprakasananda.5ara-mahtimantra -\'Tryiitmak"-piir~aha,,,tii\'diit .fudii 
.,un'asarga-su",hiirakar; nij;asa",v;d-devata-cakrdvarata prtipt;r hhCIVatiti .~;vam, PBH, 20; 
\~~nslation by Singh, SSs, p.I06. 
IPK, 2.7. p.39; trcmslation by Pandit.IPKp, 2.1.7. p.112. 
NM Ibid. 
I~I 
IPK, 2.10, p.40; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.2.2. p.116. ~(XI 
Utpala stated: "Isvara is the extroversive aspect of the Absolute and Sadas;va is the intoversive one, 
the former being known (in the Agamas) as unme$a and the later as nime~ ... ", 
t-\J'I.,qft()rtAlII'F.ltAlII'~(1:~TCf:,lsvaro bah;r unme$() n;meso 'ntab .{ada-.v;vab. IPK, 3.3, p.60; 
~~nslation by Pandit, !PKp, 3.1.3, p.159. 
Utpala stated "The Introvert reality is unity. The same, being unified with the manifestation of time 
and space and essential nature, appears as multiplicity, when it becomes the object of sense-perception" 
see IPV, 2.2.2; translation by Pandey.IPVp, p.129. 
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qualified through an experience of the essential reality of being (or Alman). It is in 
this experience ofthe Alman that a sense of person was developed and correlated to a 
spiritual mode of existing, which allowed for both individual existence and unity in 
the divine experience. This manifested a model which qualifies non-dualistic aspects 
of Pratyabhijiiii and the dualistic within the model of unity-in-diversity. In this model 
the world is viewed as the light of consciousness (prakiisa) and as such the human 
person gains significance to freely be a person in the highest condition and not be 
restrained by what Zizioulas called "ontological necessity",402 where the human 
person is dominated by instincts and lower impulses. 
However, while Zizioulas was dependent on an existential model to overcome the 
lower nature of human personhood, or the biological hyposta.\·i,\·, it was argued that 
this model should be qualified through an experience of the essential reality of being 
or Atman. In this experience the lower naturalphysis of the human person is 
overcome through grace to attain a mode of life in the experience of Alman, having 
conscious awareness of this state in the material life within a spiritual mode of 
existence. This approach allowed me to present a model which accepts the place for 
individual concrete existence as a mode or type of human existing and the 
overcoming of the natural physis in another type of existence or conscious awareness, 
an Almanic existence and awareness. 
The notion of person is not dissolved in that experience, but on the contrary it allowed 
a sense of freedom where a human person attains a true sense of personhood in that 
state as an Alman-hYPoslasis. If a person were not able to have this experience he or 
she would be bound to the biological condition and have no freedom to escape the 
prison of the natural existence. This will be argued in the next chapter in relation to 
the Alman-hypostasis model of person, where this model will allow for a real sense of 
being as a human person without displacing the important stress on essential being. It 
was also argued in this chapter that Pralyahhijnii does have a sense of the personal in 
the stress on divine awareness of the true subject (.~iva-pramiilr), which when 
translated into the human level allows for a sense of true personal cognition, made 
possible through the Almanic reality. The Alman reality has at its core both pure being 
4(J, Be 50 
• p. . 
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and pure awareness or Cit. which implies that on the divine and human levels. 
personhood includes notions of existence within an essential reality of heing. 
The Atmanic model when correlated to human personhood affirms the place for 
personal consciousness on both a limited and a de~fied or re-cogni.\·ed level. which is 
made possible through the divine unity and the divine expansion of the Supreme 
Puru$a (Siva). The many levels of human consciousness considered in PralyahhijiUi 
did not divide personhood but allowed for a harmonisation of many types of 
consciousness through the Absolute Consciousness. Despite the admittance of both 
cilia and Cil in human personhood. concrete existence was not denied but affirmed. 
In this sense Pratyabhijnii can be said to have an understanding of personlpllru.)·a. 
harmonising the sense of ordinary existence and the possibilities of what can he in 
human personhood through the experience of re-cognition. These ideas will be 
correlated to a notion of person within a single model. the Atman-hJ1JO,\'{asi.\· model. 
which in the next chapter through a convergence of terms will allow for a notion of 
person to be explored through a synthesis of ideas from both traditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONVERGING THEOLOGIES 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter I will converge ideas from both the Byzantine and PratyahhUnii 
traditions relating to a concept of person within a synthesis. through a single model. 
the Atman-hypostas;s. The considering of a synthetic model is not to force 
comparison I into rigid parameters. but to explore the possibilities of theological 
development through convergence and synthesis. 
As a consequence of this exploration. the boundaries of theological approaches to 
person will be approached in such a way so as to consider areas relating to the 
personhood debate throughout this thesis. of individual. relationality and unity. 
through the Atman-hypostas;s model. It is through this model that the monism of 
Pratyahh~inii is qualified within the Byzantine concrete sense of person. while 
utilising the notion of Atman to consider person within a substantialist context through 
de(/ication, which qualifies any existentialist approach to person. By exploring the 
Atman-hypostasis model I establish a conceptual bridge between heing and hecoming. 
between existence and an essential reality. between mundane individual awareness 
and relational hypostasis, within a concept of deijiedlre-cogn;sed person. 
I I will build upon the comparative theological attempts exemplified by Francis X. Clooney sec, 
Theology Ajier Vedanta (Delhi: 1993), p.l. but most especially utilising K. P. Aleaz's model of 
convergence sec. A Convergence of Ad\'aita Vedanta And Chri.~tian Thought (Delhi: 2(00). This type 
of convergence has also been developed by M. Dhavamony in his. "Indian Christian theological 
method", see M. Dhavamony. 'Indian Christian Theological Method', Studia Mi.uionalia 45 (1996), 
pp.57, where he outlines how Indian Christian theological method is validated though a correct 
henneneutical approach, in which convergence might take place. These henneneutics are based upon 
the legitimacy of convergence which is founded upon the primary place of Christ as the ultimate reality 
who "illumines all people in different ways and in a variety of fonns" (ibid.). While I agree with this 
sentiment, I would question what variety of forms means. Nevertheless I affirm that the notion of 
cosmic revelation allows the place for convergence though the many activities of divine revelation. 
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The explorations of theological possibilities inherent within the tenn Atman-
hypostasis, affinns the place for a theological space of convergence (in part 4.2) or a 
theology of convergence. where Christianity (the Byzantine tradition) and Indian 
Philosophy (PratyabhijiUi) can meet in a fruitful encounter, where ideas from each 
tradition can infonn the other. 2 
While the convergence of traditions is placed within a Christian schema, where types 
of revelatory events will be related to the divine economy. to the divine revelatory 
activity and divine condescension, this allows for an inclusive approach yet upholding 
the dignity of any given revelatory activity. The notion of many types of revelation, 
considered through the divine economy, pennits a synthesis of ideas to relate to the 
very nature of revelation, in that the notions of many types of revelation allows many 
approaches to uncovering truth, and thus affinning the place for convergence and 
synthesis. 
Ideas relating to personhood, or hypostatic difference (or otherness), and unity is 
brought together within a focus on unity-in-diversity through the Atman-hypostasis 
model. This model is constructed to overcome two dilemmas, pertaining to the 
ontological and the existential. The ontological dilemma relates to a seeming 
~ Comparison and convergence in India can correlated to a genealogy of models of convergence (The 
idea for such a genealogical methodology was taken from Paul M. Collins' use of genealogy in 
relationality in the development of the term "hermeneutic ofrelationality", see P. M. Collins in 'The 
Nature and Mission of the Church Communion: God, Creation and Church'), where the historical 
development of Indian-Christian ideas have manifested a genealogy and theological evolution of ideas. 
This represents a type of tradition and Indian Christianity (see A. Mookenthottam, Indiun Th"ologicul 
T"ndencit's, p.29). See Robin Boyd, An Introc/uction to Indiun Christian Tht·oloKY (Delhi: 1969, 200:'1); 
Anthony Mookenthottam. Indian Theological Tend(·ncie.~; Jacob Parappally, Emt'rging T"·nd.~ in 
Indian Christ%gr (Bangalore: 1995): K. P. Aleaz, Religion.~ in Chr;.~tian Tht'ology (Kolkata: 1991); 
also see Mookenthottam. Indian Theological Tendencies. A short genealogy follows: Ram Mohan Roy 
( 1772-1833) who was the founder of the BrAhma Samlj or Brahmo Samaj: Ram Mohan Roy who 
developed links with Unitarians in England: K. M. Banerjea (I I( 13-1 1(1(5) who sought a common origin 
of Hinduism and Judaism. K. C. Sen (1108-1884): Keshab Chandrcl Sen who was deeply influenced by 
Christianity and introduced a Christian type of liturgical dimension to the Briihma Samii}: Nehemiah 
Goreh (11<25-1895) refuted Hinduism as a Christian trclditionalist; B. lJphadhaya (1861-1907), who 
was an important figure in inter-religious dialogue in India, and may be considered the "first Indian 
Catholic Theologian" (Mookenthottam, Indian Theological Tendencies. p.34): M. C. Parekh (1 MM5-
1977) also was another important contributor; Swami Abhishiktananda, (1910-1973) developed some 
of the most significant work in relation to the dialogue between Christianity and Hinduism in modem 
times see 'The Depth-Dimension of Religious Dialogue', Vic/yajl'oti 4515; 19M I, pp.202-22I ): Richard 
De Smet also highlighted important theological points in relation to Atman, see 'Focusing on the 
Brahman-Atman', in Anand Amaladass ed .. Christian Contrihution 10 Indian Philosophy. Madras: 
.1995); Bede Griffiths (b. 1906) equated Satcidiinanda with the Trinity; J. N. Farquhar was also an 
I~ponant figure in comparing Hinduism and Christianity, as was Sarah Grant who considered a "world 
view" as an Advaitic Christian. 
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separation of essential being and material existing. This is why the focus has been on 
the Atman in this thesis as the essential reality of heing. to address the lack of 
ontological depth in existential models of person. However. this focus on Atman is 
qualified to argue that Atman does not indicate a monist "single changeless entity'" or 
"single monist Self·4• but the highest spiritual reality of the human person. Both 
aspects of person. the outward characteristics of hypostasis. and the inner hJpostatic 
essential nature is equally stressed within a model of whole and concrete. The focus is 
on whole person through the Atman-hypostasis to overcome the existential dilemma 
of individuum. as highlighted by Zizioulas.5 and the need to overcome the natural 
physis or "ontological necessity .. 6 within the natural life. 
Thus in the Atman-hypostasis these dilemmas are confronted within a single model 
that includes the notion of essential being. the what of heing. to qualify the existential 
or the outward looking person. by considering person as a way of existing through a 
Cid-utmani,? mode of hypostatic existence. Here the stress is on the essential heing 
and awareness of the essential reality (Atman) within concrete person. This model 
includes within it a sense of deification and an aspect of conscious awareness of this 
higher life within the world. The tropos of existence is not to be considered in 
isolation as an activity without ontological substance. but fundamentally related to the 
true nature or the Atman within the hypostasis. 
4.).) Seeking a Common Ground 
This chapter seeks a common ground between the two traditions hence an approach to 
person are sought by linking substantialist models from both traditions in relation to 
person and the essential nature of person. Consequently. the concept of the soul is 
equated to the Atman. while utilising notions of a reasoning soul in the Byzantine 
tradition and adapting the model of consciousness (Cit) from Pratyahhijnu. This 
\ IPK. 2.50-51. p.56-57; translation by Pandit IPKp, 2.4.18-19, pp.14S-149. 
• Ibid. 
, Zizioulas. Be. p.2S. 
I, Be. p.50. 
J This term has already been explained indicates a mode of existence that shares both the essential 
nature (Alman) and pure Consciousness and taken from IPK, 2.51, p.57. which describes heing in terms 
of cicJ-iilmani in relation to manifestations (iihhiisas). 
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substantialist model is correlated to the divine essence (ousia). the nature of the 
Godhead, with Paramiitman,8 where the divine model helps to understand the human, 
by showing how unity and difference are not at odds with each other but complement 
each other within a model of unity in diversity. Common ground is sought by 
equating the Atman with the highest part of the human soul as a portion of the divine 
within the human being, having likeness with the Godhead (Paramiitman), but not 
equality. The Atman is equated with a metaphysical substance akin and similar to the 
Paramiitman but different according to measure, will and activity. 
However, there are some obvious problems in bringing together ideas from the 
Byzantine and Pratyabhijitii traditions. One of the most important relates to the notion 
of ontological separation or the gulf between humanity and God in Byzantine 
theology!) as compared to ontological non-difference in Pratyabhijitii. This gll/lhas 
been overcome throughout this thesis by stressing that the divine the%gia is not 
divorced from divine economia. but the two are intimately related when understood 
from the point of Atmanic unity within the hypostasis. The notion of unity or non-
difference allows a reference point to understand difference and the two can be 
brought together in the human condition within the Atman-hypostasis. In this model. 
simultaneity of difference and unity is argued but ultimately resolved in dt:~fication in 
the Atmanic: experience or the event of being within the hypostasis. and reflected 
outwardly in a Cid-iitmanic mode of existence. In this mode or tropos. the human 
person can be said to participate with the divine in the Atmanic: state, having an 
awareness of the divine. due to the sharing of a nature of heing. which is akin or like 
the divine. While the notion of de~fication is correlated to re-cognition. it has to be 
noted here that deUication and re-cognition are terms that cannot be made totally 
synonymous. Re-cognition implies cognition of a truth that already is. not a deijl'ing 
of the person who enters into a state of becoming, a becoming of something that was 
~ As stated in the IPK, 1.44. p.18; and implied by K$emaraj in the PBH, commentary to Sulra 10, 
referring to the "Exalted One (Siva)" who is the Highest reality (PBH.~, p.74). The term is also 
synonymous with the Absolute personal Godhead or Paramasivo. sec IPKI', p.ll5, however the word 
!tman was also taken to meant the Absolute Reality (ibid .• p.(6). 
, See Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, pp.32-3. Dumitru Staniloae states that: Christian teaching adopts 
a middle ground between the mysticism of identity and the irreducible separation between man and 
God ... Christian teaching rejects both identification and absolute separ.ttion (ibid.). Nevertheless 
Staniloae's views are not an accurate appraisal of Greek Patristic notions of unity, for in the Greek 
Fathers in the mystical union of deification. the lines between anthropological identity and separation, 
and complete unity with the divine are often blurred (see K. Ware, 'Deification in St Symeon the New 
Theologian', Sohornost2512; 2003, pp.7-29). 
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not, and now is. What can be affinned is, that both the tenns deijication and re-
cognition imply the fullness of the human being as far as is possible for a human 
person. This indicates the telos or perfected 10 end of person as an Atman-hypostasis 
wrought by the perfecter. II 
Hypostasis is also equated with puru~'a and through punl,\'a/hypostasis, human 
existence is understood to be correlated to the individual and limited natural physis, 
but also correlated to a higher existence through the nature of hypostasis. This allows 
a concept of puru$a/person to be related to a category of the common human 
experience and also to an experience in which the highest mystical condition is 
attained. 12 While Pratyabhijflii did not distinguish ontologically between the divine 
and the human but related the human condition to a single knowing person. 11 I do not 
denude the unique cognitions of individual persons within a suffocating union. but 
stress a certain amount of ontological difference to the divine. while also focusing on 
union with the divine as far as possible without destroying the concrete specificity of 
each person. This view is argued through the Trinitarian model. while utilising the 
notion of Atman to stress an essential reality in the human person. to aftinn an 
ontological distinction between the pa.~u and the Lord, where ideas relating to both 
difference and non-difference can be incorporated within the notion of 
puru.~a/hypo.\'ta.\'i.\', united through deijication. In this model, Pra~vahhijnii '.\' notion of 
revelatory activity (kriyii-.~akti) is correlated to the economy of Christ's revelation. 
where the Cit;-.~akti of the divine is equated to the Logos-Christ activity. This part of 
the thesis will not examine the pneumatological implications in relation to .~akti other 
than to state that there is much scope for examination in this area. The external divine 
III The term "perfect" in the New Testament is better understood as 'completed' for it indicates the end 
of heing; from. ttA.tIO~ (perfect. complete). T£A£16T'1~ (completeness, perfection), tWI6w (I perfect. 
complete). to .. o.; (end). Theologically I prefer the translation complete or completed as the word 
Plerfect has ethic~1 associations while completed has a fuller ontological i~plications. 
Or the Paramatman hypostatic-Puru$a. In Hebrews 12:2 Chnst IS descnbcd In terms as the 
completer (T£A£I(J)T~V). It is Christ the Logos On. I: 1·14) who completes all things which in 
PratyahhijFlii can be correlated to the activity of God to Muhe.h'ara (~~ or the Great God, sec IPK, 
1.1. 1'.1; and in the Hindi Bihle described as Parumdvura (~~ or highest God in Genesis I: I. 
" As Utpaladeva stated that "a person who sees objects as his own form is called a puti (a master), 
while one lying under the effects of delusion of seeing objects as different from him are called pa.fu (a 
bound being)".IPK. 3.14. p.64.fq~I(~" ~~~~:I ~~cffi1ICfi41faCfic:\": 
tnJ: II. sviin/?a-riipe$u bhiive$u pramiitii kathyate patib! miiyiito bhedi$u kldu-lc(Jrmiidi·k(Jlu~·a pa.~ufVl; 
translation by Pandit. IPKp, 3.2.3. 1'.173. 
II See IPKp. p.147. 
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activity, when situated within the term, Logos, is to be understood within a synthetic 
model that includes the conscious awareness within divine activity, or Cil, as the 
Logos-cit-hypostasis. 14 This highlights how difference and yet unity is to be 
understood within a single hypostatic model as the Logos-dt-hypostasis. which is 
unified within its Paramiitmanic nature, while focusing on awareness to qualify an 
overt stress on essential substance. When translating this model to a human condition, 
each person or hypostasis can be said to experience individual existence and 
consciousness or uniqueness, but having an essential reality of being correlated to the 
term Atman and indicating a potentiality for a higher state of being or cognition. This 
correlation of the divine model to the human highlights a pattern by which the human 
condition can be understood, having at the centre of the hypostatic existence, an 
essential Atmanic nature. 
4.2 A Space for Convergence: A Theology of Convergence 
It is proposed in this part of the thesis is that what is needed in the present theological 
debates between religions and traditions is a theological .\pace for convergence and 
dialogue. A theology (~rc()nvergence could provide a structure by which theological 
convergences and synthesis could take place, such as the use of Surddiinanda within 
Trinitarian models. In the forum of a theology (~lc()nvergence. the examination of 
Sutcidiinanda could be taken out of the discourse of comparativism and analysed 
more fully in convergence, as could the model of Alman-hypostasis. A tht.'tJ/ogy (~r 
convergence would allow fuller theological examinations and open dialogue through 
synthesis and convergence without concern of recrimination or ridicule within a space 
of discourse and reciprocation. Given that many terms and theological correlations 
1~ This model is given by Vekathanam (in. Indian Christ%gy. p.395. who cites Brahmabandhav use of 
"Cit-Logos" to argue against a monist interpretation of Brahman in the activity of the Logos and 
equated with Cit to give an Indian Christian perspective in Christian theology) as Cit-L(Jgo.~. but I will 
argue for Logos-Cit-hypostasis. where the consciousness of the Logos is highlighted within II 
hypostatic model. I qualify the awareness of the essential nature (Paramiitman) of the L(Jgo.~ through 
Cit or consciousness. Hence the notion of Cit uncovers the relationship of the unmoving Paramiitman 
to the world through the activity of the Logos-cit-hypostasis. which also provides a mode for human 
persons, made in the image of God. to understand the nature of their own being (Atman) through a 
deified awareness in a Cid-iitmanic mode of existence. 
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exist between Byzantine and Pratyahhijiiii traditions. I ~ these traditions would greatly 
benefit from such a space of discourse and convergence. 
Consequently. this part of the thesis develops a convergence within a theology (~l 
convergence. which offers a space for convergence between Byzantine and 
Pratyahhijiiii traditions. even though dissimilarities between the two traditions 
remain. Despite these dissimilarities, on a basic level of comparison there are many 
examples of terms that can be equated from the Byzantine and Pralyahhijiiii traditions 
within a space for convergence. such as: energeia and kriyii-Sakti; Logos and Vii£.'; 
h)postasis/prosopon (indicating person) and purU$a; the general category of 
anlhropos (man) as a zoon logikon (rational animal) and pasu (beast); nou,\' (here used 
in a spiritual. metaphysical noetic context indicating the soul) and Atman (indicating 
the Selfor soul); d;ano;a (mind) and manas; /ogismos (reasoning) and hllddhi 
(intellect); atomos (indivisible particle) and a~lI; and gll~as (mode of being or 
existence) and tropos hyparxeos. It is the intention of this part of the chapter to 
examine the compatibility of some of these terms within a space for convergence. 
focusing on Atman-hypostasis. 
4.2.1 Logos and Cit 
Within a space for convergence, correlations between terms, such as Logos and Cit. It. 
within the Byzantine and Pratyahhijifii narratives are possible through a shared focus 
on intentionality and divine awareness. 17 In a Christological context the word (';t does 
not imply a mode or principle. but the united consciousness of God and in Trinitarian 
terms, to each hypostasis. not only to the Son. Cit would have to be considered as the 
I'S ome tenns have already been examined to manifest a model of convergence dealing with fullness. 
see Bettina Baumer (ed.). Mvsticism in Sai\'ism and Christianitr. and Be«ina Baumer and John R. 
Dupuche. Void and Fullnes.;. . 
It, The Logos-cit model has already discussed in Chapter 1.4.6 in this thesis. According to the 
commentary of K~emaraja of the PBH. "Citi (consciousness) used in the singular denotes its non-
limitation by space. time. etc .. shows the unreality of all theories of dualism. The word noatantra (free 
Will) points out the fact that supreme power is of the essence of Cit. and thus distinguishes it from the 
doctrine of Brahman (Le. Sankara Vedanta, where the Cit is considered to be non-active). The word 
'·i.iva etc. (in SUtra I) declares that Cit has unlimited power, can bring about every thing"; translation 
by Singh. PBHs. p.50. 
I A correlation between these tenns is also developed by Vekathanam. Indian Chri.\·t%gy, pJ95, but 
very spcrficialy. 
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very awareness of the united being of the Godhead. Nevertheless Cit in the sense of 
Pratyahhijiiii also implies a mediating activity (kriyii) of Citi-,~aktilll between God and 
the world. This has an existential dimension similar to the Logos in the Byzantine 
tradition l ,) where both become the mediating principle of the divine to the world. Both 
Logos and Cit are terms that imply a metaphysical bridge between the transcendent 
and the world through the will (thelimalicchii) of the divine "Egoity". expressed as '1-
Am·.2o in an outward flowing of divine existing through the divine operations 
(energeialkriYii-Sakti). But this model considers the divine activities not in relation to 
a Palamite type model but through a substantialist context. The divine revelatory 
activities can thus be understood through the Logos-cit-hypostasis model,:! I which 
indicates the ontological relationship of the Logos to the divine nature and the 
supreme awareness of consciousness (Cit) of the Logos through a revelatory context 
in the world (as Christ). 
However, the Logos-cit model has problems for the two terms are not completely 
equivalent. Cit relates to the consciousness of the Absolute reality that begins to be 
extrusive and as Citi-.~akti is an activity of the Supreme ,~ivU22 and does not have, in 
Pratyahhijiiii. a separate ontological existence and identity in itself, which the Logos 
existentially has as one of the hypostuses of the Trinity. The Logos (Word) also 
implies speech (Veic-,~akti),2' while Cit relates to the Supreme Consciousness, Perhaps 
a better term for correlation would be Veie. 24 While Veie would imply a certain 
1M The PBfI states: "By the power of her own will (alone), she (Cili) unfolds the universe upon her own 
screen (i.e. in herself) as the basis of the universe", n'ecchu)'o .fvuhhillUU Vi.f\·um unmilu)'ulil, 1'811.2; 
t~anslation by Singh. PBHs. p.51. 
II The development of the Logos as the mediating principle. especially by the Middle Platonists is 
highlighted by H. F. Hligg who stated that: "while the concept of Logos has a wide range of 
applications as a designation of the mediating principle between the transcendent God and the world". 
Clt'mt'nl (~lAIt'xundria and Iht' beginnings o/Chrislian Apophalici.\·m, p.230. 
~tJ As exemplified in LXX. Exodus. 3: 14, 
: I As explained also in Chapter 1.4.6 of this thesis. 
:: As it states in K~emaraja's commentary ofSOtra 4 of the PBH that: "The magnificent highest Siva 
desiring to manifest the universe. which lies in Him as identical with Himself. in the from of SadMiva 
and other appropriate forms flashes forth (pralciHamiinalu),ii sphurali) at first as non-different from the 
light of consciousness (pralcii.~iibhedena) but not experiencing the unity of consciousness (in which the 
universe is identified with consciousness) (cidai/cya-alchyiilimaya). of which state aniifrila-.siva is only 
~other name"; translation by Singh. PBHs. p.55 . 
. 11·iic·.~alcli is the power of the divine power of speech. see Mishra. Kashmir .~aivi.vm. p.159. which is 
undifferentiated and related to paS.vanl; (3,d person plural. from the verbal root cJr.f to see) or the divine 
view of the universe. "going forth and ·seeing .. •• in Tagare. 'Glossary' in The Pratyabhijnii Philo.mph)'. 
~here there is no difference between viiqa (object) and vikalca (word). 
As used In IPK. 1.44. 18. and correlated to Paramiilman. the Supreme essence and St'll: as the 
highest speech. or • Pariiviilc·. See also Andre Padoux. Viic: The Concepl o/Ihe Word in :C;elecled Hindu 
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modalist quality (in Trinitarian tenns) to divine activity. it does come very close to 
what is conceptually understood by the word Logos. In the context of revelation and 
the ability of the tenn to convey ontological gravitas, Viie simply docs not have the 
same weight and thus there has to be a return to Cit. Cit is capable of expressing 
ontological depth and existential meaning, as a mediating divine activity between that 
(tat) or manifest principles tattvas. 25 which indicates the objectified manifestations or 
iihhiisas.26 Cit. as with the Logos, is the bridge between divine 'I-consciousness' and 
the world and thus allows an ontological and existential qualification of unity-in-
diversity (hhediihheda), as discussed in the previous chapter. The tenn Cit can also be 
correlated to the Logos. as the conscious awareness of the divine revelatory activity 
and how the divine consciousness unites with the world to express a double 
consciousness. of the world and divine without confusing either. 27 
4.2.2 Principles of Revelation 
Another important tenn that can be incorporated in models of convergence in a 
Christological context is the tenn Uvara. which in Pratyahhiii'tti is a divine principle. 
the fourth lattva of revelation and relates to the divine economy.2K But Christ is not to 
be understood merely as a principle of the divine revelation. for that would predicate 
Christ to a mode of the divine being. which is unacceptable in Byzantine Trinitarian 
theology. Christ is the One by whom the tallvas become manifest. What can be 
7"antras (Delhi; 1990). p.ix; and Lawrence. Rt·di.\·cow.'ring God With Tran.m·ndental Ar~um('nt. p.21; 
also K. Mishra. Kashmir ,~aivism. p.158. 
~~ See IPK. 3.2. p.59. 
't. See ('hapter 3 of this thesis. 
'7 . 
. ThiS represents a double consciousness and will and the uniting of wills and consciousness expressed 
in Maximus' dyothelite theology. Maximus stated: "let no-one censure the doctrine that forbids a 
duality of gnomic wills. when they find that nearly all the glorious teachers say that there are two 
wills ... For the divine Fathers do not speak of quantity in relation to gnomic wills. but only in relation to 
natund wills. rightly calling the essential and natural laws and principles of what has been united 
Wills ... so being able to speak always belongs to the nature. but how you speak belongs to the 
hypostasis. So is it with being disposed by nature to will and willing ... Then the Incarnate Word 
possesses as a human being the natural disposition to will. and this is moved and shaped by his divine 
will". Op.H·.3. 45(' -48B; trdnslation by Louth. Maximus the Con{e.Hor Maximus the Conje.Hor. p.193. 
See also Maximus. Ep. 19. 592C. As Bathrellos states: "For Maximus. the Logt)l' is the same before and 
after the incarnation. namely God a divine person ... Maximus says that the flesh became one with the 
L(}gos according to hypostasis. However. although the Logos is identical with the human nature 
according to hypostasis. he is not identical with it according to nature". see 'The Dyothelite 
~~hristology of Maximus·. in The Byzantine Christ. p.lll. 
o The lrvara-tattva has already been discussed in Chapter 3.4 of this thesis. 
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asserted, from a 8 yzantine point of view, is that Christ (the enJleshed-Logos )2'1 
manifests principles (logo;), which come from Him (God) and are non-ditTerentlO to 
Him, and which includes the "pure" tattvas (also the l~vara tattva).ll The impure 
wttvas can be correlated to the natural physis of manifest phenomena. In this 
Christological model the Logos becomes identified with the Supreme unmoving One 
which is the "Highest Reality,,'2 or Siva, where the Logos-activity can be correlated to 
divine principles (tattvas) or logoi. and can be understood as uncreated and 
"Preexistent"B activities of the divine. Again, as in Chapter 28, reference is made to 
Maximus the Confessor's notion of logoi or principles of uncreated divine operations 
in relation to the Logos. 14 to argue that the lsvara can be understood as an economic 
principle. and as an exterior aspect of the divine. ,l~ As such, the Nvara can be 
understood in terms of a manifested logos or principle of Christ. The divine principles 
can thus be considered in relation to the Supreme or unmoving transcendent God 
(Param{lIman);l6 who can be considered as ontologically non-different from the 
Logos-cit. 
The notion of divine economy also helps to resolve the riddle of whether Christ is to 
be viewed as another Avatarn or the only perfect total bodily Incarnation of the 
divine. To resolve this issue, this thesis utilises Pratyahh~ina .... concept of principles 
(tattvas), as described in Chapter 3.4 of this thesis, in conjunction with the Maximus 
notion of principles (Iogoi) to affirm Christ as the author of such principles. It is 
argued that Christ is not to be considered as another A valar, but the source of all 
principles, including the Avataric principle or U,'ara-Iattva. This principle, related to 
the term l';:vara (God personified in Pratyahhijna) and the fourth lattva of divine 
manifestation as shown in Chapter 3.4.1, is to be considered as an extrusive revelatory 
aspect of the Absolute. The Incarnate Christ as the second person of the tri-h,vpo ... tatic 
~'I On this see. D. Dragas. Saint Athanasius of Alexandria (Rollinsford: 2(05). p.l. 
II, See Maximus. Amhig. 7 (1077e-1081C'). 
II The "pure latt1,'a.\'" belong to the first five fam'as and the "pure universe" whilst the remaining lam'a.~ 
belong to the "impure universe", see Chapter 3.4 of this thesis. 
\' 
. See PBHs. p.118. 
:~ Pscudo-Oionysius, DN. 5.5-5.8, 820A-824A. 
See Maxlmus, Ambig. 7, 1077('- 1081 C; and see Chapter 2B of this thesis. 
l' See IPKp. 3.1.2. 
It, This word is used in IPK, 1.44, p.IH. According to the PBH. Siva is the "Highest Reality ... His Self 
(which is also the Real Self of each individual) that is a mass of consciousness and bliss" (Singh). 
PBHs, p.46 
\' Which is argued by Torwesten in. Ramakrishna and Christ, pp.5-15. 23, 174. 
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Godhead becomes the source from which A vatarie fonns or divine revelatory 
principles manifest. As such Avalaric manifestations can be correlated to the lvvara-
tattva and economic manifestations of the Absolute Godhead. While historically the 
Avatar principle or personified divine revelations are equated with the lvvara-fattva. it 
also indicates a type of revelation of the Absolute within the wider Hindu tradition. 
This is exemplified in the Bhagavad Gitii where the lvvara is called the "Supreme 
Puru~a (param puru~'am)",3K which ultimately points to the Paramiifmanic reality. 
Another point that must be raised here relates to the notion of Godhead in 
Prafyahhijnii. which did not have a precise doctrine of Godhead. Nevertheless, the 
notion of the unmoving divine essence of Paramiilman has be correlated to a Judeo-
Christian notion of Godhead, and to a personal sense of Paramiilman contained 
within the tenn, ,~iva.3l) But there is again some confusion as to what constitutes the 
Absolute Reality in Pratyabhijnii for sometimes some tenns such as Mahe.\:mrtl40 and 
Piiramdvara are related to a notion similar to that which is understood by a personal 
Godhead and at other times in relation to an extrusive principle of the Absolute 
Reality.41 In addition, contemporary translations of Pralytlhh~iiJii texts use such words 
as Godhead,42 superimposing theological ideas that were not originally present in 
IX The BhaRavud Gila states: "Who meditates on Me with his mind controlled by constant practice of 
Yoga and not wandering astrdY. 0 Son of Pritha! He attains to Him. the effulgent sciI' the Supreme 
Purusha". ~1'fI(ljfll"i$'" ~ "'1~fllI~"'1 ~ ~ ft'li' ~ cntfj1fbrct~""II' II. uhilyii.HI,yoRa· 
yukiena cetu.~ii niinya'Kiiminii param puru$am divyam yiiti piirthiinudntaycm. H.H (Vaidik). The nature 
of this Supreme person though is non-different to the reality of that personhood or . .ftmanh· roldiance. 
thus in this context there is no difference between the Alman. Supreme Person or the radiance of the 
divine Sd/: but in the Byzantine trddition. because of trinitarian theology. there is a need to qualify how 
divine difference is to be understood in relation to non-difference. 
\'1 As exemplified by Pandit throughout his translation of the IPK. Nevertheless the absolute h('inK is 
described as the "highest Siva desiring to manifest the universe". PBf/. 4; translation by Singh. PBI/s. 
r.. 55 . 
II Sec IPK. 1.2. p.2. which states "Other than the person taking some insentient entity as his Self. who 
would try to either deny or establish the existence of the eternally existent Almighty God (Mahc!.f\'art'). 
who has the independent power of doing and knowing, and is. in fact. onne's own (real) Self?" 
(Pandit).~~fql('"I1~lfa~ttJJti~I3tJt!lt"+Il~~~~~~:II~II.kar'ari 
Htiilari .'tviitmuny iidhi-,\'iddhe mahdvaral aja~ii'mu ni$edha", \'ii siddhi", va \'iduhilu kub!i, IPKp. 
1.1.2. trdnslation by Pandit. p.7. 
~ I 
Utpala states that Piirumdvara represented an "exterior aspect" indicating the lfl'ara (alt\'a. "later. 
through an emphasis on its exterior aspect. Piirame.fvara (meaning the i.fvara-Iam·a here) emerges". 
1\;('qlrc'H~~~aq;Irt1I~I&Q C'1fQl1lfaC'1: I ~~: ~~II. bahir-hhiiva-I'arafve III 
p,aratah piiramdvaramll. IPK. 3.2. p.59; translation by Pandit. IPKp. p.157. 
4. This word or God, is used by Pandit not only in his commentary but also in the trolnslation of the text 
(sec IPKp. 2.4.4. p.137) where he refers to the "unknowable Authority (God)" (ibid.). He again refers 
to God in the translation of the text stating "God has been accepted as the casue" (lPKI'. 2.4.H. p.140) 
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PratyahhijiW. but which now have come to indicate a contemporary notion of 
Godhead. Certainly, in the text of the Pratyahhijniihrdayam the description of the 
Brahman43 and words indicating the Absolute Lord44 do indeed seem to be correlated 
to an idea of Godhead,45 and sometimes equated with light of essential heing 
(prakii.\:iitmii) of manifestation.46 But how far this monist reality can be equated with a 
Judeo-Christian theistic God is still open to question. 
4.3 Atman-hypostasis: A new Model of Person 
In the concluding part of the thesis, I synthesise ideas relating to person from both 
traditions, within a space for convergence, relating to Atman and hyposlasis that have 
been discussed throughout the thesis, within a single term the Alman-hypo.\·ltlsi.\·. 
Through this term the Atmanic monism of Prtltytlhhijnt; is qualified and also the 
existential stress on individual. This allows a flexible approach to person. so as to 
argue that the individual can be considered as able to rise above the natural condition. 
through grace, and thus able to experience the fullness of personhood. This is based 
upon the model of person developed by Zizioulas, where he divides person into 
existential categories of biological mode of hypostatic existence as opposed to an 
ecclesial hJ1)ostatic existence.47 However. unlike Zizioulas' I do not stress the 
existential to explain person. but utilise the outer to point to the inner which then 
reflects outwards to transform the outer condition. I do not only rely on outward 
looking existential models to explain person. but consider a substantialist context 
within person, where hypostatic communion with the divine implies a material and 
immaterial substantial union with the divine. 
when the actual word is Piiramdvara (/PK. 2.40.1".52). and many times refers to the "Absolute God" 
!n his commentary. see IPKp. 1".141. 
\ See PBH.I-2. 'Commentary'; on this also see also IPKp. 1".150. 
~ See IPK. 1.1. 1".1. 
~'I' I tIS a so correlated to the human condition. see IPK. 1.41. 1".17. where Utpala equated the . .flmanit' 
experience of the SWlimi with the divine stating "the divine master (n'iimi) surley has the knowledge of 
the entire phenomenal existence contained within Himself(in his I"otency of Alman); otherwise the 
~rob of his will to manifest could not proceed"; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.5.10.1".59. 
IPK. 1.34. 1".15. 
n BC, 1"1".16-50. 
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In the Atman-hypostas;s the focus is be upon the existential individual and essential 
immaterial nature (Atman), bringing together ideas relating to both hypostas;s and 
Atman. The Atman;c nature and the individual are united in the hypostas;s. where both 
are so completely bound to each other so making an indissoluble bond. Through this 
ontological union, the possibilities inherent in those natures allow person to attain to a 
restoration ofthose natures within an experience of union with the divine. The Atman-
hypostas;s allows the restoration to be explained in the hypostas;s within a context of 
restored natures, which then impacts on a specific individual life. It reveals how the 
specific hypostat;c life should exist, its type of restored existence intended for a 
person. This type of life then comes to be reflected in a type of consciousness within 
the hypostas;s. 
It is because each person can be known as an Atman-hypostas;s having an Atmanic 
reality within the hypostasis. the potentiality of heing is underlined within a specific 
existence through the prefix, Atman. This prefix indicates an immaterial substantiality 
with the existential individual. but which is usually unknown by the individual and so 
initially these parts seem to be disconnected from each other. This disconnection is 
existential and not ontological, for in a higher experience of this ontological unity is 
perceived, where through the reception of divine grace, the individual begins to 
become of aware of this essential nature and attains a wholeness not previously open 
to the individual. 
It is through the Atman-hypostasis model that the possibilities of fullness are thus 
made apparent. While each term independently indicates an aspect of heing and 
existence, together they imply a whole condition of person. The term Atman-
hypostasis in human persons allows ideas of an immaterial nature and material 
existence to be brought together within a single term (Atman-hypostasis) in the same 
way the word Christ implied, within a Chalcedonian context, a uniting of the Logos 
nature and the material nature of the Incarnation. In the Council of Chalcedon a model 
of whole Christ is argued as having certain qualities within a single person.4K The 
focus is on a unity through the term Christ. while having two natures, a rational soul 
(\jIum<; Mryl1(ti<;) and material body, while being the Son and only begotten 
~M Albcrgio ct al. (cds.). Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.57-63; and Norman Tanner. Decree.I' o(the 
Ecumenical Counci/s,p.86. 
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(llovoYEvi'j) 49 of the Father. These properties come together within a single property 
bearer, a single person (1tpo(J(t)7[ov) and single subsistent being (i)1[o(Jta(Jlv).~() The 
word hypostasis here is not completely synonymous with person but also indicates an 
underlying substantial context with the prosopon, which becomes the personal bearer 
of these properties. In this model of person all the above properties are contained 
within a single entity, properly named Jesus Christ. Through this model, hyp.WJstasis 
has come to be equated with person, which then can be applied to the human model. 
The word hypostasis denotes an ontological condition within a person that highlights 
specific characteristics and an underlying nature. Christ becomes the personal bearer 
of these properties and it is through this singular existential condition that the notion 
of person has come to be ascribed to the term hypostasis, which contains certain 
ontological qualities. The quality of Atman is however, not to be considered as 
predicated to the existential or outward individual but, as the higher spiritual nature, 
informs person of its true condition, just as in Christ his nature allows us to consider 
Him God. In the same way, the Atman has a certain quality of heing and awareness as 
a potion of the divine stuff; which unites with the person on a mundane level and then 
fully to the hypostasis through de~/icat;on. 
When the divine hypostatic model or specificity is translated to the human condition. 
the term hypostasis can thus be used to denote whole person in a way which 
underlines the speci fic properties of a person. This is exempli fied in speei fie 
properties in the Trinity where the Logos-hypostasi.\· differs to the Father-hypostasis 
and both differ to the Holy Spirit-hypostasis, but are united within a single nature. The 
equating specificity of hypostasis, within a united nature of the Trinity, allows person 
to be considered through an ontological union but also highlights the importance of 
specific characteristics. 
However, while the prefix Logo,\' in the Logos-hypostasis denotes a particular quality 
of each hypostasis, this correlation cannot be fully ascribed to the human for each 
proper name of a particular individual would then have to come before the term 
h),postas;.\'. The prefix can be used to ascribe in the human person a unifying 
ontological condition within the hypostasis. As the appellation Logo.\', implies in the 
~'I Ibid, 
\I) Ibid. 
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Christ that there is a unity with the Father, being OJ,.looucnov tro nutpi, ~ I so human 
persons (hypostases) can be said to be homoous;on with their essential Alman;c 
nature. Consequently, when using Atman-hypostas;s the Atman implies an essential 
ontological nature within the human hypostasis. The term has a uniting dynamic 
inherent within it that allows for an ontological uniting of natures with h,lposta.\·;s, that 
of the mundane and that of the spiritual. However, the unity inherent within the 
ontological condition of the person is not experienced by most people, but only comes 
to be experienced through a restoration of this unity in an experience of deification. 
Thus de~/icalion allows for an experience of unity within the restored person. whether 
in a soteriological and eschatological context or as a mystical experience. 
The Atman-hypostas;s also indicates that within h,lpostat;c condition there exists the 
possibilities of many types of consciousness, pertaining to the mundane and the 
Atman;c reflecting the two natures within the Atman-hJpostas;s. A person has a life 
and awareness that directly reflects the nature of the life and awareness that a specific 
person lives within, pertaining to either higher or lower natures. In the lower nature 
only the natural life and consciousness is experienced, while in the higher, there is a 
unity of the natural condition with the spiritual or Atmanic. In the unified ,,(tmanic: 
condition, the individual becomes aware of his or her hypostatic value and rt'-
('ognises the true nature of that existence. 
The Atman-hypostas;s also allows for correlations to both difference and non-
difference, where individual concrete existence implies difference and yet through 
Atman, allows non-difference to always be expressed. Thus the Atman-hypo.\·w.\·i.\· 
model represents a qualifying of difference through unity. What is inferred in the term 
Alman-hypostasis is that in an individual (which indicates the natural phy.'>;.'», a 
potentiality for fulfilment of the natural physis in deification is expressed. 
Hence, this part of the last chapter four areas relating to the Alman-hypostus;s model 
will be examined, that of: unity, through the notion of Atman and an Atmcmic event 
within the hypostasis; Cit (consciousness), which will relate to an Atmanic unity 
expressing difference with the hypostasis, and relating to subjectivity; relationality, 
'I Ibid. 
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where difference manifests a quality of otherness and yet participation through an 
Atmanic mode of hypostatic existence; and lastly unity-in-difference. which qualifies 
both unity (Atman) and difference (hypostasis). 
4.4 Concerning Alman 
Here I focus on what is specifically meant by Alman in the Alman-hypostasis context. 
The word Alman indicates not a singularity at the expense of specific and concrete 
persons, but a spiritual nature, a consciousness aware reality that has the character and 
awareness of a singularity, but at the same time allowing for diverse and concrete 
persons. This paradoxical approach mirrors the Trinity, where there is evidenced an 
equal stress on both specificity and unity. In the human context, this dual approach 
also mirrors the dyolhelite Christology of Maximus, who argued that in Christ there 
were evidenced two natural wills, one relating to his bodily incarnation and another of 
his divine physis. ~2 In the human condition this relates to a natural or bodily will and a 
"deliberative (or 'gnomic') will",~] implying intention and consequent possibilities to 
overcome the natural will through a higher condition. The possibilities to overcome 
the natural physis in the human through participation with a higher divine will and 
nature is ultimately related to an A/manic nature and will within the person. 
Through the awareness of the Atmanic nature, a dynamic of volition is brought into 
the equation, where the whole person becomes properly united. overcoming the 
intentions of the natural physis, or the deliberate intentions oflower state through the 
spiritual or that which has the capability of being deliberately spiritual. Through the 
spiritual nature, persons have the capabilities of deliberately overcoming the natural 
through grace and rising above the natural condition through the divine willing of 
deification. Thus there is reciprocity of wills. However, the lower human nature 
condition is not capable of restoring itself due to its insentience, and ifit were sentient 
it would become a pantheistic or gnostic monstrosity, and so human nature is 
dependent on the divine will and activity to become restored. This restoration is made 
:~ Maximus. Opsc.3. 45B-46A; trdnslation by Louth. Maximu.'>' the lon/e.mr. pp.I92-197. 
Ibid .. p.193. 
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accessible through the reciprocal intention of the individual to wish to be restored, but 
made possible through the divine will and operations. Restoration is only possible 
through grace, which also represents the intentionality of the divine, because the 
portion of the divine acts within an awareness in accordance with the divine intention. 
The dependency on the divine marks the ontological distinction between the divine 
and human realities. It allows a sense of the possibilities of human persons as portions 
of the divine within divine participation, but also marks the limitations of the human 
person. 
The correlation of Atman with a portion of the divine is defended by equating the 
Atman within a pneumatological context of spirit and to the divine breath, 
"God ... breathed upon his (man's) face the breath of life (1tVot;v ~(J.)"~) and the man 
became a living soul (\jIuxiJv ~&aav)",S4 where the human partakes of the divine 
nature (2 Peter 1:4) through that breath. This participation of the spirit within was 
opened up to humanity through the Incarnation, which makes accessible the previous 
condition. The partaking of the divine through a restoring of what was and now is, 
allows a focus on the indwelling divine reality as the true centre of the person within a 
concrete existence. 
The notion of Atman is also placed within a substantialist context as the true .'-J't'lt: It 
has been argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis, that in Pratyahh(jiiii the Atman was the 
highest reality of all existence and that human personhood, whether understood in 
terms of the individual or hypostasis, has as its centre of existence, the Atmanic.' 
nature. The Atman was considered as a single entity as the 'subject of knowing', but 
in the Atman-hypostasis, this is qualified. Through the accepting of dual willing, as 
stated above, there is evident a dual awareness within person, but when restoration is 
experienced, this is unified within the whole person. In the individual, there is an 
existential disconnection from this awareness, but in deification this condition is 
restored. 
In the Atman-hypostasis model a correlation is also made between the Alman and the 
highest part of the soul (\j1Um) or nou.\'. This correlation allows not only a rational 
~~ . 
LXX, Gen. 2:7. In Gennan atmen means breaths, which provides a tantalising connection between 
breath and being within the Indo-European languages. 
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element to be considered within the soul, but also the soul within a substantialist 
context. I do not, as stated above, relate Alman to an ontological singularity, a notion 
of a single "knowing sUbject", 55 but an essential nature and awareness as a portion of 
the divine. The Alman is not to be considered equal to the Paramiilman, but shares in 
a type of nature of the divine. Through a union with God a soul participates with this 
Almanic nature, which changes the consciousness of a person, but although the 
specific subject or person (hyposlasis) experiences a type of knowing similar to the 
divine subject when experiencing union with the divine through this nature, and is 
divinised as far as possible, but is not totally God. 
This correlation of the Alman with the soul, which has already been accepted within 
Indian Christianity and expressed through the term jiviilman, ~Il existentially unites the 
notion of concretejiva (individual) with the indwelling metaphysical portion of the 
divine or Alman in the human person. However, this model. juxtaposed to a dualislic 
or quali fied non-dualistic model. leaves an unsatisfactory resolution between the jiva 
and Alman especially when considering a substantialist type union with the divine. 
This is why Pratyahhijitii has been utilised to help correlate an essential reality with 
the soul. as the metaphysical stuff of heing. in a context of dt'ijicalion. 
The term Alman while expressing non-difference is considered through difference 
(person) and therefore should not to be considered disconnected from difTerence. 
However. in difference phenomenal manifestation appears different to the Alman, but 
the Alman is not disconnected from the natural individual but as the underlying reality 
of existence which unites material manifestation to itself through the divine 
luminosity. This luminosity shines in all aspects of creation and is the "very heart of 
the Supreme. because it is the real essence of all existence". ~7 Hence each particular 
hJ'Poslasis indicates the possibilities of a relationship with God implied in the general 
category of human person through an ontological condition. but is not necessarily 
existentially available within a notion of separated individual. The possibilities of 
understanding this Almanic nature becomes reflected in a reciprocal movement to the 
:' IPK, 1.67, p.27; translation by Pandit,IPKp. 1.7.4. p.K4. 
I, See Mathew Vekathanam. Indian Chrislology. p.SS. The jiva is expressed in Pralyahhijnii. in 
K~emaraja's commentary of SUlra 4 of the PBH. as "the individual experient" as "Siva"; translation by 
Singh. PBHs. p.57. 
'7 IPK• 1.45. p.19; trdnslation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.4.13. p.l44. 
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divine within a God-related person. It is through hyposlalic reciprocity that the ability 
to experience a change of conscious awareness in the hypostasis becomes apparent 
and thus results in the end fulfilment in the Almanic state. 
4.4.1 Atmanic Freedom 
Within the Atman-hypostasis model. the Atman comes to reflect a sense of true 
freedom. which mirrors the freedom of the divine Paramiilmanic nature and allows 
the individual to experience total freedom in overcoming the natural state. The human 
person has the freedom to be and a way of existing which was initially intended by the 
divine. It is the notion of freedom. the freedom of the Lord to create individuals and 
allowing the freedom of individuals to be that is central to understanding the nature of 
the Almanic condition. Freedom is not to be considered a condition dominated by the 
natural condition but allows the expansion and fullness of human cognition. This full 
sense of freedom allows human persons to enter into a state of becoming on many 
levels. firstly of a biological becoming. then of a spiritual becoming and then a 
fulfilled or de~/ied becoming. 
K~emaraja stated that through "His free will, pervasion of non-duality, He assumes 
duality all around. then His will and other powers though essentially non-limited, 
assumes limitation".~!1 Here K~emaraja highlights the difference between 
Paramiilman as the Cause, which is localised in a human sense as the Alman relates to 
freedom that allows a response to that Cause. The individual is not an aspect or 
insentient object but has a real life and freedom. which is the very nature of the 
Atman. Without the Alman, the human individual would have no capabilities for 
freedom. bound by its natural physis and unable to escape the ontological prison of 
the biological nature. but the possibilities of Almanic freedom within the hypostasi.\· 
allows the person to truly be free. Freedom is not the ability to do this or that but 
allows the person to escape its biological prison and attain perfection. 
Through true freedom. the human the person is existentially able to break the bonds of 
isolation and difference through participation with the divine within or non-
<k tr.mslation by Singh. PBHs. pp.71-72 
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difference. But as K!?emaraja considers that if "Atman (Self) has total freedom and 
greatness, how is it said to be equated with the a~u Viva) and covered with mala".5'} 
The answer is provided in the next Sutra: "in consequence of its limitation of .C;akti, 
reality, which is all consciousness, becomes the mala-covered samsarin".C.o Out of the 
Lord's own will and freedom, being and existence become possible for it is He that 
creates and becomes, allowing also for a sense of individuality, but which is in truth 
nothing other than the Lord. 
4.4.2 Substantialist Implications 
The Atm£lnic part of the Alman-hypostasis indicates the possibilities of person within 
a substantialist context. Each person has at his or her core, or soul, an essential reality 
of the hypostasis. or the divine within each person, which allows a person to become 
what he or she should be. This becoming can be translated to a process of deUictJt;on. 
as Rolt stated "God is present in each separate dei tied soul". (>I The characteristic of 
this essential reality is how a 'likeness' can be considered as correlating to the deepest 
nature of the person and yet is intrinsically related to each unique individual in a 
personal way. as Gregory of Nyssa stated: 
'The kingdom of God is within you (Lk.17:21)" by this we should learn that if 
a man's heart has been purified from every creature and earthly affections. he 
will see the image of the divine nature in his own beauty ... for God imprinted 
on our nature the likeness of the glories of His own nature. (,2 
This implies that at very core of person there is in the soul, a portion of the divine. a 
metaphysical Atmanic: substance, which is the preconceived state for human persons, 
when restored to the human person, and allows the person to experience the fullness 
of heing within a concrete existence. This Almanic nature docs not imply that there is 
a negation of the hypostasis within a monist reality, but rather both aspects come 
together in the living person. The Atmanic reality implies an essential non-
"I PBH.H (commentary); PBH.~. p.71. 
t~J Rl .~ ~ PBH.9.,t'h .. tJrll'tiCfl tllt"(~: <t<t,,« I. cid\·ai·ta('(·hakti·.~a",k(}c"t maICh'rita!! .~a"'J"ri. 
translation by Singh. PBHs. p.71. 
t.: Rolt. 'Divine Names', Dionysius the Areopagite (NY: 1920),1'.79, footnote 2. 
t •• The Beatitudes. Semon I (ACW 18:89, 90, 95). in Holy Apostles Convent, The Orthodo.t Nt'\\' 
Te.\tament: The Holy Gospels. Volume J, Evangelistarion (Colorddo: 2004), pp.84-85. 
277 
differentiation which has as its attributes, transcendence, unknowability, permanence 
yet also consciousness indicating the total or true moi.6 ' As in the Christ hyposlasis 
where the two natures and wills were united in the Logos (or divine reality), so the 
natural physis of the human hyposlasis when deified, comes to re-cognise its true 
condition in the Almani£.' reality. Just as in the Christ there were two natures and wills 
which did not indicate a division of natures and wills but a united consciousness and 
being, where the material nature deified in the Logos becomes conformed to the 
divine nature and will, so in the human hyposlasis the natural physis de~fied 
experiences a single consciousness and experience. While there seems to be an 
apparent discontinuity between the Almanic metaphysical condition and the 
individualistic distinction of the concrete and unique person, there is in the re-
cognised unity, simultaneity of both. Hence there is a need to qualify both the terms 
hyposlasis, which cannot stand by itself in its indicating difference. and Alman which 
also cannot stand by itself outside of the human condition due to phenomenal 
manifestation. As a result, in the Alman-hyposlasi.\· both terms are reconciled in a 
single model of person. 
4.4.3 Alman and Paramiilman 
The notion of Alman correlates to the essential reality of the human heing. which has 
been understood in this thesis as indicating a certain amount of non-di fference but is 
not equal to the Paramiilman (Godhead). While the Alman is similar to the 
Paramiilman in relation to its nature, it can be considered different according to 
measure and capacity. The model of the Godhead (Paramiilman) in Dionysius 
provides a context to better understand the Alman in human beings from an 
ontological perspective. The Godhead is expressed in terms of a "Super-Essential 
Godhcad,,64 (6 9EO<; i)1u;po\)(Ji(J)<;).6~ This implies that a supreme unity is evident in the 
divine Super Essence, but which is also understood as beyond the human nature 
/,\ These qualities are described by Pseudo-Dionysius (DN, 2.11. 6498; translation by Rolt) as related 
to the Supreme Godhead. but these qualities also can be attributed to the notion of ,.(,man in a 
proportional context as being like that of the Godhead yet reduced in measure as a small pond may be 
compared to an infinite ocean where all the characteristics are present but not the same in dimensions 
or existence. 
:~ Rolt. DionysiuJ Ihe Areopagite, p.4. 
Pscudo-Dionysius. DN. 2.11.6498. 
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(physis) and thus above the human essential reality (ousia). This notion of a beyond 
state, beyond the Alman, allows the Alman to remain as the metaphysical bridge to the 
divine and yet this model also retains a certain sense of the divine reality being 
beyond the human condition. The prefix \)1tEP denotes a higher ousia. beyond the 
ordinary human experience, and indicates that in the Trinity the highest Subject 
relates not to an outer existential character but a "Super-Essential Godhead". So too in 
the case of human personhood, the highest expression of subjective awareness is 
ultimately expressed as the Alman through the particular hypostasis. The Atman is the 
metaphysical ousia of the human soul, the highest reality of unity in human 
personhood, united completely with the hypostasis and not disconnected. Even though 
humans may believe they experience separation due to the influence of their fallen 
nature, this separation is reconciled through the fullness of hypostalic life. 
It. the Absolute Essence. is Absolute consciousness and awareness and yet it is 
personally tri-hypostatic. united in its unity of ht'ing in the subject of that heing. 
which is the Super Essence. having Super Essential consciousness and yet having 
differentiation in the characteristics of the Trinity. Thus the paradox of unity and 
difference in the divine allows for a model to be expressed in a similar way in the 
human being, where there is difference. individual characteristics. and yet a divine 
essence of that existence in the form of the Atman. This remains unknown until the 
experience of deification. but this does not infer that there are ontologically different 
types of persons. The human person is of a generic type. having body and soul where 
the highest part of the soul is equated to the Atman. and specifically existent as a 
unique person. This specificity has ordinary awareness and the possibilities of extra-
ordinary awareness through developing an awareness of the true nature of h.~1JOstasi.\·. 
Each person is capable of experiencing the simultaneity of both. but Christ reveals to 
each person this experience in many differing ways in an unfathomable activity. 
Thus the Super Essence. correlated to the Paramiilman. expresses the highest divine 
reality (.~iva). which in the human person is localised as a portion of the divine as an 
emanation of the Supreme Godhead, as Dionysius stated: 
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For bestowing upon all things and supernally infusing Its Communications 
unto the goodly Universe, It becomes differentiated without lose of 
Undifference; and multiplied without loss of Unity; from its Oneness it 
becomes manifold while yet remaining within Itself. htJ 
The Alman thus represents unity with the divine and yet also expressing difference in 
relation to measure, will and activity of the Absolute. This distinction is also made in 
Pratyahhijnii in the distinguishing of laltvas or principles in the divine; which 
represents models moving from sameness, to this-ness and that-ness as shown in 
Chapter 3.4, where it was shown, how non-difference is related to difference even in 
the context of unity with the divine heing. From this movement in the divine heing. 
movement comes from God to the created universe through \'imadah7 or the aspect of 
divine consciousness by which the manifest universe is evident, while simultaneously 
unity is preserved in the Paramiilmanic consciousness (of itself) in the manifested 
universe. Using Byzantine methodology unity within difference can be understood, in 
relation to the human person, as expressing a unity of ht'ing through the Alman. as a 
portion of the divine as the "breath of God,,6K and "mingled in an unseen way,,6') with 
the divine. within hyposlalic difference. This mingling represents unity-in-
distinctiveness. The person who attains awareness of the highest reality. within the 
hypostasis, experiences an event of Alman where the individual consciousness rt'-
cognises its true reality of heing and as such lives in an Almanic mode of hYPoslalic 
existence70 as a de~/ied person. 
,~, ... hn<o ~ tv 
u("poul'''' 'I yap n/lol toi~ 0001. Kal ultEpxooooa ttl.; tWV OA.wv. oyaOWv I'ctooo(~, ~VWI'CV~ I' 
OIUl(p(VETUI. nA.'l0u£tul ot tvucw.; Kal noUwrAaoloy:yal tK tOU tva.; OV£IC!pOlttlto.;·. Pseudo-Dionysius. 
e,~· 2.11.6498. translation by Roll. Dionysius the Areopugite. pp.7H-HO. 
See IPK. 1.42. p.IS. which states that the divine awareness is the "essential character of 
consciousness being aware of himself...other wise Prakasa even though bearing the appearance of an 
object. could almost be compared to some insentient element like crystal" (lPK. 1.5.11. Pandit). God's 
power is not insentient. and thus a movement in the divine awareness becomes related outwardly as an 
aspect which humans in their ignorant state understand as the created world. The ,·imar.ia is the second 
tUII\'u or .sa/(Ii-tallva (see IPKp. p.156) and the existential awareness of the Absolute reality. 
t.lIG N' regory aztanzen. 'On the Soul' in Poemata Arcana. 447 A (Sykes). 
10'1 Ibid .. 453A. 
11J l'h' . bo 
. IS term IS rrowed from Zizioulas' term mode ofhnHH'tatic existence. see BC, p.50. which will 
Include the tcrm Almun within a contcxt of deification. 
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4.4.4 Possibilities of Person 
The context of Atman. in relation to a model of h.lpostasis. indicates the spiritual 
reality within a concrete person, and will not be equated with a single entity or 
metaphysical reality that overwhelms the natural physis of the individual or pa.\:II. It 
will be equated with the highest reality of being and cognition of person, while 
allowing for mundane cognitions. In this schema of Atman and h.lpostasis within a 
single person, there will be affirmed a simultaneous condition of double willing, 
consciousness and being within a single person, where in the de~/;ed person both 
aspects are united. 
Through a unifying condition the sense of person, puru,'lalh.lpo.\'tasis. is altered in the 
inclusion of the term Atman to indicate the possibilities of a change of awareness and 
transformation of being through grace rendered in the deiji'ing activity of the divine. 
This activity is also correlated to the union of natures in the hypostatic union of 
Christ, which allows for deijication on a cosmic level while in the pre-Incarnation era 
this can be said to have been facilitated in the few by the activity of the Parampllrll.~a 
or the Logo.\'. Such activities can be said to be evident in such traditions as 
Pratyahhijnii and the Byzantine due to the divine economy. Through the Byzantine 
model it can be argued that after the Christ hyposta.\'is such divine activities were 
expanded to include not only a few ascetics but all persons. The fallen nature itself is 
wholly restored and thus the experience of deification is open to all persons and 
therefore the experience of the A/manic nature in the hypo.\'ta.\'is. through the 
hypostatic union. Maximus stated: 
for the incarnation is an effective demonstration of both nature and the 
economy, I mean of the natural logos of what has been united. confirming the 
mode of the hypostatic union and 'instituting afresh the natures'. without 
change or confusion.7I 
The hypostatic Atmanic experience has become available to the whole human race, 
for each person now, has in the A/man-hypos/asis the potentiality of experiencing this 
reality in the Christ. Before the Christ there was a distinction between the pa.\:u (beast) 
and the pati (the realised master) which has been rectified. This distinction was made 
71 M . 
aXlmus, Opsc.3, 48.(" (Louth). 
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in the l{:varapralyabhijfiiikiirikii, which argued that someone who experiences non-
difference in the enlightened condition is called a pati, while the one who is "under 
the effects of delusion ... is called a pa.{:u (a bound being)".72 The biological or natural 
condition of the paJu is distinguished by a covering of maya (illusion), or a~a\'U-ma/a 
(covering of se(f, limitation), or the "defilement of finitude". 7l This biological 
condition, equated to Zizioulas' notion of "hypostasis ofhi%gica/ existence",74 has a 
mode of existence that is separated from God and contrasts to a relational person or a 
"hypostasis ofecdesial existence".7S This ecclesial existence represents a 
soteriological type of life highlighted in the Atman-hypostasis, where grace allows 
access to the divine life, and where the Alman-hypostasis indicates the potentiality for 
communion in the relationship with the divine. This is not possible through the natural 
physis of the biological individual alone, but becomes open to all persons through the 
hJpostatic union. Inherent in the word hypostasis, are the possibilities of dei/icCliion 
within the human person through the sharing of an underlying stasis (standing) of 
heing, where the Atmanic experience becomes open to the h.lP(}.~tusis in the 
experience of this stasis through the Christ hypostasi.\'. 
The Alman-hypostasis model clarifies the natural condition and explains that what is 
happening in the body condition in de~/ication is a transformation of phy.\'is within the 
h.'I-po.\'tu.\'i.\'. There are not two types of hyposta.\·es, which are inferred in Zizioulas 
model. 711 one of the biological and another of the ecclesial. but a single h.lpO.\·lusi.~ 
with two natures, where the higher transfonns the lower through the h.l1JOstutic union. 
The hyposlulic union unites the natural human physi.\· to the Almanic on an individual 
level and also on a cosmic level. for all. 
The possibilities of person. allows de~/icalion to represent the true ontological 
condition of the person, whether through a soteriological or through an eschatological 
context, which infonns the person (hyp() ... tu.~is) of its true nature. Within this 
experience. the individual reality is not to be considered unreal. it is not mayic 
(illusionary). but real and yet the truest condition of the individual is understood 
:~ IPK. 3,14. p.M; translation by Pandit.IPKI'. 3,2.3. p, 173, 
, IPKp. p, 173. 
'4 Zizioulas. BC, p,50. 
71 Ibid, 
7
t
'lbid, 
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through a deijied or Almanic mode of hypostatic existence. This position allows for a 
paradoxical model of person, reconciling deijication/re-cognition and concrete 
material existentiality, of the metaphysical Atmanic reality and the real world. The 
flexibility of Byzantine and Pratyabhijita tradition in allowing antinomic models can 
be appropriated in the development of an Alman-hYPoslasis model of person in which 
the human person experiences in the body, an Almanic event in the soul. This evenl77 
results in the experience of deijicalion/re-cognilion, which involves human 
restoration,711 participation of and within the hyposlalic being where the te/os of 
human personhood is experienced within an event of the inner being. This ontological 
Almanic event can also be correlated to the inner eschaton and to the outer revelatory 
eschala where the final restoration of human personhood is experienced by some 
persons whilst alive but yet promised for all persons (in a soteriological context) in 
the eschatological restoration of aI/things. In terms of deijication/re-cognition, the 
e.'lchaton or inner event can be understood in terms of the completion of heing in the 
now. 
The inner event also relates to the outer hypostatic existence and is not only a single 
experience, but reveals the true cognitive subject, the true '( Am'. where the expcricnt 
(pramiitr) becomes aware of the true nature of his or her existence in a single evenl 
revealing a true awareness in Alman consciousness. This t'l-'ent flows continuously in 
time revealing a unity of heing throughout time, which also affirms the place for 
revelatory and soteriological multiplicity, yet having unity with the divine. In this 
experience of unity of hyposlatic existence in the essential reality of heing (or Alman) 
the conscious subject moves from an ordinary experience to a maximalist or 
completed awareness in a perfected ontological condition in the Ie/os of personhood. 
Perfection can be called the true state intended for humanity through the fullness 
(pler(jmalpiirfJa) 79 of heing where the fullness of the Alman-h.l1)ostasis is rt'-cogni,\'('d 
as non-different to the divine as far as possible in the human person. 
" Related to a Christ event. see Zizioulas. Be. p.130; see also Collins. Trinitarian Tht'ology We.\t and 
EaJt. 
1M Though Pratyahhijiiii docs not have a theology of restoration to speak of. it docs distinguish between 
what is experienced as a Pu.su (understood to be a bound soul. Jivalpuru,w) a finite experience as 
compared, to a pati (lord) who has an infinite experience in the realisation of ahum idam ("I am this") 
?~ ':1 am Siva", see IPK, 4.1-6. pp. 70-7 \. 
For a good account of the comparison of pleroma and p;4r/Ja see Bettina Baumer and John R. 
Dupuche. Void and Fullness. 
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The notion of fullness can be considered as a consequence of the divine will 
(thelima/icchii) and act (or operation. energeialkriyii-.~akti). and in the Byzantine 
tradition as already stated. due to the hypostatic union. llo Another way of putting it. is 
that through Pratyabhijiiii. because of the doctrine of iibh{lJal'iida. in which the 
universe as the luminous expression of the divine is the outward manifestation of Cit 
(divine consciousness);KI the human person as a manifestation of the divine. is to be 
considered in truth nothing other than this (Atmanic) perfection. This divine will to 
perfect creation. which is actually perfection but not re-cognised as such. is reflected 
to the concept of principles (/ogoi/taltvas).K2 which makes perfection or fullness 
(p/er6malpiir~a) possible.H] This notion of perfection of the hypostasis (person). 
becoming aware of his or her true condition. of the recovery of the perfect fe/os of 
each person is not merely an eschatological ideal. but can be considered within the 
immanent now. All that a hypostasis (person) should be is already attained in the 
fullness of the eternal Atmani" condition. This idea of the paradox of simultaneous 
being and becoming is to be understood in relation to the fullness of the divine 
("Onc,,)H4 who has fulfilled. fulfils, and continues to fulfil all at the same time. 
restoring all things to itself. to its divine perfectionll~ simultaneously. 
In this context. Maximus argued that the perfection to be wrought for everything by 
the Logo", is already existent as the potentiality of that perfection. as the logo.\' of 
perfection (as far is possible) in each h.l'1)(}"'tatic being.lll! This potentiality or potency 
III) Example of sec Maximus. ThaI. 60. 73. 
KI Sec IPK. 4.1, p.70. 
K~ The relating of the notion of logo; to principles in the context of Pra~\'ahhijita has already expressed. 
but see Pseudo-Oionysius, DN. 7090; and Maximus, Amb;g. 7. 1077(,-IOK41>. 
Kl This possibility offullness or perfection is summed up in .~r; Nopani$ud. "Om that which is perfect 
is perfect, the perfect arises from the perfect, when the perfect is taken away from the perfect, the 
perfect alone remains", jh~: ce,~ci ~ 'l"'¥wt41 ~ 'i"~AI~I<I 'lJ1Adldftie<rt4II, Om 
piirnumudu/:l purfJum idum. PiirfJiil piirfJum udu",ale. PiirfJasyu piirfJum tidciyu, P,irfJam ,'Vci\'u.ii.~-,·ult·. 
translation by A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami PrabhupAda, .~ri Nopan;$ud (UK: 19(3). p.1. 
K4 Where Pseudo-Dionysius stated that "the name One means that God is uniquely all things through 
the transcendence of one unity and that he is the cause of all without ever departing from that 
oneness", "Ev ot, otlnc'zvta tvlalw~ tent Kattl f.ll~ tv6t'lt<>l; untpoxtiv, KatntlVnov tent tOU tvlll; 
aVEl(cpolt~tcJ}~ ainov. DN. \3.2, 977C -9770, translation by Luibheid. Pn'Udo-Dion\'.{iIlJ, p.12K. 
K~ "Within its total unity it contains part and whole, and it transcends these too and is antecedent to 
them. This perfection is found in the imperfect as the source of their perfection. But it also transcends 
perfection, and in the perfect it is manifest as transcending and anticipating their perfection", w.; nllv 
I(at IlCPO>; I(at OAOV tv tautflcruVttJ..11lPuia, Kat untpi:xoooa, Kat npoi:xoooa, ttAtla Iltv fCJlIV tv toi.; 
(,lTfUmv, w~ tEktaXI~' atcl.1'l~ ot tv tO~ ttAt{O\~, W.; unEptcl.1'l.; I(at npOttA.EIO';, sec Pseudo-
Dionysoius, DN, 2.10, 646C, translation by Luibheid. Pseudo-Dion.nills, p.6S. 
III. See chapter 2B of this thesis which cites Maximus notion of deification sec Thal.6. 69-71. 
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(OUVUJ,U:l)1I7 comes to be fulfilled through the grace of the hJpostutic Logos,lIlI 
transforming being. In this transformation and perfection. the person attains a state of 
"likeness" within the human hypostusis who. as the "image" of the God. experiences 
an awareness of the divine within a Cid-ii/manic mode (~r existence. In this experience 
the hypostasis comprehends existence through a cognitive knowledge gained in the 
experience of Atman. or jiiiina. This is not mere ordinary or natural awareness or 
knowledge (vidya), but true knowing. In this condition the state of perfection is 
cognised within oneself as the Self(Atman) for the logos of perfection in each person 
allows the individual to enter into a state of becoming as a "portion of God",II'1 
through the potency and grace of the Logos, where a uniting to the Logos brings 
perfection.90 
The concept of fullness is also exemplified in the works of Gregory of Nyssa who 
utilised a paradoxical model so that fullness comes to indicate incomprehensibility.'l) 
The notion of unknowing-knowing'l2 allows for an antinomic model through a notion 
of apophasis'H in a mystical unknowing-knowing where in that experience 
epistemological constructs fail. God makes perfect all things even though the world 
seems imperfect, where God unites all things to this perfection. Another way of 
considering this position is in terms of love. Dionysius stated that "out of love he has 
come down to be at our level of nature and has become being". '14 He is also beyond 
being and human comprehension where his "fullness was unatTected hy that 
inexpressible emptying of selr'.'I~ Dionysius stated: 
X7 Ibid. 
xx M . 
aXlmus. Ambig. 7. 1077B. 
H'I . 
Ibid .. 1084(,-0, translation by Blowers, On thl! Cosmic Mv~tt'n' 0/ Chri.~t. 1'.51<-59. 
'II! Concerning this relationship of the experience of dl!ijicali~m liace Maximus stated: "By his gracious 
condescension God became man and is called man for the sake of man and by exchanging his condition 
for ours revealed that elevates man to God ... by this blessed inversion, man is made God by 
divinization" (Ibid). 
'1\ See Gregory of Nyssa, V.Mos .. 376C. For an examination of "Iereima see L. G. Patterson, 'PIt'roma: 
~he human plenitude, from Irenaeus to Gregory of Nyssa', SP (2001),1'1'.529-540. 
J. See Pseudo-Dionysius ON. 7.3, 872A; also see 'Divine Unknowing', in Hans lJrs von Balthasar, 
('osmic Liturgy, 1'.91. 
9\ 
For a contemporary Byzantine correlation of fullness to unknowing, see Yannaras, On Ih(' Ah.5t'nCI! 
and Unknowahilitv or God. 
'M •. 
Pseudo-Dionysius, ON. 2.10, 646D; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-OionY.5iu.5, 1'.65. Note in 
Luibheid's translation Chapter 2.10 of the 'Divine Names' has been incorrecled placed at page number 
64HC-D of Palro/agia Graeca (PG 3), however the correct page number is 646, and then Chapter 2.11 
continues on page 649 
I)~ . 
Ibid., 2. \0 646D; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Oionysius, p.65. 
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He transcends the unity which is in beings. He is indivisible multiplicity, the 
unfilled overfullness which produces perfects and preserves all unity and all 
multiplicity. Furthennore, since there are many who are by his gift raised, so 
far as they can be, to divinization, it would seem that here there is not only 
differentiation but actual replication of the one God.'J6 
In the notion of the perfection of being the Subject of perfection is not the individual 
experient but the conscious reality by which union takes place, which when united 
with the ordinary experient, unites the nature, will and awareness of the divine with 
the experient.97 It is the divine who becomes the experience amid differentiation as 
Dionysius stated. "He remains one. nothing less than himself. He remains one amid 
the plurality, unified throughout the procession, and full amid the emptying act of 
di fferentiation". 98 
4.5 Concerning Consciousness 
The context of Alman within hyposlasis allows not only for a substantiality of the soul 
as stated in part 4.4.2, but awareness within this condition. This qualities the monist 
implications of Alman through divine consciousness (01), where the 'knowing 
person' indicates not just the divine active awareness within the soul but also allows a 
sense of rational person to extend within and through the divine awareness. In the 
Byzantine theology of Gregory of Nyssa, the soul was related to a vital faculty having 
three varieties; that without perception; perception without the reasoning activity; and 
third being rational and extensive throughout the whole faculty.'1'J The soul, which is 
'"'l"U:P to Ev. toi.; OUOIV Ev. Kal7rAfleo~ a~u:p~. aMA"rll)(J)tov u7rcp7rAflu;. nc'lv Ev ..-al napayov • ..-ul 
tU.l:IOUV. I(al <J\Jvtxov. ncu..IV TfI ~ autOU OCOO&I. t41 Kata OUVUJ1IV tKc'.tmou 9EOClbti Or.(i)v 7roU(i)v 
r~YVOJ1£V(i)v. (ibid.). 2.11. 649('; translation by Luibheid. P.H'Udtl·Dltlny.\·lu.~. p.67. 
Or pramiilii "is the knowing subject which is distinguished from known object (l'ram(~\'a). and Ihe 
Supreme Pramalr is Parama.iiva. the divine conscious Lord, for whom the entin: universe is His 
subjective Self'. See Pandit. IPKp. p.226. The PBH shows that the nature of the pramiitr IS m~'ii in 
that its consciousness is cilia or individual consciousness. stating in SUlra 6 of PBH: "The' 
miiyiipramalr consl.~I.f of II (i.e. Cilia)". ~ J11~hfJ1I(1II. lanmayo miiyii-prumiilii; translation by 
Singh. p.62. 
'1M P d D' . 
seu 0- lonyslus. ON. 2.11. 649B. translation by Luibheid. P.H'Udo-O'OnV.I'IIH. p.67. 
'I'I 'EnElb~ bE tpd; Kat a T~V ~WT\~V buva~uv OIUlPOPa.; 6 A.6yo.; CUpE. T~V J1ho XWPL; aioO~('u:(J}';. T~V bt 
TPr.cpO~~v ~tv Kal au~avol'tv1)v. aJ10tpouoav ot TfI~ AOYIKfI.; tvtpYEIa.;. T~V bE AOYI~V Kal tu...r.lav 
01' anc'.ta'l~ bl~KOUOav Tfl.; buva~Ew.;. w.; Kul tv tK£lval~ dvUl Kal tI'I.; VOl:p~ to 7rAtOV !:xCIV'. 
Hom.Opif 14. 176A-B; translation by Moore. On Ihe Mu/cing olMun (NPNF. 5). p.403. 
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intellectual and rational for Gregory is a "living operation" (tvtpCta ~wnJOi).IU() which 
allows existing to be expressed through the faculties of reason. This in tum allows for 
many types of rational expressions, including an awareness of Atmanic operations. 
The allowing for two types of awareness within the person, one of re-capitulated 
consciousness, as discussed in Chapter 2.9, and a mundane consciousness, both united 
within a single deified person, does not indicate a bipolar person but that through 
deification the whole person experiences both aspects within a united construct. While 
before deification there can be said to be manifest a fracture of cognitive states, in 
deificalion this fracture is rendered whole through the operations of the Christ. 
Within the Alman-hypostasis. consciousness is thus expressed through the mundane 
faculties and the higher faculties, which are united, in varying degrees, within a 
person. In the highest awareness, the Almanic faculty unites within the whole person a 
sense of perfection and completion. Again a way to better understand the human 
model, can be provided through the Christological, where there was evident a uniting 
of natures within the whole Christ. The awareness of Christ reflects this unity within a 
double schema where the rational soul of Christ is expressed through the natural 
willing of his earthly and human natures but which are also united. In the same way in 
the perfected person, there is evident a double rationality. of the natural condition and 
that of the Atmanic within a single personal awareness, where the higher infonns the 
lower. This infonning, for most, is on a level not observed as the Atmanic reality and 
consciousness can never be divorced from the individual soul in which it resides, but 
constantly acts and wills in the individual until the individual comes to experience 
that perfection through grace. It can even be attested that without the Alman. mundane 
consciousness would not be possible for it is this out flowing 01"1 Am' that is the 
operation that becomes the finite 'I am', and constitutes a pattern of the divine 
awareness within. It is because the Atman is not merely a static metaphysical 
substance but having pure awareness (l'imada), or true subject awareness, that this 
awareness implicitly relates to the individual subject and awareness. As such. in the 
Atman-hypostasis model there is a perfect union of both the particular characteristics 
of the unique person and particular awareness, and of the Atmanic consciousness. lUI It 
II., Hom.Opi/.IS. 177A. 
IHI Th' . I . 
IS simu tanelty of being and consciousness is expressed in the Siva Siilra. 1.1. which states 
cuilunyumiilmii. ~C1F'<lI1IAI1II1 t II. which indicates that the Alman has as its nature. consciousness 
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is the incarnational grace that allows the gulf between the two points of awareness to 
be unified, and mirroring a pattern of Trinitarian awareness and being in specific and 
unified conditions. 
The subjective unique and particular characteristics or persons of the Trinity which 
have their set roles, indicates a consciousness that is specific to each in that role 102 and 
yet they have a united consciousness due to their Paramiitmanic: nature in relation to 
the Godhead. This highlights a model in which distinctiveness (or difference) is 
evidenced in a united being (of the Godhead), especially highlighted in the two wills 
of the Christ. 101 Unity is maintained through the shared nature which is not a static 
substance or an impersonal mass of being, but is personal, that is, it is the Se(/:aware 
essential divine reality having its own consciousness (Cit). This may seem to affirm 
that there are two types of consciousness, one relating to each specific divine 
hypostasis and one of the divine substance. But this is not the case for consciousness 
in divine hypostatic difference is non-different to the united consciousness of the 
divine essential nature. The nature of the consciousness of this non-di fferent otherness 
is expressed, in Pratyabhijitii terms. through the light of its own consciousness 
(prakiHa), which is the united consciousness of otherness and becomes the true 
consciousness of human otherness. The understanding of the nature of this sense of 
unity within the consciousness of hypostatic difference or otherness becomes very 
important when translating this model into the human condition. In the human state 
there are two consciousnesses within a single person, one pertaining to the mundane 
consciousness of the deluded state in the natural '( am', and the other ufthe inner 
divine consciousness. This inner awareness comes to be accessed through the d(I(fied 
state where the person comes to re-cogni.\"e his or her true consciousness in the 
Atmanic or deified condition. 
expressed in the most profound of ways. This profundity indicates that in the individual selves the 
natural consciousness is an awareness of a deluded or unnatunll condition when compared to that of the 
Alman which is the purest expression of consciousness. This unnatur.tl condition to the human person 
put upon human beings in Byzantine theology as consequence of the fall. represents a limited 
consciousness or a consciousness of bondage. This is why in the second SUlra of the SSt 1.2. it states. 
~ .-ru: II ~ II. jitiinam handhab (knowledge is bondage). that is all knowledge that does not relate to 
the ,-lIm an is bondage. This then leads on to a description of how to gain that experience through the 
~r.actise of yoga. In the Byzantine tmdition this pmctise is called he.u)'('ha.~m. 
IJ. Of the Unbegotten (I'ryEw'lTOV). the Begotten (YEVllTOV). and that which comes from the Father (Kai 
J(~ t.K TO\; 7[~TpO.; tl(7[OpEU6~t:vov. see Gregory Nazianzen. Or.29. 767('. 
See Maxlmus apse. 3. 45(' -48B (Louth). 
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In deification, the higher awareness overcomes the sense of separation in the natural 
physis not accomplished by the natural physis. through grace, which unifies difference 
to itself through the activity of Alman. In relation to divine participation through 
deificalion/re-cognition with the Christ hypostasis. the human person attains a true 
selj:identity gained within an Atmanic awareness. As Utpala stated: 
For this very reason the Self has been defined as Consciousness as the activity 
of awareness, in order to express its independent authority with respect to the 
activity of becoming conscious. This difference accounts for its being different 
from an insentient entity. 104 
The notions of deification/ re-cognition indicate a noetic cOb'11ition which goes 
beyond the natural knowing and willing of the human person and allows the person 
(hyp().\'ta.\'is/puru.~·a) to understand the nature of hislher true heing and existence. This 
cognition reveals a change not only of knowing but of heing and understood in both 
traditions through the relationship of heing. act and consciousness. The Supreme 
Person,lOS through God's will (thelima/icchii), and power (dyntlmi.\'/.~tlkti), manifests 
creation (iihhii.w.\·) and then brings creation and human persons (h)1JtJ.\·ttl.\·es/purtl,m.\·), 
through God's activity (f;vtfYYEta.lkriyii-.~tlkti), back to God's own personal being. This 
return constitutes a change in conscious awareness, which in tum reveals not only the 
true nature of heing but a relational context of the divine to the world. 
4.5. 1 Self-Awareness 
In the Almtln-hyposttlsis the question 'who am I' becomes resolved. a'\ highlighted 
throughout the thesis, not in the natural physis or the natural consciousness, but where 
difference (or hypostasis) and unity (or Atmtln) are expressed simultaneously: 'I am' 
because Thou (God) are. 'I am' who 'I am' but at the same time ') Am' in the highest 
awareness 'That'. There is within the Alman-h.\pOSlasi.\· reflected capabilities of the 
divine Ptlrtlmiitmtlnic awareness in . I Am That' (heing). This is expressed in a 
IIW IPK, 1.43. p.IH, ~ ~ ~ ft1a;4IftmCf\¥IIC1I("(H'oM~C1@1i1 ~ ~~: II . 
. .ftmiita eva caitanyam cit-lcriYii cililcarlrliilliil paryelJodilat lena jw,Jiit .w hi \'illJ~·lJlJalt/.'; translation by 
Pandit.IPKp,I.5.12.p.61. 
1"< 
In Neo- Vedanlit' models person is indicated in the term Sal-PUrU$a. see: Sri Aurobindo. The /.ilt' 
lJi,·int'. Sat indicates both truth and being. Se:c also the: Kalha Upani~'ad (1.3.11). 
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revelatory context. in relation to the other, to difference or human persons. so as to 
show that human personhood does not exist in isolation. This relational context to 
human personhood allows the other to come to understand his or her true awareness. 
This true awareness cannot be anything other than, in the highest state, reflected 
within 'I am-Thou' consciousness. 
The natural condition deified. is expressed in di fference as ') am' other than the 
divine, and then as 'Thou'. to qualify difference in divine unity. If this were not the 
case, there would be no expression of the divine' I Am' within, but a closed and 
isolated' 1', or it would be expressed in a close monist context. The declaration to the 
other of the divine 'I Am', represents not only 'I Am' here whilst you are there. but 
highlights that gu(lbetween the two is resolved in an inner event. Through 
participation in deijication the divine ') Am' is disclosed in an event of revelation to 
the natural 'I am' of the human person. Through this inner event, the individual comes 
to understand his or her true ') AM' through an Almanic event. which is the 
consequence of the divine commune. The revelatory dynamic of this event 
experienced within the person allows, within the context of human personhood. a 
resolution of Alman with hyp().\'/w~i.\· so as to come together within the person in a 
homogenised context. Ifthere were no inner revelation but just created beings distinct 
and divorced from the divine. then there could be no Alman-h)1m.\·/wii.\· but just 
isolated individuals. It is because of the divine revelatory activity that the broken 
ontological condition of the human person is made whole. 
Through this healing of the human condition the human consciousness becomes 
intimately related to the divine. otherwise human beings could only attain an 
awareness of the divine. a knowing about God as phenomena outside of the human 
condition, which is no disclosure at all. Hence in the Almanic event there is a 
disclosure of the true nature of heing within the h.~p(}.\'la.\'i.\·, where the natural mode of 
existence is transformed into an Almanic mode of existence. 
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4.5.2 Cid-iitmanic Mode of Hypostatic Existence 
It is because as discussed above, the Almanic condition has a rational element within 
the hypostas;s, that the mode of existence of the perfected hypostas;s has to include 
this dynamic through the inclusion of the world Cit. This implies that the mundane 
consciousness, cilia, becomes transformed into a divine pattern, Cit. Hence such a 
person can be said to live within a Cid-iitman;c: mode of existence and a true 
conscious awareness, where the nature of being is attained and experienced whilst in 
the body. 
The finite individual is moved from a natural mode of existence to a higher mode. The 
words, the 'individual is moved', implies that movement is not self-caused, but as a 
consequence of the divine mover. The notion of mode also allows an existential 
relation to being, where the inner ontological dynamic of the Atmanic experience 
reflects outwardly and allows for a type of existence that reflects the Atnwnk 
condition. In this condition, particular characteristics of the hH)(},\'las;.\· are not 
dissolved but perceived through the lens of unity. This mode itself. in expressing 
specificity. also allows the Atmanic: condition to be expressed for without the 
hypostatic condition. the Atman could not be known. for otherwise who would be the 
knower of the known? 
Both conditions of difference and non-difference are needed to express inner being 
and outer existing, so that being, true being and existing are unified within a mode of 
being and existing. It is not the outward changing individual existence that provides 
stability to an existing person, but the unchangeable reality within.1l1fl Conversely the 
Atman is experienced through the hypo.\·tasis, and by itself would only be a lump of 
insentient metaphysical .'itr~O; hence both aspects are needed 
If)l, 
As Utpala argued that the "only the interior existence of phenomenon entities IS their eternal 
existence. because they are one with pure Consciousness. Their uistence IS an exterior phenomenon as 
well. because they are brought into outward manifestation by maya", IPK. I.K4, p.34. 
~rJi4~S(f)i1<8IWiIJirt1~q ~I ~ JiI<8JiIWilifi l'lDC"CtI,It:(QJ'8l II {\I II, Cln-mayutw 
\'iihhiisunum an/ar eva slhili/,J sadii;' m~'ii hhiisa-miiniinii", hiihyutvtid huhir up\' u.sU/I!I, trdnslation by 
Pandit,/PKp, \.8.7. p.84. . 
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The Alman-hypostasis also mirrors the divine mode of existence exemplified in the 
Paramiitmanic-hypostases of the Trinity where unity is expressed through difference 
in the individual characteristics of the divine hypostasis. A mode of material existing 
through unity is also more easily shown through Christ. who indicates a way a human 
person should live. This way indicates that Christian life there is a casting away of the 
'old life' (the natural physis), which was as consequence of the jail. 107 in a unity of 
existence in the Almanic condition. In this mode of life. each person becomes "a new 
creation; the old has gone. the new has come ... so that in him we might become the 
righteousness of God" (2 Cor.5: 17. 21), where the lower is transfonned in a higher 
mode oflife. The righteousness of God here refers to the restoration 10K of the natural 
physis to its intended condition. which is an Atman;c condition within the h,l1JO.\·las;s. 
Irenaeus stated: 
Because the created man was placed upon the earth as one having the divine 
image and that he might be living, he breathed in his face the breath of life 
that. both by his creation. man might be like God.I()<I 
In the restored state of communion with the divine. as previously experienced in 
d· 110 hid' . d' . f . t h para Ise, t e natura con Itlon an consciousness attains a typ~ 0 eXls ence. were 
a spiritual life of "like" with God and indicates a similar nature and consciousness 
akin to the divine pattern. This previous condition of perfection indicates that the 
perfection is already attained in Paradise and all that is necessary. is a "reconciliation 
between God and man" I I I established in Christ. Thus the Atmun-h.l1JO.\·/usi.'i model of 
person indicates a kind of life. or a mode of existence. which is exemplified in the 
Christ Puramiitman-hypostas;s. where both material existence and absolute 
metaphysical consciousness are united and not divided. To be a true person. is thus to 
live in Atman;c consciousness within a Cid-ii/manic: mode of h,l1)(Jstatic existence. 
which is not only for the few. but afforded to all in the salvific activity of Christ. The 
1111 
As Irenaeus stated. "Adam and his wife eve being expelled from Paradise. fell into much trouble 
and tribulation. wandering around the earth with much sorrow and hard labour groaning", P.Ap. 17. 671 
( Mekcrttschian). 
111M 
Ircnaeus, P.Ap.II, 667 (Mekcrttschian). 
lin ~wuqp4hJlutwJlwu CuuUlldnJ plJ.hJlwJ hI\Wl uUlhJldhwl uWJlI\u : hl qp4huI\wup hq}lgp' 
*iiWg PI\l:;tIu unqw 2mbl4hbwg nJluttu q}l. P.Ap.ll. 667 (Mekcrttschian). 
See Ircnacus, P.Ap.16. 671 (Mekerttschian). where Irenaeus refers to a perfected state or "man" 
who fell from this perfection. 
III 
Irenacus, P.Ap.6, 664 (Mekerttschian). 
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question arises, what is the nature of cognition within the Cid-iitmanic mode of 
hypostatic existence? 
When considering the dynamic activity of the divine reality within the human 
condition, conceptual knowledge becomes expansive and also relative where the 
subject who knows, "this is" and "this is seen by me", 112 and understands the 
difference between the relative 'I am' awareness and objectified manifestation due to 
a sense of limited 'I-ness'. But where does this consciousness originate from? Not 
from its own natural physis, but from a higher awareness shining from the highest part 
of the soul (Atman), which allows the individual awareness to attain a Cid-iitmanic 
mode of hypostatic existence and thereby attain a unified awareness in difference. In 
this mode of existence the awareness that all subjects and objects have at their core, is 
experienced as ultimately "non-different from the interior I-consciousness".lll 
In the Cid-iitmanic: mode of hypostatic difference, a person moves away from a 
limited consciousness to a divine mode of life. While a limited conditioned individual 
existence experiences lower modes of existence and cannot attain the higher mode of 
existence without divine grace, the Cid-iilmanic mode of existence implies that in 
difference a unified state is experienced. This unifying state is not divorced from the 
lower modes even though mundane consciousness in these modes is unable to 
perceive the innate perfection unifying those modes. Through the perfecting activity 
of unity within the differing states of mundane existence the lower consciousness is 
raised to a sal/vic or pure life, which allows the individual consciousness to 
experience an awareness of the Atmanic state. The Od-iitmanic mode of h.l1JOstalic 
existence does not negate the place for the lower consciousness but that through the 
unity of the Atman both types of consciousness. both pure and impure states. are 
accepted in a model of unity-in-diversity. But such a unity within a higher 
consciousness is ultimately inevitable, where the force of the Atmanic consciousness 
leads the human person to a state of perfection. This inevitability is due to the outward 
flowing of the consciousness of the Paramiilman or the Supreme Godhead which not 
only accepts manifested phenomena but is the Cause of all phenomena. 
II! . 
ThiS follows the argument of Utpala to identify the true: Subject of knowing. see IPK. 1.31. p.13; 
~~~nslation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.4.R. p.46. 
Utpaladeva. IPK. 2.24. p.46: translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.3.9. p.127. 
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4.6 Concerning Relationality 
Throughout this work the notion of relationality within the context of personhood has 
been considered in relation to Zizioulas' model. but what does relationality truly 
indicate? In Zizioulas' model relationality is juxtaposed to a sense of communion and 
a mode of existence which indicates an intimate space between two subjects (persons) 
or between subject and object (God and human persons). But it is unclear as to what 
connects the subject-to-subject or subject-to-object by which a bond of relationality is 
established. Hence Zizioulas' recourse was to diminish the separation between two 
concrete individuals by stressing that the subjects or persons can have an interrelated 
mode of existence established through the ontological condition of communion. 114 
The person or hypostasis enters into an existential becoming through a mode. which 
allows the hypostasis to re-cognise his or her true mode of being through an ecclesial 
communion. Zizioulas' model is also based upon Byzantine Trinitarian rdationality, 
where Zizioulas interprets heing. through a communion of hnJOstase.\' that participates 
in a certain existential mode of existence. II ~ This existential approach to relationality, 
through the language of mode or tropos of existence, while breaking down the sense 
of autonomous se!f'within the limited consciousness of the human individual 
revealing a higher communion, limits the revelation of the true .\·('(/'to an outer act in 
communion. This reveals not the inner reality of the true Se(/,(.4tman) or the real 
subject awareness but just the activity or mode by which heinJ,: is to be fathomed. 
Consequently, through the Atman-hypostasis. this position is rectified in that the 
ontological reality of heing a essential person. as well as existing in a certain 
conscious awareness. and is affirmed through the Atmanic reality in the Atman-
hypostasis model. Being is not only interpreted as a material condition of heing here 
or there in relation to other persons, but has a metaphysical dimension of being the 
conscious Atman within the bodily life. The notion of consciousness adds to the 
Almanic condition of heing relative to the other, or hyposlas; . .,. within a hypostasis by 
affirming that in the state of true heing an awareness of being allows the state of heing 
to be fully understood. The Alman is not predicated to a metaphysical substance of the 
II~ Be 16-50 
. pp. . 
11'lbid. 
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hypostasis, but becomes the true consciousness of the hypostasis. In a relational 
context the conscious movement from the inner reality to the outer existence indicates 
the true nature of a relational bond where all relationality has as its fixed point. the 
Atmanic reality within the hypostatic existence. The nature of the relationship of the 
Atman to the hypostasis is uncovered in the Atman-hypostasi.'i model which points to 
how being and existence come together in a united sense of person. 
Relationality implies a sense of participation and sharing of a common life. which 
shall be correlated not to the outer hypostatic life. but also the inner life. The person 
experiences relationality with the divine nature. because of the inner nature of the 
human person. Just as in the Cappadocian model. as shown in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
relational participation can be Atman correlated to a sense of what is shared or a 
communion through the notion of ousia, so this model can be transferred to the 
Atmanic. In the same way Basil of Caesarea referred to a "community of substance" 
(ouoiuv Ko\v6tTlto~) to underline the unity within the divine h)1JO.'itu,\·e.'i through the 
common sharing of an essential nature. so too a communion through h)po.'ituses can 
be applied in the same way. This provides the focal point in the relationality of 
hYPosluses. In this type ofrelationality. the distinctiveness (or differences) of the 
individual characteristics of the persons. as in the Trinity. are not diminished or 
confounded in that unity. but experience an "inconceivable communion" I It. through 
the essential nature. In this model hypostatic difference does not diminish the sense of 
unity.117 but allows unity to be expressed, In the same way that it is impossible to 
conceive of difference without considering unity in the divine condition. so too 
human hypostases cannot be considered outside of the Atmunk nature which binds 
those hypostases together. 
II', S B 'I E' ) .., 
•. ee aSI. p .. ,H. ,,32D-333A (Deferr.tri). 
II, Basil stated: "In like manner he who accepts the father virtually accepts along with the Him the Son 
and the Spirit also. For it is impossible in any manner to conceIve of a severance or separatIon whereby 
eIther the Son is thought of apart from the the Father or the Spirit is parted from the Son; but there is 
apprehended among these three a certain ineffable and conceivable communion and at the same time 
distinction. with neither the difference between their persons dissintergrating the continuity of their 
nature. nor this community of substance confounding the individual character of their distinguishang 
notes" (U)(JUUtO)'; ot Kal6 tOY nattpa o~u~u;v~ lcal tOY Yiov "al TO rlvcUl1a O'\Il11tapcO~uTo Tn 
OUVUI1EI. OU yap tOtlV £ntVo1'\oUl TOI1~V i1 otuip£olV KaT'ouotva TpOnov. to.; i1 Viov XlJ)pl.; nUTpO.; 
V0'191'\VUl. i1 TO nVcUl1a tou Yio\} ota~£ux91'\vUl' Qll.iJ. tI.; o(>(>'1to.; "ul QKutuv6'1To.; tv ToutO~ 
I(Utw..U~paVEtull(Q1 ~ "OIv(J)vla Kal ~ OulP"PIOIi;. OUT£ t1'\.; TUW unOOTUO£(J)V olacpopd.; TO T1'\.; cpoocw.; 
(JUvqt.; OluonO)o'1';. OUt£ t1'\.; Kata t~V oooiav KOIV6tl1to.; TO ioi~ov TUW yv(J)plO~QT(J)V avuxw\Kn'J,;). 
Ibid. 
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The Alman-hYPoslasis model also allows relationality to be expressed in terms of 
movements from the divine being to the world, which through the Almani<.' nature 
come also to be expressed in the human condition. Through the Alman-hyposlasi.'i 
model there can be identified two types of relationality, which can be expressed in 
tenns of a horizontal movement and that of a vertical movement. Each movement can 
also be related to the divine and human cases, intimately linking God to the world 
within that relationality. The horizontal movement takes place in the divine between 
the divine hypO.'tlases or Self-awareness expressed through' I Am' and the nature of 
this awareness, the ollsia or the Paramiilmanic nature. In the human case through 
deification this horizontal movement within the person el{ists between the hypostasis 
existence and the Atmanic:. This movement can said to be unceasingly in effect due to 
the incamational activity of the Supreme PlIro.~·a (Christ) and is due to the uniting of 
natures in the hYPoslatic union. 
The relational context between the hypostatic existence of the human person and the 
Almanic reality indicates that an event of Alman takes place within the hypOSIUS;S, 
indicating the possibilities of communion within the Alman-h.'1}().'ita.\·;.'i. Through the 
.. {,man-hYPoslasi.\·, the possibility of union in the human person mirrors the nature of 
divine perfection and harmonises the outer existential life with the inner reality. The 
vertical movement relates to the revelation of God to the world and in that descent, 
how human hyposlases come to ascend to the divine through the horizontal or inner 
movement. This inner movement or state can be correlated to an ecstatic condition 
within the h.ll}().\·las;sIIM indicating a reality by which the natural mode of individual 
existence changes to a Alman-hyposlatic existence. 
However, this mode of existence is not the ontological basis for that existence but 
rather the Cid-ii/manic mode of existence is as a consequence to the ontological 
reality of being the Atman. It is because of the conscious activity and will of this 
reality within the human existence that a mode of Almanic: existence is possible in 
which a restoration of the human condition is established which provides the basis for 
all relational constructs. Within this understanding the person-to-person relational 
fonnula indicates not only my being here in relation to you being there existentially 
II" An example of the use of "ecstasis" can be found in Ircnaeus' P.Ap. 13,669 (Mckerttschian>, which 
denoted a deep sleep or mysical state, where Adam was placed into a deep sleep by God. 
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but that the notion of Almanic heing underlines how and why the encounter between 
persons takes place. 
The divine will behind the encounter between persons sets up an ontological 
condition. and an awareness of the inner spiritual reality. the Alman. which makes 
apparent the limiting condition of human consciousness. This Alman is the force that 
binds any relational characteristic of hypostases existing within a relational mode of 
hyp()static existence. Consequently. the Almanic reality of the hypostasis gives the 
true signi ficance of the encounter between persons. It indicates the importance of 
viewing the hypostasis not in isolation or in relation to other hypo.\'ta.\·C!s. but that 
hypostases are intimately related to each other because of the nature of being Alman-
hyposlatic creatures. which allows are-cognition of the .. 'Imanit: nature of other 
persons. giving significance to the other. 
4.6.1 Relationality and Otherness 
A sense of relationality includes not only a dynamic of unity but also considers in a 
notion of difference. concrete existence. where the other as expressed as h.\1JOslalic 
h · d' h f' h .. I 1'/ Th ot er. IS engage WIt through an encounter or an "eVt'nl 0 ot cmcss . e 
concrete person meets the other.!ace-lo-:/ace I20 which informs the person not only of 
the other hut also in an "event of hypostasis".' 2 I a space for reciprocity. This space for 
reciprocity becomes implicit to a notion of communion. especially in relation to the 
divine h.lposlases. which allows God to be considered in a Trinitarian context as "the 
Other". 122 But where hypostatic difference underlines in the communion with the 
other. otherness through specificity. this represents only an outer context of otherness. 
In the context of the sharing of an inner reality. the shared nature becomes the true 
other. When correlated to the human model the true other becomes the Alman. which 
establishes an essential unity in otherness. Others then are related to mo; not only 
II'I Z·· I C 
.IZIOU as. ommunion and Otherne.H. p.49. which builds upon E. Levina.'i' otherness see. Tim" and 
thl! Othl!r (Pittsburgh: 2000). p.74, in that it considers the relationship of persons In respect of other 
rl~)rsons and not just the fact that a person exists with other persons. 
I:. Levmas. T,me and the Oth", np 41 79 
'''I '" 'I·' , . 
. Ibid., p.52. 
I~~ This is argued by Zizioulas. see Communion and Olht'rne.u. p.51. and pp.43-56. 
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because of a hypostatic value, but also because of the true value of the other. which is 
their Atmanic condition. Here the other can be viewed as the Almanic other. where an 
inner context to otherness is established. 
Through the model of Almanic otherness. otherness becomes intrinsically related to 
heing and becoming and is expressed through a mode of existence by which the other 
also comes to live within. Through this outward sign of hypostalic existing as true 
other, the Almanic other is valued as the true person, while at the same time 
recognising the value of persons who also have the capability of becoming as Almanic 
others. This perspective gives. within a person. a respect and love for the other as 
icons of divine other. 
The outer hYPoslalic other comes to be viewed as the inner reflection of the divine 
other and thus also takes on a dynamic of non-difference through Almank otherness 
within hyposlalic difference. This indicates the possibilities of A/manic otherness 
through the Alman-hypos/asi.!;. When understanding Almanic otherness in a relational 
context. Zizioulas' assumption that in the Greek Fathers. God can be referred to as the 
"Other par excellence" I 23 allows the Alman to be considered as the very nature of the 
other (person) which is the true ontological value of moi. In the encounter of other 
with Serf: where the individual se(lhas an encounter with the true other (or Alman). 
the se(j" finds its own sense of heing and becomes informed of itself and otherness. 
Being is not objectified but as the pure subject. reveals itself as the true other in the 
hypostasis in an event of Alman. The event of Alman then becomes an event of 
otherness within the hypostasis. which allows. in a relational encounter with the other. 
outward events of Atmanic otherness. 
Yet this type of otherness is only possible because of the stress on a substantia list 
context highlighted in the divine context of ousialParamiitman. Through the 
ollsia/Paramiilman. hyposlalic otherness is not disconnected from specificity but 
rather allows otherness to be considered through unity. Consequently otherness comes 
III Ibid., p.51. 
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to be equated with the essential reality of the hypostasis as much as the hypo.'iItU;S 
itself. 
When correlating Paramatmanic otherness to human otherness, Atmanic.: otherness 
relates to what is unified, where specificity relates to the other within a relational 
unified context. The sense of unity provided by the Paramiitman. on the human level, 
allows Atmanic otherness to have an extrusive quality in relation to other hypo.\'tase.\'. 
As in Pratyahhijiiii. through the model of the l~mra pramiitrlH or the extrusive 
activity of the divine in relation to the phenomenal universe. the extrusive aspect of 
the Atman becomes localised as a particular h.lposta.\·;s. but also experiences itself in 
relation to other hypostases. It is only when through deification or re-cognition that 
this Atmanic other is understood as the true other. that the value of other becomes 
apparent. because the Alman is the very nature of those hypo.\·ta.'ie.\·. which is also 
consciousness (cid-iitmani)m and has "the capability of ap~aring divcrsely".1111 
4.6.2 Relationality as Movements 
The notion of Atmanic otherness when applied to relationality. through the Atman-
hypostasis model, shows that a movement from non-difference to difference and then 
back to non-difference is evident. The divine overcomes difference through the act of 
revelation and highlights the paradox of transcendence (vi.~\'ollirna) and immanence 
(\·i.\\·amaya). where there exists the simultaneous contradiction of fullness 127 and 
emptiness (kenos;s). The overcoming of this paradox can be understood in terms of a 
movement from the internal fullness of the Parumiitmanic divine state of the 
introverted n;me.~a (lit., closing of the eye) condition in relation to the divine 
I:~ 
See IPK 3.2-3, 1'1'.59-60, which states that the ltvara Subject IS the exterior aspect of the Absolutc 
( Piirame.rvaru). 
"'Rl f.l ~kl1 , IPK, 2.51. 1'.57. 
I~t, Ibid. 
1~1 This is examined by John R. Dupuche 'Themes of light and Dark in the Greek Fathers', in Bettina 
Baumcr and John R. Dupuchc, Void and Ful/ne.H, 1'1'.171-1 !l5, who argues that the two positions are 
not Incongruous. 
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unfolding (unme$a, lit., opening of the eye)12K of the created universe, as Utpala 
stated: 
So the Atman coming into the process of creation does not become enmeshed 
in any sort of diversity, although it is called different names (such as 
ParamaSiva, God or Paramatman). This is because these point toward one and 
the same end, (infinite) I-Consciousness. IN 
This view is also similar to Maximus' view that the Logo.\· nature did not get polluted 
or confused by the fallen human nature in the hypostatic union but that the human 
nature was deified in that becoming. IlO This represents an outpouring of divine heing. 
in an emptying (kenosis) of the divine for the cosmos, but also represents a relational 
context in the human becoming through fullness, in the perfecting of the human 
condition in the experience of divine union (deiJication) through a movement of the 
divine to the world. 
The relational movement from the divine Paramiilman to the world indicates that 
there can be considered movements within a vertical descent. or relational categories 
of God to the world: firstly, in the creation of the world and secondly, in the bodily 
condition and encounter with the divine hyp(}.\·la.\';.\'lpllrll.~a. This allows for a 
relational context on a personal level, where each person experiences a personal 
encounter with God. Within this relationality a further category can be added where 
the person experiences, in the highest union, a further movement and union as the 
experience of deijicationlre-cognition. These movements from divine to the world 
begin with a movement within itself from the divine unmoving reality (ninlt',w) to the 
divine outward act (unme~'a), which can be equated to a movement from the divine 
essence to the divine hypostase.\'. This movement then continues to manifest created 
phenomena and the creation of life, which can he correlated to Maximus' notion of 
the divine "inhreathing,,'Hinto Adam. This in-breathing was then correlated to the 
1:- See IPK. 3.3. p.60. which states that the If\'ara is the. "extroversive aspect of the Absolute and 
SadiHi\'a is the introversive one. the former being known as unme~a and the la"er as niml.'~a'·. 
translation by Pandit. IPKp. 3.1.3. p.159. 
1:'1 ~ ~ . "'1~r(11 q:(IJitl ~elef<lllr;q(1Ic-Ji"': I ~~(1~qlf<ll "tefffi~:qICQ4iJtq(1-'I'It" II. mihanl,id,-
pariimar.sa-hhediid asyiin.valiilmana!J/ aha", mrsyalayai\'iiyu Jr11eJ lin-\'Cil)·u-karma\'Ulr;. IPK 1.4101. 
p.20; translation by Pandit.IPKp 1.5.17. ".65. 
11'1 SM' 
III ',cc a)(lmUS, Ops('.3 (PG 91). 4HA-56B (Louth). 
See Ma)(lmus, Amhig.42 (1316e); translation by Blowers. 0" Iht' COS""" Mr.\"It'ry· olJI'\II~ ('hri.~'. 
p.KO. 
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incamationallife of Christ by Maximus, which allows human restoration. Maximus 
makes a direct correlation to the notion of in-breathing with the human person having 
the divine likeness and the soteriological activity of Christ stating that Christ himself 
received "the vital inbreathing of man" 112 and thus receiving as man what was created 
in the divine image".1H Through the divine in-breathing the divine imparts the 
essence of Himself, which allows a reciprocal inward return where the fullness of 
heing is realised. In such a movement the context of relationality in the wish of the 
divine to engage in a relationship with human persons, becomes revealed, and shows 
that relationality should not only be considered in terms of outward hyptJ.'otulic 
meetings but related to the inward Atmanic experience. 
4.6.3 Relationality and Awareness 
Within the notion of the Alman-hypostusis. relationality is not confined only to 
outward modes of hypostatic existences, but can be considered through an inward 
change of awareness through the relational encounter. This type of relationality is 
primarily indicated in the I-consciousness of the Alman within the hnJO.\·lu.\·i.\· which 
radiates outwards and manifests the outer limited 'I-consciousness' (aham). The true 
')' (uhum) is not the indi vidualistic and separated notion of indi vidual but the (kith'" 
')' of the hYPoSlusis which becomes intrinsically relational to the Almanic ,)' or the 
true awareness. The Almanic 'r reflects the true nature of its Jt·~t;t'J reality and in the 
hypostasis. while allowing a sense of difference, constitutes a relational movement of 
unity from the divine I-consciousness within the human to the individual awareness. 
Through this awareness of Alman, the individual experiences a shift in awareness In 
relation to other individuals, firstly, experienced as relativistic '1', then as relational 
heing as 'I-thou', and then as 'I am-thou'. This corresponds to a movement from 
individual to hYPoslasis which allows a sense of a deeper heing. Levinas argues that 
relationality, in the context of personal heing. overcomes the dependency on static 
11: Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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hdng. of being there (Dase;n)!l4 stating that the "epiphany of exteriority .... exposes 
the deficiency of the sovereign interiority of separated being." I \~ However a 
resolution of this deficiency is not really explored either as Levinas does not explore 
fully another ontological condition, of heing as I should he (sein wit' ;ch so/lte) in 
relation to others heing and the divine heing. In this context a further movement can 
be explored in the Atman-hypostasis. which resolves how heing and existing can 
come together in allowing for outer condition to be qualified through the inner. The 
inability of the outward individual to convey a sense of what is true was conceded by 
Levinas in his recognising that thejace cannot disclose interiority. Ill. The relationship 
and movement from the lace to the interior condition indicates how hypo.\·fclt;c 
difference is resolved in the unity of Atman while maintaining the concrete existence 
of the hypostasis. 
This premise for relationality highlighted in the Jtman-h.'1Jo.\·ta.\'i.\' and the overcoming 
of separated exteriority through interiority. allows for simultaneity of both unity and 
difference. where specific personal existence and the essential reality of that existence 
are affinned without negating either. Thus, a relationality of persons is not a 
relationality of isolated individuals who have something in common. whether in a 
context of heing or in an existential context, but fundamentally infers cohesion 
through an essential reality of heing that connects human persons with the divine and 
each other. In this sense relationality is a relationship of difference (otherness) with 
I \~ That-being or existence. The notion of ht'ing there (lJa.u·in) of lIeidegger should be exrllnded Into, 
"being here" as argued by Raymond Tallis. see I Am: A Phi/o.mphicallnquiry Into Fint·Pc·ntm HC'mg 
(Edinburgh: 2004). rr. 142-145. 190-191. Ht'ing tht're' cannot be conSidered outSide of a sense of the 
personal in which ht'ing is affirmed in a relational context. but not lit the expense of understanding the 
subject. The cognate or person comes to understand himselflhersclfthrough his/her own sense ofbcing 
which as an embodied existence is in context with other persons. Thus l.cvlnas IIpproach to otherness 
accepts the place of rersonal rclationality fllce-to-face. the responsibility for Ihe other and "proximity 
of neighbour", see Levinas. Otherwise than Being. pp.121-129 where .fc·ll~hood IS not considered al the 
expense of the other. 
I".: I . 
L .• evlnas. Totality and Injini~' (Pinsburgh: 2(07). p. I HO. 
III. Ibid. While the Levinas-Zizioulas schema, if we can refer to such a thing. establishes a bndge 10 
overcome the static ontologies in the movement provided In the relatlOnality of personal existing and 
Ihe consequence of thaI existing in relation to other persons. the Atman-hYl'mta.~iJ model qualifies thIS 
exterior notion of person. The task of Zizioulas is hindered by his inability to IIccept the role of I'hl·Ji.~ 
in his equation. while Levinas' task is closed in his inability to reach beyond the phYSICS of the 
metaphysics and death (Sec. Emmanuellevinas. Time and the Other. p.51). Levinas' works have 
however helped to somewhat resolve the gulf of otherness by e"pressing the importance of the personal 
relationship of persons "face-to-face" (See Emmanuel Levinas. Time and tht' Other, p.79) which 
overcomes the impersonalism of Dasein. Levinas' model then has been transposed by Zizioulas into 
the Trinity. where otherness expresscs an intimate intercommunicative reality. However, Zlzioulas 
model. In bringing otherness into the ontological (trinitarian) debate to revise the existential context of 
individual through trinitarian personhood. has become a victim of the e"istcntialist debate. 
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non-difference or the unity that connects the h.l'posltJlic others together in a unity of 
heing and awareness through the Almanic condition. In this Almanic: relational model 
di fference expresses not separation but cohesion through unity and a model of unity-
in-difference which shall be the subject of the last area discussed in relation to the 
Alman-hypostasis. 
4.7 Concerning Unity-in-DifTerence 
In this last part of the thesis. the notion of Alman is qualified through the Byzantine 
model of unity-in-difference lH or distinction. In the Byzantine tradition the way of 
viewing unity-in-difference or distinction has come to be understood as M. Toronen 
describes. within "a principle of simultaneous union and distinction ... things united 
remain distinct and without confusion in an inseparable union". I \K In the Byzantine 
tradition there is a movement "from above'" \'J to the world which allows human 
persons to be deified and a movement to the divine "from below,,'4u and then a divine 
ascent. In the Byzantine tradition unity and distinction were expressed by highlighting 
an ontological gu(lbetween the divine and human conditions. which was rc!solved 
through the hypos/a tic union of the Incarnation. 141 
111 See IPK. 2.15. p.42. which states: "In this way the objects of a peN(m desirous of mundane: 
attainments arc fulfilled - with the help of entities (in the world) thllt have (both) unity and dlverslly as 
their character. Such a thing is therefore not an illusion". ,''''Jm ",·i}rthu·.flJJhih .fy,in miltur urth,,· 
knyiirthinah! hheJiihhedavatiirthena tena na hhriintir Idr.fl'l. (!qAql~~~: f'41ri1ICj(~~(JI~"": 
~~CI(1ltf"" ~ if IIlwtrc=tH tTtIl. translation by Pandit. II'K", 2.2.7. For an In dquh C:'IamlnatlOn of 
hht'JiihheJa in reJiinta. sec P. N. Srinivasachari. The Phi/tI.wphl' oj BheJiihheda (Madras: 1996). 
"ratyahhijitii took up this model from Advaita Vedanta and inco'l'J'orated Ideas of .~ai\·i.fm of Kashmir. 
the three aspects of; ahheda (unity). hh"da (diversity). and hhediihhedu (unitY-In-diverslty): sec also J. 
C. Chattcrji, Ka.fhmir ,~aivi.fm (Delhi: 2004). p.l!. Alexis Sanderson shows that this view of unity and 
diversity was inherited. in the resurgent monism of the TriJca of Ka.Jhmir .~ui\·i.tm e'lpounded by 
Vasugupta, Abhinavagupta and K~emaraja. from the Miilin;\·ija)'ollaratuntru. sec AleXIS Sanderson. 
'The Doctrine of the MalinTvijayonaratantra·. inT.Goudriaan(ed.). In RihlalundSl't'culation In Earl,' 
Tantri.\'m· Swdit's in /fonour ofAndrt' Padou:c (Albany: SUNY Press. 1992). 
I I" Sec M. Toronen. Union anti Di.~tinction in the Thought of St. Ma.{imuJ tht' ('onlt'.Hor. 
11'1 Sec Julius Lipner. The Fact' of'Truth. pp.44-45. . 
I~O Ibid. -
I~I Sec Maximus Amhig. 42. 73.11. 1325B-(, . where he argues that existence. the material and 
immaterial. is unified in the hypoJtatic union which unifies the world (difference), to the diVine in the 
uniting of Christ's natures. body and soul. This economic hy/uHtatic Ilnion also represents a model by 
which union and difference are vouchsafed. Maximu! stated "preserving the difference perfectly andin 
Ib effects in respect of the natural logos. and again saving union. in the manner of the economy. tinnly 
and hypostatically. so as to confinn the maners that essentially exist in the one and sole Christ God in 
accordance with the inseparable union". DpJC. 7. K4B (Louth). 
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Conversely, in Pralyabhijiiii philosophy, the notion of unity and difference or unity-
in-difference was developed, not by considering difference (or diversity), 142 but in 
terms of unity to show that difference was in reality non-different to the divine. This 
did not negate the notion of difference, for otherwise there would just be the concept 
of unity. but rather difference was qualified through the light of consciousness 
(prakii.~a) to relate that sense of difference to a centre of unity. Rather than 
understanding the world from the viewpoint of the world. the world was explained 
through the divine reality. 
In both traditions the divine is connected to the world on an intimate level. which 
manifests a relational context to person. The world is "not a thing in itself existing 
separately from Him",141 but intimately related to the divine being and awareness 
(01).144 and therefore difference must always be considered in relation to unity. 
In Prutyubhijiiii, as already stated in Chapter 3.7, unity-in-difference (bht'diibht'da)14~ 
is fundamental in explaining the paradox of the fullness (unity) of God in relation to 
the world. This provides a model to understand the nature of h.~lJOslalic difference in 
relation to objectified manifestation (iibhii.'itl.'1), of divine revelation in relation to unity 
or non-difference, of Almun in relation to hypo.\·tasis. This is considered through a 
model of unity-in-difference within the Alman-hypostatic model. As previously stated 
in Chapter 3, manifestation cannot be self-caused or be responsible for release from 
its natural condition, or from experiencing difference in relation only to isolated 
difference. For difference to escape its state of isolated difference, it has to be 
considered through a reality that can overcome its sense of difference otherwise it is 
trapped within a gnostic prison. This overcoming of isolated difference in Byzantine 
theology is paradoxically accomplished through God incarnating as difference. 
Through divine difference, difference is overcome through the unity inherent within 
I~, Sec IPKp. p.115. 
I~\ IPK. 1.46. p.19; trdnslation by Pandit,lPKp, 1.5.15, p.64. 
1« As Utpaladeva stated that: "such light cannot be different from it (world), as the object has 
consciousness as its very soul" (atmarlhasya prakiHala).JPK, I, :n, (1.14; IPKp; translation by Pandit, 
1.5.2, p.50. 
I~' Utpala argues that manifestations cannot be understood from the point diversity because of the 
"contradiction between unity and diversity", IPK, 2.51, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.4.19, (1.149 . 
. but from the view of Atman which "consists of pure consciousness with the capability of appearing 
diversely" (ibid.). 
divine difference. But difference (hheda) does not have priority over unity. but is 
dependent on unity. where difference or manifested phenomena (iihhii.'itls) arc due to a 
force creating and acting upon them, the will and reality of God. loll, 
Thus difference (hheda) cannot be understood from the viewpoint of difference. or 
that which is from he/ow, the phenomenal manifestation (iihhli,\'(ls). but from a notion 
of unity. A model of unity-in-difference in relation to the .4tman-h.l1}().wa.\·is model, 
the Christ hypostasis, where hypostatic specificity is juxtaposed to divine unity, can 
be applied to the human model, where hypostases comes to be understood through a 
sense of unity in the Atmanic condition. Just as difference, indicated in the Christ 
h.lpo.\·tasi.\·, cannot be divorced from divine unity in relation to the divinity of the 
Father, so too human hypostases cannot be divorced from their essential reality of 
ht'ing or the Atman: in both cases there is simultaneity of unity in-difference. 
The nature and awareness of a particular existence attains a sense of .\'e/f'through 
unity. which allows awareness to exist in a unique and specific way. The notion of 
specificity or difference is not crushed or dissolved in the unity underpinning that 
existence but paradoxically, is the basis for that very individual existence. When 
considering the Christ model for the human, the notion of concrete existence attains 
fulfilment within unity (with the Father). The Christ model shows how human beings 
arc to he and provides a relational dynamic in which the encounter with God unites 
the outer with the inner. As Christ's existential reality is 4ualified through unity with 
the Father,I47 so too human personhood becomes truly significant through an 
emphasis on unity not only on a general soteriologicallevcl but when considering the 
ontological implications within the human person. 
The importance of juxtaposing the hypostatic differences of the Trinity in relation to 
divine unity is also exemplified by Gregory Nazianzen who argued that: 
1~, As Utpala stated: "mutual difference is the base on which the sequence of time and srace stands. 
That difference is based on the manifestation and non-manafestatlon (of particular cnhtlC:s). Such 
manifestations and non-manifestations arc due to the Lord. who brings these wonderful displays IOto 
(apparent) existence", ~ ~SQlTJfFtH1etH'q(1: I Jfm'tHie~k~ CJ Rh"'tif(1: ~: IIW II. Ammo 
hhc:Jii.irIlY(} hhedo 'py iihhiiw-sad-asattvata"" iihhii.fa-sad-asaltl'e Iu cilriihhiiHJ.Arla~ praMo"", IPK, 
~~.~. p.3!!; tran~'atio.n by Pandit.IPKI'. 2.1.4,1'.109. 
As exempltfied In Hebrews I :5, which states. "for which of the angels did God ever say 'you are my 
Son today I have become your Father'. Or again 'I will be his father and he will be my Son'?" 
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We recognise the Father. the Son and the Holy Spirit as God. and these as not 
being mere appellations detennining inequalities of ranks or powers. but we 
reCOb'1lise that as there is one and the same title so is there one and the same 
nature, substance and power of Godhead. 14K 
This unity does not to undennine the specific characteristics of the each h.~1}(J.lita'\"i.li 
but highlights that unity within the divine nature does not denude a notion of 
difference. but that the notion of difference can exist simultaneously within unity. 
When this model is translated into the human case, hyposlUtic difference is also based 
on the underlying ontological unity inherent within each person due to the human 
person being created in the image and likeness of God as discussed in Chapter 2B. 
Consequently. difference can only be properly understood from a viewpoint of unity 
and then difference. Difference cannot understand itself. otherwise there would be no 
perception outside of itsel f and an isolated introverted vision would be the result. 
where even a perception of the world would be impossible. for how would separated 
difference communicate its sense of reality to anything outside of its reality. The 
answer lies in a notion of unity within difference or a divine consciousness that allows 
difference within the human person to experience its own reality and others through a 
unity. but which is not immediately experienced in that limited condition. In this 
context it is possible to understand the how unity in the incarnate Loxo.\" rose up 
human nature "like by like" 14') so that the lower might attain the highcr.I~1I In this 
situation the natural sense of difference is displaced by a divine notion of difference. 
This is not to state that human hypostatic difference is identical to divine h.'1JO."tCltic 
difference. but that human hyposlalic difference not only is tr,msfomled and 
participates with the divine through unity in the Atmanic: experience, but that it attains 
its very mundane awareness through the divine activity. In both traditions. in a human 
context, the lower cannot properly comprehend itself or experience a higher reality 
within itself but the limited se((is transfonned. Consequently. in the tenn Alman-
h.'1}(JstClSi.\", the word Alman is prefixed to qualify a notion of hnJfJ.\·lal;c difference. 
which allows the tenn hyposlasi.\· to be understood in relation to a higher .4lmanic 
IU(. N' Jfcogory azlanzcn. EIJ. 101.14, (Wickham). 
I ~'I IbId. E;J./(J/.9. 
lit) , 
As Gregory stated that the "meaner element has been assumed so that it may be hallowed ... leavened 
and blended anew with God. deified by the Godhead", ibid, Ep./O/.H. 
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nature. As Utpala argued that "the interior Reality is only one and that One alone 
develops multiplicity".I"1 
4.7.1 The what of Existence 
The model of unity-in-difference affinns not only the outer existential difference but 
highlights the nature underlying that existence or the reality underpinning difference. 
The Atmanic reality is the metaphysical what of existence. this something (the tMc 
n). of the hypostasis. which infonns the hypostasis of its true value. The metaphysical 
what of existence indicates a deeper context to the outer life and through the 
conscious awareness of itself in relation to the world. reveals how to attain a depth of 
existence through the what. The metaphysical what infonns the how of existence. as 
its true reality. by establishing a bridge between the outer and inner life through the 
Atmanic: activity of consciousness (or Cit) through the h.~11O.\'tat;c existence. This 
consciousness reveals itself. not only through the mystical state. but also in mundane 
life through revelatory events. and in the person confinns the individual as an .J,man-
hypostasis and as such indicates the possibilities of a Od-citman;c: mode of life. The 
unity expressed in the Atman;£' reality through a Od-almanic: mode of life allows the 
sense of difference. within mundane existence. to gain significance in the possibilities 
of the higher mode without denuding the dignity of the lower mode. which too 
becomes an expression of that same reality. 
The intimate relationship of non-difference to difference can be understood as an act 
of revelation in a movement from the awareness of the Absolute subject to this-ness 
(idam) and then to the objectified world or that-ness (lellI\'a.\'). The movement from 
C;t-aham to taltva, 1'\2 from Supreme Consciousness to the world shows how the true 
I-consciousness relates to objectified manifestation or difference and how the 
individual experients can attain unity. through the divine manifestation and unity-in-
::; IPK. 2.10. p.40; translation by Pandit,lPKl', 2.2.2. p.116. 
As Utpala states In IPK that the nature of Cit (infinite I conscIOusness) under the seeming elTect of 
mtiyii as ("it-taln'am, is not revealed and seems to be identical to "deha (physical body or with prana 
(the animating life-force or with vacuous individual consciousness; and is taken to be the (individual 
knowing and acting) SUbject", IPK, 1.56-57, p.23-24; IPKp 1.6.4-5 (Pandn). This individual subjective 
eXistence has been correlated to the notion of the natural "hysiJ of human eXistence in thiS thesis. 
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difference as an Atman-hypostas;s. Unity is vouchsafed through the conscious activity 
of the essential reality of he;ng (or Atman). which is understood as such because of 
the awareness of heing as an Alman-hYPoslas;s, where unity is expressed through 
hJPoslat;c difference. 
It is in the Atman-hypostas;s model. that unity awareness is experienced as the what 
of existence. or the nature behind hypostasis within the ,4tman-h.,postas;s, while 
allowing for specificity to be experienced. This model highlights perfect unity and the 
divine presence experienced in the Alman-hypostas;s and at the same time mundane 
existence. Hence. there is expressed a paradox of form and beyond form; of mind and 
beyond mind; of imperfection and beyond imperfection; of part and whole; and of 
nature and beyond nature, where impurity. delusion and ignorance are qualified in the 
unified activity of the Alman. As Utpaladeva stated "the Lord by virtue of His infinite 
divine power manifests this apparent phenomenon. through the power of his divine 
will".1 ~, Here all types of phenomena exist in relation to the unity of divine 
awareness. will and power and not by their own existence. 
4.7.2 Difference through Unity 
Existence then comes to be expressed perfectly through a condition of difference. 
where a sense of differentiation does not indicate separation or even some sort of 
outward relational belonging wrought through a common sense of existing. but 
indicates that at creations very core. even in difference. there is expressed the 
essential reality of that existence. The ability of difference. or created persons. to even 
to gain awareness different to others and specific in unique individual consciousness 
is only possible due to the will and activity of divine. At the very centre of difference. 
and the core of mundane existence. is an awareness that focuses outwards in such a 
way as to indicate that such limited and isolated consciousness that should not be able 
to even conceive of itself within the phenomenal existence. How could a 
consciousness force itself upon an unconscious universe? The answer is found in that 
both the Byzantine and Pratyahhijnii traditions there is an intimate relationship 
1'1 
IPK. 2.33. p.50; translation by Pandit. IPKp. 2.4.1. p.135. 
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between manifested or created phenomena and the Cause by which creation is made 
manifest. The divine comes to express itself through the very nature of di fference as 
an expression of the luminous activity of Cit;-.~akt;. allowing individual 
consciousness to be expressed and to express itself This luminosity brings into 
creation a consciousness out of non-fonn and an awareness where even the lowest 
forms of consciousness come to be understood as expressions of the supreme 
consciousness having as the very nature of that consciousness the divine awareness. 
Form and expression of that fonn through consciousness anains awareness of itself 
because of the very nature of the divine presence and activity within phenomena. This 
conscious activity of the divine within mundane consciousness allows the very 
concept of difference to be expressed as non-different to the One who has manifested 
that very difference. The basic expressions of consciousness can then be understood 
as developing within phenomena, which become more complex until awareness 
encompasses all levels of he;ng where a consciousness. which sprung from the divine. 
experiences itself in a unified condition while experiencing the conscious awareness 
of difference. The experience of unity while in difference is paramount. for without 
this condition the divine would be unable to break the bonds of its own reality in 
relation to the phenomenal universe being an impotent force. 
Hence. the divine will and power to manifest crcation and then to let creation ,,<'. 
expericnces firstly: as a conscious awareness of itself through human persons; and 
secondly where difference becomes aware of the divine. This affirms the complete 
authority and perfection of God to overcome the bonds of diflcrence. which has been 
set into place by God in the first place. To negate difference would then be a negation 
of the divine will and power. Difference within the human consciousness cannot be 
divorced from the individual experience. in which consciousness is expressed or the 
divine reality. which creates that consciousness and allows it to hf.' what it is and to 
become what it should he. This becoming is to be linked to a movement within the 
individual who moves into a true awareness within the h.\1)(),\'tal;c condition where the 
person re-mgn;ses his or her Alman-hYP0,\'Ia,\';,\' and perceives that difference is to be 
understood as intrinsically related to divine unity. Thus implicit to the term .·llman-
h.\1)oslaS;s are the possibilities of he;ng in difference and becoming within difference 
through the inherent unity implied in the ontological condition of the Alman-
hyp0,\'Ia,\'i,\'. This unity. expressed through the J'man, does not negate the place for 
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hypostatic difference but rather rejoices in it, for that difference is viewed as a 
luminous manifestation of the Cit-.~akt; or divine operations (prtlkiHu).lq 
Unity in difference implies a movement from God to the world and a reciprocal 
movement from the human individuals (world) to the divine. for it is the Lord who is 
the Cause of both difference and unity. Dionysius argued that God is the cause of the 
movements of what is perceived and preserved I ~~ indicating a simultaneity of the 
"One and the many ... 1~6 In the context of the Atman-hypo.\·lasis, unity is vouchsafed in 
the Atmanic experience within h)postalic difference. This notion of difference is not 
to be considered in relation to a self-informing natural condition. but related to the 
divine. who "remains One in the act of Self-multiplication; undi fferentiated 
throughout the process of emanation and fullness in the emptying process of 
differentiation".1~7 So too in the Alman-hYPoslasi.li, it is the divine itself that reveals a 
specific existence of the true nature of that unique existence,l~K of both distinctiveness 
and union due to the character of Atman in the human h.l1JOJltJJ;J, as the true image 
and likeness of the Super Essential Godhead. 
I'~ As Abhinavagupta stated: The pure consciousness. having adopled "'(~'J as a part and par\:c! of lis 
self becomes impure but is pure and appears as the: finile subJecl known as Purll,J(I who IS hound like II 
beasl with (Ihe chains of bondage consisting) of leilla. the sense ofllme:.lcuIJ. the: hnule:d capaclly to do 
Ju,1 a httle. nirati. the law of natural causation. rilga. thc limited Inte:re:st In rartu;ulllr somc:thlllg IIn,1 
.·"·iJyci. Ihe limited capacity 10 know just a Iittle:.J1ll1jqft"Jtcd'~ ~: ~ Q1~1 
Cflf<'lCfl<'lf~lI~d~~ (1"f1~Qld~r.r ~:. Afiiyii'l'arlgraha,,·a.itiJ hodho mulmah pum(in I'a.';ur 
~,~U\·llti· Killu·lealii·nitYllti'l'Il.~iid riigii\·idyii,\·(J.~t'na .w",haddhah . ..thhmamgupla. I'S.~. 1(' (I'andll). 
J'seudo-[)Ionyslus. DN. 4.10. 7058-('; translation by I.ulbhe:ld. l'u·",lo·/)wnn/ll.{. p.79. [)lUnyslus 
Soc'> on to say that; "it is the source. the origin. the preserver. the goat. and the objective of re:st and of 
motion. The being and the life of the mind and of the soul denve: from It. Also from II come: the: small, 
the equal. and the great in nature. the measure and the rrorortlon of all things. the mi:\tures. the 
totalities. and Ihe rarts of things, the universal one and the many. the: hnks between rarts. the 
unityundcrlying everything. the perfection of wholes", 010 nOaa otaOl'; Kal KIVllot.;. Kal t~ 0\,. Koi tv 
(~. Kal d; O. Kal ou evcKa. Kal yap U, autoil. Kal 01' autoil. Kal ooota. Kal ~u)l'lnOoa. Kol "oil Kal 
IjfUxf\.;. Kal nQo'l'; cpoocw.; at OIAIKp6t'ltt:.;. at t06T'lTt:.;. ai 1AcyuAE:16t'lTt:.;, to IAttpu n(I\'to. Kalal t(;)\1 
O\'tllIV civaAoyial. lcal aplAovlal. KaIKptlocl';. at 6A6Tlltt:.;. to ~tp'l. nOv i:v. KalnA~o.;. at (JUvotOCI'; 
tlilv ~cplilv. ai nuVTo.; nAti90.; tvWoCI';. ai T£.A£16t'ltt:.; nov OAOn'ltOV (Ibid.). 
l'I'lbid. 
1<7 P .1 [. . 
scUuO- )JOnyslus. DN. 2.11. 6498; tnmslation by Rolt. Di(mniu~ Ih,· . .frt·opllgit". p.79. 
I '. As Dionysius stated: "He is nothing less than the archetypal God. the supra-dIVIne transcendentally 
one God who dwells indivisibly in every individual and who is in himself undifferentiated unity wilh 
no commixture and no multiplication arising out of his presence among the many". Pseudo-Dlonyslus. 
2.11. 649('-D; translation by Luibheid. Pwudo-Dionys;us. 1".67. 
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4.H Conclusion 
Through the Atman-h.~postasis model, a synthesis of ideas, developed from the two 
traditions in Chapters 2 and 3, has allowed the human person to be considered in both 
tenns of a concrete person (hypostasis) and yet intimately related to the divine 
through the context of an underlying essential reality to that existence. When the 
individual nature (what is he/ow) is raised to a higher level of ht'ing the consciousness 
of the person changes and so reflects the divine consciousness within an . .ftmanh· 
mode of hypostatic existence. The synthesis oftenns from both traditions allowed an 
evolution of the Cappadocian and contemporary ideas which has led to an over 
emphasis on the existential negating a focus on the physis of personhood. The re-
addressing of these ideas in this chapter underlined the importance of stressing the 
notion of difference to retain the notion of concrete personhood in relation to the 
higher (dt'~/it'd) physis of the h)-postasis through the Atmanic nature, as examined in 
Chapter 2B. 
Conversely. the notion of Atman was taken out of a purely monist category. explained 
in parts 3.1-3.2. and related to a model of h.lpostasi.'i that allows a sense of ditlerence 
within a model that also accommodated a sense of unity. Thus in the ,·l/nwn-
h.'l}()stasis model there is the movement from ahoVt' (God) to the world. to that which 
is below. while at the same time a movement from below to God. However all 
movements are ultimately considered as aspects of the divine manifestation and 
activity for without this context, all movement is self-infonning and thus trapped 
within a prison of its own lower nature. Thus ht'ing and existing are not dislocated or 
separated into diverging categories. but are considered together within a single model. 
The model of Atman-h.lpostasis successfully juxtaposes ht'in/o:. within a context of 
restoration of the natural physis of humans, and the existential that includes a sense of 
absolute consciousness expressed in the Od-ti/manic: mode of h.l1JO.\·tatic existence. 
This provides answers to the question 'who am r from a view of absolute ht'in/o: (or 
Iftman) and consciousness within the existence of concrete personhood. 
In this thesis, the Atman-hyposta.\·is model has indicated something more than the 
ordinary condition or the natural human physis, where human being-ness is restored 
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and elevated. body and soul. to a state of hecoming of "cvcrything that was". I ~'1 
Hence. in the experience of union with the divine through the .. {Iman or the highest 
nature of the soul. the person/plIrll$a achieves the fulfilment of heing. as an ..llman-
h.lpostasis. While in PralyabhijiM in this cognitive experience the individual pramiilr 
experiences either delusion (as pa.\:u) or enlightenment (as pali) leaving no room for a 
simultaneity of both. the Alman-hypostasis incorporated ideas of both. This allowed 
for a flexibility of recognising both conditions without negating either. In such a 
model. unique characteristics are affirmed as is the possibility of dt'ilimlion. 
However. unlike the Byzantine model of de~!ied h,\P(Hta.~es this is not confined to an 
existential mode. even though it is expressed through a mode of . .frnwnic existence. 
but affirms the place for an essential reality as the foundation of dt'ilh'tll;on. The 
notion of h,\postasis is not confined to an outward activity. but includes the notion of 
essential reality highlighted in the term Atman-h.\1)(Jstas;s. where the person 
understands that his or her own se(lis ultimately non-different to the supreme Sdf,'lt'{) 
1"/ Dumitru Staniloae, 'Deification', in Orthudo.t 5j,irituahty. 1'.269. 
IW IPK, 4.1,1'.70. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to construct a model of person within a theological narrative 
that affirms the place for a real and concrete hyposta.\·i.". considered in Chapters 2A 
and 2B. with the inclusion of an awareness of the essential reality of ht'ing (Atman). 
examined in Chapter 3. It has addressed issues in the Byzantine tradition how the 
terms h.lpostasis. ousia and deification related to person. and then how these ideas 
related to the Pratyahhijnii tradition. to the essentiality of Atman and Cit. While there 
is much more that should be considered and many areas that still remain problematic. 
such as Trinitarian issues. and a need to expand on resolving the problem of an 
experience of the Alman had by the few. this thesis represents a point for converging 
the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions within the context of person. While in this 
thesis some of the major points relating to the Byzantine tradition have been 
addressed. especially in relation to individuality. as exemplified in parts 2.1.1. 2.2.2 
and 2.4.2. and in relation to Zizioulas' interpn:tation of By;t.antine theology. I also 
have to concede that much more can be done. especially in relation to the contc:xl of 
the notion of otherness. Issues were considered. in parts 2.2-2.3. around the problem 
of overcoming the lack of a stress on the essential reality or substance of ht'inK. which 
is particularly evident in contemporary interpretations of BYlantine theology as 
highlighted by Zizioulas. To overcome this the focus on a substantialist context to 
person through Alman was developed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
It was argued that in the model of the .4tmcm-h.11JO.\·ta."i.\· both the concrete existence 
(or difference) and metaphysical reality (or non-difference) were important and that a 
notion of person culminates within a certain type of existence. a Cid-iitmcmic mode of 
h.l1)()Slali(' existence. In parts. 1.4.5 and 4.5.2. the notion of person is fulfilled in the 
experience of deijicationlre-cognition. The use of h.1POSltlsis from the Byzantine 
tradition related to developing a type of personhood. which affirmed the place for 
what is concrete and unique without detracting from the affirmation for the place of 
fulfilment. Also the notion of fulfilment was correlated to the experience of 
de(/ication in the context of converging ideas in relation to Pralyabhijrl£i '.'i notion of 
the metaphysical reality of heing (Atman), where fulfilment also related to a change of 
consciousness and not only to a partial sense of unity as discussed in parts 3.2.2. 
3.6.1, and 4.5 - 4.5.1. 
The thesis has outlined some of the problems relating to the existential debate of 
person through contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy and has highlighted issues raised by 
Zizioulas. Even though in Zizioulas' model the individual human person was 
correlated to the outward person, highlighted in Chapter 2.1, and to an outer 
experience, especially in relation to an ecclesial communion, this thesis sought to 
balance the inner state within the outer condition. The outer notion of person was 
qualified by re-introducing the context of substance or the essential reality of ht'ing in 
part 2.3, where communion and participation included not only an outer context but 
an inner experience through a unity with the Atmanic reality in Chapter 3. By 
considering the dimension of outward-inwardness in relation to a notion of person 
through the experience of dt.'(/icutiunlrt.'-c:ugnition. in parts 2X4 and 3.2., it was 
considered that this experience relates to the true notion of freedom. The notion of 
freedom, as expressed in part 4.4.1, includes not a subordination of the divine nature 
to the natural biological condition, but indicates a life that has become or should 
become full in the Atmanic experience. While it was shown that contemporary 
Eastern Orthodox approaches to the West have presented a model of person that was 
opposed to individuum as highlighted in part 2.1.1, which paradoxically also 
developed outward looking existential models. This thesis therefore looked to halance 
existential models of person by incorporating both inwardness and outward-ness, of 
non-difference and difference. In this qualified model the concrete existence is 
informed through the essential reality of person. 
Hence, the thesis has provided an examination of the concept of person within the 
Byzantine and Pratyahh~inii tradition by focusing on contemporary interpretations of 
hJ1}().\'tusis and puru,\'U. While it was recognised that the scope of the examination goes 
beyond what could possibly be accomplished in this single study. this study offers a 
model of person which hopefully goes some way highlighting the issues surrounding 
person in the two traditions, and how possible convergences could be approached in 
Chapter 4. Was this work successful in converging and synthesising ideas or was the 
outcome an unhappy mutation. not satisfactorily addressing many of the unresolved 
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differences? It is proposed that this thesis did offer a model of person through 
convergence that presented a unique resolution to existential approaches to 
h.lpoSlusis, within a .\pace of convergence, where ideas were examined and should 
continue to be examined to further to aid dialogical and converging theologies. It is 
hoped that this examination will add to the research relating to personhood and to the 
examination of person within both traditions and that ideas expressed in this thesis 
will be further developed in future collaborations between Indian philosophies and 
Christianity. Within this field of study this research could be of use to outline a 
direction for future theological convergences between Byzantine and Pralyahhijitti 
traditions in that the model of Alman-h.lpos/tlsis brings a unity of ideas between the 
two traditions. No doubt there is much to discuss in the precise determinative use of 
the concepts of hypostasis, Atman or p"rll,'iCl. and in the theological interpretation of 
the terms, but this work could be a starting point. 
Hence. the result of this work is a construction ofa model of person which qualifies 
the focus on the hypostatic, through the inclusion of the terms . .ftnWIJ and ('it in the 
construction of the new term Alman-hYPoslasi ... as examined in Chapter 4. Even 
though ideas relating to these terms were kept within the boundaries of the explored 
traditions, these ideas were evolved in Chapter 4, and allowed the terms to be 
expanded so that in the Alman-hypo.\·lasi.\· model the encounter between the divine and 
human existences could be better understood. This research also discovered that the 
influences on contemporary interpretations have impacted on the use of theological 
terms such as h.l1)(}.\·ltlsi.\·, and are just as important as considering the original 
understanding of the terms. Such was the impact of contemporary scholarship on 
determining the way the terms should understood, that it was initially impossible to 
separate the two and only after some etTort did it become clear how extensive that 
influence was. It was recognised that the terms discussed in the study evolved from 
the original use in the contemporary debate and that the terms and ideas should be 
evolved further so as to continue the examination of person. The quest to understand 
the nature of the human person and to understand what a person can he as icons of the 
divine should be continued as should the examinations in relation to existential and 
ontological implications of a notion of person. 
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